Control of mergers between newspaper enterprises under South African and German competition law by Janka, Sebastian Felix
Control of Mergers
Between Newspaper Enterprises
Under South African and German Competition Law
by
Sebastian Felix Janka
THESIS PRESENTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF LAWS AT THE
UNIVERSITY OF STELLENBOSCH
Promotor: Professor Philip Sutherland
December 2005
I, the undersigned, hereby declare that the work contained in this thesis is my own original work and that I
have not previously in its entirety or in part submitted it at any university for a degree.
Date: 30 June 2005
II
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Abstract
This thesis compares South African and German Competition Law. The focus is the con-
trol of mergers between newspaper enterprises. It has to be asked whether special rules
should apply to transactions in this field, considering the importance of an unconcentrated,
competitive press from an economic and political point of view. It will be shown that South
African and German Competition Law are similar in many respects. Both legal systems
follow a flexible, primarily economic approach to the consideration of proposed transac-
tions, taking into account a plurality of factors to determine potential detrimental effects of
mergers on competition. Moreover, pro-competitive gains and public interest issues are
recognised under South African and German law. When it comes to the control of mergers
between newspaper enterprises, though, the two legal systems diverge. Only under Ger-
man Competition Law, are there specific provisions for press mergers. In view of a recently
proposed amendment of the German Competition Law, the appropriate form of regulation
that is likely to guarantee a free press, will be investigated. It will also be analysed,
whether there is a specific need for press regulation in the South African context. Even
though there are no special provisions under South African Competition Law, the South
African Constitution leaves space for a broader understanding of the freedom of the press.
Hence, it will be examined if the South African Constitution obliges the state to enact par-
ticular laws to protect press-plurality. Moreover, it will be analysed if the South African
Competition Act should be interpreted in a manner that would promote plurality of the
press. In the view of the eminent role of the press for a democratic society, it will be ar-
gued in this thesis, that there is a particular need for media regulation. Notably the signifi-
cant levels of concentration in both German and South African press markets raise con-
cerns as regards the protection of a free and pluralistic press. It will be shown that there
are different foreign approaches to maintaining and promoting freedom of the press and it
will be suggested that South Africa recognises a need for more press-specific regulation in
the future.
III
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Opsomming
Hierdie verhandeling vergelyk Suid-Afrikaanse en Duitse mededingingsreg. Dit is gefokus
op beheer oor persondernemings. Die vraag word gevra of spesiale reëls van toepassing
behoort te wees op transaksies in hierdie sektor, indien die politieke en ekonomiese
belang van 'n ongekonsentreerde en mededingende pers in ag geneem word. Dit word
uitgewys dat Suid-Afrikaanse en Duitse mededingsreg in vele opsigte soortgelyk is, wat
die regulering van samesmeltings betref. Beide regsstelsels volg 'n buigsame, hoofsaaklik
ekonomiese benadering tot die oorweging van 'n transaksie. Beide neem 'n veelheid van
faktore in ag om te bepaal of 'n transaksie moontlik negatiewe gevolge vir mededinging
het. Verder word pro-mededingende en publieke belangsaspekte in beide die Suid-
Afrikaanse en Duitse reg in ag geneem. In die geval van 'n samesmelting tussen
koerantondernemings verskil die twee sisteme egter. Die Duitse reg het spesiale reëls vir
samesmelting van sulke ondernemings. In die lig van wysigings wat onlangs aan die
Duitse mededingsreg voorgestel is, word geskikte vlakke van regulering van die pers, wat
nodig is om 'n vrye pers te waarborg, ondersoek. Aandag word geskenk aan die vraag of
daar'n behoefte is aan regulering van die pers in die Suid-Afrikaanse omgewing. Alhoewel
die Suid-Afrikaanse Grondwet nie spesiaal daarvoor voorsiening maak nie, laat die
Grondwet plek vir 'n wyer begrip van persvryeid. Dus word vasgestelof daar 'n plig op die
staat is om wetgewing in te voer wat die staat dwing om perspluralisme te beskerm.
Verder, word bepaal of die Suid-Afrikaanse Mededingingswet op so 'n wyse interpreteer
kan word dat dit perspluralisme sal bevorder. In die lig van die sentrale rol vir 'n vrye pers
in 'n demokratiese samelewing, word geargumenteer dat, daar 'n spesiale behoefte aan
reguleringvan die media is. Die hoë vlakke van konsentrasie in beide die Duitse en Suid-
Afrikaanse persmarkte skep besorgheid oor die beskerming van 'n vrye en pluralistiese
pers in hierdie lande. Dit word aangetoon dat daar verskillende benaderings tot die
beskermingen bevordering van 'n vrye pers in ander lande is en daar word voorgestel dat
Suid-Afrika 'n behoefte aan meer spesifieke reëls vir regulering van die pers erken.
IV
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Table of Contents
Irltr()ciLlc:ti()rl ...•.••••••••••••••..••••.•..•.••••••...••••••••.....••............••.............................•...•••• 1
Chapter 1
South African Competition Law 4
1 1 Introduction 4
1 2 Purposes of the Act 4
1 3 Structure of the Act 8
1 4 Competition authorities 11
1 4 1 The Competition Commission 11
1 4 2 The Competition Tribunal 13
1 43 Competition Appeal Court 14
1 5 The control of mergers 16
1 5 1 Legal framework 24
1 5 1 1 Overview 24
1 5 1 2 The different levels of merger considerations 25
15 12 1Application of the Act.. 25
15 1 2 2 Definition of mergers 25
15 123 Necessity of notification 27
1 5 1 23 1 The procedure of large merger considerations 31
1 5 1 232 The procedure of intermediate merger considerations 32
1 5 1 233 The procedure of small merger considerations 32
1 5 1 24 1 Definition of the relevant market 34
1 5 1 242 The actual and potential level of import competition in the market.. 39
1 5 1 2 4 3 The ease of entry into the market, including tariff and regulatory
v
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
VI
barriers 39
1 5 1 2 4 5 The degree of countervailing power in the market .42
1 5 1 246 The dynamic characteristics of the market.. 44
1 5 1 24 7 The nature and extent of vertical integration in the market 44
1 5 1 248 (Potential) failure of the business of a party to the merger .45
1 5 1 2 4 9 Removal of an effective competitor .46
1 5 1 2 4 10 Other factors 46
15 125 Pro-competitive gains 47
1 5 126 Public interest grounds 48
1 5 1 2 7 Conditional approval 50
1 5 1 2 8 Single specialties 52
1 5 12 9 Penalties 53
1 5 2 Practice of merger control. 55
1 5 3 Mergers between publishing houses 56
1 53 1 The newspaper and magazines market situation 56
1 5 3 2 Publishing houses 63
1 5 3 3 Distribution 67
1 5 3 4 Conclusion 68
1 5 3 5 Single cases 68
1535 1 The Press Corporation of SA Ltd and CTP Caxton (Pty) Ltd 68
1 5 3 5 2 CT Media Publications / Caxton and Nasionale Media Ltd / Penrose
Holdings 69
1 5 3 5 3 Nasmedia and Paarl Post Web Printers (Pty) Ltd 70
15354 The Tiso Consortium and New Africa Investment Ltd (Nail) 71
1 5 3 5 5 Caxton and CTP Publishers and Printers Limited v Naspers Ltd and
others 72
15356 Johnnie Publishing Ltd and New Africa Publications Ltd 72
15357 Other cases 74
1 5 3 6 General tendency 75
1 6 Foreign legal systems 76
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
VII
1 7 The South African Constitution 77
1 7 1 Freedom of the press 78
1 7 2 Application and interpretation of the Bill of Rights 79
1 73 Interpretation of the Competition Act 83
1 7 4 Limitation 84
1 8 Conclusion 84
Chapter 2
European and German Competition Law 86
2 1 Introduction 86
2 2 European Competition Law 86
2 3 German Competition Law 91
23 1 Introduction 91
2 3 2 Competition authorities and competences 91
233 Legal Framework 93
2 3 3 1 Structure of the Act 93
2 3 3 2 Restraints of competition 93
2 3 3 2 1 'Cartel agreements' 93
2 3 322 Vertical agreements 95
2 3 4 The control of mergers 96
2 3 4 1 Applicability of the provisions for the control of mergers 97
234 1 1 Scope of application of the GWB (Anwendungsbereich des GWB) 97
2 3 4 12 Statutory definition of a merger (Zusammenschlusstatbestand) 98
2342 Necessity of notification 101
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
2343 Procedure 102
2 3 4 4 Consideration on the merger's effect on competition 106
2 3 4 4 1Definition of the relevant market 106
2 3 4 4 2 Prohibition or approval of mergers 107
2 3 4 5 Practice of merger control. 110
2 3 5 Mergers between newspaper enterprises 111
2 3 5 1 Application of the provisions for the control of mergers 111
2 3 5 2 Definition of the relevant market 114
2 3 5 3 Prohibition or approval of newspaper mergers 117
2 3 5 4 Practice of merger control. 120
2 3 5 4 1 The newspaper and magazine market situation 120
2 3 5 4 1 1 Newspaper and magazine publishers 120
2 3 5 4 1 2 Newspaper and magazine markets 122
2 3 5 4 2 General tendency 125
2 3 6 Seventh amendment of the GWB 126
2 3 6 1 The control of mergers between newspaper enterprises after the
amendment 127
2 3 6 2 Discussion 132
2 3 6 2 1Need for amendment 133
2 3 622 Impact on competition 136
2 3 6 2 3 Constitutional aspects 139
2 3 6 3 Conclusion 146
Chapter 3
C()rT1J)élri!i()rl 1!;()
3 1 Synopsis 150
3 2 Similarities between South African and German Competition Law 151
VIII
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
3 3 Differences between South African and German Competition Law 154
Chapter 4
Discussion and Concl usion 156
4 1 Introduction 156
42 Does South Africa need a media-specific competition law? 156
4 2 1 South African media regulation 156
4 2 2 The need for regulation 158
4 2 3 The need for regulation of the press 160
424 Conclusion 167
5 Bibliography of Works Cited 171
5 1 Books and Journals 171
5 2 Newspaper and magazine articles 175
53 Other sources (Reports, Press releases, Guidelines) 177
6 1 South Afric8 186
Ei lrélt>lE! ()f C:él!;E!!; •..•.•••.......................•..•...•..•.......•••...•.............•..................•.....1~E;
62 Europe 194
6 3 Germany 195
6 4 United States of America 198
7 Appendix I - Relevant Provisions of the EC lrreaty 199
IX
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
8 Appendix II - Relevant Provisions of the GWB 200
x
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Abbreviations
ABC
AfP
AG
ANC
Art.
AS
BB
BCLR
BDZV
BEE
BGBI.
BGH
BKartA
BLLR
BR-Drs.
Audit Bureau of Circulations of South Africa
Archiv fur Presserecht (Archive for Law of the Press)
Aktiengesellschaft (joint-stock company)
African National Congress
Artikel
Axel Springer AG
Betriebs-Berater
Butterworths Constitutional Law Reports
Bundesverband Deutscher Zeitungsverleger (Federal Association of
German Newspaper Publishers)
Black Economic Empowerment
Bundesgesetzblatt (German Federal Government Gazette)
Bundesgerichtshof (German Federal Court)
Bundeskartellamt (German Federal Cartel Office)
Butterworths Labour Law Reports
Bundesrats-Drucksache (Official Journal of the Bundesrat (Federal
Upper House of Parliament))
XI
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
BT-Drs. Bundestags-Drucksache (Official Journal of the Bundestag (Federal
Lower House of Parliament))
BVerfG Bundesverfassungsgericht (German Federal Constitutional Court)
BVerfGE Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts, Amtliche Sammlung
(Decisions of the German Federal Constitutional Court, Official Jour-
nal)
GAG Competition Appeal Court
cf compare
GPLR Butterworths Competition Law Reports
CT Competition Tribunal
DJV Deutscher Journalisten-Verband (German journalists' association)
EG Treaty Establishing the European Community
EGJ European Court of Justice
EGR European Court reports
E.L.Rev. European Law Review
EU European Union
EuZW Europaische Zeitschrift fur Wettbewerbsrecht
f. following (page, section etc.)
XII
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
FCC Federal Communications Commission
ft. following (pages, sections etc.)
FTC Federal Trade Commission
FXI Freedom of Expression Institute
GOR German Democratic Republic
GG Grundgesetz (German Constitution) or
Government Gazette
G+J Gruner + Jahr AG & Co. KG Druck- und Verlagshaus, Hamburg
GWB Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrankungen (German Act against
Restraints of Competition)
HHI Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index
IBA Independent Broadcasting Authority
ICASA Independent Communications Authority of South Africa
INSEAO Institut Européen et Administration des Affaires
IVW Informationsgemeinschaft zur Feststellung der Verbreitung von Wer-
betráqem e.V.
JSE Johannesburg Securities Exchange
XIII
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
KEK
KG
MDDA
Minn. L. Rev.
MISA
MMR
NPA
OECD
Ofcom
OJEC
OJEU
OLG
p.
par
PIPr
R
Kommission zur Ermittlung der Konzentration im Medienbereich
(Commission for the Assessment of Concentration in the Media Sec-
tor)
Kammergericht (Higher Regional Court of Berlin)
Media Development and Diversity Agency
Minnesota Law Review
Media Institute of Southern Africa
Multimedia Recht (Journal for Multimedia Law)
Newspaper Preservation Act
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
Office of Communications (UK)
Official Journal of the European Communities
Official Journal of the European Union
Oberlandesgericht (Higher Regional Court)
page
paragraph
Plenarprotokoll
South African Rand (ZAR)
XIV
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
RegTP Regulierungsbehorde fOrTelekommunikation und Post
RfStV Rundfunkstaatsvertrag (German Broadcasting Treaty)
Rn. Randnote (marginal note)
5 section(s)
S. Seite (page) or
Satz (sentence)
SA The South African Law Reports
SAJE The South African Journal of Economics
SAJHR South African Journal on Human Rights
SALJ South African Law Journal
SATRA South African Telecommunications Regulatory Authority
seA Supreme Court of Appeal
SME small and medium-sized enterprise
SPD Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschland (Social Democratic Party
Germany)
StGB Strafgesetzbuch (German Criminal Code)
StPO Strafprozessordnung (German Criminal Procedure Code)
TKG Telekommunikationsgesetz (German Telecommunication Act)
xv
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
UK United Kingdom
UPALR University of Pennsylvania Law Review
US United States of America
VDZ Verband Deutscher Zeitschriftenverleger (Association of German Ma-
gazine Publishers)
WAZ Westdeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung
wbl wirtschaftsrechtliche blatter
WuW Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb (Journal for Economy and Competition)
WuW/E Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb / Entscheidungssammlung (Journal for
Economy and Competition / Collection of Decisions)
ZUM Zeitschrift fur Urheber- und Medienrecht (Journal for Intellectual
Property Law and Media Law)
XVI
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Introduction
Introduction
Competition law is that branch of the law that deals with the regulation and supervision of
market conduct and market structure. It imposes legal rules in form of an interventionist
mechanism to correct unwanted anti-competitive conduct or changes in market structure
notably via mergers 1 that result in a substantial prevention or lessening of competition in a
relevant market or lead to market-dominant positions.
Conversely, media law consists of rules, which concern the media, especially media be-
haviour and media structure. This thesis focuses on the interface between competition and
media law; in this case, especially on the provisions for and judgements concerning merg-
ers between newspaper enterprises, because media law is one of the branches of the law
in which competition law plays an ambiguous role. On the one hand, the media industry is
a proper industrial sector, in which publishers try in the same way as enterprises in any
other market, to maximize their profits. On the other hand, the media - and especially
newspaper enterprises - act as an intermediary between the government and the people,
and a free press is crucial to a democratic society. Thus, the maintenance and promotion
of a plurality of opinions has to be taken into account in this area. Hence, regulating the
media via competition law has always been a delicate matter, which makes it particularly
interesting to investigate how different nations approach this problem.
In essence, this thesis shall analyse the legal framework of merger control in South Africa
and compare it to the German law. The focus will be on mergers between (newspaper)
publishing houses. This branch of competition law that deals with the structure of the me-
dia market itself is particularly problematic. It should be asked if special rules should apply
to mergers between these firms, considering the importance of an unconcentrated, com-
petitive press not only from an economic point of view. Under German Competition Law,
such an approach exists; the law prescribes special provisions for the media market sec-
tor.
1 The term 'merger' will consistently be used in this thesis instead of 'concentration' (as used in European
Competition Law).
1
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Introduction
In the first chapter of this thesis, South African Competition Law will be described. An at-
tempt will be made to give answers to following questions:
• What rules apply to firms that plan to merge?
• How do merger proceedings work?
• What do competition authorities have to consider, regarding a proposed merger?
• Do any special provisions or principles apply to media mergers?
• Which role does the South African Constitution play for the regulation of such mergers?
The second chapter is dedicated to the German regulatory framework of the control of
mergers. The specific provisions for media regulation under German Competition Law, as
far as merger control is concerned, will be explained. In particular, constitutional problems
with the recently proposed amendment to the German Act against Restraints of Competi-
tion (Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrankungen (GWB)) will be discussed. As far as
necessary, a certain cursory overview of the European approach to merger control will be
given at the beginning of this chapter.
In the third chapter of this thesis, both legal systems will be compared. Differences and
similarities of the South African and German approaches will be examined.
Finally, the last chapter will be dedicated to the question whether South Africa should
adopt a specific approach to competition problems in the media sector. The need for regu-
lating the press will be analysed in detail.
Competition law is based upon economic doctrine. The law has to use economic principles
as a base for judicial decisions. Hence, a detailed analysis of market processes and mar-
ket structure is imperative for the understanding of merger proceedings and the competi-
tion authorities' consideration of mergers. However, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to
describe economic theory thoroughly. There is a vast literature on this subject and it is not
intended and simply impossible to discuss this subject and its controversial doctrines com-
prehensively. Nevertheless, it will be overviewed in so far as it is necessary.
2
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3Introduction
As far as German law is referred to in this thesis, the respective provisions will be quoted
in the customary German way. For instance, § 37 III 2 Nr. 1 GWB refers to section 37,
paragraph 3, second sentence, number 1 of the GWB.
German jurisdiction will also be quoted in the common German method, to facilitate even-
tual research to the reader. It is also intentionally avoided to use an English translation for
German laws and authorities. Nevertheless, a translation will be given as far as it is help-
ful.
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Chapter 1 - South African Competition Law
Chapter 1
South African Competition Law
1 1 Introduction
At least nominally, South Africa has a fairly long experience of antitrust enforcement." An-
timonopoly legislation already existed since 1955.3 In 1979, the Maintenance and Promo-
tion of Competition Act" was passed and put into effect on the 1st of January 1980.5 Never-
theless, it turned out that competition authorities lacked administrative power to enforce
competition matters effectively. Quite recently, in 1998, the legal framework was totally
renewed by the South African government - in order to provide a modern system of com-
petition law for South Africa's economy on the global market - by passing the Competition
Act 89 of 1998,6 which has been in force since September 1999. The Act has already been
revised several times. First, the Competition Act will be examined, focussing notably on
mergers between newspaper enterprises. Thereafter, the South African Constitution will be
scrutinized to see, whether its provisions have any impact on the understanding and inter-
pretation of the Act.
12 Purposes of the Act
As in other jurisdictions around the world, the principal goal of South African Competition
Law is to ensure that the trade remains free and the markets are kept open." The pream-
ble to the Act outlines the general principles upon which South African Competition Law
shall be based. The Act was established to
'provide all South Africans equal opportunity to participate fairly in the national econ-
omy;
2 See for the development of competition law in South Africa in detail: Sutherland Competition Law of South
Africa (2004) chapter 3.
3 See the Regulation of Monopolistic Conditions Act 24 of 1955. Sutherland describes this Act as 'the first
comprehensive legislation in South Africa that was dedicated to competition law.' (Sutherland Competition
Law of South Africa (2004) 3-27). Cf also Theron 'The Economics of Competition Policy: Merger Analysis in
South Africa' (2001) SAJE, vol. 69: 4, 614.
4 Maintenance and Promotion of Competition Act 96 of 1979, available at:
http://www.compcom.co.za/thelaw/act960f1979.doc.
5 See Sutherland Competition Law of South Africa (2004) 3-32 for details.
6 Later on designated as 'the Act'; full text available at:
http://www.compcom.co.za/thelaw/thelaw act competition acts.asp?level=1 &child=1; all sections without
specific designation referred to in this thesis are sections of the Act.
7 Brassey in Brassey et al Competition Law (2002) 2.
4
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
achieve a more effective and efficient economy in South Africa;
provide for markets in which consumers have access to, and can freely select, the
quality and variety of goods and services they desire;
create greater capability and an environment for South Africans to compete effec-
tively in international markets;
restrain particular trade practices which undermine a competitive economy;
regulate the transfer of economic ownership in keeping with the public interest;
establish independent institutions to monitor economic competition; and
give effect to the international law obligations of the Republic.'
Chapter 1 - South African Competition Law
Indeed, South African Competition Law has a plurality of objectives. South African compe-
tition policy accommodates divergent ideals, like the promotion of efficiency, the develop-
ment of the economy, to provide consumers with competitive prices and product choice, to
promote employment and advance social and economic welfare, to ensure that small and
medium-sized enterprises have equitable participation in the economy, just to name the
main objectives. The maximisation of consumer welfare" is of crucial interest, although it is
mentioned only as one objective among others."
The Act itself sets out the different objectives, enumerated in section 2 as 'purpose of the
Act':
'The purpose of this Act is to promote and maintain competition in the Republic
in order-
(a) to promote the efficiency, adaptability and development of the economy;
(b) to provide consumers with competitive prices and product choices;
(c) to promote employment and advance the social and economic welfare of
South Africans;
(d) to expand opportunities for South African participation in world markets and
recognise the role of foreign competition in the Republic;
(e) to ensure that small and medium-sized enterprises have an equitable
opportunity to participate in the economy; and
(t) to promote a greater spread of ownership, in particular to increase the
ownership stakes of historically disadvantaged persons.'
8 See on this point Areeda & Hovenkamp Antitrust Law I Second Edition (2000) 4.
9 Also see Brassey in Brassey et al Competition Law (2002) 19-20.
5
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Chapter 1 - South African Competition Law
The Act prescribes in section 1(2)(a) that it must be interpreted in a manner that is consis-
tent with the South African Constitution 10and by giving effect to the purposes set out in
section 2. Therefore, these purposes as well as the history and the social political and
economic context of the Act must be borne in mind whenever it is applied." Thus, in each
single decision made by the competition authorities, these objectives should theoretically
play an important role from a 'formal-legal' point of view. However, section 2 and its ap-
proach of multiple goals is criticised. It is argued that the objectives of the Competition Act
are too wide and that competition law cannot guarantee, for example, the promotion of
social and economic welfare as set out in paragraph (c) of section 2. It is especially ques-
tioned, if competition policy is the appropriate instrument for the redistribution of wealth
and income, promotion of employment and the provision of equitable opportunity for par-
ticipation in the economy for small and medium-sized enterprises. In Reekie's opinion for
instance 'the promotion of employment [... ] is a matter for macroeconomics, not competi-
tion pollcy." and the desire to 'expand opportunities' for export performance (section 2(d))
would generally be a matter of macroeconomic concern (for instance international trade or
exchange rate policy)."
In fact, it is more than uncertain, if competition law is appropriate to promote all these
qoals.!"
Competition authorities have to assess the detrimental impact, a merger is or is not likely
to have on competition. Hence, the evaluation is based on competition grounds, but the
impact of the transaction on employment and on advancing the ownership stakes of black
entrepreneurs has to be taken into account as well. The Act demands the assessment of
multiple factors, but does not provide any guidelines for weighting them." Sutherland re-
marks that it may be difficult for competition law to 'assist in redressing the injustices of
South Africa's past racial policies [... ] without any cost to efficiency, especially in the short
term.'16 Reekie also foresees the occurrence of conflicts between other objectives and the
goal to promote the efficiency, adaptability, and development of economy as regulated in
section 2 paragraph (a). Tough political choices often will have to be made between these
10 For the consequences of this rule see 1 7 3 infra.
11 Cf Sutherland Competition Law of South Africa (2004) 4-12.
12 Reekie 'The Competition Act, 1998: An Economic Perspective' (1999) SAJE, Vol. 67 :2 1999 June, 258.
13 Reekie 'The Competition Act, 1998: An Economic Perspective' (1999) SAJE, Vol. 67 :2 1999 June, 258.
14 On this problem cf also Areeda & Hovenkamp Antitrust Law I Second Edition (2000) 6.
15 Lewis 'Competition Regulation: The South African Experience', paper presented to: ISCCO Conference
2000 - Taipei: June 21, 2000, available at: http://www.comptrib.co.za/Publications/Speeches/
Teipei%20Conference%20Speech.htm.
16 Sutherland Competition Law of South Africa (2004) 4-4.
6
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Chapter 1 - South African Competition Law
objectives, because they often will conflict. 'Competition policy authorities, however,
should not have to make them.:"
Furthermore, South Africa's economy competes with other countries in the global market.
It could be a disadvantage for South African enterprises to be regulated under the enu-
merated objectives. Therefore, some authors agree with the Chicago school doctrine 18and
take a purely economic point of view, which focuses on allocative efficiency as primary -
and only - goal of competition law.
In practice, however, the core objective of the Act is regarded as maintenance and promo-
tion of competition 19and hence economic considerations are the primary criteria for the
control of competitive behaviour, so that these problems play an inferior role.2o In particu-
lar, the objective in paragraph (f) to promote greater spread of ownership, notably to in-
crease the ownership stakes of historically disadvantaged persons - another South African
peculiarity - does not seem to have played a decisive role in any merger case so far.21
Moreover, the plurality of differing legal goals is not unknown in other areas of law. The
weighing of disparate goals in every case is the 'judge's daily business'. Most judges are
comfortable with this. Furthermore, in other jurisdictions competition law has a plurality of
goals as well. The European Community's Treaty (EC Treaty)22 for example follows in Arti-
cle 81 and 8223- besides the prevention of restriction or distortion of competition within the
common market - the idea of European unification and the maintenance of a European
market and the free trade between Member States.24 Therefore, the European Court of
Justice lays stress on the necessity of price competition to encourage the movement of
goods between the member states of the European Union25 and judges competitive con-
17 Reekie 'The Competition Act, 1998: An Economic Perspective' (1999) SAJE, Vol. 67 :2 1999 June, 259.
18 On this approach see 4 22 infra.
19 Lewis 'Competition Policy in South Africa - Where has it come from and where is it going?' (2002), speech
to Investment Analysts' Society of South Africa, 16th May 2002, Johannesburg, available at:
http://www.comptrib.co.za/Publications/Speeches/IAS%20speech.htm.
20 See for the influence of section 2 on the interpretation of the Competition Act in detail: Sutherland Compe-
tition Law of South Africa (2004) section 4.2.
21 Only under public interest grounds the issue of BEE is discussed in detail, see 1 5 1 2 6 infra.
22 Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community, OJEC C 325/33 of 24.12.2002,
also available at: http://europa.eu.int/eur-Iex/en/treaties/dat/EC consol.pdf.
23 See Appendix I of this thesis.
24 Cfespecially Article 3 and 4 of the EC Treaty, which outline the importance of European unification.
25 See for instance Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd v Commission of the European Communities, Judgment
of the European Court of Justice of 14 July 1972, (1972) ECR 619 (Case No. 48-69), par 115.
7
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Chapter 1 - South African Competition Law
duct according to its consistency with the objectives laid down in Article 2 to 4 of the EC
Treaty.
1 3 Structure of the Act
In essence, South African Competition Law controls two elementary branches of market
behaviour. It deals with prohibited practices and the control of mergers. The former con-
sists of anti-competitive conduct, in form of prohibited coordinated conduct (restrictive
practices, regulated in sections 4 to 5) or in form of unlawful unilateral conduct (abuse of a
dominant position, regulated in sections 6 to 9). The discussion of the prevention of prohib-
ited practices, which may affect the market by diminishing competition through certain
conduct, will not be a substantial part of this thesis, since the control of mergers is the fo-
cus of attention. Hence, neither the legal problems concerning the prohibition of these
practices (in particular the debate about the necessity of outlawing certain practices and,
inter alia, the distinction between 'agreement' and 'concerted practice') nor the similarities
and differences in approach between the South African Competition Act and the antitrust
laws of the United States of America and Europe will be discussed here.26
Nevertheless, a short overview of the South African approach towards prohibited practices
will be given in the form of a graph on the next page:
26 See the specific literature: Sutherland Competition Law of South Africa (2004) chapter 5-7; Campbell in
Brassey et al Competition Law (2002) chapter 5 - Restrictive Horizontal Practices; Unterhalter in Brassey et
al Competition Law (2002) chapter 6 - Restrictive Vertical Practices; Unterhalter in Brassey et al Competition
Law (2002) chapter 7 - The Abuse of Dominance; for the United States see Areeda & Hovenkamp Antitrust
Law I-XIV Second Edition (2002-2005).
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Graph 1: Prohibited Practices
Restrictive Practices
~.
Abuse of a dominant position
~
HOrizontal
= Agreemene7 between
or concerted practice28
by, firms29, or a decision
by an association of
firms in a horizontal
relationshlp'" (section
4(1 ))
o
-7 Practice is prohibited
Vertical
= Agreement between
parties
o
-7 Agreement is prohib-
ited
per se31 (section 4(1 )(b))
in case of:
per se (section 5(2)) in
case of:
• price-fixing32
• market allocatlorr" • minimum resale price
• collusive tendering maintenance"
o 0
otherwise only if not otherwise only if not
justifiable by the 'rule of justifiable by the 'rule of
reason' (section 4(1 )(a)): reason' (section 5(1 )):
• Practice is (only) pro-
hibited if it has the effect
of substantially prevent-
ing, or lessening, com-
petition in a market,
and
• none of the parties to
the agreement, con-
certed practice, or deci-
sion can prove that any
technological, efficiency
or other pro-competitive
gain resulting from it
outweighs that effect
• Agreement is (only)
prohibited if it has the
effect of substantially
preventing or lessening
competition in a market
and
• none of the parties to
the agreement can
prove that any techno-
logical, efficiency or
other pro-competitive
gain resulting from it
outweighs that effect
o
No exemption granted by the Commission
(section 10)
Exclusionary
Conduct
• Application, see s 6
• Dominance of a
firm in a market in
terms of section 7:
- market share of
45% or above; or
- market share be-
tween 35% and 45
% and firm cannot
show that it does
not have market
power; or
- market share of
less than 35% but
firm has market
power
-7 Exclusionary con-
duct of the dominant
firm is prohibited,
notably in the cases
of:
• charging an exces-
sive price to the det-
riment of consumers
• refusing to give a
competitor access to
an essential facility
when it is economi-
cally feasible to do
so
• refusal to deal
-7 See section 8 for
details35
Price
Discrimination
• Application, see s 6
• Dominance of a
firm in a market in
terms of section 7:
- market share of
45% or above; or
- market share be-
tween 35% and 45
% and firm cannot
show that it does
not have market
power; or
- market share of
less than 35% but
firm has market
power
-7 Price discrimina-
tion of the dominant
firm is prohibited, if it
is likely to have the
effect of substantially
preventing or lessen-
ing competition
• different forms of
discrimination, such
as in terms of price
charged, discounts
or payment
• exceptions in sec-
tion 9(2)
-7 see section 9 for
details
o
No exemption granted by the Commission
(section 10)
27 'Agreement' includes a contract, arrangement or understanding, whether or not legally enforceable (s
1(1)(ii)). See also the (confutable) presumption for the existence of an agreement in section 4(2) and (3).
28 'Concerted practice' means co-operative or co-ordinated conduct between firms, achieved through direct
or indirect contact, that replaces their independent action, but which does not amount to an agreement (s
1 (1 )(vi)).
29 'Firm' includes a person, partnership or a trust (s 1(1)(xi)).
30 Due to the definition of 'horizontal relationship' in s 1(1)(xiii) of the Act, the prohibitions of horizontal con-
certed practices only apply to agreements between competitors and to concerted practices committed by
competitors and decisions by associations of firms that are competing on the market. The competitive rela-
tionship must already exist before the prohibition comes into operation, see SA Defence and Aid Fund and
another v Minister of Justice 1967 (1) SA 31 (C) at 34H-35D.
31 This means that the conduct is prohibited outright without determining whether it has produced or may
produce anti-competitive consequences in the particular situation. Hence, this conduct is prohibited without
recourse to arguments of justification.
32 'Directly or indirectly fixing a purchase or selling price or any other trading conditions' (s 4(1 )(b)(i)).
33 'Dividing markets by allocating customers, suppliers, territories, or specific types of goods or services' (s
4(1 )(b)(ii)).
34 Not including the recommendation of a minimum resale price by a supplier or producer, see s 5(3).
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Contrary to the Maintenance and Promotion of Competition Act, the Competition Act 89 of
1998 established a system of powerful and independent bodies, which prosecute prohib-
ited anti-competitive practices and control mergers between enterprises. This 'most signifi-
cant change,36 in South African Competition Law led to the following bodies, regulated in
chapter 4 of the Act: the Competition Commission." the Competition Tribunal38 and the
Competition Appeal Court," replacing the former Competition Board.40
1 4 1 The Competition Commission
The Competition Commission is in charge of the investigation and prosecution of unlawful
competitive behaviour and the control of merqers." The Competition Commission may
grant or deny exemptions from anti-competitive practices prohibited in chapter 2 of the
Competition Act.
The Act empowers the Commission with wide investigative powers and the right of sei-
zure. Moreover, the Competition Commission may summon any person who is believed to
be able to furnish any information on the subject of the investigation, or to have posses-
sion or control of important material." Its resources and its extended powers are consid-
ered as evidence of the new regard that South Africa has for antitrust entorcernent."
According to section 20(1 )(a), the Commission is independent and subject only to the
South African Constitution and the law. Like the Competition Tribunal and the Competition
Appeal Court, its decisions cannot be reversed by governmental act. Thus, the Commis-
36 Lewis 'Competition Regulation: The South African Experience', paper presented to: ISCCO Conference
2000 - Taipei: June 21, 2000, available at: http://www.comptrib.co.za/Publications/Speeches/
Teipei%20Conference%20Speech. htm.
37 See at: www.compcom.co.za.
38 See at: www.comptrib.co.za.
39 See at: www.comptrib.co.za/CAC/appealcourt.htm.
40 See also Sutherland Competition Law of South Africa (2004) chapter 9 for details about the competition
authorities.
41 See s 21 and 1 5 infra.
42 See s 46 to 49A.
43 Lewis 'Competition Regulation: The South African Experience', paper presented to: ISCCO Conference
2000 - Taipei: June 21, 2000, available at: http://www.comptrib.co.za/Publications/Speeches/
Teipei%20Conference%20Speech .htm.
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sion can be regarded as a specialized body, which is free of ministerial and political inter-
ference.
In merger proceedings, the Competition Commission plays a crucial role. In respect of all
mergers, the Commission has an investigative function. The Competition Commission re-
fers large mergers to the Competition Tribunal and recommends that the proposed merger
be either approved unconditionally, approved subject to conditions, or prohibited. In case
of small and intermediate mergers, the Commission can even decide on its own, whether
to approve or prohibit the rnerqer." Thus, the Commission acts as an advisory body to the
Tribunal and in case of small and intermediate mergers effectively as an adjudicative body.
Parties may appeal adverse decisions of the Commission on intermediate mergers and
exemptions from anti-competitive practices to the Competition Tribunal.
In section 53(1 )(c)(ii) the Act grants a right to the Commission to participate in merger
hearings before the Tribunal. Nevertheless, the Competition Appeal Court concluded that
this does not include a right of appeal against decisions of the Tribunal approving a
merger. The Court stated that the Act does not recognise such a right. The Commission
would not be 'affected' in terms of section 61 (1) of the Act, which should be given a limited
interpretation;"
'The Commission is not 'proximately affected' by a Tribunal decision approving a
merger. The Commission's task in merger proceedings is to investigate and ad-
judicate upon small and intermediate mergers, to advise the Tribunal on large
mergers, and to participate in merger hearings before the Tribunal. Once the
Commission has discharged these duties, it is functus officio. Unlike in complaint
proceedings, the Commission is not a party to such proceedings in the ordinary
sense of the word. It is merely a participant whose participation ends with the
Tribunal hearing. The Commission has no direct or substantial interest in the de-
cision reached by the Tribunal.'
The question, whether the Commission has a right to participate in merger proceedings
before the Competition Appeal Court, has not yet come up for decision. In the case Mondi
44 See for the distinction between these different merger types and for the necessity of notification 1 5 1 2 3
infra.
45 The Competition Commission v Distillers Corporation (SA) Limited and Stellenbosch Farmers Winery
Group Limited (31/CAC/Sep03) par 6.
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v Kahle/,6 the Commission sought to participate in an appeal by parties to a large merger
against a Tribunal decision prohibiting such merger. However, this question remained un-
answered, because the Appeal Court was not forced, in view of the conclusion it reached,
to adjudicate upon this issue."
142 The Competition Tribunal
The Competition Tribunal is effectively the court of first instance, being competent for the
review of decisions made by the Competition Commission and for the hearing of appeals
from the Cornrnisslon."
The Competition Tribunal adjudicates all matters regulated by the Competition Act, that is
prohibited practices and merqers." It has the authority to issue compliance orders or in-
terdicts, levy fines and to impose structural remedies. If a merger is implemented in con-
travention of chapter 3, the Tribunal can order divestiture. It can order a party to the
merger to sell any shares, interest or other assets it has acquired pursuant to the merger,
or of declaring void any provision of an agreement to which the merger was subject."
The Tribunal may also grant an order for interim relief if there is evidence that a prohibited
practice has occurred; it is reasonably necessary to prevent serious, irreparable damage
or to prevent the purposes of the Act being frustrated; the respondent has been given a
reasonable opportunity to be heard, with regard to the urgency of the proceedings and the
balance of convenience favours the granting of the order."
The independence of the Tribunal is guaranteed by section 29(S)(b). A member of the
Competition Tribunal can only be removed by the President of the Tribunal, on the rec-
ommendation of the Minister of Trade and Industry, when that person becomes subject to
certain disqualifications enumerated in section 28(3). Such a removal from office might
happen, when a competent court holds that a member of the Tribunal is 'mentally unfit or
disordered' or the member is convicted of an offence and 'sentenced to imprisonment
46 Mondi Ltd and Kohler Cores and Tubes, A division of Kohler Packaging Ltd (20/CAC/Jun02).
47 Mondi Ltd and Kohler Cores and Tubes, A division of Kohler Packaging Ltd (20/CAC/Jun02) par 85.
48 See s 27(1 )(c).
49 See s 27(1 )(a) and (b).
50 Cf s 60(1) and s 58(1 )(a)(iv) for prohibited practices.
51 See s 49C(2)(b).
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without the option of a fine'. Moreover, serious misconduct, permanent incapacity, or en-
gaging in any activity that may undermine the integrity of the Competition Tribunal, may
lead to a removal. 52
The Act also aims at a high standard of qualification of its members, prescribing that the
Tribunal's members 'must represent a broad cross-section of the population' of South Af-
rica,53while each member must have 'suitable qualifications and experience in economics,
law, commerce, industry or public affairs' .54
The decisions of the Competition Tribunal can only be appealed to the Competition Appeal
Court.
1 4 3 Competition Appeal Court
The Competition Appeal Court is a special division of the High Court of South Africa,
staffed by judges with specialized knowledge about competition law.55 The Court is com-
petent to hear appeals on decisions of the Competition Tribunal. It may connrrn" amend"
or set aside58 a decision or order of the Competition Tribunal or remit a matter to the Com-
petition Tribunal for a further hearing on any appropriate terms. If the Competition Appeal
Court sets aside a decision of the Competition Tribunal, the Court itself must decide on the
merger by approving it with or without conditions, or by prohibiting the implementation of
the merger.59
The Competition Appeal Court'" dismissed about half of its published appeals so tar." In
52 See s 29(5)(a) and (b).
53 S 28(1 )(a).
54 S 28(2)(b).
55 For details see s 36 to 39.
56 S 17(2)(c).
57 The CAC may amend the decision by ordering or removing restrictions, or by including or deleting condi-
tions, s 17(2)(b).
58 S 17(2)(a).
59 See s 17(3).
60 Decisions published at: http://www.comptrib.co.za/CAC/appealjudgments.htm.
61 All appeals published by 30 June 2005 have been taken into account. See Telkom SA Limited v Orion
Cellular (Pty) Ltd and Standard Bank of South Africa and Edgars Consolidated Stores Ltd (38/CAC/Jan04);
The Competition Commission v Distillers Corporation (SA) Limited and Stellenbosch Farmers Winery
Group Limited (31/CAC/Sep03); American Natural Soda Ash Corporation and CHC Global (Pty) Ltd v Com-
petition Commission of South Africa and Botswana Ash (Pty) Ltd and Chemserve Technical Products and
The Minister of Trade and Industry (12/CAC/Dec01), in this case, also the application for leave to appeal to
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the rest of the cases, the matter was postponed," or the appeal was upheld,53 and the
orders of the Competition Tribunal were amended or (partially) set aside, such as the ap-
the Supreme Court of Appeal was dismissed; Patensie Sitrus Beherend Beperk v The Competition Commis-
sion and Jakobus Johannes Pietrus Bezuidenhout and Jan Daniel du Preez (16/CAC/Apr02); Anglo South
Africa Capital (Pty) Ltd and Anglovaal Mining Ltd and Anglo American Holdings Ltd and Kumba Resources
Ltd v Industrial Development Corporation of South Africa and The Competition Commission South Africa
(26/CAC/Dec02); Mondi Ltd and Kohler Cores and Tubes, A division of Kohler Packaging Ltd
(20/CAC/Jun02); Schering (Pty) Ltd and MSD (Pty) Ltd and Novartis SA (Pty) Ltd and Roche Products (Pty)
Ltd and Boehringer-Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals (Pty) Ltd and Bristol Myers Squibb (Pty) Ltd and Abbott
Laboratories SA (Pty) Ltd and Bayer (Pty) Ltd and Eli Lil/y SA (Pty) Ltd and Wyeth SA (Pty) Ltd and Aventis
Pharma (Pty) Ltd and International Healthcare Distributors (Pty) Ltd and Sanofi-Synthelobo (Pty) Ltd v New
United Pharmaceutical Distributors (Pty) Ltd [Formerly Mainstreet 2 (Pty) Ltd] and Natal Wholesale Chemists
(Pty) t/a Alpha Pharm Durban and Midlands Wholesale Chemists (Pty) Ltd t/a Alpha Pharm Pietermaritzburg
and East Cape Pharmaceuticals Ltd t/a Alpha Pharm Eastern Cape and Free State Buying Association Ltd
t/a Alpha Pharm Bloemfontein and [Kemco] and Pharmed Pharmaceuticals Ltd and AGM Pharmaceuticals
Ltd t/a Docmed and L 'Etangs Wholesale Chemists t/a L 'Etangs and Resepkor (Pty) Ltd t/a Reskor Pharma-
ceutical Wholesalers and The Competition Commission (11/CAC/Aug01); Distil/ers Corporation (SA) Ltd and
Stel/enbosch Farmers' Winery Group Ltd v Bulmer (SA) (Pty) Ltd and Seagram Africa (Pty) Ltd
(08/CAC/May01); York Timbers Ltd v South African Forestry Ltd (09/CAC/May01); Novartis SA (Pty) Ltd and
Roche Products (Pty) Ltd and Boehringer Ingelheim (Pty) Ltd and Bristolmyers Squibb (Pty) Ltd and Shering-
Berlin (Pty) Ltd t/a Berlimed and Bayer (Pty) Ltd and Rolab (Pty) Ltd and Hoechst Marion Roussel Ltd and
International Healthcare Distributors (Pty) Ltd v New United Pharmaceutical Distributors (Pty) Ltd (UPD)
(formerly Mainstreet 2 (Pty) Ltd) and Natal Wholesale Chemists (Pty) t/a Alpha Pharm Durban and Midlands
Wholesale Chemists (Pty) Ltd t/a Alpha Pharm Pietermaritzburg and East Cape Pharmaceuticals Ltd t/a
Alpha Pharm Eastern Cape and Free State Buying Association Ltd t/a Alpha Pharm Bloemfontein (Kemco)
and Pharmed Pharmaceuticals Ltd and L'Etangs Wholesale Chemist CC t/a L'Etangs and Resepkor (Pty)
Ltd t/a Reskor (07/CAC/DecOO); Glaxo WeI/come (Pty) Ltd and Pfizer Laboratories (Pty) Ltd and Pharmacare
Ltd and Smithkline Beecham Pharmaceuticals (Pty) Ltd and Warner Lambert SA (Pty) Ltd and Synergistic
Alliance Investments (Pty) Ltd and Druggist Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Terblanche, Diane, N.G. and Fourie, Fre-
derick, N.G. and Holden, Merle, N.G. and The Competition Tribunal and National Association Of Pharmaceu-
tical Wholesalers and National Wholesale Chemists (Pty) Ltd and Midlands Wholesale Chemists (Pty) Ltd t/a
Pharm Pietermaritzburg and East Cape Pharmaceuticals Ltd t/a Alpha Pharm Eastern Cape and Free State
Buying Association Ltd t/a Alpha Pharm Bloemfontein (Kemco) and Pharmed Pharmaceuticals Ltd and
L'Etangs Wholesale Chemist CC t/a L'Etangs and Resepkor (Pty) Ltd t/a Reskor and Pharmaceutical Whole-
salers Mainstreet 2 (Pty) Ltd t/a New United Pharmaceutical Distributors (02/CAC/SeptOO): In this case, the
application to suspend the operation in execution of the Tribunal's order was dismissed.
6 Federal-Mogul Aftermarket Southern Africa (Pty) Ltd v The Competition Commission (33/CAC/Sep03).
63 Astral Foods Limited v The Competition Commission (39/CAC/Feb04); Mike's Chicken (Pty) Ltd and Day-
break Farms (Pty) Ltd and Midway Chix (Pty) Ltd v Astral Foods Limited and The Competition Commission
(32/CAC/Sep03); JD Group Limited and Profurn Limited (28/CAC/May03); Glaxo WeI/come (Pty) Ltd and
Pfizer Laboratories (Pty) Ltd and Pharmacare Ltd and Smithkline Beecham Pharmaceuticals (Pty) Ltd and
Warner Lambert SA (Pty) Ltd and Synergistic AI/iance Investments (Pty) Ltd and Druggist Distributors (Pty)
Ltd v National Association Of Pharmaceutical Wholesalers and Natal Wholesale Chemist (Pty) Ltd t/a Alpha
Pharm Durban and Midlands Wholesale Chemists (Pty) Ltd t/a Alpha Pharm Pietermaritzburg and East Cape
Pharmaceuticals Ltd t/a Alpha Pharm Eastern Cape (15/CAC/Feb02); Schumann Sasol (South Africa) (Pty)
Ltd and Price's Daelite (Pty) Ltd (10/CAC/Aug01); The Competition Commission of South Africa v Unilever
PLC and Unifoods, A Division of Uni/ever South Africa (Pty) Ltd and Robertsons Foods (Pty) Ltd and Robert-
sons Food Service (Pty) Ltd (13/CAC/Jan02); Glaxo WeI/come (Pty) Ltd and Pfizer Laboratories (Pty) Ltd
and Pharmacare Ltd and Smith kline Beecham Pharmaceuticals (Pty) Ltd and Warner Lambert SA (Pty) Ltd
and Synergistic Alliance Investments (Pty) Ltd and Druggist Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Terblanche, Diane, N.O.
and Fourie, Frederick, N.G. and Holden, Merle, N.G. and The Competition Tribunal and National Association
Of Pharmaceutical Wholesalers and Natal Wholesale Chemists (Pty) Ltd and Midlands Wholesale Chemists
(Pty) Ltd t/a Alpha Pharm Pietermaritzburg and East Cape Pharmaceuticals Ltd t/a Alpha Pharm Eastern
Cape and Free State Buying Association Ltd t/a Alpha Pharm Bloemfontein (Kemco) and Pharmed Pharma-
ceuticals Ltd and L 'Etangs Wholesale Chemist CC t/a L 'Etangs and Resepkor (Pty) Ltd t/a Reskor and
Pharmaceutical Wholesalers Mainstreet 2 (Pty) Ltd t/a New United Pharmaceutical Distributors
(03/CAC/OctOO).
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proval of a merger without conditions instead of a conditional approval." In some cases,
the matter was remitted to the Competition Tribunal.65 In other cases, the operation and
execution of the order of the Tribunal was temporarily suspended" or an application for an
interdict was granted.67
In some cases, in which the Competition Appeal Court dismissed appeals, the concerned
parties applied for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal."
1 5 The control of mergers
Merger control is one of the two main branches of South African Competition Law. In es-
sence, it deals with market supervision and regulation: an analysis of the desirability of a
merger transaction is conducted by simulating the potential effects, which the transaction
may have on the pertinent degree of competition in relevant markets." Competition au-
thorities scrutinize proposed transactions and approve or prohibit them depending on
64 This happened for instance in JD Group Limited and Profurn Limited (28/CAC/May03). In Schumann Sasol
(South Africa) (Pty) Ltd and Price's Daelite (Pty) Ltd (10/CAC/Aug01) the merger was approved instead of
the prohibition by the Competition Tribunal, which concluded that the conditions proposed by the Commis-
sion did not meet the competitive concerns, which had been identified.
65 Anglo South Africa (Pty) Ltd and Anglovaal Mining Ltd and Anglo American Holding Ltd and Kumba Re-
sources Ltd v The Industrial Development Corporation of South Africa Ltd and Manoim N.N.D. and Frederick
Fourie N.O. and The Competition Commission and Simon Roberts (24&25/CAC/Oct02); Glaxo Wel/come
(Pty) Ltd and Pfizer Laboratories (Pty) Ltd and Pharmacare Ltd and Smithkline Beecham Pharmaceuticals
(Pty) Ltd and Warner Lambert SA (Pty) Ltd and Synergistic Alliance Investments (Pty) Ltd and Druggist Dis-
tributors (Pty) Ltd v Terblanche, Diane, N.O. and Fourie, Frederick, N.D. and Holden, Merle, N.D. and The
Competition Tribunal and National Association Of Pharmaceutical Wholesalers and Natal Wholesale Chem-
ists (Pty) Ltd and Midlands Wholesale Chemists (Pty) Ltd t/a Alpha Pharm Pietermaritzburg and East Cape
Pharmaceuticals Ltd t/a Alpha Pharm Eastern Cape and Free State Buying Association Ltd tla Alpha Pharm
Bloemfontein (Kemco) and Pharmed Pharmaceuticals Ltd and L'Etangs Wholesale Chemist CC t/a L'Etangs
and Resepkor (Pty) Ltd t/a Reskor and Pharmaceutical Wholesalers Mainstreet 2 (Pty) Ltd t/a New United
Pharmaceutical Distributors (03/CAC/OctOO).
66 Glaxo WeI/come (Pty) Ltd and Pfizer Laboratories (Pty) Ltd and Pharmacare Ltd and Smithkline Beecham
Pharmaceuticals (Pty) Ltd and Warner Lambert SA (Pty) Ltd and Synergistic Alliance Investments (Pty) Ltd
and Druggist Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Terblanche, Diane, N.D. and Fourie, Frederick, N.O. and Holden, Merle,
N.D. and The Competition Tribunal and National Association Of Pharmaceutical Wholesalers and National
Wholesale Chemists (Pty) Ltd and Midlands Wholesale Chemists (Pty) Ltd t/a Pharm Pietermaritzburg and
East Cape Pharmaceuticals Ltd t/a Alpha Pharm Eastern Cape and Free State Buying Association Ltd t/a
Alpha Pharm Bloemfontein (Kemco) and Pharmed Pharmaceuticals Ltd and L'Etangs Wholesale Chemist
CC t/a L'Etangs and Resepkor (Pty) Ltd t/a Reskor and Pharmaceutical Wholesalers Mainstreet 2 (Pty) Ltd
t/a New United Pharmaceutical Distributors (04/CAC/OctOO).
67 Sappi Fine Paper (Pty) Ltd v The Competition Commission of South Africa and Papercor CC
123/CAC/Sep02).
8 See for instance Harmony Gold Mining Company Ltd v Gold Fields Ltd and The Competition Commission
and The Minister of Trade and Industry and The Competition Tribunal (43/CAC/Nov04). See also American
Natural Soda Ash Corporation and CHC Global (Pty) Ltd v Competition Commission of SA and Botswana
Ash (Pty) Ltd and Chemserve Technical Products (Pty) Ltd and Minister of Trade and Industry (SCA 554/03).
69 For the definition of the relevant market see 1 5 1 2 4 1 infra.
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whether they would result in a substantial prevention or lessening of competition in the
relevant market, and with regard also to the potential adverse consequences which are
likely to occur from the exercise of market power in the relevant market by the merged un-
dertaking.
Merger control generally deals with the danger of a sudden growth in such market power
of a certain firm resulting from its merger with another firm, notably - but not necessarily -
with a competitor." Market power is defined in section 1(1)(xiv) of the Act as 'the power of
a firm to control prices, to exclude competition or to behave to an appreciable extent inde-
pendently of its competitors, customers or suppliers' .71 Hence, economists are generally
suspicious of existing market power, because it can diminish competition in a market or
even exclude it. If a merger creates an entity that has a large enough share of the market,
removes the closest competitor, and if the other firms in the market cannot provide sub-
stantial competition, the merged firm might be able to increase prices unilaterally. Econo-
mists consider that this creates a 'dead-weight loss' to society."
Some mergers create concentrated markets." In such markets, only a few firms operate.
On the one hand, this facilitates collusion between those enterprises." especially in form
70 Although the Act does not define the term 'competitor' 'firms will be regarded as competitors if they com-
pete in the same market in respect of the same or interchangeable or substitutable goods or services'
(American Soda Ash Corporation and CHC Global (Pty) Ltd v Competition Commission of South Africa and
Botswana Ash (Pty) Ltd and Chemserve Technical Products (Pty) Ltd (12/CAC/Dec01) par 24 with reference
to JD Group Ltd / Ellerine Holdings Ltd (CT 78/LM/JuI00) par 4.2).
71 This definition is equivalent to the definition of 'dominant position' as used by the European Court of Jus-
tice in the case United Brands Company and United Brands Continentaal BV v EC Commission (1978) ECR
207, 1 CMLR 429 (Case No. 27/76). The Court stated that a dominant position would be 'a position of eco-
nomic strength enjoyed by an undertaking which enables it to prevent effective competition being maintained
on the relevant market by giving it the power to behave to an appreciable extent independently of its com-
~etitors, customers and ultimately of its consumers' (par 65).
2 The unilateral increase in price to a supra-competitive level leads to higher expenses for consumers,
which economically suffer a loss. This redistribution of wealth (transfer of revenues from consumers to pro-
ducers) can be explained as follows: The monopolist is able to charge more for a product than it would be
able in a competitive market. This may reduce the amount sold, but the monopolist's total profit will be
higher. Hence, consumers are allocating more of their money resources to products of the monopolist and
less of the society's productive resources are being channelled to these products than would be in a com-
petitive environment. Thus, monopoly results in a misallocation of society's scarce resources. See also
Reekie 'The Competition Act, 1998: An Economic Perspective' (1999) SAJE, Vol. 67 :2 1999 June, 261.
73 For the consequences of concentration in markets see in detail 1 5 1 2 4 4 infra.
74 Collusion depends on other factors as well, such as product differentiation, see Sutherland Competition
Law of South Africa (2004) 5-57: 'Collusion is more likely in markets that are dominated by relatively few
sellers, of similar size, that have a similar cost structure or are equally efficient, and where the product is a
fungible or at least not differentiated. Where the market has a large number of firms, and products are differ-
entiated, it will be difficult to achieve measures for collusion with which all firms will be happy.'
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of prohibited agreements like prlce-flxlnq," thus behaviours, which lead to a lessening of
competition to the consumers' detriment. On the other hand, the merger may result in a
level of market concentration that creates barriers to entry for other potential competitors.
Such barriers to entry, in turn, facilitate collusion, because if there are no entry-barriers
'non-colluding firms will come in on the incentive of higher profits and will undermine the
conuston.:" In such a situation, it is likely that prices are raised to anti-competitive levels,
because new competitors cannot enter the market and drive prices down. Generally
speaking, mergers, which create a certain level of market concentration, are thus likely to
facilitate coordinated or unilateral anti-competitive conduct. In the case of the creation of
monopolies, competition concerns are even higher because of their 'generally evil results
or potentialities,'?" like reduced output and higher prices, diminished incentives for innova-
tion, and fewer alternatives for suppliers and customers.
However, competition authorities try to prevent changes in the market structure, which di-
verge from the economically desired market situation: from an economic point of view,
there should be theoretically perfect competition in the market. In such an idealised, prac-
tically non-existent situation, none of the competing firms would have market power and no
single firm would therefore be able to increase prices to the consumers' detriment. On the
contrary, prices would be kept low, while firms would offer the highest quality products or
services. Consumers would be able to choose easily between the competing firms, which
would maintain the firms' competitive behaviour, low prices, high quality standards, and
effect technological improvements."
Surely, every merger between competltors'" - a so-called horizontal merger - results in
the loss of one of them. This leads to the reduction of competitive pressure and is hence
likely to endanger the price competition, which is apt to keep prices down to the lowest
possible level.80 Nevertheless, it has to be borne in mind that competition law wants to pro-
75 See 1 3 supra.
76 Sutherland Competition Law of South Africa (2004) 5-58.
77 Areeda & Hovenkamp Antitrust Law 11/ Second Edition (2002) 48.
78 CfTheron 'The Economics of Competition Policy: Merger Analysis in South Africa' (2001) SAJE, vol. 69: 4,
616.
79 Or at least potentially competing firms, see infra.
80 See for instance Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the
control of concentrations between undertakings, OJEU C 31/5 of 05.02.2004 par 24-25, also available at:
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2004/c 031 Ic 03120040205en00050018.pdf.
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tect competition itself, not competitors." The competitiveness of a market is not the same
as merely the number of market partlclpants." From an economic point of view, 'competi-
tion' refers to a situation where 'all prices are driven to marginal cost and every firm in the
market is a price taker rather than a price maker - that is, no one has discretion to charge
a higher price.'83 Thus, it can be stated that competition law regulates the competitive
process, not the relationship between competitors, nor does it merely intend to maintain a
certain number of competitors. This economic principle is generally accepted." Hence, the
'loss' of a competitor caused by a merger does not inevitably lead to the loss of competi-
tiveness in that market. It always depends on the market and its special conditions, if the
impact of a merger is likely to have a detrimental effect upon competltion." In fact, most
mergers benefit competition and consumers by allowing firms to operate more efficiently.
Competition authorities therefore recognise that many mergers are efficiency enhancing
and part of the legitimate conduct of business." A transaction between smaller firms may
81 Common sense, see for instance Telkom SA Ltd / TPI Investments / Praysa Trade 1062 (Pty) Ltd (CT
81/LM/AugOO) par 37; in Europe it is currently criticized that the decision of the European Court of First In-
stance (case number T-201/04 R) on 22 December 2004 in the case European Commission v Microsoft
would rather protect competitors than competition itself. Microsoft was held responsible by the European
Commission (COMP/C-3/37.792 - Microsoft) for abusing a dominant position in terms of Article 82 EC while
offering 'Windows XP' only with integrated Media-Player. The Commission ordered a fine of almost € 500
million. The Court of First Instance now ruled against Microsoft's request for interim measures. The
economist Kirchner called it 'alarming' as far as 'incentives to innovate' for enterprises are concerned: 'Wenn
es die Aufgabe von Wettbewerbs- und Kartellrecht sein soli, den Wettbewerb, nicht aber die Wettbewerber
zu schutzen. verfehlt eine Handhabung des wettbewerbsrechtlichen Missbrauchsverbots, die
Innovationsanreize tur dynamischen Innovationswettbewerb gegenOber kurzfristig erzielbaren Erfalgen bei
der Wettbewerbsintensivierung hintanstellt, das Ziel dieser Rechtsmaterie. Das ist auch ordnungspolitisch
bedenklich.' (Kirchner 'Die Dynamik des Wettbewerbs - Der Fall Microsoft und die Instrumente des
Zwangstechnologiezugangs sowie der ProduktentbOndelung 1 Foigen fOr die Innovationsanreize' Frankfurter
Allgemeine Zeitung (2005-01-08) 13); also see Zimmerlich 'Der Fall Microsoft - Herausforderungen fOr das
Wettbewerbsrecht durch die lnternetëkonomie' (2004) WRP-Wettbewerb in Recht und Praxis, 10/2004, 1260
(1267) and Stadler 'Microsoft-Entscheidung erleichtert Zugang zu Zwangslizenzen' Frankfurter Allgemeine
Zeitung (2004-04-28) 23 with the same reservations about the decision.
82 Areeda & Hovenkamp Antitrust Law I Second Edition (2000) 3 put it this way: '[T]he economist's idea of
'competition' is related to performance rather than to the mere number of rivals.'
83 Areeda & Hovenkamp Antitrust Law XI Second Edition (2005) 202.
84 See for instance Brown Shoe Co v United States 370 US, 294 S.Ct. 1502 where it was stated that the
antitrust laws 'were enacted for the protection of competition not competitors.' Cf also Posner Antitrust Law -
An Economic Perspective (1976) 101; Schutz in Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrankungen und
Europëiscnes Kartel/recht Gemeinschaftskommentar (2001), § 36 Rn. 5. Cf also Sutherland Competition
Law of South Africa (2004) 3-13 and 3-25: 'Competition law operates globally. It is primarily concerned with
the protection of the competitive process, and not the rivals in that process. The interests of particular rivals
frequently will be protected by competition law but this will happen coincidentally'. This principle is also rele-
vant in terms of restrictive vertical practices under section 5 of the Act and exclusionary acts of a dominant
firm under section 8 of the Act, see Unterhalter in Brassey et al Competition Law (2002) 168 and 208.
85 See in detail 1 5 1 2 4 infra.
86 See for instance Federal Trade Commission 'Promoting Competition, Protecting Consumers: A Plain Eng-
lish Guide to Antitrust Laws' chapter Mergers, available at: http://www.ftc.gov/bc/compguide/mergers.htm;
that is also what the Competition Tribunal emphasises in JD Group Limited / EI/erine Holdings Limited (CT
78/LM/JuI00); for European Competition Law see Recital 29 of Council Regulation (EC) No. 139/2004 of 20
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for instance create a merged entity, which will be in a stronger position to compete with the
largest players in the relevant market and therefore will be regarded as 'pro-competltive.t"
In fact, the process of merging with another firm has to be understood a priori as a com-
mon business practice that allows an enterprise to grow externally." Nevertheless, as
mentioned above, some mergers are likely to lessen competition. In a horizontal merger,
the acquisition of a competitor can increase market concentration and the likelihood of col-
lusion.89 That, in turn, can lead to higher prices, reduced availability of goods or services,
lower quality of products, and less innovation. Moreover, it has to be noted that a horizon-
tal merger might not only raise substantive competition concerns on a horizontal level, but
also can have effects on a vertical level, like leveraging the dominance of a firm in the up-
or downstream market." The increased buying power of a merged entity, for instance,
may be likely to affect the manufacturing industry."
Also mergers between enterprises on a different level of the distribution chain92 (for exam-
ple between a producer and a wholesalerj'" - so-called vertical mergers - may have a
January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (the EC Merger Regulation), OJEU L
24/1 of 29.01.2004, also available at: http://europa.eu.inVeur-
lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2004/1 024/1 0242004012gen00010022.pdf and Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal
mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of concentrations between undertakings, OJEU C 31/5
of 05.02.2004 par 76, also available at: http://europa.eu.inVeur-
lex/pri/en/oj/daV2004/c 031/c 03120040205en00050018.pdf: 'Corporate reorganisations in the form of
mergers may be in line with the requirements of dynamic competition and are capable of increasing the
competitiveness of industry, thereby improving the conditions of growth and raising the standard of living in
the Community.'
87 So in the case Kulungile Metals (Pty) Ltd I Abkins Steel Corporation (Pty) Ltd and Abkins Steel Services
~Pty) Ltd (CT 13/LM/Mar03).
8 It can be noticed that the worldwide mergers & acquisitions volume has increased from over 200 billion US
$ in the first quarter of 2003 to an amount exceeding 600 billion US $ in the last quarter of 2004. A recently
published report shows for the year 2004 a better than 40% increase in worldwide M&A volume from 2003
levels (cf Thomson Financial Worldwide M&A Financial Advisory (Press Release, 03 January 2005), avail-
able at: http://thomson.com/cms/assets/pdfs/financial/league table/mergers and acquisitions/
4q2004/4q04 ma pr ww us.pdf; also see Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 'Wallstreet rechnet mit weiteren
Fusionen' (2005-01-12) 19.
89 For the latter problem see Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regula-
tion on the control of concentrations between undertakings, OJEU C 31/5 of 05.02.2004 par 39, also avail-
able at: http://europa.eu.inVeur-lexlpri/en/oj/dat/2004/c 031/c 03120040205en00050018.pdf.
90 See for instance Bidvest Group Limited I Voltex Holdings Limited (CT 10/LM/Feb02) par 20.
91 The US horizontal merger guidelines describe this phenomenon as follows: 'Market power also encom-
passes the ability of a single buyer (a 'monopsonist'), a coordinating group of buyers, or a single buyer, not a
monopsonist, to depress the price paid for a product to a level that is below the competitive price and
thereby depress output. The exercise of market power by buyers ('monopsony power') has adverse effects
comparable to those associated with the exercise of market power by sellers.' (1992 United States Depart-
ment of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Horizontal Merger Guidelines [with April 8, 1997, Revisions
to section 4 on efficiencies] Section 0.1, available at: http://www.ftc.gov/bc/docs/horizmer.htm).
92 The Competition Act defines such 'vertical relationships' in s 1 as follows: 'the relationship between a firm
and its suppliers, its customers, or both'.
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heavy impact on market structure, too, although vertical mergers generally do not concern
competition authorities in the same way as horizontal mergers do.94 Hence, '[c]ompetition
authorities have a permissive attitude to vertical mergers.'95 Conversely, it is argued that
anti trust law in general adopts the approach that mergers between firms in a vertical rela-
tionship hold the potential for greater efficiency than transactions among horizontal com-
petitors do: a vertical merger is in general likely to enable a firm to produce an improved or
lower priced product or service, or to distribute it through the value chain in a more efficient
way. Thus, there is an argument that vertical mergers should presumptively be regarded
as efficiency enhancinq." Nevertheless, the Competition Appeal Court pointed out that 'in
assessing the effect of a proposed merger, an assumption of efficiency enhancement can-
not trump nor should it prevent an enquiry into the manner in which market pricing is exer-
cised, viewed in terms of the structure of the market.?"
Therefore, concerns arise, when vertical mergers impact materially on downstream cus-
temers" or upstream suppliers'" or create an increase in barriers to entry100 into a mar-
ket.101 For example, a vertical merger can make it difficult for competitors to gain access to
an important component product or to an important channel of dlstrlbutlon.'?" The Tribunal
recognises the danger of vertical mergers to 'either increase the barriers to entry into a
market by requiring competitor[s] to vertically integrate as well thus raising rivals costs or
93 This includes any other constellations in which firms in buyer-seller relationship merge, like a merger be-
tween a manufacturer and a supplier of component products, or between a manufacturer with a distributor of
its products, cf Federal Trade Commission 'Promoting Competition, Protecting Consumers: A Plain English
Guide to Antitrust Laws' chapter Mergers, available at: http://www.ftc.gov/bc/compguide/mergers.htm).
94 Constant court ruling, see recently Plaaskem (Pty) Ltd I UAP Agrochemicals KZN (Pty) Ltd and UAP Crop
Care (Pty) Ltd (CT 78/LM/Oct04) par 13 with further references .
. 95 DaimlerChrysler South Africa (Pty) Ltd I Sandown Motor Holdings (Pty) Ltd (CT 44/LM/JuI01).
96 See the argumentation of the applicants in Mondi Ltd and Kohler Cores and Tubes, A division of Kohler
Packaging Ltd (20/CAC/Jun02) par 39.
97 Mondi Ltd and Kohler Cores and Tubes, A division of Kohler Packaging Ltd (20/CAC/Jun02) par 46.
9B So-called 'input foreclosure,' see for instance the merger in the case Mondi Ltd I Kohler Cores and Tubes,
A division of Kohler Packaging Ltd (CT 06/LM/Jan02) upheld by the CAC (Mondi Ltd and Kohler Cores and
Tubes, A division of Kohler Packaging Ltd (20/CAC/Jun02)).
99 So-called 'customer foreclosure,' see Coleus Packaging (Pty) Ltd IRheem Crown Plant, a division of High-
veld Steel and Vanadium Corporation Limited (CT 75/LM/Oct02).
100 On this problem see Legh in Brassey et al Competition Law (2002) 227-228.
101 Cf also Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control
of concentrations between undertakings, OJEU C 31/5 of 05.02.2004 par 61, also available at:
http://europa.eu.intleur-lex/pri/en/oj/datl2004/c 031/c 03120040205en00050018.pdf.
102 This is called 'vertical foreclosure' or 'bottleneck' problem.
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because they force them to increase their costs and thus make them less competitive in
the horizontal market in which they face the integrated firm.'103
Moreover, the vertical transaction might promote co-ordinated conduct between competi-
tors through facilitating an exchange of competitively sensitive lntormanon.'?' In this con-
text, the concern about the ability of a vertically integrated firm to evade price regulation
also has to be rnentloned.i'" Referring to Riordan and Salop,106who identified these three
main potential competition concerns that arise in vertical rnerqers.l'" the Tribunal hence
assesses if any of the mentioned concerns is relevant to the rnerqer.'?"
In cases of mergers involving a dominant firm the Competition Tribunal has pointed out its
concerns in the Schumann Sasol / Price's Dae/ite case: 109
'[I]t is widely recognized that, under particular circumstances, vertical mergers
may impact negatively on competition. Alarm bells will sound where one or both
parties to the transaction dominate the markets in which they operate. [ ... ] Suf-
fice to note that while a vertical transaction involving a dominant firm portends a
variety of potentially anti-competitive outcomes, for the purpose of the present
transaction it is the prospect of increased entry barriers as well as the possibility
of market foreclosure and the related ability to raise rival's costs that are of most
immediate concern.'!"
To summarize, it can be maintained that competition authorities have to assess the facts
of every single case in detail to determine if a vertical merger is anti-competitive or not,
especially if a dominant firm is involved. The Tribunal concluded therefore that
103 Vodacom Pty Ltd and GSM / Vodacom Pty Ltd and Teljoy Holdings Ltd (CT 10/LM/Nov99 and
13/LM/Nov99) par 6.
104 See Sutherland Competition Law of South Africa (2004) 5-54 to 5-57 with further references discussing
the effects of exchange of information.
105 See Mondi Ltd / Kohler Cores and Tubes, A division of Kohler Packaging Ltd (CT 06/LM/Jan02) par 28.
106 Riordan & Salop 'Evaluating Vertical Mergers: A Post Chicago Approach' (1995), 63 Antitrust Law Journal
551.
107 Again: 1. Raising rivals costs by means of input or customer foreclosure, 2. The ability to promote co-
ordinated behaviour between competitors, and 3. The ability of a vertically integrated firm to evade price
repulation.
10 Cf Coleus Packaging (Pty) Ltd / Rheem Crown Plant, a division of Highveld Steel and Vanadium Corpora-
tion Limited (CT 75/LM/Oct02); Inzuzo Furniture Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd / PG Bison Holdings (Pty) Ltd (CT
12/LM/FEB04).
109 Schumann Sasol (South Africa) (Pty) Ltd / Price's Daelite (Pty) (CT 23/LM/May01) par 11.
110 Cf also DaimlerChrysler South Africa (Pty) Ltd / Sandown Motor Holdings (Pty) Ltd (CT 44/LM/JuI01).
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'[alt the level of general principle, it is fair to say that vertical mergers raise fewer
competition concerns and generates [sic] larger pro-competitive gains than their
horizontal counterparts. On the other hand, it may be credibly claimed that verti-
cal transactions in which one or both of the parties dominate their respective
markets are liable to raise greater anti-trust concerns than those involving firms
with relatively small market shares.'!"
Besides those two types of mergers, so-called conglomerate mergers can be distin-
guished.112 These are mergers between firms in unrelated businesses.!" The Competition
Tribunal stated that such mergers are unlikely to prevent or lessen competition since there
is no overlap in the relevant markets of the merging parties.!" especially where no hori-
zontal or vertical relationship between the product markets of the merging parties can be
observed.!" Nevertheless, conglomerate mergers may have an anti-competitive effect, if
one of the firms was likely to enter the market and become a competitor of the other.!"
The US Federal Trade Commission refers to those mergers as 'potential competition
merqers,'!" which would result in the loss of a potential competitor and therefore prevent
the increased competition that would result from the firm's entry.!" Moreover, such merg-
ers can have the effect that the acquiring firm is no longer hindered to keep prices low,
what it otherwise would have to do because of the 'threat of entry' of the potential competi-
tor. South African competition authorities therefore recognise that a lessening of potential
competition implies higher pnces.!"
111 Schumann Sasol (South Africa) (Pty) Ltd / Price's Daelite (Pty) (CT 23/LM/May01) par 13.
112 See Pautke Die kartellrechtliche Erfassung konglomerater Konzentration in der Republik Sadafrika (1998)
for conglomerate mergers under the Maintenance and Promotion of Competition Act.
113 See Areeda & Hovenkamp Antitrust Law I Second Edition (2000) 25.
114 Standard Bank of South Africa; Real Equity Trust / Stellenbosch Vineyards Limited (CT 51/LM/JuI02);
Glidet no.485 (Pty) Ltd / Pamodzi Foods (Pty) Ltd (CT 09/LM/Feb04); Reunert Ltd / African Gables Ltd (CT
59/LM/Aug04); Investec Bank Ltd / Main Street 57 (Pty) Ltd, Gorobrik (Pty) Ltd and Corovest (Pty) Ltd (CT
15/LM/Mar05); the Tribunal comes to the same conclusion, if there is 'very little overlap' between the acquir-
inp and target firms' products, see Fraser Fyfe (Pty) Ltd / Anglo Operations Ltd (CT 10/LM/FebOO).
11 Cf Imperial Holdings Ltd / Safair (Pty) Ltd (CT 08/LM/JanOO).
116 A comparable problem - as a prohibited practice - occurs when markets are allocated and a potential
competitor agrees with a firm not to enter a specific market, see Sutherland Competition Law of South Africa
F004) 5-42 to 5-43.
17 See Federal Trade Commission 'Promoting Competition, Protecting Consumers: A Plain English Guide to
Antitrust Laws' chapter Mergers, available at: http://www.ftc.gov/bc/compguide/mergers.htm).
118 See also Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control
of concentrations between undertakings, OJEU C 31/5 of 05.02.2004 par 58-60, also available at:
http://europa.eu.inVeur-lex/pri/en/oj/daV2004/c 031 Ic 03120040205en00050018.pdf.
119 See the definition of 'potential competition' in the Glossary of Terms published by the Competition Com-
mission, available at: http://www.compcom.co.za/thelaw/thelaw glossary.asp?level=3.
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While prohibited practices, in the form of horizontal agreements may be easier to achieve
than mergers, because they do not require full integration of tlrms,"" a merger is apt to
have a bigger impact on the market, because it directly and permanently changes the
market structure itself and most mergers completely end competition between the merging
parties in the relevant market(s). Moreover, the problem of instability of such prohibited
conduct as a consequence of the 'risk of cheating,121does not occur. Furthermore, as indi-
cated above, mergers can facilitate anti-competitive conduct. Therefore, self-correcting
powers of the market are often not sufficient to address mergers. For that reason, South
Africa - like other nations - has established a legal framework to control mergers.
First, an overview of the approach to merger control under South African Competition Law
will be given. Second, the legal framework will be explained in detail.
15 1 1Overview
According to South African Competition Law, merger analysis will be done by considering
a number of interrelated questions:
• Does the Competition Act apply?
• Does the proposed transaction constitute a merger?
• In that event, is notification compulsory?
• If that is the case, is the merger likely to substantially prevent or lessen competition?
• In that case, is the merger likely to result in any technological, efficiency or other pro-
competitive gains or can it be justified on substantial public interest grounds?
• If the merger is likely to substantially prevent or lessen competition and cannot be
justified on pro-competitive gains or substantial public interest grounds, can conditions
on the proposed transaction be imposed, instead of an outright prohibition? If so, are
structural or behavioural remedies more appropriate?
24
120 CfSutherland Competition Law of South Africa (2004) 5-3.
121 Cartels tend to be instable, because it is likely that one of the involved parties does not behave in accor-
dance with the agreement to maximise its own profits. See in detail Sutherland Competition Law of South
Africa (2004) 5-4 and 5-58. Cf also Reekie 'The Competition Act, 1998: An Economic Perspective' (1999)
SAJE, Vol. 67 :2 1999 June, 263.
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• If the merger is not likely to substantially prevent or lessen competition, has the merger
to be prohibited on substantial public interest grounds?
15 12 The different levels of merger considerations
Chapter 3 of the Act provides the legal framework for the control of mergers. Mergers have
to be considered on different levels. Each of these levels will now be considered in detail.
15 12 1Application of the Act
The application of the Act normally does not cause a problem. The Act applies to all eco-
nomic activity 122 within, or having an effect123 within, South Africa.124 Nevertheless, this
can for instance be problematic when mergers, which take place outside of South Africa
but have an effect on competition in South Africa, have to be scrutinized.l'"
15 12 2 Definition of mergers
Competition authorities have to assess, if the proposed transaction constitutes a merger
as defined by the law. The Act widely defines a merger in section 12(1)(a) as follows:
'For purposes of this Act, a merger occurs when one or more firms directly or indi-
rectly acquire or establish direct or indirect control over the whole or part of the
business of another firm.'
122 For the problematic definition of this term see Sutherland Competition Law of South Africa (2004) 4-20
and section 4.4 with further references.
123 On the interpretation of 'an effect' see American Natural Soda Ash Corporation and CHC Global (Pty) Ltd
v Competition Commission of SA and Botswana Ash (Pty) Ltd and Chemserve Technical Products (Pty) Ltd
and Minister of Trade and Industry (SCA 554/03) par 24-29. Cf also the discussion of Sutherland Competi-
tion Law of South Africa (2004) 4-21 to 4-26.
124 S 3(1). The Act recognizes exceptions for collective bargaining within the meaning of s 23 of the Constitu-
tion and the Labour Relations Act 1995 (Act No. 66 of 1995) and collective agreements, as defined in section
213 of the Labour Relations Act, cf s 3(1) of the Competition Act. For details cf Sutherland Competition Law
of South Africa (2004) section 4.7.
125 For instance, such an effect on competition in South Africa can be observed when two international firms
merge and hence the South African subsidiary of the target firm will post-merger be controlled by the acquir-
ing firm. The Tribunal stated in The Dow Chemical Company / Union Carbide Corporation (CT 50/LM/AprOO)
par 10 in this context: 'Our powers are somewhat limited when we deal with mergers between multinational
companies that have already been approved in other jurisdictions. This is especially the case where the
products concerned are merely distributed in South Africa and the merger has been approved in the coun-
tries where the products are manufactured. Even if we prohibit the merger in South Africa the parties will
merge elsewhere and a single firm will control the two subsidiaries and the importation and distribution of the
three product categories in South Africa.' Cf also Legh in Brassey et al Competition Law (2002) 244-245.
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According to section 1(1)(xi) of the Act, a 'firm' is defined to include 'a person, partnership
or a trust'. Hence, the definition of a merger is quite broad. Any direct or indirect acquisi-
tion of control over another business will be regarded as a merger. This acquisition of con-
trol can be achieved by any manner, 'including through (i) purchase or lease of the shares,
an interest or assets of the other firm in question; or (ii) amalgamation or other combina-
tion with the other firm in question' .126
Accordingly, it is crucial to determine when control is acquired through a transaction. If a
transaction can be considered a 'merger' as defined by the Act, a notification of the merger
may be cornputsory!" and its omission may lead to severe penalties.!" The Act itself fol-
lows a broad approach also in this matter. Basically, any majority in shareholding or voting
rights or eminent influence on the firm's policy, depending on the nature of the firm, leads
to control, as defined in section 12(2) of the Act.129 Moreover, the South African courts
seem to interpret the acquisition of control widely. Accordingly, in the Bu/mer case130 a
change of shareholding was held to be a notifiable merger even though there had been no
change in control in the enumerated categories of section 12.131 The Tribunal postulated
that 'acquisition of control' had not been defined in section 12 as an exhaustive list. The
Act rather gives examples of control in form of a list of circumstances in which a person
126 S 12(1 )(b).
127 In case of large and intermediate mergers, s 13A(1), see in detail 1 5 1 2 3 infra.
128 See 1 5 1 29 infra.
129 Section 12(2) states that a 'person controls a firm if that person-
(a) beneficially owns more than one half of the issued share capital of the firm;
(b) is entitled to vote a majority of the votes that may be cast at a general meeting of the firm, or
has the ability to control the voting of a majority of those votes, either directly or through a
controlled entity of that person;
(c) is able to appoint or to veto the appointment of a majority of the directors of the firm;
(d) is a holding company, and the firm is a subsidiary of that company as contemplated in section
1(3) (a) of the Companies Act, 1973 (Act No. 61 of 1973);
(e) in the case of a firm that is a trust, has the ability to control the majority of the votes of the
trustees, to appoint the majority of the trustees or to appoint or change the majority of the
beneficiaries of the trust;
(f) in the case of a close corporation, owns the majority of members' interest or controls directly or
has the right to control the majority of members' votes in the close corporation; or
(g) has the ability to materially influence the policy of the firm in a manner comparable to a person
who, in ordinary commercial practice, can exercise an element of control referred to in para-
graphs (a) to (f)'.
According to the Competition Tribunal in Ethos Private Equity Fund /V / The Tsebo Outsourcing Group (Pty)
Ltd (CT 30/LM/Jun03) par 42, this subsection 'instances certain "bright lines" of when control will be as-
sumed. When firms cross that line [...l they must notify, albeit that they have not traveled very far in crossing
it.'
130 Bu/mer SA (Pty) Ltd and Seagram Africa (Pty) Ltd v Distillers Corporation (SA) Ltd and Stellenbosch
Farmers' Winery Group (Pty) Ltd and The Competition Commission (CT 94/FN/NovOO and 101/FN/DecOO).
131 In detail on this case: Legh in Brassey et al Competition Law (2002) 239-244.
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controls a firm. This decision was upheld by the Competition Appeal Court,132which con-
firmed that section 12(2) only 'instances circumstances of control but does not define nor
limit the circumstances' in which control over a firm may be acquired or established by a
person.!" Moreover, the Appeal Court suggested that that the Act provides for the possi-
bility of a plurality of controllers (joint control), stating that 'the wording of section 12(2),
clearly contemplates a situation where more than one party simultaneously exercises con-
trolover a company.'!" Furthermore, the Competition Tribunal decided in other cases that
the change from joint control to sole control could make a transaction notifiable, when it
changes the competitive environrnent.l'"
1 5 12 3 Necessity of notification
Once the transaction is labelled a merger as defined by the Act, different rules apply de-
pending on the nature of the merger and the size of the parties involved, because not
every proposed transaction is likely to be anti-competitive in the same way. Mergers be-
tween small firms normally do not concern competition authorities as much as mergers
between larger firms do, because their impact on markets are generally smalt!" Hence,
the Act differentiates between three categories of mergers: large, intermediate and small
mergers. Different provisions are set out for these categories. In particular, a party to a
small merger is generally not required to notify the Competition Commission of that
merger.137 In other words, such a merger may be implemented without first being ap-
proved by the competition authorities. At this stage, competition authorities do not con-
sider, whether the merger raises competition concerns or not. Competition concerns are
only scrutinised if transactions are notifiable, because the competition authorities only
132 Distillers Corporation (SA) Ltd and Stellenbosch Farmers' Winery Group Ltd v Bulmer (SA) (Pty) Ltd and
Seagram Africa (Pty) Ltd (08/CAC/May01).
133 Subsequently, the merger was notified. The Competition Commission recommended approving the
merger subject to certain conditions (notably the sale of a number of brandy and sparkling wine brands).
Finally, the Competition Tribunal endorsed the Commission's finding, approving the merger subject to condi-
tions, cf Distillers Corporation (SA) Limited / Stellenbosch Farmers Winery Group Ltd (CT 08/LM/Feb02) par
41.
134 Distillers Corporation (SA) Ltd and Stellenbosch Farmers' Winery Group Ltd v Bulmer (SA) (Pty) Ltd and
Seagram Africa (Pty) Ltd (08/CAC/May01).
135 Cf Iscor Limited / Saldanha Steel (Pty) Ltd (CT 67/LM/Dec01) par 36-49. See also Ethos Private Equity
Fund IV / The Tsebo Outsourcing Group (Pty) Ltd (CT 30/LM/Jun03) par 25-26.
136 This certainly depends on the respective market conditions and levels of concentration etc.
137 See s 13(3). If the Competition Commission intervenes and requires the parties to make notifications of
the merger, the Commission can approve the merger with or without conditions or prohibit it, see 1 5 1 2 3 3
infra. See for instance the case Digital Healthcare Solutions (Pty) Ltd v The Competition Commission and
Healthbridge (Pty) Ltd(CT 41/AM/Jun02).
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have jurisdiction to consider mergers that have been notified.138 In contrast and unlike un-
der the Maintenance and Promotion of Competition Act, large and intermediate mergers
must be notified to the Competition Commission before the actual implementation of the
proposed merger.139 In case of a large merger, the Commission is obliged to investigate
and report on the merger, although only the Competition Tribunal is competent to approve
or prohibit the merger. The Commission will only forward to the Competition Tribunal and
the Minister of Trade and Industry a written recommendation."? Conversely, the Competi-
tion Commission itself can approve an intermediate merger.
The Act defines large, intermediate, and small mergers. According to section 11(5)(a), a
small merger 'means a merger or proposed merger with a value at or below the lower
threshold established in terms of [section 11] subsection (1)(a)'. Conversely, all mergers or
proposed mergers with a value at or above the higher threshold are regarded as 'large
mergers,'!" while all mergers with a value between the lower and higher thresholds are
so-called 'intermediate mergers' .142
Section 11(1)(a) does not define these thresholds, though, but obliges the Minister of
Trade and lndustry!" to determine - in consultation with the Competition Commission -
the exact thresholds of the different categories. Accordingly, a lower and a higher thresh-
old have been determined by ministerial notice.!" This notice sets out certain values for
the combined annual turnover(s) and/or assets of the parties to a proposed merger, as
138 Bulmer SA (Pty) Ltd and Seagram Africa (Pty) Ltd v Distillers Corporation (SA) Ltd and Stellenbosch
Farmers' Winery Group (Pty) Ltd and The Competition Commission (CT 94/FN/NovOO and 101/FN/DecOO)
par 12; Caxton and CTP Publishers and Printers Limited v Naspers Limited and Electronic Media Network
Limited and Supersport International Holdings Limited and the Competition Commission (CT 16/FN/Mar04)
par 2.0n the other hand, the Competition Commission only requests notification for small mergers if it arrives
at the position that the merger may substantially prevent or lessen competition, or cannot be justified on pub-
lic interest grounds, see 1 51 233 infra, what makes a certain prior assessment always necessary.
139 Section 13A(1) in conjunction with section 13(A)(3). Even though transactions often have to be notified,
because competition authorities tend to interpret section 12 quite broadly (see 1 5 1 2 2 supra), more than
one notification of a transaction comprising several steps is not necessary: In Ethos Private Equity Fund IV /
The Tsebo Outsourcing Group (Pty) Ltd (CT 30/LM/Jun03) par 37, the Tribunal stated that '[a] change of
control is a once-off affair. Even if a firm has notified sole control at a time when that control is attenuated in
some respects by other shareholders and it later acquires an unfettered right, provided that sole control has
been notified and that this formed the basis of the decision, no subsequent notification is required.'
140 See s 14A(1 )(b).
141 S 11(5)(c).
142 S 11(5)(b).
143 The competence of this ministry follows from the definition of 'Minister' in s 1(xvi).
144 Notice of the department of Trade and Industry, GN 254 in GG22025 of 2 February 2001, also available
at http://www.compcom.co.za/thelaw/Thresholdterms.doc.
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well as for the annual turnover of the target firms or their assets.!" The thresholds have
been increased significantly since 1998, to reduce the number of transactions that are sub-
ject to mandatory notification and review.
According to the notice, a merger will fall above the lower threshold, if either
• the combined annual turnover in, into or from South Africa of the acquiring firms 146 and
the target firms 147 is valued at or above R 200 million, or
• the combined assets in South Africa of the acquiring firms and the target firms are val-
ued at or above R 200 million, or
• the annual turnover in, into or from South Africa of the acquiring firms and the assets of
the target firms are valued at or above R 200 million, or
• the assets in South Africa of the acquiring firms plus the annual turnover in, into or from
South Africa of the target firms are valued at or above R 200 million.
On top of this, the annual turnover of the target firms or their asset value must exceed R
30 million. Otherwise, if the merger falls below either value it will fall below the lower
threshold.
A merger will fall above the higher threshold if:
• The combined annual turnover in, into or from South Africa or the combined assets in
South Africa of the acquiring firms and the target firms are valued at or above R 3,5
billion, or
• the annual turnover in, into or from South Africa of the acquiring firms plus the assets in
South Africa of the target firms (or vice versa) are valued at or above R 3,5 billion.
On top of this, the annual turnover of the target firms or their asset value has to exceed R
100 million.
Accordingly, the position can be illustrated with the following graph on the next page:
145 The notice also prescribes the method of calculation for the assets and turnover of a firm.
146 Due to the definition in s 1(1)(i) the term 'acquiring firm' has to be understood in a wide sense, not only
including the immediate acquiring firm, but also its parent company or companies and all its fellow subsidiar-
ies, see Legh in Brassey et al Competition Law (2002) 233.
147 That is the immediate target and any firm which would - as a result of a merger - directly or indirectly
transfer direct or indirect control of the whole or part of, its business to an acquiring firm, s 1(1)(xxxiii).
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Graph 2: Merger thresholds
large merger
D
Higher threshold
Combined annual turnover(s) and/or assets!" + Target value!"
~ R 3,5 billion > R 100 million
otherwise
D
intermediate· merger
if not below
D
Lower threshold
Combined annual turnover(s) and/or assets + Target value
~ R 200 million > R 30 million
otherwise
D
small merger
Beside the difference in notification duties, only intermediate and small mergers must be
regarded as having been approved, if the Commission does not act within the prescribed
period.150 Such an event in large merger proceedings, conversely, leads only to the right to
apply to the Tribunal to begin the consideration of the merger stralqhtaway.P'
148 Annual turnover of the acquiring firms plus annual turnover of the target firms OR annual turnover of the
acquiring firms plus assets of the target firms OR annual turnover of the target firms plus assets of the ac-
quiring firms OR annual assets of the acquiring firms plus annual assets of the target firms.
149 Annual turnover of the target firms or their asset value.
150 See s 13(6) and s 14(2).
151 See s 14A(3).
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Moreover, there is an enormous difference as far as the merger filing fees are concerned,
because the fees are based on the value of the combined annual turnover or assets in-
volved in any transactlon.!"
According to the Act, the main procedural steps in the consideration of large, intermediate,
and small mergers can be summarized as follows: 153
1 5 12 3 1 The procedure of large merger considerations
• Compulsory notification by the parties to a merger154(filing) 155
• Competition Commission refers the notice to the Competition Tribunal and the Minister of
Trade and Industry 156
• Investigation by the Commission 157and consideration of the merger in terms of section
12A
• Recommendation by the Commission within 40 business days,158if the merger should be
approved, conditionally approved or prohlblted""
• Competition Tribunal phase (Tribunal sets a date for proceedings in respect of the
merger, hearing, decision on the merger)160
• Appeal from that decision to the Competition Appeal Court is possible within 20 business
days after notice of the decision by the Competition Tribunal161
152 There are no fees for small mergers, whereas the filing fee for intermediate mergers is R 75.000 and R
250.000 (plus VAT) for large mergers, see Rules for the Conduct of Proceedings in the Competition Com-
mission, Rule 10(5) and (6), GG 22025 of 1 February 2001.
153 A more detailed overview of the merger proceedings is published by the Competition Tribunal at:
http://www.comptrib.co.za/Flow%20charts/Merger%20procedures.pdf.
154 See s 13A(1). A 'party to a merger' means according to s 1(xviii) the acquiring firm or the target firm.
155 It is also stated that any person, whether or not a party to or a participant in merger proceedings, may
voluntarily file any document, affidavit, statement or other relevant information in respect of that merger, s
138(3).
156 S 14A(1 )(a).
157 Cts 138.
156 The Competition Tribunal may extend this period in respect of a particular merger upon an application by
the Competition Commission, but the Tribunal may not grant an extension of more than 15 business days at
a time, s 14A(2).
159 See s 14A(1 )(b). If the Commission fails to forward a recommendation in the prescribed time period, nor
applies for an extended time, any party to the merger may apply to the Tribunal to begin the consideration of
the merger straightaway, s 14A(3).
160 For details ct s 16.
161 For details ct s 17. See also s 61 to 63.
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15 12 32 The procedure of intermediate merger considerations
• Compulsory notification by the parties to a merger
• Competition Commission considers the merger in terms of section 12A and decides
within 20 business days whether to approve, conditionally approve or prohibit it162
• Request to the Competition Tribunal to consider the decision of the Commission is
possible, if the Commission approves the merger only conditionally or prohibits it163
• Appeal from that decision to the Competition Appeal Court is possible within 20 business
days after notice of the decision by the Competition Tribunal''"
1 5 12 3 3 The procedure of small merger considerations
• Notification by the parties to a merger is generally not required''" (but allowed) 166 and the
merger may be implemented without approval!"
• Exception: the Competition Commission requires the parties to notify during six months
after the implementation of the merger, if the merger, in the opinion of the Commission,
may substantially prevent or lessen competition, or cannot be justified on public interest
grounds 168
• In that event, the parties may not take any further steps toward the implementation until
the merger has been approved or conditionally approved''"
• Request to the Competition Tribunal to consider the decision of the Commission is
possible, if the Commission approves the merger only conditionally or even prohibits it170
In terms of section 21 (4) of the Act, the Minister of Trade and Industry, in consultation with
the Competition Commission, has prescribed regulations relating to the functions of the
Commission, which govern the merger proceedinqs.!"
162See s 14. The Competition Commission may extend the period in which it has to consider the proposed
merger by a single period not exceeding 40 business days and, in that case, must issue an extension certifi-
cate to any party who notified it of the merger, s 14(1 )(a).
163S 16(1 )(a). See for instance Nasnuus, a division of Nasionale Media Limited v The Competition Commis-
sion of South Africa (CT 27/AM/MarOO) and CT Media Publications (Pty) Ltd v The Competition Commission
of South Africa (CT 34/AM/MarOO).
164For details cf s 17.
165See s 13(1)(a).
166See s 13(2).
167See s 13(1)(b).
168See s 13(3). The consideration criteria set out in s 12A equally apply for small merger considerations.
169See s 13(4).
170S16(1).
171 Rules for the Conduct of Proceedings in the Competition Commission, GG 22025 of 1 February 2001.
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1 5 12 4 Consideration of the merger's effect on competition
Once competition authorities have determined that the Competition Act applies and the
proposed transaction constitutes a merger, which is notifiable and indeed notified, it has to
be scrutinized. It must to be determined whether the merger is 'likely to substantially pre-
vent or lessen competition' .172The test refers to likeliness. Competition authorities do not
have to consider whether the merger necessarily prevents or lessens corrpetltlon.!" Even
though the Competition Tribunal may not base its decisions upon 'speculation of a kind
which cannot be attributed to any evidential foundation placed before the Tribunal,,174 sec-
tion 12A(1) nevertheless 'enjoins the Tribunal to forecast a likely possibility; that is it
makes a predictive judgement, based on evidence which has been placed before it.,175
Hence, not every single merger is prohibited. It has already been stated above that the
number of competing firms in a market is not equal to the competitiveness of the market.
Thus, competition authorities have to assess in every single case the merger's effect on
competition, to decide, whether the merger should be approved, conditionally approved, or
prohibited. The Act sets out a range of substantive factors in section 12A, including mar-
ket, efficiency and public interest considerations, which have to be weighed up by the
Competition Commission or Competition Tribunal to determine, whether or not the merger
is likely to substantially prevent or lessen competition. However, the Tribunal made clear,
that section 12A requires a causal relationship between the merger and the substantial
lessening of competition in the implicated market: 176
'If the loss of competition would have occurred in any event due to other factors,
absent the merger, then the merger should not be enjoined because the remedy
would be pointless.'
According to section 12A(2), when considering the market and determining whether or not
a merger is likely to substantially prevent or lessen competition, the competition authorities
172 S 12A(1).
173 Cf Mondi Ltd and Kohler Cores and Tubes, A division of Kohler Packaging Ltd (20/CAC/Jun02) par 38.
174 Schumann Sasol (South Africa) (Pty) Ltd and Price's Daelite (Pty) Ltd (10/CAC/Aug01).
175 Mondi Ltd and Kohler Cores and Tubes, A division of Kohler Packaging Ltd (20/CAC/Jun02) par 38.
176 JD Group Limited / Profurn Limited (CT 60/LM/Aug02) par 106. In this context the Tribunal referred to the
European legislation in France v EC Commission, cases C-68/94 and C-90/95 [1998] ECR I - 1375, [1998] 4
CMLR 829, which follows the same approach.
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must assess the strength of competition in a relevant market,"? and the probability that the
firms in the post-merger market will behave competitively or co-operatively, taking into ac-
count any factor that is relevant to competition in that market. Even though the Act does
not define when a merger is likely to substantially prevent or lessen competition, the com-
petition authorities basically seem to weigh up the facts and competitive arguments in
each case as well as the advantages and disadvantages of the merger, assessing if the
transaction has the potential to impact adversely upon competition. Although the Competi-
tion Tribunal emphasised that '[aln anti-trust merger evaluation is always primarily con-
cerned with an assessment of the impact of the transaction in question on consumers,'!"
the Act sets out a list of eight factors, which can be taken into account considering whether
the merger should be (conditionally) approved, or not, namely:
• The actual and potential level of import competition in the market
• The ease of entry into the market, including tariff and regulatory barriers
• The level and trends of concentration, and history of collusion, in the market
• The degree of countervailing power in the market
• The dynamic characteristics of the market, including growth, innovation, and product
differentiation
• The nature and extent of vertical integration in the market
• Whether the business or part of the business of a party to the merger or proposed
merger has failed or is likely to fail
• Whether the merger will result in the removal of an effective competitor
1 5 12 4 1Definition of the relevant market
To determine the potential detrimental effects to competition resulting from the merger, the
market firstly has to be defined.179 This is often the most controversial aspect of a merger
in court and the parties to a merger will always argue for a broad market definition."? The
smaller a market is, the heavier will be the impact of a merger. A narrow market definition
177 For the definition of the relevant market see 1 5 1 2 4 1 infra.
178 JD Group Limited / EI/erine Holdings Limited (CT 78/LM/JuIOO).
179 The problem of market definition occurs in the same way as it does for the measuring of market power in
terms of section 7.
180 See paradigmatically: JD Group Limited / EI/erine Holdings Limited (CT 78/LM/JuIOO), where the parties
argued for one 'mass market' for each of their products (product market), sold on the 'national market' in-
stead of a large number of local markets (geographic market). Cf also DaimlerChrysler South Africa (Pty) Ltd
/ Sandown Motor Holdings (Pty) Ltd (CT 44/LM/JuI01) and Unilever PIc / Robertsons Foods (Pty) Ltd (CT
55/LM/Sep01) par 11 and 22.
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naturally results in higher market shares and higher concentration levels for the parties to
the merger because of a smaller pool of products and/or cornpentors.!'"
The Competition Tribunal only omits defining the relevant market, if it concludes that the
proposed transaction will not result in any substantial lessening or prevention of competi-
tion, irrespective of the market being broadly or narrowly construed.l'"
To define the relevant market, the so-called 'hypothetical monopolist test' is used, as it is
described by the 1992 United States Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Com-
mission Guidelines: 183
'A market is defined as a product or group of products and a geographic area in
which it is produced or sold such that a hypothetical profit-maximizing firm, not
subject to price regulation, that was the only present and future producer or seller
of those products in that area likely would impose at least a 'small but significant
and nontransitory' increase in price, assuming the terms of sale of all other prod-
ucts are held constant.'
Hence, the test is also signified as 'SSNIP-test' ('Small but Significant and Non-transitory
Increase in Price'). The test assesses if a hypothetical monopolist would be in a position to
exercise market power by increasing the price for its products not only for a very brief time,
without consumers either switching to other products or switching to the same product
181 See Uni/ever PIc / Robertsons Foods (Pty) Ltd (CT 55/LM/Sep01) par 34. Accordingly, regarding the mar-
ket definition of the Commission in the OTK case (OTK Agri Products Trading, a division of OTK Ltd / Farm
Feed Services, a division of Afribrand Trading (Pty) Ltd (CT 11/LM/Feb02) par 9), the Tribunal stated that
'the market identified by the Commission is, for the purposes of this transaction, the narrowest market classi-
fication possible. Since the merger raises no competition concerns on this classification, it will obviously not
raise any concerns on any (wider) market definition.'
182 The Tribunal either does not define the relevant product market precisely (see for instance Franco-
Nevada Mining Corporation Ltd / Gold Fields Ltd (CT 77/LM/JuI00); Unilever PIc / Robertsons Foods (Pty)
Ltd (CT 55/LM/Sep01) par 28; JD Group Limited / Profurn Limited (CT 60/LM/Aug02) par 103; Cool Ideas
262 (Pty) Limited / Crossroads (Pty) Ltd and others (CT 73/LM/Dec03); BOE Holdings Limited / Company
Unique Finance (Pty) Limited (CT 42/LM/Jun04) par 15 and recently Sanlam Limited / Safrican Insurance
Company and Newshelf 503 (Pty) Ltd (CT 03/LM/Jan05)), or omits to define the relevant geographic market
(cf Afgri Operations Ltd / Laeveld Korporatiewe Beleggings Beperk (CT 71/LM/Sep02); Masstores (Pty) Lim-
ited / Hentiq 2869 (Pty) Ltd and Rivonia Produce & Hardware (Pty) Limited (CT 53/LM/JuI04) par 18-19; Pio-
neer Foods (Pty) Ltd / Accolade Trading Company (Pty) Ltd (CT 55/LM/Aug04) par 11. See also recently
Liberty Group Limited / Wedelin Investments (Pty) Ltd (CT 40/LM/May05) and Kermas South Africa (Pty) Ltd
/ Samancor Ltd (CT 22/LM/Mar05) par 11).
183 1992 United States Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Horizontal Merger Guidelines
[with April 8, 1997, Revisions to section 4 on efficiencies] section 1.0, available at:
http://www.ftc.gov/bc/docs/horizmer.htm.
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produced by firms at other locattons.!" Competition authorities will tentatively assume a
certain group of products to be the relevant market. If an attempt to raise prices by the hy-
pothetical monopolist would result in a reduction of sales large enough that the price in-
crease would not prove profitable, the identified product group will be regarded as too nar-
row.185The same reasoning can be used to determine a geographic market, for the market
definition embraces different elements: a specific product or group of products and the par-
ticular geographic area, in which the product is sold.186Accordingly, the relevant market is
the smallest product or group of products (product metket; in the smallest geographic area
(geographic markeQ, where the SSNIP-test still applies.
The relevant product market is in practice determined by South African competition au-
thorities by the test of substitutability of a product or service from the consumer's point of
view. It is established, if the separate products identified are functionally interchangeable
or substitutable by the consumer by reason of the products' or services' characteristics,
their prices and their intended use, or if each product is used to perform a specific function,
which cannot be performed by one of the other products identified, even by one falling in
the same broad product category.187
The Competition Tribunal referred to the test set out by the US Supreme Court in the
Brown Shoe case.l'" in which the court declared:
'The outer boundaries of a product market are determined by the reasonable in-
terchangeability of use [by consumers] or the cross-elasticity of demand between
the product itself and substitutes for it.'189
184 The Tribunal stated: 'The relevant market is the narrowest market at a given level of the supply chain in
which a hypothetical monopolist operating at that level could exert a significant degree of market power.'
(South African Raisins (Pty) Ltd and Johannes Petrus Slabber v SAD Holdings Ltd and SAD Vine Fruit (Pty)
Ltd (CT 04/IR/OcV1999) par 3.4).
185 Cf European Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community com-
petition law, OJEC C 372 of 09.12.1997, par 16-17, also available at:
http://europa.eu.inVsmartapi/cgi/sga doc?smartapi!celexapi!prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=en&numdoc=31997Y1
209(01 )&model=guichett.
186 Sometimes also the element of time is of importance.
187 Cf Boart Longyear (a division of Anglo Operations Limited) / Huddy (Pty) Ltd and Huddy Rock Tools (Pty)
Ltd (CT 41/LM/Aug03). See also Massmart Holdings Ltd / Jumbo Cash and Carry (Pty) Ltd; Massmart Hold-
invs Ltd / Picardi Liquors (Pty) Ltd - Sip 'n Save division (CT 39/LM/JuI01 and 47LM/Aug01) par 8.
18 Brown Shoe Co v United States 370 US, 294 S.Ct. 1502 at 325.
189 See for instance Nest/é (SA) (Pty) Ltd / Pets Products (Pty) Ltd / Heinz South Africa (Pty) Ltd / Tiger
Foods Ltd (CT 21/LM/Apr01) par 21. The European Commission defines the relevant product market as
follows: CArelevant product market comprises all those products and/or services which are regarded as inter-
changeable or substitutable by the consumer, by reason of the products' characteristics, their prices and
36
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Nevertheless, in some cases mere functional interchangeability of products does not suf-
fice as only criterion for determining the relevant market. The Competition Tribunal pointed
out that '[t]here are a range of factors at play in this determination [of the relevant market]
of which functional interchangeability is but one, albeit important, conslderatlort"? In this
context, the Tribunal recognises the existence of distinguishable market segments and
'well defined sub-markets' within a broad product rnarket.!" Such sub-markets are indi-
cated by several factors, which the Supreme Court in the Brown Shoe case determined
and of which the Tribunal makes use in analysing the market delineation in some cases.
According to the Supreme Court, such factors include 'industry or public recognition of the
sub-market as a separate economic entity, the product's peculiar characteristics and uses,
unique production facilities, distinct customers, distinct prices, sensitivity to price changes,
and specialized vendors.' Hence, the Tribunal for instance also takes into account, the way
products are sold, especially the different channels of distribution and 'store types' to de-
termine the relevant market.192
their intended use.' See European Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes
of Community competition law, OJEC C 372 of 09.12.1997, par 7, also available at:
http://europa.eu.int/smartapi/cgi/sga doc?smartapi!celexapi!prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=en&numdoc=31997Y1
209(01 )&model=guichett.
190 Boart Longyear (a division of Anglo Operations Limited) / Huddy (Pty) Ltd and Huddy Rock Tools (Pty)
Ltd (CT 41/LM/Aug03). See also the European practice in defining the relevant market, European Commis-
sion Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community competition law, OJEC C 372
of 09.12.1997, part III., also available at:
http://europa.eu.int/smartapi/cgi/sga doc?smartapi!celexapi!prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=en&numdoc=31997Y1
209(01 )&model=guichett.
191 See JD Group Limited / Ellerine Holdings Limited (CT 78/LM/JuI00) referring to US and European jurisdic-
tion (namely to Brown Shoe Co v United States 370 US, 294 S.Ct. 1502); confirmed by JD Group Limited /
Profurn Limited (CT 60/LM/Aug02) par 88. See also Boart Longyear (a division of Anglo Operations Limited)
/ Huddy (Pty) Ltd and Huddy Rock Tools (Pty) Ltd (CT 41/LM/Aug03), where the Tribunal used broader mar-
ket definitions: '[I]n analyzing the retail furniture market we have not distinguished a market for lounge suites
from a market for bedroom suites even though the respective products are clearly not functionally inter-
changeable. We have rather acknowledged that, for the most part, the market is served by retailers, and to a
somewhat lesser extent, manufacturers who produce and/or supply the full range of furniture or grocery or
clothing products. This coincides, for the most part, with the demands of their customers whose requirements
~enerally cover the full range of furniture or grocery products.'
92 See JD Group Limited / Ellerine Holdings Limited (CT 78/LM/JuI00); consequently, in Nest/é (SA) (Pty)
Ltd / Pets Products (Pty) Ltd / Heinz South Africa (Pty) Ltd / Tiger Foods Ltd (CT 21/LM/Apr01) par 27 the
Tribunal distinguished between separate markets of the sale of pet food through the retail channel and the
non-retail channel.
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The geographic market is also defined by determining the cross-elasticity of demand193
and supply. It is the area to which customers can 'reasonably turn for sources of supply,194
or 'where competitors face competitlon.T" In other words, in such a market the hypotheti-
cal monopolist can increase the price for his product while reducing the quantity of produc-
tion without customers switching to sources outside this certain area and without competi-
tors from other territories entering the monopolist's territory to compete with substitute
prooucts.l'" Hence, the exercise of market definition consists of identifying the effective
alternative sources of supply for the customers of the undertakings involved, in terms both
of products/services and of geographic location of supplters.l'" The geographic market can
be local,198regional,199 national,20oor even lnternational./?'
193 Economists define cross-elasticity of demand as follows: 'The effect of a change in the price of one prod-
uct on the sales volume of some other product. Thus, if an increase in the price of butter causes a significant
increase in the volume of oleomargarine sold, then there is significant cross-elasticity of demand between
those two products.' (Glossary of Terms published by the Competition Commission, available at:
http://www.compcom.co.za/thelaw/thelaw glossary.asp?level=3). Cross-elasticities of demand provide a
useful measure of the relationship between goods. For instance, a high positive or negative cross-elasticity
indicates a close relationship between goods, see Black et al ECONOMICS Principles and Practices - A
South African Perspective Second Edition (1997) 51-52.
194 Trident Steel (Pty) Ltd / Dorbyl Ltd (CT 89/LM/OctOO) par 28 quoting American Bar Association Antitrust
Law Developments, a" (Chicago: American Bar Association) 1997 p 60.
195 Liberty Group Limited / Investec Employee Benefits Limited (CT 32/LM/Jun03) par 37. Cf also JD Group
Limited / Ellerine Holdings Limited (CT 78/LM/JuI00) and The Tongaat-Huleft Group Ltd / Transvaal Suiker
Beperk and Middenen Ontwikkeling (Pty) Ltd and Senteeko (Edms) Bpk and New Komati Sugar Miller's
Partnership and TSB Bestuursdienste (CT 83/LM/JuI00) par 43: The 'area over which merged firms and its
rivals currently supply, or could supply, the relevant product and to which consumers can practically turn.'
The European Commission defines the geographic market as follows: "The relevant geographic market
comprises the area in which the undertakings concerned are involved in the supply and demand of products
or services, in which the conditions of competition are sufficiently homogeneous and which can be distin-
guished from neighbouring areas because the conditions of competition are appreciably different in those
area.' See European Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community
competition law, OJEC C 372 of 09.12.1997, par 8, also available at:
http://europa.eu.int/smartapi/cgi/sga doc?smartapi!celexapi!prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=en&numdoc=31997Y1
209(01 )&model=guichett.
196 See for instance Murray & Roberts Ltd / The Cementation Company (Africa) Ltd (CT 02/LM/Jan04) par
26.
197 European Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community compe-
tition law, OJEC C 372 of 09.12.1997, par 13, also available at:
http://europa.eu.int/smartapi/cgi/sga doc?smartapi!celexapi!prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=en&numdoc=31997Y1
209(01 )&model=guichett.
198 Cf Pick 'n Pay Retailers (Pty) Ltd / Boxer Holdings (Pty) Ltd (CT 521LM/JuI02).
199 See for instance Highveld Steel and Vanadium Corporation Ltd / Van Leer South Africa (CT 06/LM/Oct99)
~ar 8.
00 See as an example Distillers Corporation (SA) Limited / Stellenbosch Farmers Winery Group Ltd (CT
08/LM/Feb02). Cf also JD Group Limited / Ellerine Holdings Limited (CT 78/LM/JuI00), where the Tribunal
defined a national market due to the national setting of prices and key trading conditions.
201 Cf Framatome Societe Anonyme / Siemens AG (CT 04/LM/Jan01) par 16. However, the Tribunal postu-
lated in the case Trident Steel (Pty) Ltd / Dorbyl Ltd (CT 89/LM/OctOO) par 27, that '[t]he mere presence of
imports does not necessarily indicate conclusively that a market is international.'
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As far as media markets are concerned, the South African competition authorities made
certain important statements, which will be referred to later on.202
1 5 12 4 2 The actual and potential level of import competition in the market
Competition authorities have to take into account, if products can be imported into South
Africa at prices competitive with those of the merged firm.203If this is the case, it is unlikely
that the merged entity has market power to increase prices unilaterally, because custom-
ers can switch to competing imports.204A plurality of factors can reduce such a competitive
import effect, like regulatory obstacles (import quotas or permit requirements) or actual
hindrances for foreign competitors (high transport costs, exchange rate fluctuations,205 and
domestic labelling).206
1 5 12 4 3 The ease of entry into the market, including tariff and regulatory barriers
This factor overlaps with 'level of import competition' to some extent, but it also has to
be assessed whether there are barriers to entry into the relevant market on a national
level and 'to what extent new entrants would be encouraged to enter the market and
thus constrain a possible exercise of any market power by the merged entity.,207Such
barriers can be the concentration of power in the downstream market, for instance
where major retail chain stores control a retail channel,208 or the large expenditures
which a new entrant will have to expend in order to establish a new brand in a concen-
202 See 1 5 3 5 6 infra.
203 See for instance Pioneer Foods (Pty) Ltd / John Moir's, a division of Bromor Foods (Pty) Ltd (CT
46/LM/Jun04).
204 Legh in Brassey et al Competition Law (2002) 270.
205 In the Mondi and Kohler case, the Commission argued for instance that imports were 'possible but not
economically viable due to the exchange rate', see argumentation of the Commission in Mondi Ltd and Koh-
ler Cores and Tubes, A division of Kohler Packaging Ltd (20/CAC/Jun02) par 77. Cf also Murray & Roberts
Ltd / The Cementation Company (Africa) Ltd (CT 02lLM/Jan04) par 53.
206 In detail Legh in Brassey et al Competition Law (2002) 270 referring to the Canadian Merger Enforcement
Guidelines. Cf also the examples given by the European Guidelines (Guidelines on the assessment of hori-
zontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of concentrations between undertakings, OJEU
C 31/5 of 05.02.2004 par 71, also available at: http://europa.eu.inVeur-
lex/pri/en/oj/daV2004/c 031 Ic 03120040205en00050018. pdf).
207 Xstrata South Africa (Pty) Ltd / Egalite (Pty) Ltd and International Carbon Holdings (Pty) Ltd (CT
54/LM/JuI04).
208 Cf Nest/é (SA) (Pty) Ltd / Pets Products (Pty) Ltd / Heinz South Africa (Pty) Ltd / Tiger Foods Ltd (CT
21/LM/Apr01) par 55.
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trated market, in which other well-known solid brands already exist.209 The Competition
Tribunaf"? has referred to US antitrust policy, according to which the ease of market
entry is one of the most important factors indicating that the merger might not have anti-
competitive effects.211
15 124 4 The level and trends of concentration, and history of collusion, in the market
The mere fact that the markets are highly concentrated does not mean that a merger is
likely to be anttcompetittve.ê" and '[ilt is trite that mere increases in concentration do not
necessarily give rise to competition concerns.V" Nevertheless, a merger's effect on mar-
ket concentration is an important factor in the assessment of the likelihood of the merged
firm having market power and hence the potential to raise prices post merger to a supra-
competitive level. Market concentration is a function of the number of firms in a market and
their respective market shares.ê" The assessment of market concentration is crucial for
determining the potential detrimental effects of a proposed merger. To determine the con-
centration of a market, economists use certain calculation methods, expressed by different
indices, which indicate 'the scarcity or lack of firms and the inequality in the size of the
209 Cf Bromor Foods (Pty) Ltd / National Brands Ltd (CT 19/LM/FebOO) par 17-22 with further references.
See also Nestlé (SA) (Pty) Ltd / Pets Products (Pty) Ltd / Heinz South Africa (Pty) Ltd / Tiger Foods Ltd (CT
21/LM/Apr01) par 56-59.
210 Cf Xstrata South Africa (Pty) Ltd / Egalite (Pty) Ltd and International Carbon Holdings (Pty) Ltd (CT
54/LM/JuI04).
211 According to the 'Entry Analysis' in the 1992 United States Department of Justice and Federal Trade
Commission Horizontal Merger Guidelines [with April 8, 1997, Revisions to section 4 on efficiencies] Section
3.0, available at: http://www.ftc.gov/bc/docs/horizmer.htm. the FTC assesses whether entry would be 'timely,
likely and sufficient [ ... ] to deter or to counteract the competitive effects of concern' to determine whether
entry is 'easy'. The Guidelines further postulate that '[i]n markets where entry is that easy (i.e., where entry
passes these tests of timeliness, likelihood, and sufficiency), the merger raises no antitrust concern and or-
dinarily requires no further analysis.' Also the European Merger Guidelines recognise that 'a merger is
unlikely to pose any significant anti-competitive risk' when entering a market is 'sufficiently easy'. The same
test applies and hence the entry must be 'likely, timely and sufficient' (Guidelines on the assessment of hori-
zontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of concentrations between undertakings, OJEU
C 31/5 of 05.02.2004 par 68, also available at: http://europa.eu.inVeur-
lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2004/c 031/c 03120040205en00050018.pdf). See also Theron 'The Economics of Competi-
tion Policy: Merger Analysis in South Africa' (2001) SAJE, vol. 69: 4, 646-649.
212 Nestlé (SA) (Pty) Ltd / Pets Products (Pty) Ltd / Heinz South Africa (Pty) Ltd / Tiger Foods Ltd (CT
21/LM/Apr01) par 44.
213 The Tiso Consortium (comprising of Investec Bank Ltd, Multi-Direct Investments 180 (Pty) Ltd, Capricorn
Capital Partners Holding Co (Pty) Ltd, Mineworkers Investments Co (Pty) Ltd ('MIC') and Safika Holdings
[Pty) Ltd) / New Africa Investments Limited ('NAIL') (CT 59/LM/Oct03) par 31.
14 A firm's market share reflects the amount of economic activity for which it is responsible in the relevant
market (see JD Group Limited / Ellerine Holdings Limited (CT 78/LM/JuI00)). For the different approaches of
determining the market shares, see Bidvest Group Limited / Paragon Business Communications Limited (CT
56/LM/Oct01) par 46.
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firms in the market.'215 One of the indices is the Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index (HHI). The
HHI of market concentration is calculated by summing the squares of the individual market
shares of all the participants.ê" The spectrum of market concentration as measured by the
HHI is divided into three regions that can be broadly characterized as unconcentrated (HHI
below 1000), moderately concentrated (HHI between 1000 and 1800), and highly concen-
trated (HHI above 1800).217A merger that results in an increase in the HHI of more than
100 points is likely to raise competition concems.f" The Competition Tribunal uses the
HHI as a screening mechanism, even though this index alone is not apt to constitute the
basis for a merger constderatlon.!" The Tribunal pointed out, that it does not 'believe that
the HHI, even when a relatively straightforward calculation, should, on its own, constitute
the basis for deciding on the outcome of a merger investigation.'220 HHls are 'indicative
statistical measures; they are not determinant. They must always be bolstered [by] a
deeper, qualitative enquiry in order to arrive at a realistic assessment of the impact of the
transaction on competition in the relevant market.'221 For instance, the Tribunal recognised
in certain cases that the increase in concentration post-merger might not always be as-
sessed by simply summing the market shares of the merging firms, because sometimes a
decline in market share due to the transaction itself can be observed (so-called 'run-
215 Theron 'The Economics of Competition Policy: Merger Analysis in South Africa' (2001) SAJE, vol. 69: 4,
636-637.
216 See for instance Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the
control of concentrations between undertakings, OJEU C 3115 of 05.02.2004 par 16, also available at:
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2004/c 031 Ic 03120040205en00050018.pdf.
217 The Competition Tribunal refers to the 1992 United States Department of Justice and Federal Trade
Commission Horizontal Merger Guidelines [with April 8, 1997, Revisions to section 4 on efficiencies], avail-
able at: http://www.ftc.gov/bc/docs/horizmer.htm. Cf The Bidvest Group Ltd / Island View Storage Ltd (CT
17/LM/Dec99).
218 In highly concentrated markets the FTC considers an increase in the HHI of more than 100 points likely to
create or enhance market power or facilitate its exercise, unless other factors are shown to make it unlikely
that the merger will have this effect. Moreover, the US Merger Guidelines consider an HHI increase of more
than 100 points in a merger that leads to a moderate level of concentration as a relatively large increase in
concentration. This potentially raises significantly competitive concerns, what demands for further scrutiny.
219 Also the FTC uses the HHI only 'as an aid to the interpretation of market data' and states that 'although
the resulting regions [of market concentration] provide a useful framework for merger analysis, the numerical
divisions suggest greater precision than is possible with the available economic tools and information', cf
1992 United States Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Horizontal Merger Guidelines
[with April 8, 1997, Revisions to section 4 on efficiencies] Section 1.5, available at:
http://www.ftc.gov/bc/docs/horizmer.htm. Also in the European merger guidelines it is pointed out clearly that
each of the 'HHllevels [... ] may be used as an initial indicator of the absence of competition concerns. How-
ever, they do not give rise to a presumption of either the existence or the absence of such concerns.' (Guide-
lines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of concentrations
between undertakings, OJEU C 31/5 of 05.02.2004 par 21, also available at: http://europa.eu.int/eur-
lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2004/c 031 Ic 03120040205en00050018. pdf).
220 JD Group Ltd / Ellerine Holdings Ltd (CT 78/LM/JuI/00).
221 JD Group Ltd / Ellerine Holdings Ltd (CT 78/LM/JuI/00).
41
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Chapter 1 - South African Competition Law
Off,).222 Furthermore, the use of the HHI analysis is controversial in economics and the
competition authorities use other concentration tests as well, like the four-firm concentra-
tion ratio (so-called 'CR4 test'). This test measures the portion of the market accounted for
by the four leading firms. Competition authorities are, as a rule, very sceptical of a merger
where the combined share of the four largest firms will exceed 75% and the merged firm
will supply at least 15% of the relevant market.223
Mostly, the structure and the level of concentration of a certain market are not held to be
decisive. However, the structure of an industry allows certain conclusions to be made
about the possible conduct after a merger. The Competition Commission postulated:224
'In the case of a merger a Competition Authority has to make a certain 'guessti-
mate' of what the conduct of the merged entity post-merger will be. Relying on
structural characteristics of markets (market shares, concentration levels, etc.) to
make certain conclusions about future market behaviour has become common
practice.'
History of collusion in the market, in which the proposed merger would take place, is also
of interest. It has to be assessed, whether the structure of the market is susceptible to col-
lusion prior to the merger. If the competition authorities conclude that a merger is anti-
competitive because collusion is likely to occur following the merger, that merger will be
more likely to be prohibited. If a transaction will facilitate tacit or express coordinated con-
duct by facilitating the exchange of pricing and other competitively sensitive information, it
will be regarded as being likely to substantially lessen competition in terms of section
12A.225 Conversely, the specifics of the products sold on the relevant market, like their
pricing structures, and the particular form of distribution can lead to the assessment that
collusive strategies are unlikely to occur despite high concentratlon.ê"
1 5 12 4 5 The degree of countervailing power in the market
222 See Santam Limited / Guardian National Insurance Company Limited (CT 14/LM/FebOO) par 20.
223 JD Group Ltd / Ellerine Holdings Ltd (CT 78/LM/Jul/00).
224 Competition Commission Report to the South African Reserve Bank - The proposed merger between
NEDCOR and STANBIC Pretoria (2000) 12, quoted from: Theron 'The Economics of Competition Policy:
Merger Analysis in South Africa' (2001) SAJE, vol. 69: 4, 622.
225 See for instance Mondi Ltd / Kohler Cores and Tubes, A division of Kohler Packaging Ltd (CT
06/LM/Jan02) par 85-99.
226 See for instance Pioneer Foods (Pty) Ltd / SAD Holdings Limited (CT 23/LM/Apr02) par 28.
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Competition authorities also discern whether there is compensating market power, exer-
cised by strong competitors, customers, or suppuers."? Competition authorities may con-
sider this factor as a counterbalance for the effect that the proposed merger will have on
competition.228 Especially if there are many large competitors in the market, a merger is,
generally speaking, unlikely to affect competition adversely, because it is unlikely that the
merging parties will acquire market power as a result of the transactlon.ê" The same ar-
gumentation applies, if a merger 'involve[s] firms producing arcane intermediate products
with the final consumer located several links lower in the production chain. In these in-
stances the consumers directly affected is often themselves well resoureed downstream
producers capable of mounting a sophisticated response to a merger that it deems threat-
ening to their commercial interests.'23o
Hence, parties to a merger often argue that the market power that might accrue to them
because of the merger is blunted by the countervailing strength of their customers, sug-
gesting that large, well-resourced buyers are better placed to resist an exercise of market
power on the part of a monopolistic supplier than less well-resourced and more atomised
consurners.ê'"
In view of detrimental effects for customers in downstream markets, especially the end
consumer, the Tribunal seems to be sceptical of this argument, though, stating that 'a
powerful buyer, because it often has power in its own market, will, if faced with supra-
competitive pricing by key suppliers, generally be able to pass on any increase in the cost
of its inputs to its customers.'232 Hence, the Competition Tribunal concluded that 'counter-
227 See Legh in Brassey et al Competition Law (2002) 271.
228 European authorities assess for instance the ease with which customers are able to switch to other sup-
pliers as an indicator for the likeliness of price increase post-merger, see Guidelines on the assessment of
horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of concentrations between undertakings,
OJEU C 31/5 of 05.02.2004 par 31, also available at: http://europa.eu.int/eur-
lexlpri/en/oj/dat/2004/c 031 Ic 03120040205en00050018. pdf.
229 Cffor instance recently Growthpoint Properties Limited / Tresso 119 (Pty) Ltd (CT 27/LM/Apr05) par 10.
230 JD Group Ltd / Ellerine Holdings Ltd (CT 78/LM/Ju1/00).
231 See for instance Nestlé (SA) (Pty) Ltd / Pets Products (Pty) Ltd / Heinz South Africa (Pty) Ltd / Tiger
Foods Ltd (CT 21/LM/Apr01) par 46-49, where the parties to the merger (manufacturers of pet food) claimed
that the retailers would possess 'a degree of countervailing power sufficient to restrain any anticompetitive
pricing by the merged entity.' Cf also Pioneer Foods (Pty) Ltd / SAD Holdings Limited (CT 23/LM/Apr02) par
26-27, where the parties maintained that the retailers would have 'huge negotiating power'.
232 Daun et Cie AG / Kolosus Holdings Limited (CT 10/LM/Mar03) par 115. See also Nestlé (SA) (Pty) Ltd /
Pets Products (Pty) Ltd / Heinz South Africa (Pty) Ltd / Tiger Foods Ltd (CT 21/LM/Apr01) par 48, Pioneer
Foods (Pty) Ltd / SAD Holdings Limited (CT 23/LM/Apr02) par 27 and Allied Technologies (Pty) Ltd / Na-
mlTech Holdings Limited (CT 37/LM/Jul03) par 83.
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vailing power, understood as a large well resourced purchaser dealing with a monopoly
supplier, may well provide comfort to the buyer but it does not necessarily avail the final
consumer any.'233
Moreover, the lack of countervailing power can be used as an argument against a pro-
posed merger. The Tribunal pointed out in the JD Group / Ellerine case,234that 'the parties
to the transaction are the final link with the consumers.' In this case, consumers were 'the
poorest, least powerful of South African consumers [... ] millions of atomized, disorganized
individuals incapable of defending their economic interests except to the extent that they
are able to exercise a preference for one retail outlet over another.'
1 5 12 4 6 The dynamic characteristics of the market
If a market is rapidly growing and characterised by a high level of innovation, it is more
likely that new competitors are encouraged to enter into the market, expecting profits.
Mergers taking place in such markets are less likely to raise competition concerns than
mergers in stable or stagnant markets. A high level of product differentiation also has to be
taken into account by the competition authorities, because a merger, taking place in a
market with a wide range of product differentiation, is less likely to be contentious than in
markets for generic products, for there will be less significant product overlaps and there-
fore less of an increase in market power as an effect of the merger.235
1 5 12 4 7 The nature and extent of vertical integration in the market
The higher the level of vertical integration in an industry, the more difficult it will be for such
customers or suppliers to compete with those parts of the integrated businesses with
which they previously competed on an independent basis, especially if exclusive arrange-
ments are the consequence of the vertical integration prccess.F" The Competition Appeal
Court pointed out this danger for instance in a case of a vertically integrated manufacturer.
233 Daun et Cie AG / Kolosus Holdings Limited (CT 10/LM/Mar03) par 115. Cf also Murray & Roberts Ltd /
The Cementation Company (Africa) Ltd (CT 02/LM/Jan04) par 34. The same concerns are outlined in the
European Merger Guidelines (Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regu-
lation on the control of concentrations between undertakings, OJEU C 31/5 of 05.02.2004 par 67, also avail-
able at: http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2004/c 031 Ic 03120040205en00050018.pdf referring to
European case law).
234 JD Group Ltd / E/lerine Holdings Ltd (CT 78/LM/JuI/00).
235 CfLegh in Brassey et al Competition Law (2002) 272.
236 Legh in Brassey et al Competition Law (2002) 272.
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In the Court's opinion there was a high probability that in the post merger market the
manufacturer would 'continue to receive priority in supplies over other [non-integrated]
manufactu res. ,237
A factor of the assessment of vertical mergers can be the actual level of intra-brand com-
petition.238 The Tribunal pointed out that strong inter-brand cornpetitiorr'" diminishes the
requirement to regulate the vertical relationship between a supplier and his distributor,
which primarily affects only intra-brand competltlon.ê"
1 5 12 4 8 (Potential) failure of the business of a party to the merger
This provision encapsulates the so-called 'failing-firm defence'. According to it, one of the
party's business (or part of it) effectively no longer competes in the market and the merger
thus does not have any anti-competitive effects and, on the contrary, may even be pro-
cornpetitive.ê" Nevertheless, the Competition Tribunal asserted that - unlike in other juris-
dictions242 - the failing firm doctrine is not a real 'defence' to a merger that has been found
on an initial market analysis to be anttcompetttlve.r" Consequently, the Tribunal does not
determine at first whether a merger is anti-competitive and then only if it is, consider the
'failing firm doctrine' as a defence. It rather takes the failing firm argumentation already into
account as a factor amongst others while assessing if the merger is 'likely to substantially
237 Mondi Ltd and Kohler Cores and Tubes, A division of Kohler Packaging Ltd (20/CAC/Jun02) par 68.
238 That is the competition among retailers or distributors of the same brand.
239 That is the competition between different brands of the same product.
240 See on this subject DaimlerChrysler South Africa (Pty) Ltd / Sandown Motor Holdings (Pty) Ltd (CT
44/LM/JuI01) with references to the EU Commission Guidelines on Vertical Restraints.
241 Cf the case JD Group Limited / Profurn Limited (CT 60/LMI Aug02) par 108, where the parties alleged that
the target firm was a failing firm, what would sanitise the merger.
242 See for instance for the 1992 United States Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Hori-
zontal Merger Guidelines [with April 8, 1997, Revisions to section 4 on efficiencies] Section 5.1, available at:
http://www.ftc.gov/bc/docs/horizmer.htm: 'A merger is not likely to create or enhance market power or facili-
tate its exercise if the following circumstances are met: 1) the allegedly failing firm would be unable to meet
its financial obligations in the near future; 2) it would not be able to reorganize successfully under Chapter 11
of the Bankruptcy Act; 3} it has made unsuccessful good-faith efforts to elicit reasonable alternative offers of
acquisition of the assets of the failing firm that would both keep its tangible and intangible assets in the rele-
vant market and pose a less severe danger to competition than does the proposed merger; and 4) absent
the acquisition, the assets of the failing firm would exit the relevant market.' Europe also knows this doctrine,
albeit with differences, cf in detail Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council
Regulation on the control of concentrations between undertakings, OJEU C 31/5 of 05.02.2004, par 89-91,
also available at: http://europa.eu.int/eur-lexlpri/en/oj/dat/2004/c 031 Ic 03120040205en00050018.pdf. See
also 23442 infra.
243 Iscor Limited / Saldanha Steel (Pty) Ltd (CT 67/LM/Dec01) par 101.
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prevent or lessen competition' in terms of section 12A(1).24~The consequence of this ap-
proach is, as the Tribunal pointed out, that an anti-competitive merger does not have to be
approved, if all the elements of this 'defence' can be established. Even if the conditions of
the failing firm doctrine are found to be satisfied, 'one might nevertheless still find a merger
to be anti-competitive [and hence prohibit it] because of the way one balances this failing
firm factor in relation to all the others.'245
15 12 4 9 Removal of an effective competitor
The removal of an effective competitor can be a strong argument for prohibiting a merger,
especially if the market basically consists only of a few leading competing firms. Here, the
level of concentration is also of lmportance.ê" On the other hand, the fact that an effective
competitor will not exit the market due to the merger points to the approval of the transac-
tion.247
15 12 4 10Other factors
Nevertheless, the enumerated factors constitute a non-exhaustive list of factors.248 This is
indicated by the word 'including' in section 12A(2). Furthermore, there is no hierarchy of
factors that orders their significance, and not all factors are necessarily relevant in every
case.249The uncertainties resulting from such an approach must be regarded as inevitable
and as a sacrifice to the flexibility, competition authorities need to allow them to make just
decisions.
244 In this point, the South African and Canadian approach are identical, see Iscor Limited I Saldanha Steel
(Pty) Ltd (CT 67/LM/Dec01) par 85. Cf also Schumann Sasol (South Africa) (Pty) Ltd I Price's Dae/ite (Pty)
!CT 23/LM/May01) par 58 footnote 26.
45 Iscor Limited I Saldanha Steel (Pty) Ltd (CT 67/LM/Dec01) par 104. The Tribunal continued in the case:
'Conversely, where the competitive loss is low, then one may be less exacting in requiring a showing of all
the elements of the traditional failing firm defence. If the failing firm concept was a defence, in the sense that
the efficiency defence is, then this type of flexibility would be impermissible and one would have to satisfy all
the elements of a test that the legislature had provided before it could be invoked. Whilst this approach may
risk making the concept more nebulous, it does allow the adjudicator the flexibility to achieve real interest
balancing, as opposed to the application of rigid formulas.' (par 105-106).
246 Cf for instance the JD Group I EI/erine case (CT 78/LM/Jul/00), where the four leading firms had 84% of
all market shares, the parties to the proposed merger 38,3% in a post-merger scenario.
247 Cf Secotrade 72 (Pty) Ltd and Imperial Holdings Ltd I Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd (CT
46/LM/AprOO); Edgars Consolidated Stores Limited IRetail Apparel Group (Pty) Ltd (CT 53/LM/Aug02).
248 Constant court ruling, see for instance Massmart Holdings Ltd I Jumbo Cash and Carry (Pty) Ltd; Mass-
mart Holdings Ltd I Picardi Liquors (Pty) Ltd - Sip 'n Save division (CT 39/LM/JuI01 and 47LM/Aug01) par 28;
Bidvest Group Limited I Paragon Business Communications Limited (CT 56/LM/Oct01) par 43.
249 Legh in Brassey et al Competition Law (2002) 269.
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However, the Competition Tribunal has already clarified in some cases, how the Act
should be interpreted. For instance, the Tribunal indicated that it is sufficient that potential
competition is 'substantially lessened' .250
1 5 12 5 Pro-competitive gains
If the Commission, Tribunal, or Appeal Court concludes that a merger is likely to prevent or
lessen competition substantially, the merger still can be approved in terms of section 12A.
The relevant authority has to determine in that case 'whether or not the merger is likely to
result in any technological, efficiency or other pro-competitive gain which will be greater
than, and offset, the effects of any prevention or lessening of competition, that may result
or is likely to result from the merger, and would not likely be obtained if the merger is pre-
vented,.251Accordingly, mergers can still be approved because of pro-competitive gains in
the relevant market resulting from it.252 Nevertheless, such efficiency gains must be
'merger-specific' and genuine consequence of the merger to be cognisable.253 The onus of
establishing efficiency gains rests on the merging parties,254making it - in contrast to the
failing firm doctrine255- a real 'efficiency defence'. In the Tongaat-Hulett Group / Transvaal
Suiker Beperk case,256the Tribunal gave examples of such defences although it accepted
that there is no exhaustive list of possible countervailing efficiency gains:257
250 The Tongaat-Hulett Group Ltd / Transvaal Suiker Beperk and Middenen Ontwikkeling (Pty) Ltd and Sen-
teeko (Edms) Bpk and New Komati Sugar Miller's Partnership and TSB Bestuursdienste (CT 83/LM/Ju100)
gar 61-67 and 85. See also Legh in Brassey et al Competition Law (2002) 260 agreeing with the decision.
51 S 12A(1 )(a)(i).
252 See as an example the Trident case, where a merger was approved, although the Tribunal concluded that
the merger would lead to a substantial lessening of competition in the steel products market: Trident Steel
~Pty) Ltd / Dorbyl Ltd (CT 89/LM/OctOO) par 91.
53 Consequently, in Trident Steel (Pty) Ltd / Dorbyl Ltd (CT 89/LM/OctOO) par 76 the Tribunal stated: 'If the
efficiencies could come about through some other legal arrangement or organizational form that is not a
merger, or if one of the firms could achieve a claimed efficiency on its own, the efficiency defence fails.' This
is consistent with the European approach, see Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under
the Council Regulation on the control of concentrations between undertakings, OJEU C 31/5 of 05.02.2004,
par 85 also available at: http://europa.eu.intleur-
lexlpri/en/oj/datl2004/c 031 Ic 03120040205en00050018. pdf.
254 The Tongaat-Hulett Group Ltd / Transvaal Suiker Beperk and Middenen Ontwikkeling (Pty) Ltd and Sen-
teeko (Edms) Bpk and New Komati Sugar Miller's Partnership and TSB Bestuursdienste (CT 83/LM/Ju100)
par 100. The Tribunal held in this case that 'it is for the Commission to establish a lessening of competition; it
is for the parties to establish that the efficiencies sacrificed by an anti-competitive merger are countervailed
b~ efficiency gains.'. See also Trident Steel (Pty) Ltd / Dorbyl Ltd (CT 89/LM/OctOO) par 51.
2 5 See 1 5 1 2 4 8 supra.
256 The Tongaat-Hulett Group Ltd / Transvaal Suiker Beperk and Middenen Ontwikkeling (Pty) Ltd and Sen-
teeko (Edms) Bpk and New Komati Sugar Miller's Partnership and TSB Bestuursdienste (CT 83/LM/JuI00).
257 Par 104.
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'An efficiency gain contemplated in the Act, one that may compensate for the
anti-competitive consequences of a merger that otherwise falls foul of the act, is
one that, for example, evidences new products or processes that will flow from
the merger of the two companies, or that identifies new markets that will be pene-
trated in consequence of the merger, markets that neither firm on their own
would have been capable of entering, or that significantly enhances the intensity
with which productive capacity is utilised.'
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Competition authorities, though, seem to be very reluctant to accept a merger based on a
'pro-competitive gain' argument.258 The Tribunal declared on this matter 'that an accurate
reading of the Act requires us to set a high standard for establishing possible countervail-
ing efficiency gains.'259
1 5 12 6 Public interest grounds
Besides those economic considerations, the competition authorities always have to assess
the public-interest aspects of mergers and consider 'whether the merger can or cannot be
justified on substantial public interest grounds,,260 'regardless of the outcome of the section
12A(2) "competition" analysis.'261 Thus, on the one hand, a merger, which is likely to sub-
stantially prevent or lessen competition, may be approved, whereas, on the other hand, a
merger, even if it does not have an anti-competitive effect, can be prohibited or at least
approved only subject to conditions, if public interest issues militate against the (uncondi-
tional) approval of this merger.262Again, the Act enumerates the factors, which have to be
assessed when considering justification on public interest grounds:263
258 See Legh in Brassey et al Competition Law (2002) 264-269 on this problem.
259 The Tongaat-Hulett Group Ltd / Transvaal Suiker Beperk and Middenen Ontwikkeling (Pty) Ltd and Sen-
teeko (Edms) Bpk and New Komati Sugar Miller's Partnership and TSB Bestuursdienste (CT 83/LM/JuI00)
par 98 also referring to (the 'effectively identical') subsection 96(1) of the Canadian Competition Act and
Canadian jurisdiction.
260 S 12A(1 )(a)(ii).
261 Anglo American Holdings Ltd / Kumba Resources Ltd with the Industrial Development Corporation inter-
vening (CT 46/LM/Jun02) par 138.
262 Cf Shell South Africa (Pty) Ltd / Tepco Petroleum (Pty) Ltd (CT 66/LM/Oct01) par 37; Distillers Corpora-
tion (SA) Limited / Stellenbosch Farmers Wine!}' Group Ltd (CT 08/LM/Feb02) par 214; Anglo American
Holdings Ltd / Kumba Resources Ltd with the Industrial Development Corporation intervening (CT
46/LM/Jun02) par 138: '[T]he public interest can operate either to sanitise an anticompetitive merger or to
impugn a merger found not be anticompetitive.'
263 S 12A(3).
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The Competition authorities must consider the effect that the merger will have on
• a particular industrial sector or region
• employment
• the ability of small businesses, or firms controlled or owned by historically disadvantaged
persons, to become competitive and
• the ability of national industries to compete in international markets
to decide whether a positive impact on public interest outweighs264 the negative impact on
competition, or vice versa.265
The Competition Tribunal seems particularly to lay stress on the adverse impact on em-
ployment occasioned as a result of the merger (potential job losses), or whether rights of
employees under the merger will be adequately safequarded.f" Improvements regarding
enterprises controlled or owned by historically disadvantaged persons are also positively
mentioned and in some cases discussed in detail, even though this aspect has not been
decisive so far.267 Although these factors enable the competition authorities to use merger
264 The Competition Tribunal emphasises that 'that the mere existence of a public interest ground is not
enough in itself. The Act requires the public interest ground to be substantia!.' (JD Group Ltd / Ellerine Hold-
inps Ltd (CT 78/LM/Jul/00)).
26 See Harmony Gold Mining Company Ltd / Gold Fields Ltd (CT 93/LM/NOV04) par 45.
266 See for instance Randfontein Estates Ltd / Anglogold Ltd (CT 03/LM/Jan01). Cf also the actual discussion
about the potential effects of the proposed merger between Gold Fields and Harmony, Business Report
~2005-05-04) 17.
67 In Anglo American Holdings Ltd / Kumba Resources Ltd with the Industrial Development Corporation
intervening (CT 46/LM/Jun02) par 137-170 this issue was discussed broadly, but the Tribunal was not willing
to prohibit the merger on this public interest ground, stating: 'We deem it imprudent to make a decision on so
difficult an issue when the outcome of such a debate would be academic given our conclusions on the evi-
dence.' In Shell South Africa (Pty) Ltd / Tepco Petroleum (Pty) Ltd (CT 66/LM/Oct01) the Competition Com-
mission had recommended to impose conditions on the transaction because it would have 'a negative impact
on the competitive position of a firm controlled by historically disadvantaged persons.' (cf par 39) - The Tri-
bunal rejected that argumentation stating that '[e]mpowerment is not furthered by obliging firms controlled by
historically disadvantaged persons to continue to exist on a life support machine.' (par 42) and summarised
that the Commission's argumentation on this issue 'should be advanced with considerable caution when the
competition authorities use public interest as a basis for their intervention, particularly when competition is
unimpaired and when the only historically disadvantaged investors whose interests are directly affected ex-
pressly reject the Commission's interventions. The role played by the competition authorities in defending
even those aspects of the public interest listed in the Act is, at most, secondary to other statutory and regula-
tory instruments - in this case the Employment Equity Act, the Skills Development Act and the Charter itself
immediately spring to mind. The competition authorities, however well intentioned, are well advised not to
pursue their public interest mandate in an over-zealous manner lest they damage precisely those interests
that they ostensibly seek to protect.' (par 58). In the cases Main Street No 188 (Pty) Ltd / Mondi Limited's
Newsprint Business (CT 22/LM/Apr04) and Tsebo Outsourcing Group (Pty) Ltd / Drake & Scull FM (SA) (Pty)
Ltd (CT 25/LM/Apr04) par 13, the Tribunal only positively remarked under public interest aspects that the
transaction 'increases the ownership stakes of historically disadvantaged persons'. See also Crown Gold
Recoveries (Pty) Ltd / Industrial Development Corporation of South Africa Limited / Khumo Bathong Holdings
(Pty) Ltd (CT 31/LM/May02) and Harmony Gold Mining Company Ltd / African Rainbow Minerals Gold Ltd
(CT 25/LM/May03) with the same argumentation. In Lonmin PIc / Eastern Platinum Limited and Western
Platinum Limited (CT 45/LM/Jun04) par 14, the Tribunal laid particularly stress on the 'strong empowerment
credentials' of the merger.
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control to promote statutory policies of general interest, the Tribunal nevertheless seems
to handle public interest issues very cautiously. It emphasised in the Daun et Cie / Kolosus
case268 that it is 'incumbent on an un-elected, administrative tribunal, principally charged
with defending and promoting competition, to approach its public interest mandate with
great circumspection' and that the Tribunal's role would only be 'ancillary' and 'supportive'
to legislation and institutions specifically designed for the purpose of protection and promo-
tion of each of the elements of public interest and 'should, by and large, not be employed
as a substitute for, and in order to second-guess, these other interventions.,269 Neverthe-
less, the Tribunal has already imposed conditions to merger approvals in several cases in
order to safeguard public interest issues such as employment."?
The South African approach of acknowledging public interest grounds resembles the
United Kingdom public interest test. In that country, however, the Secretary of State for
Trade and Industry can issue an intervention note based on public interest grounds, when
a merger is being considered. In particular, the Office of Communications (Ofcom) set out
a guideline on the public interest test that applies to media mergers in the event of the is-
suing of such an intervention note.271This approach will be discussed later on.272
The South African Competition Act only recognises such intervention in the banking sec-
tor. The Minister of Finance may remove a banking merger from the jurisdiction of the
Competition Act if he deems it to be in the public interest that the merger is subject only to
the jurisdiction of the Banks Act.273
1 5 12 7 Conditional approval
268 Daun et Cie AG / Kolosus Holdings Limited (CT 10/LM/Mar03) par 124.
269 See also Distillers Corporation (SA) Limited / Stellenbosch Farmers Winery Group Ltd (CT 08/LM/Feb02)
gar 232-238; Shell South Africa (Pty) Ltd / Tepco Petroleum (Pty) Ltd (CT 66/LM/Oct01) par 58.
70 See Telkom SA Ltd / TPI Investments / Praysa Trade 1062 (Pty) Ltd (CT 81/LM/AugOO) par 44; Multi-
choice Subscriber Management (Pty) Ltd / Tiscali (Pty) Ltd (CT 72/LM/Sep04) par 82. Cf the clearance for
Harmony Gold's hostile bid for Gold Fields under the condition of limited dismissals: Bailey 'Takeover gets
the nod, but with fewer lay-ofts' Business Report (2005-05-11) 17; case now published (Harmony Gold Min-
inp Company Ltd / Gold Fields Ltd (CT 93/LM/NOV04)). See also 1 5 1 2 7 infra with further references.
27 See Ofcom guidance for the public interest test for media mergers, available at:
http://www.ofcom.org.uk/codes guidelines/broadcasting/media mergers/?a=87101.
272 See 3 2 infra.
273 Act No. 94 of 1990. See s 18 of the Competition Act. The public interest is not defined, but it was under-
stood that the Minister would use this section only to facilitate urgent regulatory approval where the acquisi-
tion of a failing bank was necessary to prevent systemic risk, cfCompetition Law and Policy in South Africa-
OECD Global Forum on Competition Peer Review: Paris, 11 February 2003, p. 32, available at:
http://www.comptrib.co.za/Publications/South%20Africa% 20Peer%20Review. PDF.
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Having taken into account all these factors, the competition authorities decide, whether the
proposed merger can be approved. In that event, a so-called Merger Clearance Certificate
will be issued. If the merger is likely to substantially prevent or lessen competition, no pro-
competitive gains can be observed and the transaction cannot be justified on substantial
public interest grounds, the competition authorities have to discern, whether conditions on
the proposed transaction can be imposed, instead of an outright prohibition to remedy the
potential anti-competitive effects of the merger. The creation of such conditions aims both
at the subsistence of actual competition and at the emergence of potential compethton.F"
In some cases, such a conditional approval can dispel concerns, so there is no need to
prohibit the merger. The Competition Tribunal recognises, that mergers generally increase
efficiency and are part of the legitimate conduct of business. Thus, it pointed out 'if an anti-
competitive merger can be "rescued" by excising those aspects that generate concern,
then the Commission and the parties are encouraged to seek out these solutions.'275
Hence, competition authorities would rather approve a proposed transaction conditionally
than to prohibit it straightaway if an unconditional approval is not possible.276
The most common form of condition would be to oblige the parties to dispose of part of the
operations of the merged entity277and sell assets to a buyer being an independent third
party or parties approved by the Oomrmssion'?" in order to minimize a lessening of compe-
tition.279Nevertheless, competition authorities have to assess in every case, if structural or
behavioural remedies are more approprlate.ê" although the Competition Tribunal held in
274 Boart Longyear (a division of Anglo Operations Limited) / Huddy (Pty) Ltd and Huddy Rock Tools (Pty)
Ltd (CT 41/LM/Aug03).
275 JD Group Ltd / Ellerine Holdings Ltd (CT 78/LM/Jul/00).
276 See for instance the case Schumann Sasol (South Africa) (Pty) Ltd / Price's Daelite (Pty) (CT
23/LM/May01), where the Competition Commission recommended a conditional approval. The Competition
Tribunal concluded, though, that the conditions proposed by the Commission did not meet the competitive
concerns that had been identified and prohibited the merger. Finally, the CAC approved the merger, uphold-
ing the parties' appeal (Schumann Sasol (South Africa) (Pty) Ltd and Price's Daelite (Pty) Ltd
~10/CAC/Aug01)).
77 See for instance Coleus Packaging (Pty) Ltd / Rheem Crown Plant, a division of Highveld Steel and Va-
nadium Corporation Limited (CT 75/LM/Oct02); Nestlé (SA) (Pty) Ltd / Pets Products (Pty) Ltd / Heinz South
Africa (Pty) Ltd / Tiger Foods Ltd (CT 21/LM/ Apr01) par 67.
278 Cf Unilever PIc / Robertsons Foods (Pty) Ltd (CT 55/LM/Sep01).
279 Cf also Legh in: Brassey et al Competition Law (2002) 282. Even though the Competition Tribunal finally
declined to approve the merger in the JD Group Limited / Ellerine Holdings Limited case, the Commission
would have accepted the transaction subject to the condition that 150 stores of the merged entity were sold
to a purchaser approved by the Commission (preferably a BEE Group).
280 See for instance the imposed prohibition of retrenchment in Telkom SA Ltd / TPI Investments / Praysa
Trade 1062 (Pty) Ltd (CT 81/LM/AugOO) par 44 (prohibition for a certain period of time); Food and Allied
Workers Union v The Competition Commission and McCain Foods (SA) (Pty) Ltd and Heinz Frozen Foods
(Pty) Ltd represented by Heinz SA (Pty) Ltd (CT 17/AM/Mar01); Harmony Gold Mining Company Ltd / Gold
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this context that 'a structural solution such as divestiture, is generally to be preferred to a
behavioural condition that requires constant monitoring by the competition authorities or,
expressed otherwise, ongoing regulatory intervention in the affairs of the merged entity.'281
Yet, divestiture can be inappropriate 'in circumstances where a buyer has not been identi-
fied and where there are solid reasons for questioning the post-merger viability of the di-
vested business.'282 In the event of vertical mergers, however, the Tribunal imposes spe-
cific conditions on the merging parties to alleviate the above-mentioned concerns arising
from such transactions, for instance the obligation to contract with competing downstream
customers for a certain period in the case of the concern of input foreclosure.283
Notably in the case of a conditionally approved small or intermediate merger, the Competi-
tion Commission may revoke its own decision,284 if a firm concerned did not comply with
an imposed condition.285 In that event, the Competition Commission may prohibit the
merger even though any time limit set out in chapter 3 of the Act may have elapsed.286
1 5 12 8 Single specialties
It is a specialty of South African proceedings that the Act grants special rights for trade
unions and employees. In particular, the South African merger control process gives la-
bour interests an explicit role. Any registered trade union287that represents a substantial
Fields Ltd (CT 93/LM/NOV04); sometimes, a combination of both forms of conditions are imposed, cf Boart
Longyear (a division of Anglo Operations Limited) / Huddy (Pty) Ltd and Huddy Rock Tools (Pty) Ltd (CT
41/LM/Aug03).
281 JD Group Ltd / Ellerine Holdings Ltd (CT 78/LM/Jul/OO). On this problem see also Distillers Corporation
£SA) Limited / Stellenbosch Farmers Winery Group Ltd (CT 08/LM/Feb02 (Reasons for Decision)).
82 Boart Longyear (a division of Anglo Operations Limited) / Huddy (Pty) Ltd and Huddy Rock Tools (Pty)
Ltd (CT 41/LM/Aug03) referring to JD Group Ltd / Ellerine Holdings Ltd (CT 78/LM/Jul/OO) par 4.8. In Uni/e-
ver Pic / Robertsons Foods (Pty) Ltd (CT 55/LM/Sep01) the merging parties were obliged to submit the name
of the proposed buyer to the Commission for its prior approval 'in order that the Commission can assess
whether the proposed buyer would be able to effectively utilise the divested assets so as to be a viable com-
getitor to the merging parties.'
83 See Inzuzo Furniture Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd / PG Bison Holdings (Pty) Ltd (CT 12/LM/FEB04). See also
Coleus Packaging (Pty) Ltd / Rheem Crown Plant, a division of Highveld Steel and Vanadium Corporation
Limited (CT 75/LM/Oct02), where a bundle of conditions was imposed by the Tribunal. Cf also the condition
imposed in the case Anglo American Holdings Ltd / Kumba Resources Ltd with the Industrial Development
Corporation intervening (CT 46/LM/Jun02) par 134 to dispel the concerns on information sharing to facilitate
collusion.
284 The Competition Commission may also revoke an unconditional approval, see s 15 for details.
285 S 15(1 )(c).
286 S 15(2).
287 This is according to s 1(1)(xxvi) 'a trade union registered in terms of section 96 of the Labour Relations
Act, 1995 (Act No. 66 of 1995)'.
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number of its employees288 must be notified of proposed intermediate and large mergers,
so they can decide whether to participate in the review.289
The Competition Act provides a list of persons that are entitled to participate in merger
hearings.290 The parties to the merger,291 the Competition Commission,292 the Minister of
Trade and Industrl93 and the above-mentioned trade unions or employees294 may partici-
pate in such hearings as of right. Moreover, any other person may be recognized by the
Competition Tribunal as a particlpant.F"
Registered trade unions are allowed, like the parties to the merger concerned, to appeal
the decisions of the Competition Tribunal to the Competition Appeal Court within 20 busi-
ness days, regardless whether the Tribunal approved, conditionally approved or prohibited
the merger.296 Conversely, competitors and consumers lack this privilege and are not al-
lowed to appeal the decisions of the Tribunal, even if they participated in the proceedings
of the Tribunal. It seems to be unfair to exclude those persons who would ordinarily be
prejudiced by a merger. Moreover, trade unions or employees may appeal decisions ap-
proving a merger even if it is commercially acceptable to the parties to the merger and of
no concern to competitors, consumers, suppliers, and customers. Hence, this privilege is
criticized as being too broad.""
288 Or the employees concerned or representatives of the employees concerned, if there are no such regis-
tered trade unions, s 13A(2)(b).
289 See s 13A(2). Unions participate in about 20% of the merger proceedings, and about 20% of the unions
that are notified decide to participate, see Competition Law and Policy in South Africa - OECD Global Forum
on Competition Peer Review: Paris, 11 February 2003, p. 18, available at:
http://www.comptrib.co.za/Publications/South%20Africa% 20Peer%20Review.PDF.
290 S 53(1 )(c).
291 S 53(1 )(c)(i).
292 S 53(1 )(c)(ii).
293 If the Minister has indicated an intention to participate, s 53(1 )(c)(iv) in conjunction with s 1(1)(xvi). See
also the right of the Minister to participate as a party in any intermediate or large merger proceedings before
the Competition Commission, Competition Tribunal or the Competition Appeal Court, in order to make repre-
sentations on public interest grounds, s 18(1).
294 If there are no such registered trade unions and only if one these person was entitled to receive a notice
in terms of section 13A(2) and who indicated to the Commission an intention to participate, s 53(1 )(c)(iii) in
conjunction with s 13A(2).
295 For the latter group see Industrial Development Corporation of South Africa Ltd v Anglo-American Hold-
in~s Ltd (CT 45/LM/Jun02 and 46/LM/Jun02 - Application to participate).
29 S 17(1 )(b) referring to s 13A(2).
297 See Legh in Brassey et al Competition Law (2002) 258-259.
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As mentioned above, the Act places duties on the parties to a proposed merger. Large and
intermediate mergers have to be compulsorily notified before being implemented and par-
ties to a small merger may take no further steps to implement that merger until the merger
has been approved or conditionally approved, if the Commission requires notification.29B
In the case of a violation of the law, the Competition Tribunal may impose an administra-
tive penalty, albeit only in the events enumerated in section 59. That is, in merger cases,
according to section 59(1 )(d), if the parties to a merger have
• failed to give notice of the merger, although the notification was required;299
• proceeded to implement the merger in contravention of a decision by the Competition
Commission or Competition Tribunal to prohibit that merger;
• proceeded to implement the merger in a manner contrary to a condition for the approval
of that merger imposed by the Competition Commission, or the Competition Tribunal
• proceeded to implement the merger without the approval of the Competition Commission
or Competition Tribunal, as required by the Act.
The Tribunal can impose severe fines, taking into account the special circumstances and
factors like the nature, duration, gravity and extent of the contravention, if any loss or
damage was suffered as a result of the contravention and if any profit derived from the
contravention.i"? The penalty has to be appropriate and may not exceed 10% of the firm's
annual turnover in South Africa and its exports from South Africa during the firm's preced-
ing financial year.301
In the special event of unlawful implementation of a merger, the Competition Tribunal may
not only order a party to the merger to sell any shares, interest or other assets it has ac-
quired pursuant to the merger, it can also declare void any provision of an agreement to
which the merger was subject.302
298 See s 13(4) and 1 5 1 23 supra.
299 See for instance the cases The Competition Commission v Structa Technology (Pty) Ltd and Dorbyl En-
gineering Management Company (Pty) Ltd and Fastpulse Trading 26 (Pty) Ltd (CT 83/LM/Nov02) and The
Competition Commission v Edgars Consolidated Stores Limited and Retail Apparel (Pty) Ltd (95/FN/Dec02).
300 Cf s 59(3).
301 S 59(2).
302 S 60(1).
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Actually, the South African competition authorities approve most of the proposed mergers.
The Competition Tribunal has prohibited only four03 of 278 large mergers
over which it has adjudicated since its inception in 1999.304The last prohibition of a trans-
action was in 2002. Of all transactions, the Competition Tribunal approved 247 without
conditions and 27305were approved conditionally. In some large merger cases, the Tribu-
nal had to adjudicate upon the obligation to notify a transactlonê'" or a fine was imposed
for the omission of notification prior to the implementation of the merger,307 and in one
case the Tribunal decided on the right to participate in a merger hearing.30B
During the report period 2003/2004, the Tribunal made decisions on 60 large mergers,
of which 51 were approved unconditionally and nine were approved subject
to conditions.309
Hence, in total the Tribunal has approved more than 98,5% of all large merger cases,
which it had to decide since 1999_310This 'evidently permlselve'?" tendency can be no-
303 JD Group Ltd / Ellerine Holdings Ltd (CT 78/LM/Jul/00); Schumann Sasol (South Africa) (Pty) Ltd / Price's
Daelite (Pty) (CT 23/LM/May01); The Tongaat-Hulett Group Ltd / Transvaal Suiker Beperk and Middenen
Ontwikkeling (Pty) Ltd and Senteeko (Edms) Bpk and New Komati Sugar Miller's Partnership and TSB Bes-
tuursdienste (CT 83/LM/JuI00) and Mondi Ltd / Kohler Cores and Tubes, A division of Kohler Packaging Ltd
1CT 06/LM/Jan02).
04 All mergers published until 30 June 2005 have been taken into account.
305 The case Imperial Holdings Limited / The Cold Chain (Pty) Ltd (CT 41/LM/MarOO) has been counted as a
case of conditional approval, since the Tribunal stated that it approved the transaction 'with conditions', even
though this cannot clearly be concluded from the reasons for the decision.
306 See for instance Bulmer SA (Pty) Ltd and Seagram Africa (Pty) Ltd v Distillers Corporation (SA) Ltd and
Stellenbosch Farmers' Wine/}' Group (Pty) Ltd and The Competition Commission (CT 94/FN/NovOO and
101/FN/DecOO); Caxton and CTP Publishers and Printers Limited v Naspers Limited and Electronic Media
Network Limited and Supersport International Holdings Limited and the Competition Commission (CT
16/FN/Mar04).
307 See for instance The Competition Commission v Structa Technology (Pty) Ltd and Dorbyl Engineering
Management Company (Pty) Ltd and Fastpulse Trading 26 (Pty) Ltd (CT 83/LM/Nov02) (symbolic fine); The
Competition Commission v Edgars Consolidated Stores Limited and Retail Apparel (Pty) Ltd (95/FN/Dec02);
The Competition Commission v The Tiso Consortium and New Africa Investments Limited and Investec Bank
Limited and Safika Holdings (Pty) Ltd and Capricorn Capital Partners Holding and Company (Pty) Ltd and
Multidirect Investments 180 (Pty) Ltd and Mineworkers Investment Company (Pty) Ltd (CT 82/FN/Oct04).
308 Industrial Development Corporation of South Africa Ltd v Anglo-American Holdings Ltd (CT 45/LM/Jun02
and 46/LM/Jun02 - Application to participate), cf 1 5 1 28 supra.
309 See Competition Tribunal South Africa, Annual Report 2003/2004, RP No 103/2004, available at:
http://www.comptrib.co.za/Publications/ Annual%20Report/ Annual%20report%202003%202004. pdf.
310 Several merger notifications have been withdrawn, see for instance Competition Tribunal South Africa,
Annual Report 2001/2002, RP No 205/2002, p. 8, available at:
http://www.comptrib.co.za/Publications/Annual%20Report/Annual%20report%202001 %202002.pdf.
311 Competition Law and Policy in South Africa - OECD Global Forum on Competition Peer Review: Paris,
11 February 2003, p. 14, available at: http://www.comptrib.co.za/Publications/South%20Africa%
20Peer%20Review. PDF.
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ticed around the world, also in Germany_312An international benchmark study conducted in
1998 shows, that at least 95% of all mergers notified to regulatory authorities were ap-
proved.313
In practice, the control of mergers can be described as efficient. A high number of mergers
are adjudicated in a very short period of time.314The amendment of the Act in 2000 re-
duced the scope of mandatory filing, and the Commission issued a 'fast track' policy in
2001 to focus effort on the most significant transactions. Hence, it is not surprising that the
OECD Peer Review315gives South African merger control very good marks:
'The decisions to date show that, in terms of substantive economic analysis and
sensitivity to policy context, merger review in South Africa is done at a high level
of sophistication.'
There are no specific provisions regulating mergers between newspaper enterprises or
any other media. Nevertheless, a number of cases has concerned the newspaper sector,
and these cases will be examined. Firstly, the newspaper and magazine market situation
in South Africa will be scrutinised.
1 5 3 1 The newspaper and magazines market situation
312 See 2 3 4 5 infra.
313 See Global Forum for Competition and Trade Policy 'Policy Directions for Global Merger Review' (Sep-
tember 1999) Global Competition Review, quoted from Legh in Brassey et al Competition Law (2002) 231
footnote 18.
314 See for instance Competition Tribunal South Africa, Annual Report 2003/2004, RP No 103/2004, p. 19,
available at: http://www.comptrib.co.za/Publications/Annual%20ReportiAnnual%20report%202003%
202004.pdf, which stated: 'In terms of Tribunal Rule 35 (1), when a merger referral has been filed, the regis-
trar must set down the matter to be heard within 10 business days of the filing date. In the period under re-
view, 76% of the total merger referrals received were set down within 10 days of receiving the Competition
Commission's recommendations. In the remaining cases, a pre-hearing meeting with the parties determined
the time-frames for the proceedings. The average set-down time for large mergers, however, was within 9
days of receiving the case. Of the 60 orders on large mergers released in the period under review, 49 (82%)
were released on the same day as the hearing, 9 (15%) were released within 10 days and 2 (3%) were re-
leased beyond 10 days of the hearing. In terms of Tribunal Rule 35(5), the Tribunal must within 20 days of
issuing an order, provide written reasons for its decision. The average time taken for issuing written reasons
is 14 days. Of the 58 mergers in which reasons were released within the review period, 42 (72%) were re-
leased within 20 days of the order, and 16 (18%) were released beyond 20 days of the order.'
315 Competition Law and Policy in South Africa - OECD Global Forum on Competition Peer Review: Paris,
11 February 2003, p. 20, available at: http://www.comptrib.co.za/Publications/South%20Africa%
20Peer%20Review. PDF.
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South Africa has a long tradition of print media. In 1800, the first issue of a government
newspaper, the Cape Town Gazette and African Advertiser/Kaapsche Stads Courant en
Afrikaansche Berigter saw the light.316 In 1824, the first independent publication, The
South African Commercial Advertiser, was published.
Nowadays, there is a variety of daily and weekly newspapers, as shown by following graph
on the next page:
Graph 3: Daily and weekly newspapers"?
Name Publisher Frequency Language Audited circulation
Jul-Dec 2003
Beeld (Daily) Media24"'o MD, M-F A 101.367
Beeld (Saturday) Media24 W, Sat A 83.718
Burger, Die (Daily) Media24 MD, M-F A 102.902
Burger, Die (Sat- Media24 W, Sat A 114.587
urday)
Business Day Business Day Financial MD, M-F E 42.057
Mail Publishers (Pty) Ltd
(BDFM)319
Cape Argus, The Independent Newspapers AD, M-F E 73.206
Cape Ltd
Cape Times Independent Newspapers MD, M-F E 48.812
Cape Ltd
Citizen, The (Daily) Caxton Publishers & Print- MD, M-F E 98.228
ers Ltd
Citizen, The (Sat- Caxton Publishers & Print- W, Sat E 77.107
urday) ers Ltd
City Press Media24 W, Sun E 167.885
Daily Dispatch Dispatch Media (Pty) Ltd"'w AD, M-F E 32.770
Daily News Independent Newspapers AD, M-F E 51.131
KZN
Daily Sun Media24 MD, M-F E 235.386""
Diamond Fields Independent Newspapers MD, M-F E 8.775
Advertiser Gauteng Ltd
Herald (Daily) Johnnic"~~ MD, M-F E 30.050
Herald (Saturday) Johnnic W, Sat E 23.775
316South Africa Year Book 2003/04, 147. For the history of the South African press see also De Beer &
Diederichs in De Beer (ed) Mass Media Towards the Millenium - The South African Handbook of Mass
Communication 2nd edition (1998) chapter 4.
317The abbreviations used are the following: MD (morning daily), AD (afternoon daily), BW (bi-weekly), W
(weekly), M-F (Monday to Friday), Mo (Monday), Tu (Tuesday), Wed (Wednesday), Th (Thursday), Fr (Fri-
day), Sat (Saturday), Sun (Suday), A (Afrikaans), E (English), Z (Zulu).
316Media24 is wholly owned by Naspers, see 1 532 infra.
319BDFM publishes for Johncom in partnership with another publisher, see footnote 379 of this thesis infra.
320Owned by Johnnie.
321See also 1 5 3 2 infra.
322 Formerly Times Media Eastern Cape (Times Media was the old name of Johncom, see
http://www.southafrica.info/ess info/sa glance/constitution/971558.htm).
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"anga Mandla Matla Publishing BW, Th Z 98.492
Co (Pty) Ltd Mo
Isolezwe Independent Newspapers MD, M-F Z 55.195"£"
KZN
Independent on Independent Newspapers W, Sat E 56.116
Saturday, The KZN
Mail and Guardian M&G Media (Pty) Ltd W, Fr E 37.689
Mercury, The Independent Newspapers MD, M-F E 39.235
KZN
Post Independent Newspapers W,Wed E 38.545
KZN
Pretoria News Independent Newspapers AD, M-F E 27.164
(Daily) Gauteng Ltd
Pretoria News Independent Newspapers W, Sat E 16.477
(Saturday) Gauteng Ltd
Rapport Media24 W, Sun A 324.882
Saturday Dispatch Dispatch Media (Pty) Ltd W, Sat E 27.816
Saturday Star, The Independent Newspapers W, Sat E 136.345
Gauteng Ltd
Soccer Media24 W, Thu E 217.594
Laduuuuuma
Son, Die Media24 W, Fri A 90.015
Southern Cross, Catholic Newspapers & W, Sun E 10.082
The Pub Co Ltd
Sowetan New Africa Publications MD, M-F E 123.590
(NAP)324
Sowetan Sunday Johnnic W, Sun E 141.634
World
Star, The Independent Newspapers MD, M-F E 165.948
Gauteng Ltd
Sunday Independ- Independent Newspapers W, Sun E 41.037
ent, The Gauteng Ltd
Sunday Sun Media24 W, Sun E 164.374
Sunday Times Johnnic W, Sun E 505.717
Sunday Tribune Independent Newspapers W, Sun E 109.576
KZN
Volksblad, Die Media24 MD, M-F A 27.179
I (Daily)
Volksblad, Die Media24 W, Sat A 23.021
I (Saturday)
Weekend Argus Independent Newspapers W, Sat & Sun E 103.938
Cape Ltd
This Day ThisDay Media MD, M-F E 32.401
Weekend Post Johnnic W, Sat E 35.212
Weekend Witness Natal Witness Pr & Pub Co W, Sat E 27.309
Pty Ltd
Source: Audit Bureau of Circulations, quoted from: South Africa Year Book 2004/05,145-146 and own re-
search
323In July to December 2004 an average of even 65.109 copies a day was sold, see bizcommunity newslet-
ter of 07 March 2005 (http://www.bizcommunity.com/Article.aspx?c-15&1-196&ai-5971). Between July and
December 2002, there were only 34.057 copies sold, see South Africa Yearbook 2003/4,150.
324Johnnie now owns 90,5% of NAP. The remaining shares are owned by an Employee Share Trust (9,25%)
and minority shareholders (0,25%), see Johnnie Communications Reviewed Interim Results for the six
months ended 30 September 2004, published in Business Times (Sunday Times) (2004-11-28) 9 and John-
nie Publishing Ltd / New Africa Publications (CT 36/LM/Apr04) par 2.
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Of these newspapers, only the Sunday newspapers, Sunday Times, Rapport, Sunday In-
dependent and Sunday Sun, and the newspapers City Press and Business Day can be
regarded as truly national newspapers, because they are published simultaneously in vari-
ous cities using printing facilities of related dailies.325The size of the country - nearly 1500
km separating the main centres of Cape Town and Johannesburg - still precludes national
dailies in the true sense of the word. Nevertheless, there is a large number of local dailies.
Summa summa rum, there are at least eighteen dailies in South Africa and according to the
latest figures 28 weeklies,326 nine of them published on Sundays. Nearly 120 regional or
country newspapers, most of which are weekly tabloids, serve particular towns or districts
in South Africa.327 In 2003, the Audit Bureau of Circulations listed more than 178 so-called
'knock-and-drops' or 'freebies' newspapers, which are distributed free of charge and ap-
pear only in certain neighbourhoods. Only advertising finances them.328More than 4,5 mil-
lion newspapers of that sort are distributed weekly. Press groups such as Media24 and
CTP/Caxton are major players in this field.
According to the latest figures a list of newspapers sorted with reference to circulation
looks as follows:
Graph 4: Biggest daily- and weekly-distributed newspapers
325 South Africa Yearbook 2003/4, 147. Rapport, City Press and Sunday Sun (all Media24) are printed in four
cities and distributed nationally, see http://www.media24.co.za/eng/newspapersindex.html. The Business
Day is printed in Johannesburg, Cape Town and Durban.
326 See bizcommunity newsletter of 20 February 2005 (http://www.bizcommunity.com/Article.aspx?c=15&1
=196&ai=5809).
327 South Africa Yearbook 2004/5, 142.
328 South Africa Yearbook 2003/4, 148.
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Urban Weekly Newspapers Urban Daily Newspapers
Name Audited circulation Name Audited circulation
Jul-Dec 2004329 Jul-Dec 2004
Sunday Times 505.402 Daily Sun 364.356
Rapport 322.731 The Star 171.542"''>u
Soccer laduuuuuma 244.509 Sowetan 122.825
Son 199.959 Die Burger 104.102
City Press 173.992 Beeld 102.070
Sunday Sun 173.738
Sunday World 143.208
Die Burger 117.092
Sunday Tribune 109.774
Weekend Argus 103.953
!langa 103.597
Source:Audit Bureau of Circulations, quoted from: media.toolbox newsletter of 22 February 2005 Vol.7 No 07
As regards the weekly-distributed newspapers, a certain degree of diversity can be no-
ticed, even though Media24 holds 6 of the ten biggest weeklies. The Sunday Times, the
biggest weekly in South Africa, is held by Johnnic. As far as the biggest dailies are con-
cerned, Media24 also plays a predominant role, holding three of the five biggest newspa-
pers.
The newspaper readership is still growing331 due to publishing in indigenous languages
and the growth of the black readership.332 According to the Audit Bureau of Circulations,333
urban daily-distributed newspapers show a 4% growth for the period of July to December
2004 since 2001 and 7% growth in the same period in 2003, while urban weeklies have
grown 5% and 6% respectively for the same periods. Circulation of urban dailies has risen
from 13,3 million readers to 14,5 million over the last six months and there has been
growth in the market of urban weeklies from 23 to 28 different newspapers, which show a
steady circulation.P"
329 Total net sales per publishing day.
330 The source also refers to the figure of 166.461 copies.
331 That makes South Africa one of few countries in the world, where the newspaper readership is growing,
see Harber 'Poniepers op 'n galop' DIE BURGER (2004-11-03) 13.
332 Detailed: South Africa Yearbook 2003/4, 148. See also for instance the growth of the Zulu newspaper
Isolezwe, selling between July and December 2004 already an average of 65,109 copies a day, bizcommu-
nity newsletter of 07 March 2005 (http://www.bizcommunity.com/Article.aspx?c=15&1=196&ai=5971). For the
history of the black press in South Africa see Fourie (ed) Media Studies Volume 1: Institutions, Theories and
Issues (2001) 49-52.
333 Quoted from: media.toolbox newsletter of 22 February 2005 Vol. 7 No 07.
334 However, there has been a significant decrease in advertising expenditure over the same period, from
15,6% to 11 ,9%, see bizcommunity newsletter of 20 February 2005
(http://www.bizcommunity.com/Article .aspx?c= 15&1=196&ai=5809).
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There is also a large number of magazine titles distributed in South Africa.335 Currently,
more than 1100 magazine titles are published monthly.336 The magazine market can be
characterised as relatively stable, and considering the explosion of titles in the market over
the last few years, magazine sales have remained constant and even growing. The focus
for publishers remains on retail sales.33? Magazines have experienced circulation in-
creases from 8,4 million to 14,8 million over the past five years.338 Hence, the net sales in
the magazine field have increased by 41% since 2001 and 13% over the same period for
2003.339Most titles are sold in niche markets with small circulations. The latest magazine
figures of the Audit Bureau of Circulations show that there is a decline in the women's
magazine segment and an increase in men's rnaqazlne."? According to the Printing and
Publishing Handbook (1999), there were 180 consumer magazine titles in 1977 in South
Africa, by 1987 this number had increased to 200, and by 1999, there were 510 titles_341
Graph 5: Sold magazines with the largest circulation, July - December 2004342
Name Frequency Language Audited circulation
Huisgenoot W A 340.570
You W E 222.845
Sarie M A 137.970
TV Plus M B 135.563
RooiRose M A 119.994
FHM M E 118.428;:l4;:l
Cosmopolitan M E 117.255
True Love M E 114.793
CAR M E 105.934
People F E 105.535" ....
335 For the history of magazine publishing in South Africa see Claasen in De Beer (ed) Mass Media Towards
the Millenium - The South African Handbook of Mass Communication 2nd edition (1998) chapter 5.
336 South Africa Yearbook 2004/5, 143.
337 Detailed: South Africa Yearbook 2003/4, 149.
338 Audit Bureau of Circulation, quoted from bizcommunity newsletter of 20 February 2005
~http://www.bizcommunity.com/Article.aspx?c= 15&1=196&ai=5809).
39 Audit Bureau of Circulation, quoted from media.toolbox newsletter of 22 February 2005 Vol. 7 No 07.
340 Charisse Tabak, managing director of Nota Bene Cape Town, explains this by describing the category of
women's magazines as 'over-traded' and 'missing the mark in terms
of addressing the real needs of contemporary women.' Content would tend to be
'patronizing' and there would be lack of differentiation from title to title, see media.toolbox newsletter of 01
March 2005 Vol. 7 No 08.
341 Quoted from Nasmedia / Paarl Post Web Printers (Pty) Ltd (CT 65/LM/MayOO) par 23.
342 The abbreviations used are the following: W (weekly), F (fortnightly), M (monthly), Q (quarterly), E (Eng-
lish), A (Afrikaans), B (bilingual).
343 FHM is therefore the biggest men's magazine in South Africa.
344 Between July and December 2002 the order has been the following: Huisgenoot (347.519 sold copies),
YOU (231.648), Sarie (162.642), Rooi Rose (141.155), True Love (134.098), Reader's Digest (119.373), TV
Plus (118.015), People (113.285), The Motorist (110.348) and Cosmopolitan (102.984), see South Africa
Year Book 2003/04, 149.
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Source:Audit Bureau of Circulations, quoted from: media.toolbox newsletter of 22 February 2005 Vol.7 No 07
and own research
Media24 either directly publishes or owns a stake in six of the top ten magazine brands for
the period July 2004 to December 2004. Other major publishers in the magazine industry
are Caxton, Johnnic, Associated Magazines and Ramsay Son & Parker.
To summarize: the South African press market seems to be stable and growing. A plural-
istic press market exists, even though it is shared by a few big publishing houses.r" In this
respect, a resemblance exists with Germany. A decline in certain segments of the print
industry is not necessarily a sign of lack of competition. Changing media consumption pat-
terns can be noticed also in other countries, such as the shift to electronic media. As far as
consumer magazines are concerned, the print media did not keep pace with the competi-
tion and innovation taking place in the media industry:
'Most consumer magazine titles are predictable and formulaic. Innovation has
been limited to improvements in packaging and paper, but content remains
unoriginal. ,346
The South African press itself, however, can be considered as fairly free, also as far as the
freedom of journalists is concerned. The international organisation 'Reporters without bor-
ders' publishes since 2002 a 'World Press Freedom Ranking'. The ranking measures the
state of press freedom in the world by observing whether independent news media exist in
a country or if the authorities constantly repress it. The ranking reflects the degree of free-
dom that journalists and news organisations enjoy in each country, and the efforts under-
taken by the state to respect and ensure respect for this freedom. Hence, it shows, under
which conditions journalists work, especially whether their work is unfettered and secure
and without governmental influence.347 In the last ranking (October 2003),348 South Africa
345 See in detail 1 5 3 2 infra.
346 Charisse Tabak, managing director of Nota Bene Cape Town, interpreting the latest ABC results, in me-
dia.toolbox newsletter of 01 March 2005 Vol. 7 No 08.
347 To compile this ranking, Reporters Without Borders asked journalists, researchers, jurists and human
rights activists to fill out a questionnaire evaluating respect for press freedom in a particular country. It in-
cludes every kind of violation directly affecting journalists (such as murders, imprisonment, physical attacks
and threats) and news media (censorship, confiscation of issues, searches and harassment) and registers
the degree of impunity enjoyed by those responsible for these press freedom violations. The questionnaire
also takes account of the legal and judicial situation affecting the news media (such as the penalties for
press offences, the existence of a state monopoly in certain areas and the existence of a regulatory body)
62
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
1 5 3 2 Publishing houses
Chapter 1 - South African Competition Law
is placed at 23rd position in the world (of 166 observed countries), achieving even the 12th
best mark in the ranking.349Thus, South Africa's ranking has even improved since 2002.350
The 2003 report Africa351observed a 'satisfactory situation' in South Africa and acknowl-
edged that 'no journalists were imprisoned just for doing their job and no news media were
shut down for being too critical of the authorities.'352 Germany is ranked at position eight,
getting the 4th best result in the world.353
South African newspapers and magazines are mainly organised into press groups, which
have burgeoned over the years as a result of take-overs.P" The four major press groups
are Nasionale Pers Ltd (Naspers), Independent Newspapers (Pty) Ltd, Johnnic Communi-
cations (Johncom) as well as Caxton and CTP Publishers and Printers Ltd.355Other impor-
tant media players include Primedia, Nail (New Africa Investments Limited)356 and Kagiso
Media Ltd.35?
and the behaviour of the authorities towards the state-owned news media and international press. Even the
main obstacles to the free flow of information on the Internet are taken into account.
348 Reporters without borders: Second world press freedom ranking (October 2003), available at:
http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id article=8247.
349 With the mark 3.33, due to several of the firms above it achieving the same mark. South Africa therefore
~ot the best ranking in Africa.
50 Reporters without borders: First worldwide press freedom index (October 2002), available at:
http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id article=4116. South Africa was ranked at zs" position (mark 7,50 and 16th
best mark worldwide of 139 observed countries).
351 Reporters without borders: Africa introduction - 2003 Annual Report, available at:
http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id article=6462.
352 Although it was observed that journalists continued to be the victims of threats and attacks in some iso-
lated regions, South Africa is still getting good marks for respect for press freedom, cf Reporters without
borders: South Africa - 2003 Annual Report, available at: http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id article=6452.
353 For South Africa see also Berger 'So this is Democracy?', in Report on the state of media freedom in
Southern Africa, published by MISA (2003), 71-74.
354 See the discussion between Louwand Sullivan in Louw (ed) South African Media Policy: Debates of the
1990s (1993) chapter 13-15.
355 For the history of these four press groups see De Beer & Diederichs in De Beer (ed) Mass Media To-
wards the Millenium - The South African Handbook of Mass Communication 2nd edition (1998) 93-97.
356 Nail is an investment holding company with interests in radio broadcasting, media marketing, printing
publications, exhibitions, film and television production, as well as certain non-media activities and was tem-
porarily acquired by a consortium, see for details The Tiso Consortium (comprising of Investee Bank Ltd,
Multi-Direct Investments 180 (Pty) Ltd, Capricorn Capital Partners Holding Co (Pty) Ltd, Mineworkers In-
vestments Co (Pty) Ltd ('MIC') and Safika Holdings (Pty) Ltd) / New Africa Investments Limited ('NAIL') (CT
59/LM/Oct03) par 9-19. Nail has unbundled into a commercial company (New Africa Capital) and a media
company (New Africa Media).
357 This company is controlled by the Kagiso Trust. Kagiso Media's assets include its Broadcasting Division,
which owns 100% of East Coast Radio, 60% of Jacaranda fm, 24,9% of OFM and 47,47% of RadMark.
Kagiso's specialist publishing division owns 50% of Butterworths, see for further details Kagiso Media Ltd -
Audited results for the year ended 30 June 2004, available at:
http://www.kagiso.com/media/Kagiso%20results.pdf.
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The biggest South African media company when it comes to print products is Nasionale
Pers Ltd (Naspers).358 Naspers is a multinational media group with operations in, inter alia,
pay-TV, Internet services, print media and publishing. Naspers controls Media24, M-Nee5g
and the satellite pay TV network DStv, MultiChoice and Internet services like News24.
Naspers has also extensive interests in rural and suburban newspapers throughout South
Africa.360According to the recently released financial results for the year to March 2005,361
the group revenue grew 9% to almost R 14 billion.362 The bulk of revenue and profits
comes from pay_TV,363but also from newspapers, magazines, and printing.364 The wholly
owned company Media24 (formerly known as Nasmedia), with a turnover in excess of R 2
billion a year, is according to the company's information 'Africa's biggest publishing
group,365and the 'dominant player in the South African magazine industry,'366 controlling
more than 60% of the country's total circulation. In total, the company publishes 10 na-
tional newspaper titles,367 almost 40 regional newspapers368 and more than 30 different
magazines.36g The company uses it subsidiaries NND24 and Newspaper Leaflet Distribu-
tors (NLD.24) for distribution of its magazines and newspapera."? Media24 Digital is the
electronic publishing arm of Media24, offering services around Health, Motoring, Women's
Interest, Property, Food and especially News through its online portal News24.com.371
358 Until 2000, listed financial services company Sanlam was the major shareholder in Naspers, with about
16,5% of the shares. The company is now effectively controlled by Standard Bank Nominees Ltd (18%).
Nedcor Bank Nominees Ltd (15,2%), and CMB Nominees Ltd (16,4%), the main shareholder is now Old
Mutual (9,7%), see Business Report (2005-06-22) 25. See also www.naspers.com.
359 M-Net is a pay television network. The Johnnie Group participates in M-Net Supersport, having a 2% in-
terest in MTN Group Ltd, which operates digital cellular network services, commercial satellite signal distribu-
tion as well as internet access and managed Internet Protocol network solutions throughout Africa.
360 For details cf Fourie (ed) Media Studies Volume 1: Institutions, Theories and Issues (2001) 66.
361 Naspers Limited, Provisional Report - Summary of the audited results of the Naspers group for the year
ended 31 March 2005, published in Business Day (2005-06-30) 11.
362 See also Derby 'Naspers share price dips even as results shine' Business Day (2005-06-30) 15; Salgado
'Naspers stock dips despite profit leap' Business Report (2005-06-30) 23.
363 Pay-tv comprises almost 60% of the total revenue.
364 Naspers Limited, Provisional Report - Summary of the audited results of the Naspers group for the year
ended 31 March 2005, published in Business Day (2005-06-30) 11.
365 See hnp://www.media24.co.za/eng/community.html#about.
366 See hnp://www.media24.co.za/eng/mags/magazinesindex.html.
367 Dailies: Daily Sun, Die Burger (the first Afrikaans daily in South Africa), Beeld, Volksblad and The Wit-
ness; Sunday newspapers: Rapport, Sunday Sun and City Press; Weeklies: Son and Soccer Laduuuuuma.
368 List at hnp://www.media24.co.za/eng/newspapersindex.html. Circa two thirds of the titles are distributed
free of charge, cfhnp://www.media24.co.za/eng/circulation.html.
369 These are, inter alia, the magazines Huisgenoot, Sarie, TV Plus, YOU, Fairlady, True Love and FHM. For
details see hnp://www.media24.co.za/eng/mags/magazinesindex.html.
370 Cfhnp://www.media24.co.za/eng/distribution/distributionindex.html.
371 According to the company 'South Africa's leading online news service', see
http://www.media24.co.za/eng/internetlinternetindex.html.
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The importance of Media24 can be observed on the market for dailies. Around 520.000
copies of Afrikaans newspapers are sold from Monday to Friday, that is almost 42% of the
national market (1,3 million copies). Only the Independent Newspaper group is a competi-
tor with similar size (490.000 copies, more than 36%).372Also on the English newspaper
market, Media24 plays a more and more important role. In particular, the newspaper Daily
Sun is growing remarkably (around 360.000 sold copies).373 It is expected that the reader-
ship will even grow to 400.000 sold copies. That would make Media24 also the biggest
player in the English daily newspaper marker'" and the classic distinction between Eng-
lish press (Independent, Johnnie) and Afrikaans press (Naspers) would then become ob-
solete.375
Johnnie Communications Ltd (Johncornr'" is a media and entertainment company, being
controlled by Johnnie Holdings Limited (Johnntc),"" and recently had revenues of almost
R 2 billion.378 Johncom owns a couple of national and Eastern Cape newspapers,379
magazines,38o and also is, inter alia, active in the segments of digital publishing, book and
372 Harber 'Poniepers op 'n galop' DIE BURGER (2004-11-03) 13.
373 See Graph 4 (1 53 1 supra). Between July and December 2002, the audited circulation was only 71.742,
see South Africa Yearbook 2003/2004,150.
374 The Daily Sun would then sell more than all 14 titles of the Independent group together, see Harber
'Poniepers op 'n galop' DIE BURG ER (2004-11-03) 13.
375 See for the historic structure of the press Fourie (ed) Media Studies Volume 1: Institutions, Theories and
Issues (2001) 47.
376 See http://www.johncom.co.za; Johncom was formerly known as Times Media Limited (TML).
377 Johnnie Holdings Ltd is an investment holding company with interests in the media, telecommunications,
casino, entertainment, exhibition, and property industries and as public company listed on the JSE. None of
its shareholders either directly or indirectly controls Johnnie Holdings (Its main shareholders are Old Mutual
(13%); PIC (8,65%); RMB (6,86%); Metropolitan (6,60%); Coronation (6,19%); Liberty Group (5,15%) and
Sanlam (5,04%). Johnnie Holdings has more than 20 subsidiaries, see Johnnie Holdings Limited / Fabcos
Investment Holding Company Limited (CT 01/LM/Jan05) par 2. According to Johnnie Publishing Ltd / New
Africa Publications (CT 36/LM/Apr04) par 5, Johnnie Holdings Ltd is controlled by the National Empowerment
Consortium ('NEC'), a consortium established by labour unions and black owned businesses (see also
http://www.southafrica.info/ess info/sa glance/constitution/971557.htm). Johnnie recently announced that it
intends to unbundled its 62.5% shareholding in Johncom, see Business Report (2004-12-01) 1, Business
Report (2004-12-03) 1 and Business Report (2004-12-07) 3.
376 See Johnnie Communications Reviewed Interim Results for the six months ended 30 September 2004,
~ublished in Business Times (Sunday Times) (2004-11-28) 9.
79 Such as Sunday Times (the flagship weekly-distributed newspaper), Sowetan, Sowetan Sunday World,
Daily Dispatch, Dispatch on Saturday, Weekend Post and The Herald. Johncom also publishes financial
newspapers and magazines through Business Day Financial Mail Publishers (BDFM), in partnership with
Pearson, the UK-based publishers of the Financial Times. These newspapers are Business Day, Business
Day pm, Financial Mail, Summit TV and PR Newswire. See also
http://www.johncom.co.za/busnewspapers.asp.
360 Johncom produces a wide range of magazine titles spanning business, consumer, and medical publish-
ing. Leading titles include Elle, SA Home Owners, Longevity, and Computing SA, see
http://www.johncom.co.za/busmagazines.asp.
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map publishing, retail,381music, home entertainment and pay television.382 The bulk of its
revenue and profits comes from two divisions: media and pay_TV.383Johncom is interlaced
with other media interests, such as its stake in M-Net Supersport''" in a joint venture with
Naspers. The Competition Tribunal had to adjudicate upon a proposed transaction involv-
ing Johnnie recently, albeit not in the media sector.?"
Caxton and CTp386 Publishers and Printers (Caxton),387 is an associated company of
Johnnie: Johncom has 36,2% stake in CTP.388Caxton controls the national daily newspa-
per The Citizen, which started off as a pro-government English morning tabloid established
during the apartheid years in the late 1970's by the Department of Information.389 Caxton
also publishes several regional and community newspapers and magazines390 and is also
involved in the paper and printing industry and considers itself to be Naspers' major com-
petitor in that industry.391
The fourth big group is the Independent News and Media (South Africa) Limited.392 Its
wholly owned subsidiary, Independent Newspapers, publishes a total of 15 daily and
381 This includes Exclusive Books (a retailer of a range of books, magazines and newspapers) and the Nu
Metro chain of cinemas.
382 A detailed structure of Johncom is available at
http://www.johncom.co.za/ACCESS%20TO%20INFO%20MANUAL %20-%202004.pdf (p. 16).
383 See Klein 'Johncom rides the crest of a wave' Business Times (Sunday Times) (2004-11-28) 3. Cf also
for details Johnnie Communications Reviewed Interim Results for the six months ended 30 September 2004,
~ublished in Business Times (Sunday Times) (2004-11-28) 9.
84 Johncom holds 38,5%.
385 In this (approved) merger case, Johnnie Holdings acquired an additional 25% of the issued share capital
of Fabcos Investment Holdings (casino & gaming industry), see Johnnie Holdings Limited I Fabcos Invest-
ment Holding Company Limited (CT 01/LM/Jan05).
386 CTP (Cape and Transvaal Printers), a R 100 million printing company, was acquired in 1985.
387 See http://www.caxton.co.za. Caxton and CTP Publishers and Printers are controlled by the CTP Hold-
in~s Ltd (CTP).
38 According to Johnnie Publishing Ltd I New Africa Publications (CT 36/LM/Apr04) par 10, Johncom has
only an 18% stake in CTP. Apparently, this merely refers to its direct stake in Caxton (17,3%); Johncom
holds an additional indirect stake of 19,8% through a company called Afmed, see
http://www.johncom.co.za/pressMar0105a.asp.
389 See Fourie (ed) Media Studies Volume 1: Institutions, Theories and Issues (2001) 45.
390 Rooi Rose, Style, People Magazine and Farmers Weekly (the oldest magazine in South Africa), see
http://www.caxton.co.za.
391 See Caxton and CTP Publishers and Printers Limited v Naspers Limited and Electronic Media Network
Limited and Supersport International Holdings Limited and the Competition Commission (CT 16/FN/Mar04)
gar2.
92 Independent News and Media (South Africa) Limited, in turn, is part of Independent News & Media PLC
(INM), an international media and communications group, with a turnover of € 1,56 billion having interests in
Australia, Ireland, New Zealand, South Africa and the United Kingdom. The Group publishes 175 newspaper
and magazine titles in these 5 countries with weekly circulation of over 13,5 million copies and operates 53
online sites, achieving 95 million page impressions per month in aggregate, see
http://www.independentnewsmedia.com/corp.htm and Business Report 'Independent News & Media PLC -
celebrating 100 years' (2005-06-09) 18.
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weekly newspapers in South Africa's three major metropolitan areas.393 The group also
has interests in magazines,394 book publishing, radio and broadcasting, outdoor publish-
ing, and electronic media.395
In cities, newspapers are mainly distributed by street sales and door-ta-door delivery, while
in rural areas, the distribution is mainly done by special truck deliveries.396 Some of the big
publishers use their own distribution system, like Naspers/Media24.397 Another major dis-
tributor of newspapers is Allied Publishing Ltd (Allied). Independent Newspapers (pty) Ltd
and Johncom jointly control Allied, each having a 50% stake in the company.398 Hence,
Allied carries the publications of Johnnie and Independent Newspapers, but also those of
Nail and third parties.
In the most recent case concerning a newspaper merger, the Johnnie Publishing / New
Africa Publications case,399the Tribunal pointed out that 'it is clear that distribution is a bar-
rier to entry for a new publlcatlon.r''" It described the distribution market as 'concentrated'
and 'characterised by vertically integrated flrms."?' However, Johnnie's and Independent's
joint control of Allied post merger in this sense raised no competition concerns on a verti-
393 Newspapers include the titles Cape Times, Cape Argus, The Star, Sunday Tribune, Post, Mercury, and
Daily News. In March 2005, the group launched also Daily Voice (a Cape Town tabloid). According to the
firm's information, Independent Newspapers currently receives 48% of the total advertising spend in the paid
newspaper market (more than twice that of any other newspaper group), with aggregate weekly sales of 2,8
million copies in Gauteng, KwaZulu Natal and the Western Cape, see
http://www.iol.co.za/index.php?click id=1905.
394 Such as the magazine Glamour.
395 Moreover, Independent Newspapers also publishes 13 free delivery weekly community newspapers in
Cape Town and holds a number of commercial printing and distribution contracts in all areas. Cf also Busi-
ness Report 'Independent News & Media PLC - celebrating 100 years' (2005-06-09) 18.
396 Detailed: South Africa Yearbook 2003/4,149.
397 See 1 5 3 2 supra.
398 This is a result of the acquisition of New Africa Publications by Johnnic Publishing. Independent Newspa-
pers exercised its pre-emption right, already being a shareholder of Allied, see Johnnie Publishing Ltd / New
Africa Publications (CT 36/LM/Apr04) par 22 and 1 5356 infra.
399 Johnnie Publishing Ltd / New Africa Publications (CT 36/LM/Apr04). See the discussion of the case in
detail 1 5 3 5 6 infra.
400 Johnnie Publishing Ltd / New Africa Publications (CT 36/LM/Apr04) par 31.
401 That would mean that a new entrant had to approach a firm controlled by a rival, or would be rival, for
distribution. The Competition Tribunal already mentioned in the Nasmedia / Paarl Post case (Nasmedia /
Paarl Post Web Printers (Pty) Ltd (CT 65/LM/MayOO) par 28, see also 1 5 3 5 3 infra) that all the independent
publishers - contacted by the Tribunal in this case - indicated that distribution was a problem. The Tribunal
was 'concerned about the possible impact of vertical integration, in particular on the ability of the large inte-
grated companies to use their dominant position in distribution to exclude new competitors in publishing.'
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cal level402as such joint control would prevent Johncom from exercising any foreclosure
strategy, especially in view of the fact that Allied always distributed third parties' newspa-
pers and never refused to do so. Moreover, the parties to the merger argued that Naspers
and Caxton also would use their own distribution networks that also work for third parties,
and hence foreclosure 'would not only be unsuccessful because of the presence of these
rivals, but would also be irrational, because economies of scale are crucial in distribution
and spreading the costs of distribution over a wide range of customers is vital to the profit-
ability of the company."?'
1 5 3 4 Conclusion
The South African media sector seems to be complex. Media companies cooperate in di-
versified areas, like broadcasting, publishing, printing, and distribution, forming joint ven-
tures or having shares in holding companies.
In the newspaper markets, there are only a few independent competing firms, whereas the
magazine markets seem to be more diverse.
1 5 3 5 Single cases
There are a couple of cases involving media companies, especially newspaper publishers,
which will be presented to demonstrate the South African competition authorities' ap-
proach in this field.
1 5 35 1 The Press Corporation of SA Ltd and CTP Caxton (Pty) Ltd
The merger between The Press Corporation of SA Ltd and CTP Caxton (Pty) Ltd took
place in 1998 and was approved. It raised no concerns from a competition law perspec-
tive, but led to a dispute between the South African Typographical Union (SATU)404 and
The Press Corporation of SA Ltd in terms of section 189 of the Labour Relations Act 66 of
402 For the Tribunal's horizontal concerns in this case see 1 5 3 5 6 infra.
403 See Johnnie Publishing Ltd / New Africa Publications (CT 36/LM/Apr04) par 29-30.
404 SATU is a registered trade union, which represents the majority of the newspaper, printing and packaging
sector of the market.
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1995405as a result of the proposed retrenchment of staff which had become necessary
because of this merger.406
There have been two intermediate mergers in 1999, which have been prohibited by the
Competition Commission in terms of section 14(1)(b)(iii).407 Consequently, the parties re-
quested the Competition Tribunal to consider these mergers.408
The first merger was between CT Media Publications (Pty) Limited and Caxton Publishers
and Printers Limited. CT Media is a subsidiary of Nasionale Media Limited.
The other merger involved Nasnuus, a division of Nasionale Media Limited and Penrose
Holdings. Penrose Holdings, in turn, is a subsidiary of Caxton Publishers and Printers Lim-
ited. The mergers involved sales of regional newspaper titles. Since both mergers involved
the same set of procedural facts, the Tribunal adjudicated upon these transactions to-
gether.
The Tribunal held that the Commission's decisions to prohibit were not made within the
time period required by section 14(2) of the ACt.409So it did not have to assess the impact
of these transactions on competition, but could already find the Commission's prohibitions
of the mergers to be invalid for procedural reasons and directed the Commission 'to issue
clearance certificates to the parties and to otherwise comply with Rule 33(2) of the Com-
mission Rules.'410
405 S 189 of the Labour Relations Act, inter alia, sets out: 'When an employer contemplates dismissing one or
more employees for reasons based on employer's operational requirements, the employer must con-
sult. ..any person whom the employer is required to consult in terms of a collective agreement' and in the
event that 'there is no workplace forum in the workplace in which the employees likely to be affected by the
proposed dismissals are employed, any registered trade union whose members are likely to be affected by
the proposed dismissals'. The fulfilment of the employer's obligations as stated in s 189 was controversial in
this case.
406 See South African Typographical Union (SATU) v The Press Corporation of SA Ltd 1998 (11) BLLR 1173
iLC).
07 S 15 old version.
408 See Nasnuus, a division of Nasionale Media Limited v The Competition Commission of South Africa (CT
27/AM/MarOO) and CT Media Publications (Pty) Ltd v The Competition Commission of South Africa (CT
34/AM/MarOO).
409 In terms of section 14(1) of the Act in its old version the Commission had 30 days to approve or prohibit
the merger.
410 The old Commission's Rules (available at: http://www.compcom.co.za/thelaw/RulesfortheConductof Pro-
cedings.doc) postulated in 33(2): 'If the Commission is deemed to have approved a merger in terms of sec-
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In this large merger case, the Tribunal unconditionally approved the transactions between
Nasmedia Limited (Nasrneolar'" and Paarl Post Web Printers (Pty) Limited (PPW), by
which the parties were forming a new printing company (New Print). Hence, this was a
merger of two printing facilities. On the one hand the in-house printer for Nasmedia, which
was also a publisher, printer and distributor for several independent publishers and other
clients, was to be part of the merged entity. On the other hand, PPW as an independent
printer would be 100% owned by New Print.
The parties to the merger planned New Print to be owned by different shareholders (Nas-
pers413 (65%), Eagle Media414 (25%), MICEF415 and employees (each 5%)). Nasmedia
would appoint half of the Board members of Newprint with certain restrictions. Accordingly,
the Tribunal assumed that Newprint would be controlled by Nasrnedia.t"
The Competition Tribunal defined the relevant product market as the 'printing market for
magazines, brochures and advertising inserts printed on litho-web presses.' Moreover, the
Tribunal declared the geographic market to be national, since the consumers of the prod-
ucts and the merging parties' competitors were spread across the entire country."?
The transaction did not raise competition concerns, since in a post-merger scenario a simi-
lar sized (and even larger) competitor (Caxton) and several smaller printers existed and
could compete with Newprint. The Court stated that therefore Newprint would 'not be able
to control prices, exclude competition or behave to an appreciable extent independently of
its competitors in the magazine printing market,"!" Furthermore, the Court expected an
tion 14(2), the Commission must - (a) issue a Clearance Certificate, in Form CC 15, to the Participant who
filed the Merger Notice; and (b) publish a notice of that approval in the Gazette'.
411 Nasmedia I Paarl Post Web Printers (Pty) Ltd (CT 65/LM/MayOO).
412 Nasmedia changed its name to Media24, see already 1 5 3 2 supra.
413 Controlling Nasmedia (now Media24), see 1 5 3 2 supra.
414 That is the holding company of PPW.
415 Mineworkers Investment Company Empowerment Fund.
416 Par 29.
417 Par 14.
418 Par 22.
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increase in competition. It held that this strongly indicated that concentration could in future
even decrease, which would also lessen the possibility of collusion.
Publishing houses are in need of printing facilities and ways of distribution for their prod-
ucts. Accordingly, big publishers tend to have their own in-house printers, like CTP,419and
Nasmedia (Media24).42o
15 3 5 4 The Tiso Consortium and New Africa Investment Ltd (Naill21
In this (conditionally approved) merger,422 through which the media holding company Nail
was acquired by a consortium of several firms, the Tribunal was concerned about the fact
that one member of the consortium, which acquired Nail, was - through its holding in the
media company Primedia423- active in certain of the markets in which Nail was also active
(namely magazine publishing in South Africa, radio broadcasting services in Gauteng and
in the Western Cape and outdoor advertising nationally). The Tribunal, referring to the
Commission's finding, concluded that the transaction raised competition concerns only in
the radio service and outdoor advertising markets, as it would lead to an increase in con-
centration in those markets. The Tribunal followed the Commission, which had suggested
that competition concerns could only arise in markets in which the combined market share
of Nail and Primedia exceeded 20%.424 There were no concerns as regards magazine
publishing, where neither Nail nor Primedia had significant market shares. The Tribunal
419 Owning the Republican Press.
420 For the printing facilities of Media24 nowadays see http://www.media24.co.za/eng/printing/print-
in~ index.html.
42 The Tiso Consortium (comprising of Investec Bank Ltd, Multi-Direct Investments 180 (Pty) Ltd, Capricorn
Capital Partners Holding Co (Pty) Ltd, Mineworkers Investments Co (Pty) Ltd ('MIC') and Safika Holdings
(Pty) Ltd) / New Africa Investments Limited ('NAIL') (CT 59/LM/Oct03). Cf also The Competition Commission
v The Tiso Consortium and New Africa Investments Limited and Investec Bank Limited and Safika Holdings
(Pty) Ltd and Capricorn Capital Partners Holding and Company (Pty) Ltd and Multidirect Investments 180
(Pty) Ltd and Mineworkers Investment Company (Pty) Ltd (CT 82/FN/Oct04) - fine for omission of notifica-
tion.
422 See for the history of this transaction the urgent application of other media companies such as Johnnie to
interdict the Tiso consortium from further implementing a series of transactions to purchase shares in Nail:
Johnnie Communications Ltd and Kagiso Media Ltd and Caxton and CTP Publishers and Printers Ltd and
Terence Desmond Moolman v New Africa Investments Ltd and Investec Bank Ltd and Safika Holdings (Pty)
Ltd and Capricorn Capital Partners Holding Company (Pty) Lts (previously known as Newshelf 730 (Pty) Ltd)
and Multidirect Investments 180 (Pty) Ltd and Mineworkers Investment Company (Pty) Ltd and Phaphama
Holdings (Pty) Ltd and The Competition Commission and Shares Traded Totally Electronically Ltd and Ned-
bank Ltd and Standard Corporate and Merchant Bank Ltd and Firstrand Bank Ltd and ABSA Bank Ltd and
Société Générale Ltd and Computershare Ltd (CT 54/FN/Oct03).
423 The Mineworkers Investment Company had a 19,7% share hold.
424 See par 23.
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took into account that the transaction was only planned to be temporary, and approved the
merger subject to condltlons.i"
In this case, Caxton sought an order from the Tribunal declaring that a transaction be-
tween Naspers, M-Net and Supersport, by which Naspers should acquire shares in the
latter firms,427constituted a merger, which should have been notified to the Competition
Commission. The application was dismissed, because the Tribunal concluded that the
transaction did not constitute a 'change of control' in terms of section 12.428Although Nas-
pers was increasing it's direct holding in MNet and Supersport, the Tribunal found that M-
Net and Supersport would remain subject to joint control despite the transaction.t"
1 5 3 5 6 Johnnie Publishing Ltd and New Africa Publications Ltcf30
The most recent merger case between newspaper companies is the large merger between
Johnnic Publishing (Pty) Ltd and New Africa Publications Ltd (NAP). The Competition Tri-
bunal approved the transaction without conditions in July 2004, endorsing the findings of
the Competition Cornmisslon.t"
Johnnic Publishing, a local wholly owned subsidiary of Johncorn.f" acquired 90,5% of the
issued share capital of NAP and hence gained sole control. NAP was a holding company
425 The imposed conditions aimed at preventing influence of the Mineworkers Investment Company (the con-
sortium member, which had assets in Primedia) on the businesses of the same markets, in which Nail was
active in the interim.
426 Caxton and CTP Publishers and Printers Limited v Naspers Limited and Electronic Media Network Lim-
ited and Supersport International Holdings Limited and the Competition Commission (CT 16/FN/Mar04).
427 Naspers acquired further shares in Electronic Media Network Ltd (M-Net) and SuperSport International
Holdings Ltd.
428 The Tribunal stated: 'Granted there may be degrees of enhanced quality in forms of control, but the Act
cannot be interpreted to make merger notification so burdensome that every increment in shareholding re-
~uires an inquest into whether there has been a corresponding increment in the "quality" of control.' (par 45).
4 9 MNH98, a company jointly controlled by Naspers and Johncom held 52% of the shares in M-Net and Su-
persport prior to the transaction. This was not to be changed by the transaction. Also the MNH98 sharehold-
ers agreement, contained various clauses that ensured that MNH98 continued to control both MNet and
Supersport. See also Competition Tribunal South Africa, Annual Report 2003/2004, RP No 103/2004, p. 35,
available at: http://www.comptrib.co.za/Publications/Annual%20Report/Annual%20report%202003%
202004.pdf.
430 Johnnie Publishing Ltd / New Africa Publications Ltd (CT 36/LM/Apr04).
431 Cf also Johnnie Communications Reviewed Interim Results for the six months ended 30 September 2004,
published in Business Times (Sunday Times) (2004-11-28) 9.
432 For the structure of the Johnnie Group see 1 5 3 2 supra.
72
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Chapter 1 - South African Competition Law
whose subsidiaries are primarily involved in publishing newspapers and magazines433 and
in the production of television proqrarnrnes.f" In particular, NAP owned the newspapers
The Sowetan 100% and Sowetan Sunday World 50%; the latter was already owned 50%
by Johnnie Publishing. NAP also had a 50% interest in the firms Sowetan Television (Pty)
Ltd435and New Africa Publications Magazines Ltd, and a 33,3% interest in the company
Allied Publishing Ltd (a distributor), which was prior to the merger already owned 33,3% by
Johncom and to the same extent by Independent Newspapers Gauteng (pty) Ltd.436
First, the Tribunal made important observations about media markets in this case. Refer-
ring to the argumentation of the Competition Commission, it pointed out that 'media mar-
kets are typically analysed both from the point of view of the consumer, as the reader of
the publication, and the consumer as a purchaser of advertising in the publlcation.'?"
Hence, it differentiated between the 'print media market' and the 'sale of advertising space
market.' The definition of the relevant market for newspapers would be determined by a
variety of different factors. In this context, the Tribunal observed that:
'[n]ewspapers seem to operate in very niche markets. This is a function not only of
the geographic markets in which they operate, but other factors, which include the
frequency and time of day of distribution, the demographics of the readership (in-
cluding language, race and income groups at which the newspaper is targeted), and
the content of the newspaper.'438
Furthermore, the Tribunal examined a potential detrimental impact on competition on a
horizontal level, in view of the overlap between NAP's and Johncom's newspaper owner-
ship, but concluded that a substantial lessening or prevention of competition in 'any of the
relevant market' was not Iikely.439Conversely, it stated broadly that it was 'very unlikely
that this merger may result in the substantial lessening or prevention of competition - ver-
433 NAP publishes through its wholly owned subsidiary New Africa Publications Magazines Ltd the Leader-
ship Magazine, a monthly magazine which focuses on current political and business related issues.
434 NAP, in turn, was owned by 90,5% by Nail, see The Tiso Consortium (comprising of Investec Bank Ltd,
Multi-Direct Investments 180 (Pty) Ltd, Capricorn Capital Partners Holding Co (Pty) Ltd, Mineworkers In-
vestments Co (Pty) Ltd ('MIC') and Safika Holdings (Pty) Ltd) / New Africa Investments Limited ('NAIL') (CT
59/LM/Oct03) par 12.
435 The company produces local television shows.
436 See already 1 5 3 3 supra.
437 Par 34.
438 Par 32.
439 Par 32.
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tically, horizontally or otherwise - irrespective of any market deuneatlon"? Analysing the
different areas of distribution and the circulation figures, the Tribunal considered the
Sowetan not to be an important competitor to Johnnic's dailies in the Eastern Cape,441nor
to Naspers' Daily Sun in Gauteng. Moreover, the Competition Tribunal stated that even
though the Sowetan Sunday World and the Sunday Times (owned by Johnnic) were 'both
Sunday papers with a national distribution, they are aimed at very different readers which
suggests that they are not significant rivals of one another.'442
The Tribunal's conclusions on public interest issues are also of interest in this case. The
concerns expressed by the Freedom of Expression Institute to the Competition Commis-
sion, could not convince the Tribunal to alter its decision based on competition reasons.
The Tribunal stated:443
'Whilst the FEl [Freedom of Expression Institute] is properly concerned with the
issue of whether media mergers can lead to a lessening of independent voices in
the media it has not shown that a change in the Sowetan's positioning, if there is
to be one, is a necessary outcome of the merger and not something that its own-
ers might not have done despite the merger. Nor has it been established that
even if there is a change in strategy that this will lessen the number of voices in
the market place in a substantial manner.'
The analysis of South African newspaper distribution, which the Tribunal made in this case
in view of vertical competition concerns, had already been explained in detail above.444
1 5 3 5 7 Other cases
A couple of other merger cases, involving media companies are of interest. Two cases will
be discussed here.445
440 Par 35.
441 According to the Commission's figures, on which the Tribunal relied, the Eastern Cape market is domi-
nated by Die Burger (78,9% market share), followed by the EP Herald (1,5%) and the Daily Dispatch (0,9%).
The Sowetan would only sell about 803 copies per day, which is significantly lower than the sales of other
papers like Die Burgerwhich would sell around 19000 copies per day.
442 Par 33.
443 Par 36.
444 See 1 5 3 3 supra.
445 Another published decision in the media sector is an application to award costs (Paarl Post Web Printers
(Pty) Ltd v CTP Holdings Ltd and Republican News Agency (CT 47/IR/AiJunOO)). See also another merger
involving Naspers: Nasionale Pers Limited / Educational Investment Corporation Limited (CT 45/LM/AprOO).
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In the first caso.?" the Tribunal recently had to adjudicate a large merger, involving the
media company Venfin Media Investments, a wholly owned subsidiary of VenFin Lim-
ited,447which has shares in the free-to-air broadcasting station e-tv. The acquisition of the
company SAIL Group Ltd, which provides various professional services to the sport and
entertainment industries,448 raised competition concerns notably insofar, as the acquiring
firms449would not only exercise control over SAIL, but also be in a position to exercise
control over e-tv. However, the Tribunal's concern that the acquiring firms 'may have an
incentive to use SAIL to foreclose broadcasting rivals of e-tv in relation to sports broad-
casting rights,' could be dispelled, though, and the merger was approved unconditionally.
In the second case,"? the acquiring firm was Multichoice Subscriber Management Ser-
vices (M-Web), a subsidiary of M-Web Holdings, whose ultimate owner is Naspers."? M-
Web acquired the entire issued share capital of Tiscali (Pty) Ltd, an Internet Access Pro-
vider. The Tribunal stated there to be 'a vertical relationship between a primary internet
service provider and a firm which is a significant content contributor to its portal,' but could
not discern any serious (vertical) concerns and approved the merger.452
1 5 3 6 General tendency
South African competition authorities do not judge competition cases in the press sector
on a special basis, although they are aware of the special role of the press in a constitu-
tional cemocracy.f"
Nevertheless, the case of Johnnie Publishing / NAP, in particular, raises concerns as far
as media regulation is concerned. Hence, this case will be commented upon view of the
In this (conditionally approved) merger, Naspers sought to extend its involvements in the private education
sector (see also the Tribunal's following order of 4 March 2003).
446 Venfin Media Investments (Pty) Limited / Sail Group Ltd (CT 67/LM/Sep04).
447 VenFin Limited is an investment holding company focussing on telecommunication, technology, and me-
dia businesses.
448 See par 12.
449 The other primary acquiring firm was Tree Tell, a subsidiary of SIG, which holds a 42% stake in Hosken
Consolidated Investments (HCI), which in turn owns a 66% stake in e-tv.
450 Multichoice Subscriber Management (Pty) Ltd / Tiscali (Pty) Ltd (CT 72/LM/Sep04).
451 See 1 5 3 2 supra.
452 Albeit subject to conditions for the sake of employment issues.
453 See in detail 1 7 infra.
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potential consequences of the Tribunal's statements for the control of mergers between
newspaper publishers, albeit later on.454
South African Competition Law has been widely influenced by foreign competition law. In
the judgments of the Competition Tribunal, reference is regularly made to US and Euro-
pean law. Especially US scholarship and antitrust-doctrine tend to playa privileged role in
South African jurisdiction. Moreover, the South African Competition Act itself is widely in-
fluenced by foreign law. In particular, chapter 3 of the Act is in many respects modelled on
the Canadian Competition Act.455
The South African Competition Act itself contains a special provision in this regard. Section
1(3) determines that any person interpreting or applying the Act may consider appropriate
foreign and international law. Hence, South African competition authorities seem to con-
sider foreign approaches broadly, benefiting from foreign expertise. The present Commis-
sioner of the Competition Commission, Menzi Simelane, recently outlined at the Interna-
tional Competition Network (ICN) Conference the important role of multilateral institutions,
exchange programmes, and interaction with other authoritles.f'"
Commendable as such an approach may be, there is a certain danger of strict and inade-
quate 'copying' of foreign principles. European jurisprudence has to be handled particularly
carefully since European competition objectives differ from those in South Africa. It has
always been recognised in Europe that competition law must promote market integra-
tion.457 Hence, in some cases the European Court of Justice seems to disregard pure eco-
nomic principles for the sake of the promotion of the common market.458 Therefore, foreign
454 See 4 2 4 infra.
455 RSC 1985 C-4. Cf Legh in Brassey et al Competition Law (2002) 224 showing the parallels; Brassey
even criticises merger provisions for being 'blindly borrowed from the corresponding sections of the Cana-
dian law.' (Brassey in Brassey et al Competition Law (2002) 18).
456 Newsletter of the Competition Commission, edition 16, June 2004, p. 3, available at:
http://www.compcom.co.za/resources/newsletter%20-%20june%202004/pdf%20version/CompCom%20
News.pdf.
457 See already 1 2 supra with further references. Cf Sutherland Competition Law of South Africa (2004) 2-
28.
456 Especially in United Brands Company and United Brands Continentaal BV v EC Commission (1978) ECR
207, 1 CMLR 429 (Case No. 27/76) community goals tended to be more important to the Court than the
competitiveness of the market.
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law approaches must not be adopted blindly,459when they are inappropriate in the South
African context. Instead, competition laws of other countries have to be viewed 'in their
proper historical, social and institutional contexts.'460 South African competition authorities
seem to be aware of this problem, though. The Competition Appeal Court pointed out that
the interpretation of the Competition Act necessitates recourse to the preamble to the Act
and the unique South African purposes as set out in section 2:461
'These are important sources for interpretative guidelines (see also section 1(2)
of the Act). Thus care must be taken before an uncritical borrowing of traditional
anti-trust economic theories, as developed in the United States of America, en-
crust the process of interpretation of our Act. Unlike much comparative competi-
tion law, the Act specifies among overall its purpose of the maintenance of com-
petition, that small and medium size businesses have an equitable opportunity to
participate in the economy and that there be promotion of a greater spread of
ownership, in particular to increase the ownership stake of historically disadvan-
taged persons (section 2(e) and (f) of the Act).'
However, the South African approach signifies the openness of the South African legisla-
ture for foreign doctrine and approaches, and can be welcomed. It can even be described
as an enlightened approach, since competition law has developed to extremely sophisti-
cated levels in some other countries and regions, and the door is now open for the adop-
tion of the best practice from elsewhere to overcome interpretive and other difficulties. The
South African approach is therefore acceptable, if the competition authorities bear the
specialties of South African Competition Law in mind, notably as regards the interpretation
of the Act.
1 7 The South African Constitution
Mergers between publishing houses that are ruled by the Competition Act are primarily
considered with reference to economic arguments. It may be asked, whether the South
African Constitution462 could lead to a different interpretation of the described competition
459 See for an example Brassey in Brassey et al Competition Law (2002) 18 footnote 84.
460 Sutherland Competition Law of South Africa (2004) 2-4.
461 Mondi Ltd and Kohler Cores and Tubes, A division of Kohler Packaging Ltd (20/CAC/Jun02) par 48.
462 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (Act 108 of 1996), as adopted on 8 May 1996 and
amended by the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Second Amendment Act 3 of 2003.
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rules for mergers between publishers. In fact, section 1(2)(a) of the Act prescribes that it
must be interpreted in a manner that is consistent with the Constitution. Therefore, rights
granted by the Constitution always have to be borne in mind whenever applying the Act.
1 7 1 Freedom of the press
Chapter two of the Constitution consists of the Bill of Rights. Freedom of expression463 is
guaranteed in section 16 of the South African Constitution:
'Everyone has the right to freedom of expression.'
This includes according to subsection 1(a) the 'freedom of the press and other media'.
Freedom of the press being part of freedom of speech has always been recognised as a
residual freedom at common law, being permitted, if not expressly forbidden.464
Freedom of expression is regarded as an individual right to express opinions and give
news and information to the public without interference. Hence, the freedom of the press
embraces the right to publish information and it is extended by section 16(1)(b) which pro-
tects the 'freedom to receive or impart information or ideas,' and 'probably by section
16(1 )(d),,465which relates to the right to academic freedom and freedom of scientific re-
search. The freedom of expression is crucial to a democratic society and the vital role of
the press in supplying information, in particular of a political nature, is recognised by South
African courts.r" In South African National Defence Force Union v Minister of Defence467
the Constitutional Court declared the freedom of expression to have an 'instrumental func-
tion as a guarantor of dernocracy.r''" Due to its textual emphasis in the Constitution, it is
controversial if an exceptional high degree of protection should be afforded to the press.469
In particular, it has been discussed, whether the press enjoys exceptional constitutional
protection in terms of publishing defamatory statements. The South African courts do not
463 'Expression' embraces also activities such as displaying posters, painting, dancing, the publication of
photographs and symbolic acts such as flag burning, wearing of certain items of clothing and physical ges-
tures, see De Waal et al The Bill of Rights Handbook (2001) 311 with further references.
464 Burns Communications Law (2001) 56.
465 Burns Communications Law (2001) 59.
466 See for instance the cases Government of the Republic of South Africa v The Sunday Times Newspaper
1995 (2) BClR 182 (T) and National Media Ltd v Bogoshi 1998 (4) SA 1196 (SCA).
467 South African National Defence Force Union v Minister of Defence 1999 (4) SA 469 (CC) par 7.
468 See also De Waal et al The Bill of Rights Handbook (2001) 310 with further references.
469 Declining this approach: De Waal et al The Bill of Rights Handbook (2001) 311.
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seem to follow a 'press exceptional ism' approach. In the case Holomisa v Argus Newspa-
pers470 for instance, Cameron J did not accept such exceptionalism. In his view, journalists
should not enjoy constitutional immunity beyond that granted to ordinary citizens, even
though the 'especial importance and role of the media' in a constitutional democracy was
recognised.471
However, section 16 of the South African Constitution could be interpreted to encompass
'institutional autonomy' for the press. This entails that the freedom of the press would not
only have an individual dimension (protection against the state), but also an objective di-
mension. The latter signifies a proper obligation of the state to protect the institutional in-
dependence of the press by enacting and enforcing appropriate laws to guarantee press
plurality.
The Constitution does not expressly give a privileged position to the press at all. The text
itself only declares the press to be protected. This is not unusual, though, and other legis-
lation follow a similar approach. The German Constitution concisely codifies that the free-
dom of the press is 'guaranteed'. Moreover, in the United States the First Amendment to
the US Constitution only provides that 'Congress shall make no law [... ] abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press' .472Nevertheless, US and German Courts recognise
the exceptional importance of the press for establishing and maintaining an open and de-
mocratic society and there are several judgements that concretised the freedom of the
press quite precisely.473
470 Holomisa v Argus Newspapers Ltd 1996 (6) BClR 836 (W).
471 See Holomisa v Argus Newspapers Ltd 1996 (6) BClR 836 (W) 855-E. See also Davis Comment on
Holomisa v Argus Newspapers Ltd, 1996 (12) SAJHR 328-337.
472 First Amendment to Constitution of the United States, available at:
http://www.usconstitution.net/const. html.
473 For the interpretation of the German Federal Constitution Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) see in detail
2 3 6 2 3 infra; in the United States Black J stated in New York Times Co v United States 403 US 713 (1971)
that '[the constitutional guarantee of a free press] gave the press the protection it must have to fulfil its es-
sential role in our democracy.' In Associated Press v United States, 326 U.S. 1, 65 S.Ct. 1416 (1945) at 20 it
was stated that the First Amendment 'rests on the assumption that the widest possible dissemination of in-
formation from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the public, that a free press is a
condition of a free society.' This has been repeatedly confirmed by the Supreme Court, see N. Y. Times Co. v
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964); Citizen Publ'g Co. v United States, 394 U.S. 131, 139-40 (1969) and
Buckley v Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 49 (1976).
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The South African Constitution does not recognise expressly such an objective dimension.
Hence, it has been argued that such institutional independence does not exist: '[i]n es-
sence, therefore, the right to free expression enjoyed by the South African press is no
greater than enjoyed by individuals.V" Nevertheless, the broad formulation in the Consti-
tution leaves space for a wider understanding of this constitutional right to 'institutional
autonomy' for the press and for placing duties on the state to ensure a plurality of newspa-
per enterprises, in the same way as the German Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesver-
fassungsgericht).475
The Bill of Rights in the South African Constitution was codified to ensure extensive indi-
vidual protection. The Constitutional Court even affirmed, 'it should be emphasised that in
general the Bill of Rights drafted by the CA [Constitutional Assembly] is as extensive as
any to be found in any national constltutlon.r'"
The question here is not whether freedom of the press should be interpreted in an exten-
sive way as far as the protection of published statements is concerned. Under German
constitutional law, the right of expression and the freedom of the press are limited by other
fundamental rights and other rights, which are protected by the Constitution, too. Similar
restrictions apply to the rights set out in the South African Bill of Rights.477The question of
interest is, whether the press and press plurality itself is guaranteed by the South African
Constitution and whether the state has a duty to take positive steps to protect it.
The starting point for such an approach is section 7(2) of the South African Constitution,
which proclaims that '[t]he state must respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the
Bill of Rights.' Hence, it is accepted that the provisions of the Bill of Rights not only protect
certain kinds of activities but also sometimes demand the fulfilment of certain objectives.478
'A fundamental right may therefore be infringed [... ] by failing to fulfil a positive obliga-
tion.'479
474 Burns Communications Law (2001) 59.
475 See in detail 2 3 6 2 3 infra.
476 In re: Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 19961996 (10) BClR 1253 (CC)
par 52.
477 Cf sections 7(3), 16(2) and 36. See also 1 7 4 infra.
478 De Waal et al The Bill of Rights Handbook (2001) 126.
479 De Waal et al The Bill of Rights Handbook (2001) 126-127 with further references.
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Thus, it has to be asked, if there is such a governmental obligation deriving from the free-
dom of the press to enact special provisions for the protection of plurality on the press
market. In particular, it has to be asked if at a certain point of market concentration in
press markets governmental duties in the field of merger control arise.
Basically, the answer to this question lies in the understanding of the application and inter-
pretation of the Bill of Rights .
• Who is bound by the Bill of Rights?
First, the state is obliged to comply with the Bill of Rights. According to section 8(1) of the
Constitution '[t]he Bill of Rights applies to all law, and binds the legislature, the executive,
the judiciary and all organs of state.' This formulation raises many questlons.f" However,
the term 'legislature' refers especially to the Paruament.?" The term judiciary includes
judges and magistrates.482 Having stated that the legislature and the judiciary are bound
by the Bill of Rights, the second question arises:
• How and to which extent are the legislature and the judiciary bound and what responsi-
bilities arise from the Bill of Rights?
As regards the legislature, it can be asserted that legislation must comply with the Bill of
Rights.483 The requirement of consistency with the Bill of Rights, though, does not neces-
sarily include the obligation to enact certain provisions, even though the primary responsi-
bility of the legislature is the making of legislation.484 In the first place, it merely means that
promulgated laws and parliamentary acts have to be constitutional.f'" However, the obliga-
tion deriving from the Constitution to enact certain provisions has not been codified.
Even though the Constitution sets out in section 39(1) that
460 Such as the scope of the Bill of Rights (direct applicability) and the question whether the Bill of Rights
applies horizontally, meaning its application not only between the state and the individual persons (vertical
application), but also between individuals in the private sphere. For the discussion of these aspects see De
Waal et al The Bill of Rights Handbook (2001) Chapter Three - Application of the Bill of Rights.
461 The term also includes the provincial legislatures and the municipal councils, see De Waal et al The Bill of
Rights Handbook (2001) 46. Only the Parliament is of interest here, because the Competition Act is a na-
tionallaw.
462 De Waal et al The Bill of Rights Handbook (2001) 54.
463 De Waal et al The Bill of Rights Handbook (2001) 46.
464 De Waal et al The Bill of Rights Handbook (2001) 46.
465 See in detail De Waal et al The Bill of Rights Handbook (2001) 46-47.
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'[w]hen interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum
a. must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society
based on human dignity, equality and freedom;
b. must consider international law; and
c. may consider foreign law,'
the Constitutional Court has not declared there to be such an obligation. Conversely, one
judgement of the Court makes it unlikely that South Africa will adopt a similar doctrine as
for instance the German Bundesverfassungsgericht, which proclaimed governmental du-
ties arising from the German Constitution to implement specific legislation to protect the
freedom of the press.486 In the case Ferreira v Lenin NO,487 the South African Constitu-
tional Court pointed out its position vis-a-vis policy making by the legislature:
'Whether or not there should be regulation and distribution is essentially a politi-
cal question which falls within the domain of the legislature and not the court. It is
not for the courts to approve or disapprove of such policies. What the courts must
ensure is that the implementation of any political decisions to undertake such
policies conforms with the Constitution. It should not, however, require the legis-
lature to show that they are necessary if the Constitution does not specifically re-
quire that this be done.'488
The Constitutional Court follows the same careful approach as regards declaring a law
inconsistent with the Constitution, preserving space for the legislature and other courts to
reform the law. The Court will only declare a law constitutionally invalid 'on the issues pre-
sented to it and not as a matter of abstract constitutional adjudication.'489 Moreover, statu-
tory rules have firstly to be interpreted in such a way as to conform to the Bill of Rights.490
This approach indicates that there is a certain reluctance to prescribe proactive conduct as
regards lawmaking. The Court will most likely not interfere with political decisions, if they
are objectively rational.t'" Hence, the Constitutional Court will not demand the enactment
of a press-specific Competition Act, nor will it declare the Act unconstitutional with refer-
486 See 2 3 6 2 3 infra.
487 Ferreira v Lenin NO 1996 (1) SA 984 (CC).
488 Par 180.
489 See De Waal et al The Bill of Rights Handbook (2001) 66 with further references.
490 De Waal et al The Bill of Rights Handbook (2001) 70. This principle is also recognised under German
Constitutional Law (so-called 'verfassungskonforme Auslegung').
491 See De Waal et al The Bill of Rights Handbook (2001) 53-54.
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ence to abstract considerations. It would be very difficult anyway, to prescribe the concrete
content of a law to protect the freedom of the press, since there are various means by
which to ensure press plurality. This is illustrated by several foreign approaches.t" Hence,
it can be concluded that the Bill of Rights in the South African Constitution does not oblige
the legislature to act positively to protect plurality of the press.
1 73 Interpretation of the Competition Act
If the South African Constitution will not be interpreted in the described extensive way, the
impact of the Bill of Rights on ordinary laws, such as the existing Competition Act, has to
be analysed. It has already been stated that the judiciary is bound by the Bill of Rights.
Certain obligations could therefore arise for the Competition Tribunal and Competition Ap-
peal Court in interpreting the Competition Act.
It is recognised that 'the Bill of Rights contains a set of values that must be respected
whenever ordinary law is interpreted, developed or applied,493 (so-called indirect applica-
tion). Section 39(2) of the Constitution provides:
'When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common law or cus-
tomary law, every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and
objects of the Bill of Rights.'
As indicated above, section 1(2)(a) of the Competition Act, in turn, prescribes that the Act
must be interpreted in a manner that is consistent with the South African Constltutlon.t'"
Thus, in cases of mergers between newspaper enterprises, these provisions could for in-
stance oblige competition authorities to define narrow markets to prevent concentration in
press markets or to give sway to public interest issues in order to maintain press plurality.
The Bill of Rights, however, only 'demands furtherance of its values through the operation
of the ordinary law.'495However, there are limits to these duties. Thus, even if the authori-
ties have to take into account the values of the Bill of Rights and must promote its spirit,
492 See 4 2 3 infra.
493 De Waal et al The Bill of Rights Handbook (2001) 37.
494 This reaffirmation 'serves as a reminder of the principle and thereby strengthens the link.' (Sutherland
Competition Law of South Africa (2004) 4-12 with further references).
495 De Waal et al The Bill of Rights Handbook (2001) 63.
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purport, and objects, namely those of the freedom of the press, they are not bound to a
specific interpretation favouring press-plurality, even if the Constitution is interpreted in a
'purposive' and 'generous' way.496 On the contrary, the courts have to leave a certain
'space for the legislature to reform the law in accordance with its own interpretation of the
Constitution. ,497
1 7 4 Limitation
Moreover, section 36 of the Constitution recognises that the rights in the Bill of Rights are
limited, even though 'only in terms of law of general application to the extent that the limita-
tion is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dig-
nity, equality and freedom'.
In addition, section 16(2) also sets an 'internal modifier,498for the freedom of the press and
the common law limits the exercise of this right, too, although it must comply with the gen-
eral scope of the limitations clause in section 36.499
The establishment of a legal framework, which intends to maximise competition in South
Africa, taken into account the purposes set out in the Competition Act, is indubitably such
a law of general applicatlon.P??
1 8 Conclusion
The relatively new South African Competition Law departs remarkably from former legisla-
tion. The surveillance of mergers by independent and specialized authorities has been re-
garded as a remarkable step forward. The creation of new and better resourced competi-
tion authorities and the provisions imposing heavy fines for severe infringements of the Act
will contribute towards the development of competitive South African markets, which are
still often described as oligopolistic, highly concentrated and uncompetitive.
496 For this approach to interpretation of the Bill of Rights see De Waal et al The Bill of Rights Handbook
12001) 130-135.
97 See De Waal et al The Bill of Rights Handbook (2001) 67-70 on this controversial aspect.
498 Burns Communications Law (2001) 288.
499 See Burns Communications Law (2001) 288. 305-306 and chapter 4 for details.
500 See also the discussion on the limitation of constitutional rights in chapter 4 infra.
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Despite the high number of approvals, competition authorities seem to follow a strict policy
as far as mergers are concerned, being cautious to approve a merger on efficiency or pub-
lic interest grounds.
Although the freedom of the press is expressly protected in the South African Constitution
and recognised as crucial by South African courts, an institutional independence of the
press, which could lead to a governmental obligation to enact laws specifically to protect
the press, has not been recognised so far. It remains unsure whether South Africa will fol-
low the approach of a 'multi-dimensional' understanding of the Bill of Rights. The future will
show if the courts will interpret the Constitution in this way, even though this is unlikely.
There are a large number of published newspapers and magazines in South Africa, even
though only a few big publishing groups seem to have critical mass in this sector.
Competition authorities adjudicate upon mergers between publishing houses as they do
upon any other mergers. The question whether these rules adequately protect press plu-
rality in South Africa will be discussed later on.501
501 See the discussion in chapter 4 infra.
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Chapter 2
European and German Competition Law
2 1 Introduction
This part of the thesis will focus on German Competition Law. Nevertheless, a certain
overview of merger control under European Competition Law is unavoidable, because its
influence on the national legislation and jurisdiction of the European Member States is
wide and a delineation of both the European and German system, is important for the as-
sessment of transactions taking place in the European Community's markets.
22 European Competition Law
First, it has to be assessed, which provisions apply if a men.er takes place within Europe.
Even if there are - due to the European process of harmoni..anon ' . parallels between the
European and the German legal system, it is crucial for the parties to a merger to know,
whether European Law, or the German Competition Act, the so Galled 'Act against Re-
straints of C »rnpetltton' (Gesetz gegen WettbewerbsbeschanJ unoon (GWB)) applies.502
Since 1 May:2004, a new European merger reguiation503 IS in force.504 The regulation
flanks the recent fundamental change in European competition: procedure legislation
through the regulation 1/2003,505issued in terms of Article ~3 of- he European Treaty (EC
502 Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrankungen, BGBI I 1998, 2521, "S amended by Article 20 Nr. 1 G of
09.12.2004 I 3220, see Appendix II of this thesis.
503 Council Regulation (EC) No. 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between un-
dertakings (the EC Merger Regulation), OJEU L 24/1 0" 29.01 :2P04, also available at:
http://europa.eu.inVeur-lexlpri/en/oj/dat/2004/1024/102420040129enO.l010022.pr (. For details see also
Kofler-Senoner & Scholz 'Die neue Europáische Fusionslmntrollverorinung' (20f 4), wbl 06/2004, 266-273;
B6ge 'Reform .der Europálschen Fusionskontrolle' (2004), WuW 2/2004, 138-1-"8; Staebe & Denzel 'Die
neue Europëische Fusionskontrollverordnung (VO 139/20(4)' (2004), EWS 5/2004 194-201.
504 The old Regulation (Council Regulation (EEC) No. 4064/89 of 21 December 1 '89 on the control of con-
centrations between undertakings, OJ No. L 395/1 of 1989, amended by Council :egulation No. 1310/97 of
30 June 1997, OJ No. L180/1 of 1997 and OJ No. L 40/17 of 1998) only contihues ro apply to concentrations
which were the subject of an agreement or announcement or where control was é' :quired before the date of
acPsplicationof the new regulation, see Article 26(2) of regulation 139/2004.
5 5 Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competi-
tion laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, OJEC L 1/1 of 04.01 2003, also available at:
http://europa.eu.inVsmartapi/cgi/sga doc?smartapi!celexplus!prod!DocNumber&lg: :m&type doc=Regulation
&an doc=2003&nu ooce t.
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Treaty).506 The regulation 1/2003 brought two major changes: firstly - as far as prohibited
practices are concerned (Article 81 and 82 EC)507- the EU abolished its system of notifi-
cations to the Commission/individual exemption and replaced it with a regime of 'self-
assessment' (directly applicable exception system)508 and, secondly, the regulation pro-
vided for a decentralisation of antitrust enforcement and should result in major devolution
of enforcement of Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty from the European Commission to
the Member States' competition authorities and Gourts,509which have to apply European
Competition Law in any case, in which interstate commerce is affected.510
However, the merger regulation aims at the harmonisation of the control of mergers in the
legislations of the Member States by achieving the objective of ensuring that competition in
the common market is not dlstorted.t" in accordance with the principle of an open market
economy with free cornpetitlon.?" The regulation also intends to simplify the assessment
of transactions and determinations of competences between European and Member
States' competition authorities. As the regulation points OUt:513
'The provisions to be adopted in this Regulation should apply to significant struc-
tural changes, the impact of which on the market goes beyond the national bor-
ders of anyone Member State. Such concentrations should, as a general rule, be
reviewed exclusively at Community level, in application of a 'one-stop shop' sys-
tem and in compliance with the principle of subsidiarity. Concentrations not cov-
ered by this Regulation come, in principle, within the jurisdiction of the Member
States.,514
506 See Article 83 EC in Appendix I of this thesis.
507 See Article 81 and 82 EC in Appendix I of this thesis.
50B Agreements, which restrain competition, are now automatically exempted, if they fulfil the conditions set
out in Article 81 (3) EC.
509 For the application of European law by the Member States' authorities see Article 3 of the Regulation
1/2003. See also Hirsch 'Anwendung der Kartellverfahrensordnung (EG) Nr. 1/2003 durch nationale
Gerichte' (2003), ZWeR 2003, 233 ft. Moreover, harmonisation is tried to be obtain by the foundation of the
European Competition Network (ECN), see Recital 15-18 of the regulation. Cf also Terhechte 'Die Reform
des europálschen Kartellrechts - am Ende eines langen Weges?' (2004), EuZW 12/2004, 353.
510 See Weitbrecht 'To Harmonize or Not to Harmonize - Zur Diskussion um die 7. GWB-Novelle' (2004),
EuZW 15/2004, 449.
511 Cfthe purpose set out in Article 3(g) EC.
512 Cf Recital 6 of the EC Merger Regulation.
513 Recital 8 of the EC Merger Regulation.
514 On the other hand, under certain circumstances parties to a merger may apply for the assessment of the
transaction by the European Commission before any notification to the competent (Member States') authori-
ties, even if the merger does not have a Community dimension, see Article 4 V of the EC Merger Regulation.
Cf for details Rosenthal 'Neuordnung der Zustándiqkeiten und des Verfahrens in der Europálschen
Fusionskontrolle' (2004), EuZW 11/2004,327-332.
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Overall, the reform of European merger control was rather modestly implemented, though,
and major changes have not been made, even though proposed by the Commission in the
beginning.515 Nevertheless, certain aspects have changed. According to the new regula-
tion and likewise German Competition Law, undertaklnqs=" can notify the proposed trans-
action even before the conclusion of the merger contract.?" Even though a 'substantial
lessening of competition' criterion ('SLC test') has not been introduced completely, Euro-
pean Merger Law now sets out a 'mixed test'. According to Article 2(3) of the new regula-
tion, a merger shall be declared incompatible with the common market, if it would 'signifi-
cantly impede effective competition, in the common market or in a substantial part of it, in
particular as a result of the creation or strengthening of a dominant posltlon'?" ('SIEC
test'). This formulation can be regarded as a compromise between the US approach ('sub-
stantial lessening of competition test')519 and the wording of the old European merger
regulation and the approach of other European countries ('creation or strengthening of a
dominant position test').520 This new test has been criticised and it has been argued that
American and old European antitrust jurisprudencef" would now be of reduced value be-
cause of the mixed elements in the new approach.t" Only the future will show, whether
515 Several major changes have not been implemented like the legal definition of the term 'oligopoly,' efTer-
hechte 'Die Reform des europaischen Kartellrechts - am Ende eines langen Weges?' (2004), EuZW
12/2004, 353. .
516 The term 'undertaking' has been defined by the European Courts as 'every entity engaged in economic
activity, regardless of the legal status of the entity and the way in which it is financed' (see Hotnet and Elser
v Maerotron, Judgment of the European Court of Justice of 23 April 1991, (1991) ECR 1-1979 (Case C-
41/90) par 21). The European Commission stated: 'The term "undertaking" is not defined in the Treaty. It
may, however, refer to any entity engaged in commercial activities and in the case of corporate bodies may
refer to a parent or to a subsidiary or to the unit formed by the parent and subsidiaries together.' (Polypropyl-
ene, Decision of the EC Commission of 23 April 1986 (Case No. IV/31.149)). Cf also Sutherland Competition
Law of South Africa (2004) section 4.4 for the discussion of the term 'economic activity'.
517 See Article 4(1) subparagraph 2 of the EC Merger Regulation.
518 See also Article 2(2).
519 The 'SLC test' applies also in other European jurisdictions, like the UK and Ireland, as well as in South
Africa.
520 Cf Schwarze 'Das wirtschaftsverfassungsrechtliche Konzept des Verfassungsentwurfs des Europaischen
Konvents - zugleich eine Untersuchung der Grundprobleme des europáischen Wirtschaftsrechts' (2004),
EuZW 5/2004, 135 (138). As will be shown, for instance the German legislature uses the criterion of 'market-
dominant position'.
521 Since the enactment of the Merger Regulation in 1990, there have been more than 2300 decisions of the
Commission using the criterion of 'dominant position'.
522 See for instance B6ge 'Reform der Europálschen Fusionskontrolle' (2004), WuW 2/2004, 138 (146);
Bergmann & Burholt 'Nicht Fisch und nicht Fleisch - Zur Anderung des materiellen PrOfkriteriums in der
Europaischen Fusionskontrollverordnung' (2004), EuZW 6/2004, 161.
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the test is workable.523 The European Competition Commission has already published
adapted guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers.524
The merger regulation sets out exactly when European law has to be applied. Generally
speaking, it only applies when the European market is affected by a certain competitive
behaviour or a merger between enterprises. According to the European merger regulation,
the Commission of the European Communities has exclusive jurisdiction, if the transaction
has a 'Community dimension,.525 This is the case, when certain thresholds, as defined by
Article 1(2), are reached.
The regulation uses the term 'concentration' instead of 'merger'. Article 3 defines a con-
centration. There has to be a 'change of control on a lasting basis'. This may occur in two
forms. Firstly, in form of a merger of two or more previously independent undertakings or
parts of undertakings; or, secondly, in form of an acquisition, by one or more persons al-
ready controlling at least one undertaking, or by one or more undertakings, whether by
purchase of securities or assets, by contract or by any other means, of direct or indirect
control of the whole or parts of one or more other undertakings.
The definition is quite broad. According to Article 3(2), control can be constituted by rights,
contracts or any other means which, either separately or in combination and having regard
to the considerations of fact or law involved, confer the possibility of exercising decisive
influence on an undertaking. Hence, control can either be obtained by ownership or the
right to use all or part of the assets of an undertaking, or rights or contracts which confer
decisive influence on the composition, voting or decisions of the organs of an undertaking.
The regulation also sets out, when control is acquired. It is acquired by persons or under-
takings which are either holders of the rights or entitled to rights under the contracts con-
cerned, or which have at least the power to exercise the rights deriving from such rights or
523 See also Sanden 'Die Europáische Fusionskontrolle im liberalisierten Energiemarkt' (2004), EuZW
20/2004, 620 (622 f.).
524 Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of con-
centrations between undertakings, OJEU C 31/5 of 05.02.2004, also available at: http://europa.eu.int/eur-
lexlpri/en/oj/dat/2004/c 031 Ic 03120040205en00050018.pdf.
525 Article 1(1).
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contracts.t" The creation of a joint venture performing on a lasting basis 'all the functions
of an autonomous economic entity' also constitutes a concentration. Special exceptions
are set out for credit institutions, other financial institutions, or insurance corripanles.?"
As stated above, to apply European law, such concentration has to have a European
Community dimension. According to the regulation, this is the case, if the combined ag-
gregate worldwide turnover of all the undertakings concerned is more than € 5 billion. On
top of that, the aggregate Community-wide turnover of each of at least two of the undertak-
ings concerned has to be more than € 250 million. Moreover, there is no Community di-
mension, if each of the undertakings concerned achieves more than two-thirds of its ag-
gregate Community-wide turnover within one and the same Member State.528
Hence, many mergers - especially mergers between newspaper enterprises - will not be
considered in terms of European law, because of these high thresholds.529
If European law is applicable, though, Article 21 (3) of the regulation points out, that '[n]o
Member State shall apply its national legislation on competition to any concentration that
has a Community dimension.' Notwithstanding this Article, 'Member States may take ap-
propriate measures to protect legitimate interests other than those taken into consideration
by this Regulation and compatible with the general principles and other provisions of
Community law,.53oThese interests are expressly stated to include 'plurality of the media'.
Hence, Member States can still review a proposed merger, approved by the Commission
in order to protect media pluralism.531 German Competition Law, however, expressly out-
526 Article 3(3).
527 See Article 3(5). This provision has been adopted by the German legislature, see § 37 III GWB.
526 According to Article 1(3) of the regulation, a concentration that does not meet the mentioned thresholds
has a Community dimension where '(a) the combined aggregate worldwide turnover of all the undertakings
concerned is more than EUR 2 500 million; (b) in each of at least three Member States, the combined ag-
gregate turnover of all the undertakings concerned is more than EUR 100 million; (c) in each of at least three
Member States included for the purpose of point (b), the aggregate turnover of each of at least two of the
undertakings concerned is more than EUR 25 million; and (d) the aggregate Community-wide turnover of
each of at least two of the undertakings concerned is more than EUR 100 million, unless each of the under-
takings concerned achieves more than two-thirds of its aggregate Community-wide turnover within one and
the same Member State'.
529 See for instance BKartA, decision of 03.08.2004, B 6 - 045/04 - Gruner + Jahr/RBA at IV, where there
was no Community-wide importance, because the transaction did not meet the threshold of € 100 million of
Article 1(3)(d) of the old Regulation (No. 4064/89 of 21.12.1989).
530 Article 21 (4).
531 See also Smith 'Rethinking European Union competence in the field of media ownership: the internal
market, fundamental rights and European citizenship' (2004), 29 E.L.Rev. Oct, 669.
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lines, that the provisions of the GWB regarding the control of mergers do not apply, if the
Commission of the European Communities has exclusive jurisdiction according to the
European regulation concerning the control of mergers.532
23 German Competition Law
As mentioned above, European Competition Law does not apply to every single proposed
merger, taking place within the territory of the European Community, nor are European
competition authorities always competent to enforce competition law. Therefore, and be-
cause this thesis focuses on German Competition Law, the legal system of merger control
as codified by the German legislature will now be examined.
2 3 1 Introduction
Merger control, being part of competition law, is regulated under the GWB. This Act con-
tains several provisions to prohibit anti-competitive conduct. Similar to South African law,
German Competition Law also aims to outlaw anti-competitive market behaviour in the
form of prohibited practices (including abuse of a dominant position). Prohibited practices
are not a major focus of this thesis. Nevertheless, there are certain special features and
exemptions for the media, which at least have to be noted.
Due to the developments in European Competition Law, the GWB has been amended re-
cently. The new GWB came into force on the t'" of July 2005. Especially the provisions
concerning prohibited practices have changed. This has to be borne in mind when reading
the following description of German Competition Law. In contrast, the provisions of merger
control did not change materially. 533
2 32 Competition authorities and competences
Due to the structure of the Federal Republic of Germany, there are competition authorities
in every region (Land) as well as a Federal Cartel Office (Bundeskartellam~.534
532 § 35 III GWB. See also 2 3 4 1 1 infra.
533 See for details 2 3 6 infra.
534 See www.bundeskartellamt.de.
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Generally speaking, the Bundeskartellamt is responsible for the implementation of all pro-
visions of the GWB, if the GWB does not expressly prescribe a special competence for a
regional authority and if the effect of an anti-competitive or discriminating act is national.535
The examination of mergers is the exclusive responsibility of the Bundeskarlellamt.536
The Bundeskartellamt can prohibit any anti-competitive restraints of competition and pro-
posed mergers.537 Besides that, the German legislature conferred several powers and
functions on the competition authorities as set out in the GWB, such as the right of obtain-
ing information during the investigations538 and seizing evidence.53g German competition
authorities are also competent to levy fines in the event of infringements. The provisions
governing the power of German competition authorities to impose fines for the infringe-
ment of the rules on competition are codified in §§ 81 ff. GWB.
The GWB recognises another independent authority, which has only consultative functions
but has to be heard in certain circumstances. This special competition body is the so-
called 'monopoly commission' (Monopolkommission). According to § 44 I GWB, the Mo-
nopolkommission issues every second year a report on the competition situation in Ger-
many, such as level and trends of concentration. This commission also assesses the prac-
tice of merger control. In addition, the Monopolkommission may release special reports on
certain topics (Sondergutachten). The monopoly commission is independent540 and con-
sists of five experts in the field of politics, economy or technology.541
535 § 48 II GWB.
536 Cf the wording of § 36 and § 48 GWB. See also Schutz in Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrankungen
und Europëisches Kartel/recht Gemeinschaftskommentar (2001), § 36 Rn. 1.
537 For the exact procedure and conditions of a prohibition see 2 3 4 infra. See also Newssheet of the
Bundeskartel/amt, available at: http://www.bundeskarteliamt.de/wDeutsch/download/pdf/ 03 Infobrosch.pdf
for detailed competences of the different departments of the Bundeskartel/amt.
538 See for instance § 39 Vand § 59 GWB.
539 For details cf§§ 57 ff. GWB.
540 § 44 II GWB.
541 § 45 I GWB. The independence of the Monopolkommission is strengthened by the fact that the members
of the commission may not be members of the federal or regional parliaments nor work for the civil service,
cf§ 45111 GWB.
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2 3 3 Legal Framework
2 3 3 1Structure of the Act
The GWB has six parts. The first part of the GWB deals with restraints of cornpetition.t"
while the second part sets out provisions concerning the competition authorities.543 The
third part contains provisions that regulate judicial proceedlnqs.v" whereas the fourth part
is dedicated to the awarding of public contracts.r" The fifth part is concerned with the ap-
plication of the GWB546 and, finally, the sixth part sets out miscellaneous rules, such as the
repeal of the old GWB547 and transitional provtstons.P"
2 3 3 2 Restraints of competition
The first part of the GWB, dealing with restraints of competition, is subdivided into eight
chapters. The first chapter ('cartel agreements'), as well as the second ('vertical agree-
ments'), and notably the seventh chapter ('control of mergers') are of interest here. Hence,
an overview of the first two will be given here, while the seventh chapter will be scrutinized
later on.
2 3 32 1 'Cartel agreements'
The first chapter of the first part of the GWB is headlined 'cartel agreements, cartel deci-
sions, and coordinated conduct'. This chapter deals with all forms of restraint of competi-
tion, caused on a horizontal level.
According to § 1 GWB, all agreements between competitors, decisions by an association
of firms or concerted conducts are prohibited, if they are aimed at or leading to prevention,
restraints or distortion of competition (so-called 'cartel agreements').
542 §§ 1 to 47 GWB.
543 §§ 48 to 53 GWB.
544 §§ 54 to 96 GWB.
545 §§ 54 to 96 GWB.
546 § 130 GWB.
547 The GWB was amended in 1998 by the sixth Act to amend the GWB, which came into force on 1 January
1999.
548 § 131 GWB.
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There are a couple of exemptions from this general prohibitive regulation of the GWB,
codified in §§ 2 to 8 GWB. According to these sections, certain cartels in terms of § 1
GWB can be exempted from prohibition in certain circumstances. However, the cartel
agreement always has to be notified or the parties have to apply for exernptlon.P" § 4
GWB, for instance empowers the Bundeskartellamt to grant exemption from the prohibition
of § 1 GWB, if the cartel agreement helps small and medium-sized enterprises. For pub-
lishers, also § 2 and § 7 GWB are of special importance.55o The conditions set out in § 7
GWB are quite strict, though, so that this exemption does not apply often. For instance,
such cartels have to lead to an improvement (for instance of the development of goods or
services), which could not be obtained in other ways. Moreover, the consumers have to
adequately participate in the financial profits. Furthermore, this restraint of competition
may not lead to a market-dominant position, nor may it strengthen market domination. For
instance, a group of national newspapers'" applied for such an exemption to cooperate in
the advertisement market. The parties to the agreement founded a limited company to sell
national recruitment advertisements jointly and co-ordinately (so-called Anzeigenkoopera-
tion). The Bundeskartellamt prohibited the agreement, declaring it anti-competitive552 and
rejecting an exemption in terms of § 7 GWB.553 The appeal against the decision was dis-
missed.554
A uniquely German - and still very controverslaf''" - regulation is codified in § 8 GWB.
According to this section, the Minister for Economic Affairs and Employment may grant an
exemption from a prohibition of anti-competitive conduct. This concept is called the 'Minis-
ter's permission' (Ministererlaubnis). If, for instance, the Bundeskartellamt prohibits a car-
tel, the Minister can still approve it. It is obvious why this section is so controversial. Such
permission allows the Minister to overrule the decisions of specialised competition authori-
ties, which rule on every case in a fair and economically reasonable manner. Hence, it
may be contended that the danger of abuse for political reasons is immanent, even though
549 See §§ 9 and 10 GWB.
550 CfL6ffier & Ricker Handbuch des Presserechts (2000),4. Auflage, 651 with further references.
551 SOddeutsche Zeitung, Frankfurter Rundschau and WeltIWelt am Sonntag.
552 The Bundeskartellamt was especially concerned about the effects on prices.
553 BKartA, WuW/E DE-V 209 ff .. See also Bechtold 'Medienkartellrecht - Aktueller Oberbliek Ober die
deutsche Praxis' (2000), AfP 2000, 156.
554 CfBechtold 'Medienkartellrecht - Aktueller Oberbliek Ober die deutsche Praxis' (2000), AfP 2000,436.
555 See for instance for the parliamentary discussion about this concept (for the control of mergers), Press
Release of the Bundestag (Lower House of Parliament), available at
http://www.bundestag.de/bic/hib/2003/2003040/07.html.
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the provision sets high hurdles. An exemption for such restraints of competition 'excep-
tionally' has to be 'necessary' because there are 'prevailing reasons for the economy as a
whole and the general good,.556
If a Ministererlaubnis is granted because the majority of enterprises in a certain industry
are directly endangered, the exemption is only admissible, if there are no other legal or
political preventive measures possible at all. Moreover, such an exemption may only be
granted in 'exceptionally serious special cases,.557Furthermore, the Ministererlaubnis has
to be regarded as a last resort for the parties concerned, because normally an exemption
according to §§ 2 to 7 GWB can be granted and § 8 GWB only applies, if such other ex-
emptions do not.
2 3 322 Vertical agreements
The GWB proscribes vertical price-fixing. § 14 GWB prohibits any agreements between
enterprises which restrain one of the parties' freedom to set prices or business conditions.
A specific exception is made in German law for newspapers and magazines.558 According
to § 15 GWB, a publishing house may determine the retail price for its products. Competi-
tion authorities can intervene in such agreements, only in special circumstances for in-
stance in cases of abusive price-fixing.559 The German legislature justifies this exception
for publishers with cultural and educational arguments.560 Moreover, the distribution of
newspapers and magazines in Germany is subject to a special system, which explains this
legally tolerated restraint of competition. Besides subscriptions, all newspaper companies
distribute their products via wholesalers (so-called Pressegrossisten), who each have their
exclusive territory to sell the newspapers and magazines to the retailers. The wholesaler
chooses how many copies of different newspapers he or she sells to the retailer (so-called
Dlspositlonsrecnïï. being bound only by the principle of neutrality and press plurality.561
The retailer, in turn, is allowed to return all unsold copies, getting back the complete pur-
556 Cf§ 8 I GWB.
557 Cfthe wording of § 8 II GWB.
558 The provision refers to 'publisher products' (Verlagserzeugnisse), which has to be interpreted broadly
including also CD-ROMs under certain circumstances, see Loftier & Ricker Handbuch des Presserechts
12000), 4. Auflage, 653.
59 § 15 III GWB. For details see Loftier & Ricker Handbuch des Presserechts (2000), 4. Auflage, 652-655.
560 Cf BegrOndung zum Regierungsentwurf, BR-Drs. 857/97, p. 36; Loftier & Ricker Handbuch des
Presserechts (2000), 4. Auflage, 653.
561 CfBGH, WuW/E BGH 879 ft. - Dispositionsrecht.
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chase price (so-called Remissionsrech~. This system, which guarantees the plurality of
press products, only works if the retailers are not able to set different prices for the differ-
ent newspapers and magazines. The price-fixing, which ensures the principle of exclusivity
of the wholesalers, leads to a diminution of competition, but is legally desirable to ensure
press plurality.562 The Bundesverfassungsgericht even attributed constitutional protection
to the wholesaler of newspapers and magazines in order to promote freedom of the
press.563
Other forms of vertical agreements are also prohibited in this chapter, like abusive exclu-
sionary acts (such as tying arrangements), if they affect competition substantially.564 Fi-
nally, according to § 17 GWB certain licence agreements are exempted from prohibition.
2 3 4 The control of mergers
The control of mergers aims at the maintenance of structural conditions of markets, that
allow effective competition. Examining mergers and their effects on competition, German
competition authorities approach a merger principally by following these steps:
• Can the transaction be scrutinized under the provisions set out in the GWB for the con-
trol of mergers (applicability of the provisions for the control of mergers)? Two main steps
have to be assessed: the scope of application of the GWB (Anwendungsbereich des
GWB) and the statutory definition of a merger (so-called Zusammenschlusstatbestand).
- The transaction is within the scope of application of the GWB, if the merging parties
reach certain turnover thresholds and national competition authorities have jurisdiction.
562 Cf Bechtold 'Medienkartellrecht - Aktueller Oberblick Ober die deutsche Praxis' (2000), AfP 2000, 436
1437).
63 In the case BVerfGE 77, 346 ft. - Pressegrosso, a wholesaler was condemned for distributing illegal con-
tent by delivering a certain magazine to retailers. The Bundesverfassungsgericht stated that whenever apply-
ing statutory (criminal) law, also to press wholesalers the freedom of the press has to be borne in mind, this
should lead to a restrictive interpretation of the statutory law: 'Art. 5 Abs. 1 Satz 2 GG ist auf die hier zu
beurteilende Hitigkeit des Presse-Grossisten anwendbar. Das Grundrecht der Pressefreiheit gewahrleistet
als subjektives Recht den im Pressewesen tatigen Personen und Unternehmen Freiheit von staatlietrem
Zwang; als objektives Recht garantiert es die Freiheit des Pressewesens insgesamt. Dieser Schutz reicht
von der Beschaffung der Information bis zur Verbreitung der Nachricht und der Meinung (BVerfGE 10, 118
(121)). Er beschrankt sich nicht auf die unmittelbar inhaltsbezogenen Pressetatigkeiten, sondern erfaêt im
Interesse einer ungehinderten Meinungsverbreitung auch inhaltsferne Hilfsfunktionen von
Presseunternehmen (vgl. BVerfGE 25, 296 (304) - Buchhaltung; BVerfGE 64, 108 (114 f.) -
Anzeigenaufnahme). 1m einzelnen kommt es fOr die Definition des Schutzbereichs darauf an, was
notwendige Bedingung des Funktionierens einer freien Presse ist (BVerfGE 66, 116 (134)).' (p. 354).
564 Cf § 16 GWB. See also Loftier & Ricker Handbuch des Presserechts (2000), 4. Auflage, 656 for the im-
portance of this section to publishers.
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- The statutory definition of a merger is fulfilled, if the transaction constitutes a merger as
defined by the Act.
• If these conditions are fulfilled, the transaction is notifiable565and the competition authori-
ties have to assess the effects of the merger on competition .
• If it is likely that the merger will lead to a 'market-dominant position' or will strengthen it,
the merger will be prohibited, unless certain exemptions appll66 or a conditional approval
is an adequate remedy for the merger's detrimental effect.
2 3 4 1Applicability of the provisions for the control of mergers
First, the provisions for the control of mergers have to be applicable.
234 1 1Scope of application of the GWB (Anwendungsbereich des GWB)
To be subject to control, the transaction has to be within the scope of application of the
GWB. This depends on the turnovers of the participating firms. According to § 35 I GWB,
the provisions concerning the control of mergers only apply, if the combined aggregate
worldwide turnover of all participating undertakings was more than € 500 million during the
last business year preceding the merger. Additionally, the domestic turnover of at least
one of the participating undertakings must have been more than € 25 million.567
Even in that case, two exceptions ('bagatelle clauses') are set out in § 35 II GWB. Of im-
portance is § 35 II Nr. 1 GWB, which consists of a so-called 'de-minimis clause,.568§ 35 I
GWB - and therefore the provisions controlling mergers - do not apply, if one of the par-
ties to a merger, that is not a 'controlled undertaking' within the meaning of § 36 II GWB,
had a worldwide turnover of less than € 10 million during the last business year and affili-
ates itself with another undertaking. The de-minimis clause does not apply to mergers be-
tween newspaper enterprises.56g
565 Competition authorities often scrutinise the statutory definition of a merger and the obligation to notify in a
single step, see for instance BKartA, decision of 04.05.2004, B 3 - 2450 - Fa - 154/03 - Colgate-Palmolive
Company/Gaba Holding AG par 4.
566 See 2 3 4 4 2 infra.
567 For the press-specific turnover calculation see 2 3 5 1 infra.
568 Also sometimes simply called 'bagatelle clause' and formerly known as 'Anschlussklausef ('affiliation
clause'), because the provision initially intended to facilitate the sale of medium-sized enterprises.
569 See 2 3 5 1 infra.
97
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Chapter 2 - European and German Competition law
The second exception is § 35 II Nr. 2 GWB, the so-called 'bagatelle market clause'."? Ac-
cording to this section, which also applies to pubusners.?" a merger may not be regulated
in a market which has existed for at least 5 years and on which products or commercial
services of a sales volume of less than € 15 million were transacted during the last calen-
dar year. Nevertheless, mergers may be subject to assessment, if the involved parties also
produce and distribute products on other ('non bagatelle') markets.572 In this case, a
merger's effects only on the 'bagatelle market' may not be part of the merger considera-
tion.573
Generally, the Bundeskartellamt is responsible for the examination of all mergers within
these thresholds, if European authorities are not. Accordingly, § 35 III GWB outlines, that
these provisions only do not apply, if the Commission of the European Communities has
exclusive jurisdiction according to the European regulation concerning mergers.574
2 3 4 12 Statutory definition of a merger (Zusammenschlusstatbestand)
The transaction has to be a merger per definitionem according to the GWB. § 37 GWB
defines, when a merger takes place. A list of cases is enumerated in § 37 I Nr. 1 to 4,
which is remarkably similar to the one provided in South Africa in section 12 of the Compe-
tition Act575 and is modelled on European law.576 According to § 37 I GWB, a transaction
will be regarded as merger in one of the following circumstances:
• If an undertaklnq"" acquires the 'whole or a substantial part' of the assets578 of another
570 Also called 'minor market clause'.
571 See in detail 2 3 5 1 infra.
572 As the BKartA points out: '[O]nly if a concentration exclusively affects a minor market is it not subject to
control, and therefore not subject to notification. A necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for this is that the
acquired undertaking operates exclusively on a market that is a minor market. It may, however, be open to
question whether such a case will not for example also improve the position of the purchaser in the upstream
market.' (Information leaflet relating to the German control of concentrations, November 2000, available at:
http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/wDeutsch/download/pdf/Merkblaetter/Merkblaetter englisch/OO MerkblattFu
KoD e.pdf, p. 4.
573 See for instance the case BKartA, decision of 04.05.2004, B 3 - 2450 - Fa - 154/03 - Colgate-Palmolive
Company/Gaba Holding AG par 16.
574 See already 2 2 supra.
575 See 1 5 1 2 2 supra.
576 See 2 2 supra.
577 According to § 36 III GWB, also a person is also regarded as 'undertaking,' if he or she holds the majority
shares in a company.
578 The definition of assets is understood in the broadest sense, including all rights or even customer rela-
tions, as far as they have monetary value, KG, WuW/E OlG 4095 (4102) - W + i VerlaglWeiss-Druck. See
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undertaking579 (§ 37 I Nr. 1 GWB); or
• In the event of acquisition of direct or indirect control by one or several undertakings of
the whole or parts of one or more other undertakings. Control may be constituted by
rights, contracts or any other means, which either separately or in combination allow the
acquiring firm(s)58oto exercise determinant influence on the activity of the target firm,
notably via ownership or the rights to use all or part of the assets of the target firm (Ii-
cences)581or by rights and contracts.ê'" which allow determinant influence583on the
structure, voting or decisions of the organs of the target firm584(§ 37 I Nr. 2 GWB); or
• If the acquiring firm holds due to the transaction shares of the target firm of 50% or 25%
of the capital or the voting rights of the target firm585(§ 37 I Nr. 3 GWB).
Due to § 37 I Nr. 3 b) GWB it is often believed that a minority shareholding below 25% of
an enterprise cannot raise competition law concerns. Thus, it is a common practice to ac-
also SchOtz in Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrankungen und Européisches Kartel/recht
Gemeinschaftskommentar (2001), § 37 Rn. 10.
579 The amalgamation of two firms (cf s 12(1 )(b)(ii) of the South African Competition Act) is also embraced by
this provision, see Schutz in Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrankungen und Europëisctïes Kartel/recht
Gemeinschaftskommentar (2001), § 37 Rn. 21.
580 The control can be exercised jointly by several enterprises.
581 The abstract aptitude of the acquired part of the enterprise (licence) to change the market position of the
acquiring firm is decisive, not the concrete effect of the acquisition on its market position, BGH, WuW/E BGH
2783 (2785) - Warenzeichenerwerb.
582 In detail: Schutz in Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrankungen und Europëisches Kartel/recht
Gemeinschaftskommentar (2001), § 37 Rn. 29.
583 As a rule, this is the case if the acquiring firm(s) can decisively influence strategic business policy deci-
sions or the composition of the supervisory or administrative boards of the target firm.
584 A internal change of control may also constitute a merger, such as the 'split' of an enterprise, cf SchOtz in
Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrankungen und Europaisches Kartel/recht Gemeinschaftskommentar
(2001), § 37 Rn. 42, or the change from jointly exercised control to sole control, see BKartA, decision of
03.08.2004, B 6 - 045/04 - Gruner + Jahr/RBA at V. (licence agreement to publish a foreign magazine).
585 In this case, it is only decisive whether the thresholds are exceeded or not. It is not important for § 37 I Nr.
3 GWB, whether certain additional rights are acquired, so that even a minimum increase of 0,01% in shares
can make this section applicable, see SchOtz in Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrankungen und Eu-
ropëiscnes Kartel/recht Gemeinschaftskommentar (2001), § 37 Rn. 50. According to § 37 I Nr. 3, S 2 GWB
shares of other firms can be attributed to an enterprise, if the shares held are fiduciary. ('The shares held by
the undertaking also include the shares held by another for the account of this undertaking and, if the owner
of the undertaking is a sole proprietor, also any other shares held by him. If several undertakings simultane-
ously or successively acquire shares in another undertaking within the parameters mentioned above, this is
deemed to constitute a concentration among the acquiring undertakings with respect to those markets on
which the other undertaking operates as well (joint venture)', see Information leaflet relating to the German
control of concentrations, November 2000, available at:
http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/wDeutsch/download/pdf/Merkblaetter/Merkblaetter englisch/OO MerkblattFu
KoD e.pdf, p. 5). According to the court ruling, this is the case, if the enterprise bears the economic risk of
the involvement and is able to practice control, cf BGH, WuW/E DE-R 613 (615) - Treuhanderwerb.
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quire a shareholding of only 24,9%.586Conversely, according to § 37 I Nr. 4 GWB an ac-
quisition can be considered a 'merger,' if it enables the acquiring firm(s) to influence the
target firm - directly or indirectly - in a competitive way. Hence, such transactions princi-
pally can be scrutinised under the provisions set out in the GWB for the control of mergers
and can be prohibited by the competition authorities. This clause (which applies to all
transactions not falling under §§ 37 I Nr. 1 to 3 GWB)587has been interpreted broadly by
the Bundesgerichtshof (BGH). According to a recent judgement concerning the press mar-
ket,588it is not necessary that the acquiring firm be legally or practically able to enforce all
his competitive interests. To apply § 37 I Nr. 4 GWB, it suffices that it can be expected that
the majority shareholder will 'show consideration for the interests of the purchaser.'589
Thus, only a certain degree of 'influence' of the minority shareholder is essential, but not a
real 'control' of the enterprise.590 Moreover, there is no minimum of shares, which have to
be acquired for considering a union between enterprises as a 'merger' according to § 37
GWB.591Thus, § 37 I Nr. 4 GWB applies quite broadly, regardless of its subsidiarity to the
sections § 37 I Nr. 1 to 3 GWB.592The legislature intended with that regulation to avoid
dubious legal circumventions of competition provisions, especially in the media sector.593
However, this section does not only deal with the acquisition of minority shares on a hori-
zontallevel,594 even though the lawmaker especially intended to cover such situations with
586 See for instance BKartA, decision of 02.04.2004, B 6 - 22122 - Fb - 81/03 - KG WochenkurierlWM/LR
Medienverlag. Cf Knapp & MeBmer 'Minderheitsbeteiligungen geraten ins Visier des Kartellamts - Auch
unter 25 Prozent kann eine Anmeldung notig sein' Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (2005-01-12) 21.
587 SchOtz in Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrankungen und Europaisches Kartel/recht
Gemeinschaftskommentar (2001), § 37 Rn. 7 and 61.
588 BGH, WuW/E DE-R 609 ft. - ASV/Stilke.
589 '1m Sinne dieses Zusammenschlusstatbestandes setzt das Merkmal des wettbewerblich erheblichen
Einflusses nicht voraus, dass der Erwerber der Minderheitsbeteiligung seine wettbewerblichen Interessen in
allen Belangen rechtlich oder tatsëchllch durchsetzen kann. FOr die Anwendung der Vorschrift genOgt, dass
nach Art der Vertragsgestaltung und der wirtschaftlichen Verhaltnisse zu erwarten ist, dass der
Mehrheitsgesellschafter auf die Vorstellungen des Erwerbers ROcksicht nimmt oder diesem freien Raum
lasst', BGH, WuW/E DE-R 609 (610) - ASV/Stilke.
590 BGH, WuW/E DE-R 609 ft. - ASV/Stilke.
591 Schutz in Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrankungen und Europelsenes Kartel/recht
Gemeinschaftskommentar (2001), § 37 Rn. 63. In its decision of the 9 September 2004, the
Bundeskartel/amt even prohibited a purchase of only 9,015% shares, cf Knapp & MeBmer
'Minderheitsbeteiligungen geraten ins Visier des Kartellamts - Auch unter 25 Prozent kann eine Anmeldung
notig sein' Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (2005-01-12) 21.
592 SchOtz in Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrankungen und Europëtsches Kartel/recht
Gemeinschaftskommentar (2001), § 37 Rn. 63.
593 BT-Drs. 13/9720, p. 43.
594 Cf BGH, WuW/E DE-R 609 ft. - ASV/Stilke with further references.
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this provision.595The applicability of § 37 I Nr. 4 GWB on vertical agreements has already
been confirmed by lower courtS.596
2 3 4 2 Necessity of notification
Under German Competition Law, the parties to proposed mergers, for which the provisions
of the GWB are appflcable.?" principally have to notify the planned transaction to the
Bundeskartellamt before598 implementing it.599However, unlike European law § 39 GWB
does not prescribe a certain period in which the merger has to be notified.6ooEven though
this section does not technically codify a 'proper legal' obligation to the parties,601 the
omission of notification - and not only the implementation of the merger602- constitutes an
infringement of the law (administrative offence)603and can lead to a fine up to € 25.000.604
Moreover, the notification is not a condition for competition authorities to prohibit the
merger. If a merger has been implemented but not notified, the transaction can be prohib-
ited nevertheless.605
595 BT-Drs. 11/4610, p. 13 and 19.
596 KG, WuW/E DE-R 270 ff. - ASV/Stilke. Also see the decision of the Bundeskartel/amt, WuW/E DE-V1 ff.
597 See 2 3 4 1 supra. Cf also § 130 II GWB, for the condition that the transaction has to have effect on the
domestic market.
598 § 39 VI GWB also prescribes the obligation to notify after implementation.
599 § 39 GWB. For further details concerning the notification process and the notification form see Merkblatt
des Bundeskartellamtes zur deutschen Fusionskontrolle (Information leaflet relating to the German control of
concentrations, November 2000), available at: http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/wDeutsch/download/
pdf/Merkblaetter/Merkblaetter deutsch/Merkblatt Dt Fuko.pdf (German) and http://www.bundeskartellamt.
de/wDeutsch/download/pdf/Merkblaetter/Merkblaetter englisch/OO MerkblattFuKoD e.pdf (English).
600 Bosch in Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrankungen und Eutopëiscnes Kartel/recht Gemeinschaft-
skommentar (2001), § 39 Rn. 2 therefore points out correctly, that a sanction for violating the notification duty
itself is meaningless, because either the merger is implemented (what can lead to a fine for the implementa-
tion itself) or the merger is not implemented (so notification was never compulsory). For the discussion on
this issue see Rosenthal 'Neuordnung der Zustándiqkelten und des Verfahrens in der Europalachen Fu-
sionskontrolle' (2004), EuZW 11/2004, 327 (329) footnote 13 with further references. Only importance of the
section is, that correct details have to be given in the notification papers, see § 39 III 4 GWB.
601 Cf Bosch in Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrankungen und Europëtsches Kartel/recht
Gemeinschaftskommentar (2001), § 39 Rn. 1.
602 Cffootnote 614 of this thesis infra.
603 § 81 I Nr. 7 GWB. § 81 I Nr. 4 GWB in conjunction with § 39 VI GWB applies in the case of the omission
of notification of a merger after its implementation.
604 § 81 II 1 a.E. GWB.
605 Bosch in Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrankungen und Europaisches Kartel/recht
Gemeinschaftskommentar (2001), § 40 Rn. 32.
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§ 41 I GWB, in addition, can be regarded as a 'supporting provision'. It determines that all
mergers, which are not approved by the Bundeskartellamt may not be implemented and
that all transactions, which violate this principle, are of no effect.606 The implementation of
unapproved mergers is penalised under § 81 Nr. 1 GWB. Hence, a system of preventive
control of mergers is codified under German Competition Law.
According to § 39 II GWB, the parties to the merger always have to notify the transaction.
It is sufficient, however, that one of the participating parties to a merger fulfils its notifica-
tion duty on behalf of the others.607
A fee is charged for the notification of mergers that are subject to merger control.608 The
amount of the fee is determined according to the personnel and material expenses of the
Bundeskartellamt. Account is taken of the economic significance of the merger.609
2 3 4 3 Procedure
After notification, the Bundeskartellamt assesses, if the merger proceedings can be con-
cluded and the merger can be approved without formal considerations of the effect on
competition.
If additional assessment is necessary,"? the Bundeskartellamt has to start the 'main re-
view proceedings' (HauptprOfverfahren).611 A merger can only be prohibited, if the
Bundeskartellamt has announced to the parties to the merger within one month after notifi-
cation that the merger is going to be scrutinized in detail. Hence, the start of the main re-
view proceedings within a month after notification is a condition for every prohlbltlon.F"
Once the main review proceedings have been initiated, the Bundeskartellamt has to de-
cide on the merger within four month. In general, a merger will be regarded as approved, if
606 However, the Bundeskartellamt may, upon application, grant an exemption from the prohibition of putting
a merger into effect if the participating undertakings put forward important reasons for this, notably to prevent
serious damage to a participating undertaking or to a third party, § 41 II 1 GWB.
607 Thus, Bosch in Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbesehrankungen und Europëlscnes Kartellrecht
Gemeinsehaftskommentar (2001), § 39 Rn. 7 speaks of a 'joint obligation' of all participating firms.
608 § 80 I 2 Nr. 1 GWB.
609 § 80 II 1 GWB. In principle, the fee may not exceed € 50.000, ct § 80 II 2 Nr. 1 GWB.
610 Notably because of the complexity of the case, etBT-Drs. 13/9720, S.59.
611 § 4012 GWB.
612 § 40 I 1 GWB. See also Bosch in Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbesehrankungen und Europëlscties
Kartellrecht Gemeinsehaftskommentar (2001), § 40 Rn. 3.
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the Bundeskartellamt has not prohibited it within four months after its notification.613 Thus,
not only the clearance by the Bundeskartellamt, but also the lapse of the above-described
periods enables the parties to a proposed merger to implement it.614
According to § 40 II GWB, the Bundeskartellamt has to prohibit a merger, or approve it.615
An approval can also be subject to certain conditions and obllqations.?" Nevertheless,
these conditions and obligations may not require constant rnonltortnq."" An approval or
conditional approval may be revoked in view of certain unlawful actions of the parties to
the merger, such as non-compliance with the imposed conditions or obnqanons.?"
Where an approval has been revoked, the Bundeskartellamt has to order the demerger.619
However, such a decision is only to be made, if no special exemption is granted. The par-
ties to a prohibited merger can appll20 within one month after the prohibition for exemp-
tion.621The Federal Minister for Economic Affairs and Employment can grant such an ex-
emption. Here again, this concept is called 'Minister's permission' (Ministererlaubnis) and
is subject to strict conditions, enumerated in §42 GWB.622
According to this section, the Minister approves a merger, if advantages of the merger for
the economy as a whole 'offset' the restraints of competition, or the merger is justified by
'overriding public interest,.623 It is impossible to specify a precise point of delineation be-
tween these two alternatives.624 However, the term 'public interest' embraces besides
613 § 40 II 2 GWB. Cf § 40 II 3 Nr. 1 to 3 GWB for exceptions.
614 On the other hand, anyone, who deliberately or negligently puts into effect a notifiable merger, which has
not been cleared by the Bundeskartel/amt or where the described periods have not elapsed, or who partici-
pates in putting such merger into effect can be punished by a fine even up to € 500.000, § 81 II 1 GWB in
conjunction with § 81 I Nr. 1 GWB and § 41 I 1 GWB.
615 See in detail 2 3 4 4 2 infra.
616 § 40 III GWB.
617 § 40 III 2 GWB. On this aspect see KG, WuW/E OlG 1937 (1944) - Thyssen-HOl/er, for the different
forms of possible conditions see in detail Bosch in Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrankungen und
Europëisches Kartel/recht Gemeinschaftskommentar (2001), § 40 Rn. 20 ff.
618 § 40 III 2 in conjunction with § 12 II 1 Nr. 2 and 3 GWB. See also Bosch in Gesetz gegen
Wettbewerbsbeschrankungen und Europaisches Kartel/recht Gemeinschaftskommentar (2001), § 40 Rn. 27.
619 § 41 1111GWB.
620 It suffices that one of the involved enterprises applies for the exemption, Bosch in Gesetz gegen
Wettbewerbsbeschrankungen und Europëiscnes Kartel/recht Gemeinschaftskommentar (2001), § 42 Rn. 17.
621 See § 42 III GWB.
622 See already 2 3 3 2 1 supra for exemptions from prohibited cartels.
623 § 42 I 1 GWB.
624 Bosch in Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrankungen und Eutopëiscnes Kartel/recht
Gemeinschaftskommentar (2001), § 42 Rn. 4.
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economic values also social, cultural, and moral goods and values.625 The Minister re-
garded for instance the safeguarding of jobs626and military-political reasons as such inter-
ests.627 Hence, while the Bundeskartellamt principally has to take into account only as-
pects of competition, the Minister for Economic Affairs and Employment may consider a
wider range of aspects.628
Aspects such as the removal of structural crises, the strengthening of international com-
petitiveness or the maintenance or the creation of essential economic sectors629 have
been made out by the Minister as 'advantages of the merger for the economy as a
whole,.63o
The competitiveness of the enterprises involved on markets beyond the application of the
GWB has to be taken into account, toO.631Additionally, the section imposes that the Minis-
ter's permission may only be given if the 'order of the market economy' is not endangered
by the dimension of the restrains of competition.632
Finally, the 'Minister's permission' may be subject to conditions if necessary.f" The legis-
lature seemed to be aware of the risks of such an exemption, but nevertheless wanted to
empower the Minister in exceptional cases to overrule the decisions of the competition
authorities.634 So the Minister for Economic Affairs and Employment has to inform the Mo-
625 See Bosch in Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrankungen und Europëisches Kartel/recht
Gemeinschaftskommentar (2001), § 42 Rn. 5.
626 This argument was only regarded as sufficient interest, because the merger led also to other advantages,
notably international competitiveness.
627 See BMWi, WuW/E 177 (182) - IBH/Wibau; BMWi, WuW/E 191 (198) - Daimler/MBB.
628 See Bosch in Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrankungen und Eutooëiscnes Kartel/recht
Gemeinschaftskommentar (2001), § 42 Rn.1.
629 Notably the energy supply sector.
630 Cf Bosch in Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrankungen und Europaisches Kartel/recht
Gemeinschaftskommentar (2001), § 42 Rn. 9 with further references.
631 § 42 I 2 GWB.
632 § 42 I 3 GWB.
633 § 42 II 1 GWB.
634 Cf BegrOndung zum Regierungsentwurf, BT-Drs. 13/9720, S.44 hh).
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nopolkommission,635 which issues its opinion of the exemptlon.f" although this statement
is not binding.63?
The decisions of the Bundeskartellamt constitute administrative acts, which can be con-
tested (so-called 'Beschwerde') within one month to a Higher Regional Court (Oberlan-
desgerich(38).639 According to § 63 IV GWB, the Higher Regional Court of that district,
where the relevant competition authority has its seat, has exclusive jurisdiction over this
appeal. In case of §§ 35 to 42 GWB, only that Higher Regional Court, where the
Bundeskartellamt is based, has jurisdiction.P'?
If this remedy does not succeed, an appeal to the Chamber for Competition Matters at the
German Federal Court (Kartellsenat des Bundesgerichtshofs) is possible. The Bundes-
gerichtshof only analyses if the High Court has violated the law with its decision. It does
not examine the facts (so-called Rechtsbeschwerde or Revision).641
Only the parties that participated in the merger proceedings may contest the decisions of
the Bundeskartellamt.642 According to § 54 II and III GWB, every person who 'applied for
the instituting of legal proceedings,,643 but also cartels, firms or trade association, against
which the proceedings are directed,644 are regarded as 'participant,' or persons or associa-
tions of persons, if their interests are substantially affected by the decision and they have
been summonsed by the competition authoritles.P" Finally, in the case of share or assets
purchases, vendors also are partlcipants.P"
635 See 2 3 2 supra.
636 See for instance: Zusammenschlussvorhaben der Georg von Holtzbrinck GmbH & Co. KG mit der
Berliner Verlag GmbH & Co. KG - 36. Erganzendes Sondergutachten der Monopolkommission (April 2003),
available at: http://www.monopolkommission.de/sg 36/text s36.pdf.
637 Bosch in Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrankungen und Europëisches Kartel/recht
Gemeinschaftskommentar (2001), § 42 Rn. 20.
636 That is the high court and court of appeal of a Land (German region).
639 § 63 GWB.
640 Hence the Oberlandesgericht Dusseldorf is competent for the hearing of appeals against merger deci-
sions (the Bundeskartel/amt moved to Bonn in 1999). Before this time, the BKartA had its seat in Berlin,
which explains the plurality of decisions by the Kammergericht (Higher Regional Court of Berlin).
641 For the case of an amendment of the law during the proceedings cf BGH, WuW/E Verg 297 (305) -
Terittreueetklërunq II; BGH, WuW/E DE-R 399 (401) - Verbundnetz with further references.
642 § 63 II GWB.
643 § 54 II Nr. 1 GWB.
644 § 54 II Nr. 2 GWB.
645 § 54 II Nr. 3 GWB.
646 § 54 II Nr. 4 GWB. This section refers to 'cases of § 37 I Nr. 1 or 3,' see 2 3 4 1 2 supra.
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Hence, third parties interested in the outcome of a case may only take legal action against
decisions of the Bundeskartellamt, such as merger approvals, if the competition authorities
have requested them to participate in the proceedings. At first glance, it seems unfair to
make legal actions of third parties dependent on the competition authority's summons, but
if the interests of a third party are substantially affected, there is a proper right to partici-
pate,647for which the party may - as expressly set out in § 54 II Nr. 3 GWB - apply.
2 3 4 4 Consideration on the merger's effect on competition
German competition authorities are concerned with the potential effects of mergers on
competition. As under South African law, not only horizontal mergers but also vertical
mergers may raise competition concerns. Vertical mergers can be particularly problematic
if the acquiring firm gains eminent influence on the downstream market in a post-merger
scenario. This, for instance, can be the case if a newspaper company acquires interests in
a newspaper retailer, as happened in the ASV/Stilke case.648 In this case, the Axel
Springer AG (a big publisher) intended to buy shares of the Stilke Buch- und Zeitschriften-
handelsgesellschaft mbH (a distributor and newspaper retailer). The merger was prohib-
ited, even though only minority shares would have been acqulred.?" The competition au-
thorities were concerned about the influence on competition on the upstream (newspaper)
market, since Springer would have been in a position widely to promote the sales of its
own newspapers via the retailer's shops, disadvantaging cornpetltors.ï"? No publishing
houses are currently involved in the newspaper retail business in Germany, and an acqui-
sition of shares of a retailer was regarded as being detrimental to the principle of neutral-
ity651in this sector.652
2 3 4 4 1Definition of the relevant market
647 Bosch in Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrankungen und Europëiscnes Kartel/recht
Gemeinschaftskommentar (2001), § 40 Rn. 29.
648 BGH, WuW/E DE-R 609 H. - ASV/Stilke.
649 In this case, a stake of 24%.
650 See BGH, WuW/E DE-R 609 H. - ASV/Stilke par II 2. c).
651 This principle shall guarantee a fair distribution of all press products.
652 See BGH, WuW/E DE-R 609 H. - ASV/Stilke par II 2. e).
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For the assessment of the effects of a merger on competition, again, the relevant market
has to be defined first. German authorities and jurisprudence define the product market
from the customer's point of view (functional substitutability of goods and services), a con-
cept that is colloquially referred to as Bedarfsmarktkonzept.653 Hence, all products are part
of a relevant product market, which are - from a reasonable, average customer's point of
view - apt to accommodate the demand in the same way (and are therefore substitutable),
even if they differ in certain details, like construction, quality, or price.554A customer may
be the end consumer, but also a wholesaler or retailer, depending on which level the
merger would take place. If a merger between manufacturers is concerned, competition
authorities assess, to whom the products of the parties are sold.555The end consumers'
demand influences the market strategies and demand of all players 'higher' in the market
chain, so also their behaviour has to be taken into account.f" especially when end con-
sumer products are sold.55?
Competition authorities also assess the relevant geographic market for all relevant product
markets. Authorities are obliged to assess the merger's effect on competition only insofar
as the GWB applies, hence in the German territory.658 Nevertheless, influences on compe-
tition from abroad may be taken into account in terms of § 36 I GWB.
2 3 4 4 2 Prohibition or approval of mergers
According to § 36 GWB, the Bundeskartellamt has to prohibit a mergers, if it the transac-
tion is calculated to lead to a market-dominant position or strengthening of it.
The existence of such a market-dominant position is defined in § 19 II GWB, which also
applies to mergers, even though this section refers to the abuse of a market-dominant po-
653 'Bedarf' means in this context the customers' need for certain products and services.
654 'Zu einem sachlich relevanten Markt gehoren alle Produkte, die in den Augen eines vernunftigen,
durchschnittlichen Abnehmers wegen gleicher Eignung und Verwendungszwecke geeignet sind, einen
bestimmten Bedart auf zumutbare, gleichwertige Weise zu befriedigen, auch wenn sie sich in Einzelheiten
wie Konstruktion, Oualitat, Preis und áhnlichern unterscheiden', KG, WuW/E OlG 3795 - PiIIsbury-Sonnen-
Bassermann. See also BGH, WuW/E BGH 2433 (2436 t.) - Gruner + Jahr/ Zeit /I and BGH, WuW/E BGH
2150 (2153) - Edelstahlbestecke.
655 Cf OlG Dusseldorf, WuW/E DE-R 1112 (1113) - Melitta/Airflo.
656 In detail BKartA, decision of 02.03.2004, B 10 - 102/03.
657 KG, WuW/E OlG 3795 - PiIIsbury-Sonnen-Bassermann.
658 BGH, WuW/E BGH 3026 (3029 t.) - Backofenmarkt.
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sition.6s9According to this provision, an enterprise is market-dominant, if there is no or only
insignificant competition in the market in which it acts as offeror of products or purveyor of
services or as customer.660 Alternatively, there is also market dominance, if the enterprise
has a 'paramount market position' vis-a-vis its cornpetttors.P" The Bundesgerichtshof pos-
tulated that an enterprise has such a 'paramount market position,' if it has reached a lead
over its competitors, that provides the enterprise with a paramount scope of action, which
is no longer controlled effectively by competition.662 The 'paramount market position,' how-
ever, has to be determined by a plurality of factors, which are enumerated in the section,
'especially' the market share and financial strength of the enterprise and barriers to entry
to the market for other firms.663The assessment of the market share is of particular impor-
tance,664 because the market share shows the market position of an enterprise and its
economic success on this market and thus indicates its ability to prevail against its com-
petltors.?" South African competition authorities impute relevance to market share data as
an indicator of competitiveness in the same way:
'Although market share data are rarely dispositive and must always be comple-
mented by an analysis of entry barriers and other dynamic features of the market
in question, they are legitimately and widely used as reliable prima facie indica-
tors of the competitive temperature in a given market.,666
§ 19 III 1 GWB sets out a presumption for market dominance, if the enterprise has at least
a market share of one-third. The presumption is refutable, though, for instance in cases
where the merged entity would have a market share exceeding this margin, but substantial
competition can be expected due to the market struciure.?" § 19 III 2 GWB sets out a pre-
sumption for market dominance for 0ligopolies.668
659 Schutz in Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrankungen und Eurooëiscnes Kartel/recht
Gemeinschaftskommentar (2001), § 36 Rn. 59.
660 § 19111 Nr. 1 GWB.
661 § 19 111Nr. 2 GWB.
662 Cffor instance BGH, WuW/E BGH 1445 (1449) - Valium.
663 Cf § 19 II GWB in Appendix II of this thesis.
664 See BKartA, decision of 02.02.2004, B 6 - 22121 - U - 120/03 - Holtzbrinck/Berliner Verlag/G+J /I at V.
1.2.3.1.
665 See BGH, WuW/E BGH 1501 (1503) - Kfz-Kupplungen.
666 Murray & Roberts Ltd / The Cementation Company (Africa) Ltd (CT 02/LM/Jan04) par 31.
667 Cf for instance BKartA, decision of 04.05.2004, B 3 - 2450 - Fa - 154/03 - Colgate-Palmolive Com-
~any/Gaba Holding AG par 57.
68 In detail see Schutz in Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrankungen und Europëiscnes Kartel/recht
Gemeinschaftskommentar (2001), § 36 Rn. 111 f.
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The Bundeskarlellamt published guidelines,669 in which it sets out how it interprets market
domination. For instance, a transaction through which an internal change of control of a
firm is caused - like the change from jointly exercised control to sole control - is regarded
as strengthening market domination, if the transaction intensifies the influence of the ac-
quiring firm on the target firm.67o
The proposed merger has to 'lead' to a market-dominant position or the strengthening of it.
This means that the merger has to be causal to the detrimental effects. Hence, it is ac-
cepted that a merger, which is calculated to lead to a market-dominant position or a
strengthening thereof, has to be approved, if even without the proposed transaction, a de-
terioration of the structure of competition would occur."? However, according to the
Bundeskarlellamt such an approval requires, firstly, that the target firm cannot be sold to a
third party, which would continue to run the enterprise and, secondly, it must be shown,
that the target firm would have to leave the market without the merger. Finally, it must be
proven that the market shares of the target firm would fall completely to the market-
dominant acquiring firm.672The condition that a significant competitor will be removed from
the market and competition will be diminished in consequence of the failure of this com-
petitor is equivalent to the 'failing-firm doctrine' as known in South Africa. The German ap-
proach is modelled on the European Commission's test, which requires that the following
conditions be satisfied:
'Firstly, the allegedly failing firm would in the near future be forced out of the
market because of financial difficulties if not taken over by another undertaking.
Second, there is no less anti-competitive alternative purchase than the notified
669 Auslegungsgrundsatze des Bundeskartellamtes zum Begrift der Marktbeherrschung (Principles of
Interpretation, October 2000), available at:
http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/wDeutsch/download/pdf/Merkblaetter/
Merkblaetter deutsch/Auslegungsgrunds.pdf (German) and http://www.bundeskarteliamt.de/wDeutsch/
download/pdf/Merkblaetter/Merkblaetter englisch/02 Checkliste e.pdf (English).
670 BKartA, Principles of Interpretation, p. 9.
671 BGH,WuW/E BGH 1655 (1660) - Zementmahlanlage 1/; WuW/E BGH 2731 (2736) - Inlandstochter.
672 'Bei einem Zusammenschluss, der zur Entstehung oder Verstarkung marktbeherrschender Stellungen
fOhrt, sind die Untersagungsvoraussetzungen dann zu verneinen, wenn auch ohne den Zusammenschluss
dieselbe Verschlechterung der Wettbewerbsstruktur wie durch den Zusammenschluss eintráte (mangeinde
Kausalitát des Zusammenschlusses). Dies setzt insbesondere voraus, dass das zu erwerbende
Unternehmen an einen Dritten, der es fortfOhren wOrde, nicht veráuêerbar ist, ferner, dass es ohne den
Zusammenschluss aus dem Markt austreten mOsste und dass seine Marktanteile im letzteren Fall
vollstándlq dem marktbeherrschenden Erwerber zuwachsen wOrden', BKartA, decision of 10.12.2002, B 6 -
22121 - U - 98/02 - HoltzbrinckiBerliner Verlag/G+J I at V.1.3.
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merger. Third, in the absence of a merger, the assets of the failing firm would in-
evitably exit the market.,673
The European Commission points out that the inevitability of the assets of the failing firm
leaving the market in question may, notably in a case of merger to monopoly, 'underlie a
finding that the market share of the failing firm would in any event accrue to the other
merging party.'674
As already pointed out, § 36 GWB obliges the Bundeskartellamt to prohibit a merger, if it is
likely that the merger will lead to a market-dominant position or will strengthen it. There is
one exception, though, which resembles the concept of 'pro-competitive gains' under
South African law. According to § 36 I, 2. HS GWB, the proposed merger does not have to
be prohibited, if the participating parties can prove that the merger will 'also lead to im-
provements in the competition conditions and that these improvements outweigh the dis-
advantages of market domination' (so-called Abwagungsklause~. Such improvements are
regarded as exceptional.?" though, and mere improvements, which do not outweigh the
detrimental effects of the merger, such as the improvement of the competitive position of
only one competitor, are not sufficient.676
2 3 4 5 Practice of merger control
According to § 53 I GWB, every second year, the Bundeskartellamt has to publish a report
on all aspects of its work (Tatigkeitsberichn.677 Every year, there are about 1500 merger
decislons.?" The Bundeskartellamt approves most of the proposed mergers. For the re-
673 Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of con-
centrations between undertakings, OJEU C 31/5 of 05.02.2004 par 90, also available at:
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2004/c 031/c 03120040205en00050018.pdf. See also Iscor Limited
/ Saldanha Steel (Pty) Ltd (CT 67/LM/Dec01) par 82.
674 Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of con-
centrations between undertakings, OJEU C 31/5 of 05.02.2004 footnote 111, also available at:
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2004/c 031/c 03120040205en00050018.pdf) referring to the judg-
ment of the European Court of Justice, joined cases No. C-68/94 and C-30/95 - Kali and Salz, par 115-116.
675 See for instance KG, WuW/E OLG 2228 (2233) - Zeitungsmarkt Munchen.
676 Schutz in Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrankungen und Europëisctïes Kartel/recht
Gemeinschaftskommentar (2001), § 36 Rn. 152.
677 See for instance the latest published report: Bericht des Bundeskartellamtes Ober seine Ta.tigkeit in den
Jahren 2001/2002 sowie Ober die Lage und Entwicklung auf seinem Aufgabengebiet, BT-Drs. 15/1226, also
available at: http://dip.bundestag.de/btd/15/012/1501226.pdf.
678 Newssheet of the Bundeskartel/amt, available at: http://www.bundeskarteliamt.de/wDeutsch/download/
pdf/03 Infobrosch.pdf.
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port year 2001/2002, the Bundeskartellamt received 3152 notifications. Of these, only 95
have been assessed in the main review proceedings679 and only 8 have been prohibited;
62 have been approved unconditionally, 25 conditionally.68o
2 3 5 Mergers between newspaper enterprises
Generally, mergers between newspaper enterprises are subject to the same competition
rules as other mergers. There is no special act, nor special authority, which controls such
mergers. Arguably, there is no 'unique' press- or media merger control. Nevertheless, the
consideration of media mergers shows some special features.
In 1976, special provisions for the control of mergers between publishing houses were en-
acted by the third amendment of the GWB, only three years after the German legislature
introduced a system of merger control. In fact, these provisions were introduced, because
it turned out that the general provisions of 1973 with their relatively high thresholds were
not apt to guarantee effective competition in the newspaper sector, consisting predomi-
nantly of local or regional enterprises with smaller turnovers. Hence, in the 1960s and 70s,
there had been a large number of mergers, which resulted in high concentration in many
press markets.681The government wanted to face increasing concentration on these mar-
kets with specific provtsions.P"
Since that time, certain sections exist, which only apply to 'press mergers'. Moreover, the
competition authorities have developed a special interpretation of the GWB for media
mergers, when it comes to the definition of the relevant market and market dominance.
2 3 5 1Application of the provisions for the control of mergers
For the consideration of mergers between publishing houses, competition authorities have
to assess like in any other merger case, whether the proposed transaction can be scruti-
nized under the provisions set out in the GWB for the control of mergers. Hence, the
679 See 2 3 4 3 supra.
680 Between 1973 and 2002, only 173 mergers have been prohibited, of which only 89 were non-appealable;
in 45 cases the prohibition was revoked. Cf Bericht des Bundeskartellamtes Ober seine Ta.tigkeit in den
Jahren 2001/2002 sowie Ober die Lage und Entwicklung auf seinem Aufgabengebiet, BT-Drs. 15/1226, p.
12-14, also available at: http://dip.bundestag.de/btd/15/012/1501226.pdf.
681 CfGraph 7 (2 3541 2 infra).
682 Weberling 'Novellierung der Pressefusionskontrolle: Auslaufmodell Pressevielfalt? Zur geplanten
Lockerung des Pressekartellrechts' (2004), promedia, Nr. 7/04, 22.
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transaction has to be within the scope of application of the GWB (Anwendungsbereich des
GWB). But in the case of publishing mergers, the provisions concerning merger control
apply, even if the turnovers of the merging parties are relatively low. According to § 38 III
GWB, for the calculation of the combined annual turnover of the merging parties, the ac-
tual turnover has to be multiplied by 20 when it comes to publishers. This section is re-
ferred to as 'press calculation clause' (Presserecnentaeuseë, even though it nowadays
also applies to broadcasting and the production and distribution of broadcasting pro-
grammes.683 However, this provision especially applies to the turnovers of undertakings,
whose operations wholly or partially consist of the publication, production or distribution of
newspapers, magazines and parts thereof. 'Newspapers' and 'magazines' are defined as
all periodical publications.684 The definition of 'newspaper' includes advertisement papers,
if they contain a 'not completely insignificant editorial part.'685The calculation method ap-
plies to all mergers, in which publishing houses are involved, even if a particular merger is
outside the press or broadcasting sector.686
Hence, the control of mergers in this field happens much sooner than in other market
segments. The participating parties to a newspaper merger only must have had worldwide
turnovers of over € 25 million in total during the last business year preceding the merger
and, additionally, the domestic turnover of at least one of the participating undertakings
must have been more than € 1,25 million, for the transaction to be within the scope of ap-
plication of the GWB.
Moreover, according to § 35 II 2 GWB, the above-mentioned 'de-minimis clause' (§ 35 II
Nr. 1 GWB) does not apply to mergers between print media enterprises. As the provision
sets out, the de-minimis clause does not apply, if the merger restrains competition con-
cerning 'the publisher, the production and distribution of newspapers and magazines or
parts thereof'. So this is not an exception for all media, but only applies to the print media
6B3 The section was extended to broadcasting only with the sixth amendment of the GWB (1999).
684 Bosch in Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschriinkungen und Europiiisches Kartel/recht
Gemeinschaftskommentar (2001), § 38 Rn. 17.
6B5 BGH, WuW/E BGH 1905 (1905 f.) - MOnchner Anzeigenbliitter; confirmed by BVerfG, WuW/E VG 307
(308) - MOnchner Anzeigenbliitter. See also BGH, WuW/E BGH 2443 (2449) - SOdkurier/Singener
Wochenblatt.
6B6 Bosch in Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschriinkungen und Europiiisches Kartel/recht
Gemeinschaftskommentar (2001), § 38 Rn. 16.
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and not for instance to broadcasting, although § 38 III GWB also applies to the latter sec-
tor.687
Furthermore, the 'bagatelle market clause' (§ 35 II Nr. 2 GWB) applies to press mergers.
Nevertheless, this section is not often of decisive importance, as the 'press-specific' turn-
over calculation in § 38 III GWB leads to a figure of € 0,75 million for press-related mar-
kets.688Thus, only markets, on which products or services of a sales volume of less than
this amount were transacted during the last calendar year, are not subject to control.
Secondly, the transaction has to fulfil the statutory definition of a merger (Zusammen-
schlusstatbestand) as set out in § 37 GWB. As shown above, competition authorities inter-
pret this section quite broadly.689 Moreover, the Bundeskarlellamt pointed out, that a sub-
stantial part of the assets within the meaning of § 37 I Nr. 1 GWB
'means not only parts of the assets which, in terms of quantity, are sufficiently
large in relation to the seller's total assets. Rather, a part of the assets is sub-
stantial whenever it has a significance of its own as regards production, distribu-
tion targets and current market conditions and whenever it consequently appears
to be a unit that can be separated from the seller's other assets.'690
In the case of newspaper mergers, the courts concluded that the assignment of the title of
a newspaper''" is a transaction in terms of § 37 I Nr. 1 GWB. The permission to use and
publish a newspaper title would fulfil the requirement of being the acquisition of a 'substan-
tial part' of the assets of another enterprise in terms of § 37 I Nr. 1 GWB.692Hence, in the
G+J/RBA case,693the acquisition of the exclusive licence to publish the magazine National
687 See Schutz in Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrankungen und Europëiscnes Kartel/recht
Gemeinschaftskommentar (2001), § 35 Rn. 34.
688 Cf recently BKartA, decision of 01.03.2005, B 6 - 22122 - Fb - 103/04 - S-W Verlag at IV.; also see
Bechtold 'Medienkartellrecht - Aktueller Oberblick Ober die deutsche Praxis' (2000), AfP 2000, 436 (437).
689 See 2 3 4 1 2 supra.
690 Information leaflet relating to the German control of concentrations, November 2000, available at:
http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/wDeutsch/download/pdf/Merkblaetter/Merkblaetter englisch/OO MerkblattFu
KoD e.pdf, p. 12.
691 Under German law, the newspaper title (the name of the newspaper) is generally protected under Ger-
man Trademark law with the publication of the first edition of the newspaper (it is even possible, to obtain
~rotection before this time) and thus constitutes a right, which can be assigned.
92 KG, WuW/E OlG 4095 (4102) - W + i VerlaglVv'eiss-Druck. See also BKartA, decision of 01.03.2005, B 6
- 22122 - Fb - 103/04 - S-W Verlag at V.
693 BKartA, decision of 02.08.2004, B 6 - 026/04 - Gruner + Jahr/RBA.
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Geographic on the German market in a German edition was labelled a merger, especially
because of the economic strength of the title.
2 3 5 2 Definition of the relevant market
On a newspaper market level, the product market - as for other industries694 - is defined
from the customer's point of view. As regards newspapers, readers and advertisers are the
publishers' customers, either buying the press product itself or advertising space in the
newspaper. Accordingly, the Bundeskartellamt and the competition courts differentiate be-
tween the 'reader market' and 'advertisement market,.695 Moreover, it has been stated
clearly that there are different sub-markets. The diverging characteristics of different types
of newspapers and magazines, like their content and periodical appearance, determine,
whether the publication can be regarded as substitutable with others to accommodate the
demand of the reader or the advertising industry in the same way. Competition courts,
however, already affirmed that there is no substitutability between books and maga-
zines.696 The Bundeskartellamf also distinguishes between newspaper and magazine
markets, even though the delineation between newspapers and magazines is not always
easy to draw. It is characteristic for magazines - in contrast to newspapers - that their
content, generally speaking, focuses on certain topics and subjects.69? In practice, though,
also newspapers, especially weeklies, have such 'magazine elements,' or even proper
'magazine parts'.
According to the Bundeskartellamt, the 'reader market' and 'advertisement market' for
press products are divisible themselves. Competition authorities use certain criteria to
subdivide the 'reader markets'. As far as newspapers are concerned, the criterion of topi-
cality is used to differentiate between daily- and weekly-distributed newspapers.?" Sunday
papers (that are the seventh issue of a daily) are considered to be dailies, because they
are only a special daily for Sundays,699 in contrast to newspapers only being distributed on
Sundays."?
694 See 2 3 4 4 1 supra.
695 See for instance KG, WuW/E OlG 2228 ft. - Zeitungsmarkt Munchen.
696 See KG, WuW/E OlG 2825 (2832) - TaschenbOcher.
697 See loffier Presserecht (1997), 4. Auflage, Einleitung, Rn. 14 bis 16.
69B BGH, WuW/E BGH 2112 (2121 f.) - Gruner + Jahr/Zeit I.
699 BGH, WuW/E BGH 2433 (2438) - Gruner + Jahr/Zeit II.
700 See BKartA, decision of 02.02.2004, B 6 - 22121 - U - 120/03 - Holtzbrinck/Berfiner Verfag/G+J II.
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Dailies are divided into 'newspapers on subscription' (Abonnement- Tageszeitung) and
'street-traded newspapers' (StraBenverkaufszeitung or Boulevardzeitung), because these
types of dailies differ in terms of their depth of the coverage and layout."?' This differentia-
tion is controversiat''" and misleading, because subscribed newspapers are in general
street-traded as wel1.703 A further distinction is drawn between national and regional or lo-
cal dailies_l°4 Hence, competition authorities defined a specific 'reader market for daily-
distributed newspapers on subscription with regional or local coverage' _losThere is a clear
line between this product market and the reader markets for street-traded newspapers on
the one hand, and for national dailies on the other, because these newspapers are not
substitutable from the reader's point of view. In contrast to national dailies, newspapers
with regional or local coverage would accommodate the reader's demand for regional or
local news and information. Compared to street-traded newspapers, they differ in depth of
the coverage and layout.
Typically, there are no daily or regional journals. However, magazines are classified as
publications for a broader readership (Publikumszeitschriften) and specialist journals
(Fachzeitschriften).706 The former have been divided into political weekly journals?" and
general rnaqazlnes/?" by the competition courts. The Bundeskartellamt subdivides the
market for publications with a broader readership into 'special interest magazines' and
'general interest magazines,' because magazines that accommodate the reader's demand
for a certain topic would not be substitutable with magazines with other special or general
topics_l°9 Thus, laying meticulous stress on the interests and demand of the reader, very
701 Constant court ruling, see for instance BGH, WuW/E BGH 1854 (1856 f.) - Zeitungsmarkt Munchen;
BGH, WuW/E BGH 2425 (2428) - Niederrheinische AnzeigenbltJtter. See also KG, WuW/E OlG 2228
~2230) - Zeitungsmarkt Munchen; KG, WuW/E DE-R 270 (275 f.) - ASV/Stilke.
02 Cf for instance the case BKartA, decision of 02.02.2004, B 6 - 22121 - U - 120/03 - HoltzbrinckiBerliner
Verlag/G+J 1/ at V.1.1.1, in which Holtzbrinck pleaded for the definition of one single market including both
re:pional dailies on subscription and street-traded newspapers.
70 See Schutz in Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrankungen und Europëiscnes Kartel/recht
Gemeinschaftskommentar (2001), § 36 Rn. 160.
704 Cf BGH, WuW/E BGH 2112 ft. - Gruner + Jahr/Zeit I.
705 BKartA, decision of 02.02.2004, B 6 - 22121 - U - 120/03 - HoltzbrinckIBerliner Verlag/G+J 1/ at V.1.1.1.
706 See for instance BKartA, decision of 03.08.2004, B 6 - 045/04 - Gruner + Jahr/RBA. Cf Schutz in Gesetz
gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrankungen und Europëiscnes Kartel/recht Gemeinschaftskommentar (2001), § 36
Rn. 161; for the specialist journals see also BKartA, WuW/E 1709 (1710) - Bertelsmann/Deutscher
Verkehrsverlag.
707 BGH, WuW/E BGH 2433 (2436) - Gruner + Jahr/Zeit 1/.
708 BGH, WuW/E BGH 2112 (2114) - Gruner + Jahr/Zeit I.
709 BKartA, decision of 03.08.2004, B 6 - 045/04 - Gruner + Jahr/RBA.
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detailed definitions of the different markets for newspapers and magazines have been de-
veloped by the competition authorities. Hence, the Bundeskarlellamt even defined a sub-
division of the special interest magazine market, namely the market for 'popular science
rnaqazines'."? Arguably, the narrow definition of markets by the Bundeskarlellamt is very
detailed and not favourable for the parties to a merger, because market domination is
more likely to occur on such narrowly defined markets. Thus, in the Gruner + Jahr/RBA
case."" the parties contested the market definition of 'popular science magazines' and
pleaded for a broader understanding of reader markets, in this case for a market of 'non-
fiction or report magazines,' which would also include niche publications, like travel maga-
zines.
The 'advertisement market' can be subdivided, too, although competition authorities gen-
erally define-.Droader product markets, because the demand of the advertisers and not the
readers' demand is of importance. The area of distribution and not the form of publication
is determinative, because advertisers regularly place advertisements in publications of dif-
ferent reader markets at the same time. Hence, daily-distributed newspapers (street-
traded and on subscription) and advertisement papers can be classified as belonging to
the same advertisement rnarket.?" Criteria for the definition of advertising markets are the
price, the frequency of publication and hence actuality, because these factors determine
the clientele. Here again, it has to be asked if different press products are substitutable
from the advertisers' point of view.713 In the case SOdkurier/'akzent',714 the Bundeskar-
tellamt assessed different markets, on which the parties to the proposed merger (a pub-
lisher, which sold regional dailies on subscription and a regional, free of charge distributed
'cultural magazine') were active, especially because of the 'completely different market
strategies' for advertisers. Hence, the Bundeskartellamt concluded that the merger would
not lead to a strengthening of the - uncontroversial - dominant position of the publisher
with its regional dailies on subscription on the advertising markets.
710 BKartA, decision of 03.08.2004, B 6 - 045/04 - Gruner + Jahr/RBA; for the structure of this market see
Graph 6 (2 3 5 4 1 2 infra).
711 BKartA, decision of 03.08.2004, B 6 - 045/04 - Gruner + Jahr/RBA.
712 See BGH, WuW/E BGH 1685 (1692) - Springer/Elbe-Wochenblatt; WuW/E BGH 2425 (2428) -
Niederrheinische AnzeigenbMitter, WuW/E BGH 2443 (2449) - Sudkurier/Singener Wochenblatt.
713 See BGH, WuW/E BGH 1905 (1907) - Munchner AnzeigenbMitter.
714 BKartA, decision of 12.04.2000, B 6 - 20/00 - Sudkurier/'akzent'.
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In a recent case.?" the Bundeskartellamt even defined an own market for 'national re-
cruitment aovernsements?"
The relevant geographic markets for newspapers depend on the area of distribution, which
can be nationwide, regional, or even local. Competition courts precisely define the geo-
graphic market as well and have even developed sub-local advertisement markets."?
Mostly, the 'core area of distribution' (Kernverbreitungsgebie~ of a newspaper is decisive.
If a newspaper is for instance mainly distributed in a city, but also to some extent in the
urban area around it, the geographic market will be defined as only the city market, if the
coverage is primarily focussed on topics concerning the city. Thus, in the Holtz-
brinck/Berliner Verlag/G + J case the Bundeskartellamt defined the geographic market as
the 'market of Berlin,' even though the respective newspapers were also sold in the region
Brandenburg and even though one page of the newspaper Tagesspiegel was dedicated to
specific coverage of this region.718
2 3 5 3 Prohibition or approval of newspaper mergers
As mentioned above, there are no special provisions regarding the effects of a media
merger on competition. The above-described lower thresholds for mergers involving media
companies were inserted in order to make control of transactions in this sector possible at
all. Thus, the Bundeskartellamt assesses, whether it is likely that the merger will lead to a
market-dominant position or will strengthen it.719 Barriers to entry to the market for other
firms in terms of § 19 II GWB are of special importance in newspaper mergers.720 More-
over, the circulation and the enterprises' resources/" have to be assessed and taken into
715 BKartA, WuW/E DE-V100 ff. - Stellenmarkt fOr Deutschland GmbH.
716 For further details of the definition of the relevant product market for press products see Golz Der sachlich
relevante Markt bei Verlagserzeugnissen (2003).
717 BGH, WuW IE BGH 1905 (1906 f.) - MOnchner Anzeigenblatter.
718 In Berlin itself, 82,9% of the Berliner Zeitung, 87,5% of the Tagesspiegel and 81,6% of the Berliner
Morgenpost (the latter is the main competitor of Holtzbrinck on this market and belonging to the Axel
Springer AG) were sold, see BKartA, decision of 02.02.2004, B 6 - 22121 - U - 120/03 - Holtzbrinck/Berliner
Verlag/G+J " at V.1.1.2; for the distinction between core distribution areas and marginal areas see also OlG
Dusseldorf, WuW/E OlG 1645 (1649) - Valium Librium.
719 § 36 GWB in conjunction with § 19 II GWB, see 2 3 4 4 2 supra.
720 Cf BGH, WuW/E BGH 2425 (2429) - Niederrheinische Anzeigenblatter; BKartA, decision of 03.08.2004,
B 6 - 045/04 - Gruner + Jahr/RBA. See in detail 2 3 6 2 2 infra.
721 This could be structural or personal resources, for instance of the holding company of a publishing house.
See for example BKartA, decision of 03.08.2004, B 6 - 045/04 - Gruner + Jahr/RBA (G+J is part of Bertels-
mann).
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account to determine a market-dominant position.722 Nevertheless, the mere count of dis-
tributed press products does not necessarily equal the market share. The turnover
achieved is decisive. This differentiation is particularly crucial in the case of free of charge
distributed press products, like advertisement papers. Here, turnovers achieved from the
sales of advertising space have to be looked at.723
It has consistently been ruled in press merger cases, that a 'strengthening of market domi-
nation' in terms of § 36 GWB does not need to result in a 'qualitative minimum effect';
every strengthening - even if very low - is sufficient, if there is a quasi monopoly in that
market.?" In press markets, such quasi monopoly situations exist quite often.72S
Competition authorities also take into account the interdependences between the 'reader
market' and 'advertisement market,' because both are characterised by a 'close reciprocal
retatlon.'?" A dominant position on the advertisement market is likely to guarantee stable
income. This increases the resources of a newspaper company to improve the quality of
the press product and hence eventually the amount of readers. The high circulation, in
turn, guarantees higher profits, because of the increase in sold newspapers."? Moreover,
profits will also increase, because advertising is linked to the amount of distributed news-
papers.?" Structural changes on one market may therefore have a strong impact on the
other markst.?" At least in the long term, changes of competition on the reader market are
thus likely to influence also the advertisement market. The Higher Regional Court of Berlin
(Ksmmerqeticnt; declared in the Zeitungsmarkt Munchen case,730 that if a publishing
house has a predominant market position on the reader market, it is an 'important factor, if
the prime position of the enterprise on the reader market can be balanced permanently by
722 Cf BGH, WuW/E BGH 1905 (1907) - Munchner Anzeigenblatter.
723 BGH, WuW/E BGH 1905 (1907) - Munchner Anzeigenblatter. In this case, however, the BGH stated that
there was no decisive difference between the share in the total circulation of the respective markets and the
share in the totality of advertisements, because the number of distributed products would usually determine
the price of advertisements.
724 See BGH, WuW/E BGH 1685 (1691 f.) - Springer/Elbe-Wochenblatt. See also Bechtold
'Medienkartellrecht - Aktueller Oberbliek Ober die deutsche Praxis' (2000), AfP 2000, 156 (158) with further
references.
725 See 2 3 5 4 1 2 infra.
726KG, WuW/E OlG 2228 (2232) - Zeitungsmarkt Munchen. This interrelation is often called 'reader-
advertisement -spiral' (Leser-Anzeigen-Spira le).
727 Especially for press products, economy of scale is important.
7281nGermany, the prices for advertisements are measures in 'price per 1000 reader contacts' (Tausendkon-
taktpreis (TKP)).
729 Cf KG, WuW/E OlG 2228 (2232) - Zeitungsmarkt Munchen.
730 KG, WuW/E OlG 2228 (2232) - Zeitungsmarkt Munchen.
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the success of its competitors on the advertisement market and the scope of action of the
leading enterprise on the reader market therefore may be limited and controlled.'731
If other publishers have a strong position on the advertisement market, it is more likely that
they can face the leading position of the firm on the reader market. This can be explained
by the importance of advertising for a newspaper, which guarantees the economic basis of
a newspaper. Profits from advertising increase the paper's editorial and technical re-
sources and thus ultimately guarantee the newspaper's success on the reader market.
The exception set out in § 36 I, 2. HS GWB (Abwagungsklause~ also applies to mergers
between newspapers. Competition authorities have to assess, if the merger 'also leads to
improvements of the competition conditions which improvements outweigh the disadvan-
tages of the market domination'. Competition authorities sometimes recognise such im-
provements in press merger cases, if the proposed transaction safeguards the mainte-
nance of an editorially independent newspaper.?" Accordingly, several newspaper merg-
ers with some anti-competitive aspects have been approved.733 Nevertheless, the
Bundeskartellamt is cautious with such 'safeguard-approvals' (so-called Sanierungsfu-
sionen)_734It rather uses the 'failing firm doctrine,,735 to determine, whether a newspaper
would be forced out of the market without the merger. The Bundeskartellamt stated that
competition authorities could not rely on the merging parties' announcements and prom-
ises. As it pointed out, 'the editorial independence of daily-distributed newspapers of a
concern is an entrepreneurial behaviour, which can be changed any time and may there-
731 'Wegen der Bedeutung, die das Anzeigenaufkommen tur die wirtschaftliche Grundlage einer Zeitung,
aber auch fOr ihre redaktionelle und technische Ausstattung und damit letztlich fOr den Erfolg auf dem
lesermarkt hat, [...] stellt dieser Umstand bei der Abwáqunq, ob ein Unternehmen der Zeitungsbranche
gegenOber seinen Wettbewerbern eine Oberragende Marktstellung hat, einen wesentlichen Faktor dar, wenn
seine vorrangige Stellung auf dem lesermarkt durch die Erfolge seiner Wettbewerber auf dem
Anzeigenmarkt dauerhaft ausgeglichen werden und auf diese Weise der Verhaltensspielraum des auf dem
lesermarkt fOhrenden Unternehmens beschrankt und kontrolliert werden kann.'; confirmed by BGH, WuW/E
BGH 1854 (1856 ft.) - Zeitungsmarkt Munchen.
732 This is controversial, see KG, WuW/E OlG 2228 (2233) - Zeitungsmarkt Munchen with further
references.
733 For instance in 1998, the merger between the newspapers Kolner-Stadt-Anzeiger and Kolnischen Rund-
schau was approved.
734 See Birnbaum Die Problematik von Sanierungsfusionen bei deutschen Tageszeitungen im Recht der
Zusammenschlusskontrolle (1989) for details.
735 See 2 3 4 4 2 supra.
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fore not be taken into account in terms of the control of mergers, which aims at the preser-
vation of competitive structures.F"
The Bundeskartellamt always assesses possible improvements on the reader market and
advertisement market in press merger cases, when it considers § 36 I, 2. HS GWB, ac-
knowledging the interdependences between both rnarksts.?"
As regards conditional approvals, the Bundeskartellamt often approves a press merger
subject to the condition that the publisher sells one or more of his newspapers to an inde-
pendent third party, which is able to continue to run the paper(s).738
2 3 5 4 Practice of merger control
To understand press merger control as exercised by German competition authorities, the
newspaper market situation has to be analysed in detail.
2 3 5 4 1 The newspaper and magazine market situation
First, the big German publishers will be described, and the newspaper and magazine mar-
kets will be examined thereafter.
2 3 5 4 1 1Newspaper and magazine publishers
The Axel Springer AG (ASf39 is the biggest publisher in Germany in the newspaper sec-
tor, publishing more than every fifth newspaper, that is a reader market share of over
736 'Die redaktionelle Selbstandigkeit von Tageszeitungen eines Konzerns ist eine unternehmerische
Verhaltensweise, die jederzeit geandert werden kann und deswegen bei der die Erhaltung wettbewerblicher
Strukturen bezweckenden Zusammenschlusskontrolle nicht berOcksichtigt werden dart', BKartA, decision of
10.12.2002, B 6 - 22121 - U - 98/02 - Holtzbrinck/Berliner VerlaglG+J I at V.1.2.1. and BKartA, decision of
02.02.2004, B 6 - 22121 - U - 120/03 - Holtzbrinck/Berliner VerlaglG+J /I at V.1.2.2.
737 See for instance BKartA, decision of 02.02.2004, B 6 - 22121 - U - 120/03 - Holtzbrinck/Berliner Ver-
latG+J /I at V.1.4.1.
73 See for instance BKartA, decision of 22.08.2001, B 6 - 56/01 - SV-C/WEKA. Cf also Bericht des
Bundeskartellamtes Ober seine Tátiqkeit in den Jahren 2001/2002 sowie Ober die Lage und Entwicklung auf
seinem Aufgabengebiet, BT-Drs. 15/1226, also available at: http://dip.bundestag.de/btd/15/012/1501226.pdf,
S.138.
739 See http://www.axelspringer.de.
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20%.740 In 2004, Springer had an annual turnover of € 2,4 billion.741The group publishes
and prints maqazines.Ï'" books, advertisement papers, and all kinds of newspapers.Ï'"
The most famous and biggest daily-distributed street-traded newspaper in Europe,744 the
Bild (nowadays approximately 3,7 million sold copies745), is published by AS.746
The Gruner + Jahr AG & Co. KG Druck- und Verlagshaus, Hamburg (G+J) is one of the
biggest magazine publishers in Europe with a worldwide portfolio of 125 maqazlnes.Ï'" In
2004, G+J had a worldwide turnover of more than € 2,4 billion.74874,9% of the publishing
house's shares are held by the Bertelsmann AG, which is a global media player in the field
of books, press, print, broadcastinq/'" and entertainment with a worldwide turnover of ap-
proximately € 16,8 billion in 2003.750However, on the magazine markets, there are several
other big publishers, for instance the Heinrich Bauer Zeitschriften Verlag KG, Hamburg,
with a turnover of € 1,66 in 2004 and worldwide 125 titles published.i'" Bauer publishes
television-, youth-, and women's magazines.752 As far as the two former categories are
concerned, Bauer's national market share is approximately 50%, in the latter field it is
around 40%. The Hubert Burda Media company is also one of the biggest magazine pub-
lishers in Germany/53 and it even publishes 239 titles worldwide, with an annual turnover
exceeding € 1,5 billion in 2003_754
740 See Graph 8 (2 3 5 4 1 2 infra). Cf also Hamann 'AuBer Kontrolle' DIE ZEIT Nr. 17 (2005-04-21),
available at: http://www.zeit.de/2005/17/springer-psm.
741 Schulz 'Der Moskau-Peking-Express' DER SPIEGEL Nr. 18 (2005-05-02) 181. In 1996, the annual
turnover was already around € 2,27 billion, cfBGH, WuW/E DE-R 609 tt. - ASV/Stilke.
742 Such as Horzu, Bi/d der Frau, Auto Bild and Computer Bi/d.
743 AS publishes national and regional newspapers, on subscription and street-traded, such as Bi/d,
Hamburger Abendblatt, Die Welt, Berliner Morgenpost, B.Z. and participates in the papers Uibecker
Nachrichten and Kieler Nachrichten.
744 See Publishing Market Watch, Sector Report 1: The European Newspaper Market (European Commis-
sion 2004, available at: http://www.publishing-watch.org/documents/PMW-0-20040316-
02%20European%20Newspaper%20Publishing%20Submission%20Final.pdf) referring to World Press
Trends 2002, International Federation of Audit Bureaux of Circulation.
745 The circulation even used to be over 5 million in the 1980s.
746 For details see BKartA, decision of 02.02.2004, B 6 - 22121 - U - 120/03 - Holtzbrinck/Berliner Ver-
la~/G+J /I at I 3.1.
74 In Germany, G+J publishes several magazines, beside others the magazines Stem, GEO, Brigitte, Capi-
tal, Eltem and Schaner Wohnen, cfwww.guj.de.
748 Schulz 'Der Moskau-Peking-Express' DER SPIEGEL Nr. 18 (2005-05-02) 181.
749 One of the big German private broadcasting company, the RTL Group, is controlled by Bertelsmann.
750 € 5,2 billion were turned over in Germany.
751 Schulz 'Der Moskau-Peking-Express' DER SPIEGEL Nr. 18 (2005-05-02) 181.
752 Big titles are for instance Bravo, TV Horen&Sehen and TV Movie.
753 Burda publishes for instance titles such as Focus, Bunte and Freizeit Revue.
754 Schulz 'Der Moskau-Peking-Express' DER SPIEGEL Nr. 18 (2005-05-02) 181.
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Another big publisher of newspapers and magazines is the Georg von Holtzbrinck group
(Holtzbrinck), which had a worldwide turnover of around € 1,9 billion in 2003_755The group
is active in the book sector and prints and publishes daily newspapers on subscription,
political weeklies, but is also involved in broadcastinq.f" Holtzbrinck is one of the biggest
publishing firms of regional newspapers in Germany.
The Westdeutsche Allgemeine Verlags AG (WAZ) also has to be named as an important
publisher, especially on the (regional) daily-distributed newspaper rnarket.?"
2 3 5 4 12 Newspaper and magazine markets
The printing media industry (publishing and printing) is an important economic sector in
Germany. As reported by the German Federal Statistical Office (Statistisches BundesamQ,
publishing houses had turnovers of € 22,3 billion (€ 9,7 billion with distribution and € 10
billion with press advertising) in 1994_758In the same year, 3160 enterprises resident in
Germany were engaged in the publication of a total of 1436 newspapers (381 main titles)
and 9093 magazines:759 an unusual high number of titles. In 2000, this industry generated
1,2% of the total economic output."?
In 1994, a daily average circulation of 30,6 million newspapers (21,1 million newspapers
on subscription and 9,6 million street-traded newspapers), and 387,8 million magazines
were counted. Not less than 325 newspaper publishers and 1951 magazine publishers
were found_761According to the newest figures, there are 331 publishers of local and re-
755 See www.holtzbrinck.com.ln 2002, the Holtzbrinck group had a worldwide turnover of € 2,241 billion,
nearly half of it turned over in Germany. The publishing, production and distribution of newspapers and
magazines led to turnovers of an upper three-digit million amount, see BKartA, decision of 02.04.2004, B 6 -
22122 - Fb - 81/03 - KG WochenkurierlWMILR Medienverlag.
756 Holtzbrinck publishes the national daily-distributed business paper Hande/sb/aft and the political weekly
Die Zeit as well as several regional dailies on subscription, such as: SOdkurier (Konstanz), SaarbrOcker Zei-
tung (Saarbrucken), Trierischer Vo/ksfreund (Trier), Mainpost (WOrzburg), Lausitzer Rundschau (Cottbus),
Potsdamer Neueste Nachrichten (Potsdam) and Der Tagesspiege/ (Berlin).
757 Other big publishers that should at least be mentioned are the Verlagsgesellschaft Madsack GmbH & Co.
~Hannover) and the Unternehmensgruppe M. DuMont Schauberg (Kain).
5B Statistisches Bundesamt, Pressemitteilung vom 11.06.1996, available at:
http://www.destatis.de/presse/deutsch/pm1996/p1570073.htm.
759 Statistisches Bundesamt, Pressemitteilung vom 11.06.1996, available at:
http://www.destatis.de/presse/deutsch/pm1996/p1570073.htm.
760 Statistisches Bundesamt, Pressemitteilung vom 08.10.2002, available at:
http://www.destatis.de/presse/deutsch/pm2002/zdw41.htm .
761 Statistisches Bundesamt, Pressemitteilung vom 11.06.1996, available at:
http://www.destatis.de/presse/deutsch/pm1996/p1570073.htm.
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gional newspapers on subscription (circulation of 15,8 million), ten publishing houses for
national dailies (circulation of 1,6 million) and eight for street-traded newspapers (circula-
tion of 5,2 million). Moreover, seven Sunday papers (circulation of 4,3 million) and 25
weeklies (circulation of 1,9 million) exist.762
Notwithstanding the plurality of publishers and published press products, the concentration
on newspaper markets is generally high, when the narrow market definition of the competi-
tion authorities is applied. For instance, the Bundeskarlellamt defined a market for 'popular
science magazines,,763which leads to the following concentration rates on the next page:
Graph 6: The 'popular science magazines' market (2003)764
Magazine title . I' > Publisher. c•. ':. Frequency Circulation (average) Market share (%)
GEO Gruner + Jahr monthly 380.000 29,8
P.M. Gruner + Jahr monthly 335.000 26,2
National Geographic Gruner + Jahr monthly 247.000 19,3
Spektrum der v. Holtzbrinck monthly 100.500 7,9
Wissenschaft
Bild der Wissenschaft Konradin monthly 114.328 9,0
Natur & Kosmos Konradin monthly 100.105 7,8
Total Market 1.276.933 100
In the market for 'popular science magazines' G+J would have published the monthly-
distributed titles GEO,765P.M. and National Geographic, and therefore would have had a
market-dominant position, having a market share of over 75%_766
762 Gutachten des Wissenschaftlichen Beirats beim Bundesministerium fur Wirtschaft und Arbeit
(Dokumentation Nr. 535) - 'Keine Aufweichung der Pressefusionskontrolle' (August 2004) par 9, available at:
http://www.bmwa.bund.de/Redaktion/lnhalte/Pdfldoku-nr-535-keine-aufweichung-pressefusionskontrolle,
woperty=pdf.pdf. See also the figures of the IVW for details on circulation: www.ivw.de.
63 See already 2 3 5 2 supra.
764 According to the assessment of BKartA, decision of 03.08.2004, B 6 - 045/04 - Gruner + Jahr/RBA.
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Hence, oligopolies or even (quasi) monopolies exist in many markets, especially on a local
and regional level.767 For instance, the Axel Springer publishing group has a share of 75%
in the national market for 'street traded newspapers'T" In 2002, the ten biggest publishers
controlled approximately 56% of all distributed papers.769
Moreover, even though there are nowadays statistically 349 publishers of daily-distributed
newspapers,"? this figure does not equal the amount of editorially independent publishers.
Editorially independent newspapers are measured in 'editorial units' (publizistische Ein-
heiten). These units are editorially independent dailies, because the complete newspaper
is produced independently, including the part of the newspaper consisting in advertise-
ments.
Graph 7: Editorial Units in Germany
Year Editorial Unit
1954 225
1964 183
1976 121
1989 119 (plus 37 GDR)
2003 134
Hence, the number of editorially independent dailies is much smaller than the amount of
published newspapers in total. As indicated above, until the introduction of specific provi-
765 Circulation of even 506.835 copies sold worldwide.
766 Accordingly, the transaction was prohibited by the Bundeskartellamt, see BKartA, decision of 03.08.2004,
B 6 - 045/04 - Gruner + Jahr/RBA; confirmed recently by the OlG Dusseldorf, decision of 15.06.2005, VI-
Kart 25/04 (V) - Gruner + Jahr/RBA.
767 Cf Gutachten des Wissenschaftlichen Beirats beim Bundesministerium fur Wirtschaft und Arbeit
(Dokumentation Nr. 535) - 'Keine Aufweichung der Pressefusionskontrolle' (August 2004) par 5, available at:
http://www.bmwa.bund.de/Redaktion/lnhalte/Pdf/doku-nr-535-keine-aufweichung-pressefusionskontrolle,
~roperty=pdf. pdf.
68 CfBGH, WuW/E DE-R 609 ft. - ASV/Stilke par I.
769 Daten zur Pressefusionskontrolle (DJV), available at: www.djv.de/downloads/Daten.pdf. See also
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 03-12-16.
770 See Gutachten des Wissenschaftlichen Beirats beim Bundesministerium fOr Wirtschaft und Arbeit
(Dokumentation Nr. 535) - 'Keine Aufweichung der Pressefusionskontrolle' (August 2004) par 4, available at:
http://www.bmwa.bund.de/Redaktion/lnhalte/Pdf/doku-nr-535-keine-aufweichung-pressefusionskontrolle,
property=pdf. pdf.
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sions for press mergers in 1976, the amount of editorially independent newspapers de-
creased significantly.
Especially on the market for daily-distributed newspapers, five big publishing groups share
42,4% of the market, as shown by following graph:
Graph 8: Level of concentration on the daily newspaper market (2002)
Publisher Market share of circulation (%)
:' :",
Axel Springer AG 23,4
Verlagsgruppe WAZ 6,1
Verlagsgruppe Stuttgarter Zeitung, Rheinpfalz, 4,9
SOdwest Presse
Verlagsgruppe DuMont-Schauberg 4,2
Ippen-Gruppe 3,8
Total 42,4
Source: Media Perspektiven Basisdaten 2002
2 3 5 4 2 General tendency
As far as mergers between newspapers are concerned, the following data is available;":
Between 1976 and 1995, 23 mergers between daily newspapers have been prohibited.
The application for fourteen proposed mergers has been withdrawn because of competi-
tion concerns of the Bundeskartellamt. It is not recorded, however, how many applications
for merger approvals have been issued during this period.
Between 1995 and 2002, the number of 90 notifications of daily newspaper mergers has
been reported. Eight of the proposed mergers have been prohibited; seven applications
have been withdrawn by the respective parties.
771 CfDaten zur Pressefusionskontrolle (DJV), available at: www.djv.de/downloads/Daten.pdf.
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Hence, between 1976 and 2002, competition authorities prohibited 31 mergers concerning
dailies. In thirteen of these prohibitions, the parties appealed to the Bundesgerichtshof,772
in four cases successfully. In eighteen of these 31 prohibited mergers, big publishers were
involved.773 Recently, the Bundeskartellamt approved a merger concerning a big daily-
distributed newspaper.?"
Even though a large number of newspaper mergers has been approved, most of these
transactions involve the peripheral activities of newspaper firms, such as production, print-
ing or distribution. Mergers often fell within the merger control regime only because of for-
mal rsasons.?" Still, merger control in the newspaper sector has to be described as rather
restricted, despite the high concentration in most markets.
236 Seventh amendment of the GWB
The German government has amended the GWB recently (seventh amendment of the
GWB). The new GWB has been in force from the 1st of July 2005. Besides adapting na-
tional law to European legislation,776 it was also planned to substitute certain provisions
concerning the control of mergers between newspaper enterprises.?" Even though the
German government finally did not succeed in its plan to change the latter provisions, the
possible impact of the proposed amendment on control of mergers between newspaper
772 For the procedure see 2 3 4 3 supra.
773 AS (10), WAZ group (5), Si.iddeutscher Verlag (2), Westdeutscher Verlag/Rheinische Post (1).
774 The Federal Cartel Office approved the acquisition of the company Druck- und Verlagshaus Frankfurt am
Main, which owned the daily newspaper Frankfurter Rundschau. The transaction was controversial, though
not for competition reasons but for political reasons. The acquiring firm DDVG belongs to the political party
the SPD, which governs in Germany at the moment, see epd medien 'Bundeskartellamt genehmigt
Obernahme der '''Rundschau''', Nr. 37 (2004-05-15) 15.
775 See Gutachten des Wissenschaftlichen Beirats beim Bundesministerium fur Wirtschaft und Arbeit
(Dokumentation Nr. 535) - 'Keine Aufweichung der Pressefusionskontrolle' (August 2004) par 8, available at:
http://www.bmwa.bund.de/Redaktion/lnhalte/Pdf/doku-nr-535-keine-aufweichung-pressefusionskontrolle,
~roperty=pdf. pdf.
76 Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competi-
tion laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, OJEC L 1/1 of 04.01.2003, also available at:
http://europa.eu.intlsmartapi/cgi/sga doc?smartapi!celexplus!prod!DocNumber&lg=en&type doc=Regulation
&an doc=2003&nu doc=1, see already 2 2 supra.
777 Other crucial aspects of the amendment are a) the introduction of a locus standi for trade unions, b) re-
strictions on the right of third parties to apply for interim relief against approved mergers and c) the tightening
up of penalties especially in the case of 'hard-core cartels,' see in detail the memorandum of the German
government (Regierungsbegri.indung zum Gesetzentwurf), BR-Drs. 441/04 v. 28.05.2004, par A.2 .. Cf also
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 'Verbraucherverbánde werden Partei im Kartellverfahren' (2003-12-24) 12
and Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 'Wirtschaftsminister Clement beschránkt Klagen gegen genehmigte
Fusionen' (2003-12-23) 11. For a short description of the amendment in its latest version see Meyer-
Lindemann 'KartelInoveIle bringt Annáherunq an europëisches Recht' Bërsen-Zeltunq (2005-06-22),
available at: http://www.boersen-zeitung.com/online/redaktion/aktuell/bz117039.htm.
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enterprises will be described and criticized, because it can be expected that there will still
be discussion about an amendment of the newspaper provisions in the next few years.
2 3 6 1 The control of mergers between newspaper enterprises after the amendment
The Minister for Economic Affairs and Employment issued a first draft of the amendment of
the GWB in December 2003,778which was to be put into effect on the 1st of May 2004.
The draft was highly controversial and it came in for critlclsm.?" The German government
issued a revised draft in August 2004_780After further debates, the political parties in the
government agreed on a final draft on 11 March 2005,781 which was passed by the
Bundestag (Federal Lower House of Parliament)_782In April 2005, though, the Bundesrat
(Federal Upper House of Parliament), which is dominated by the opposition parties, re-
jected the draft.783Consequently, the so-called' Vermittlungsausschuss,' a body consisting
of members of the Bundestag and Bundesrat, tried to find a consensus on the law in a sort
of 'mediation procedure'?" and submitted its compromise (Beschlussempfehlung des
vermituunqeeusscnueeesi/" In the end - after a discussion of almost one and a half
years - the government had to give up the idea of changing the provisions concerning
press mergers. The Bundesrat ultimately passed the act to amend the GWB without the
controversial proposed changes on press mergers.786
778 Referentenentwurfs des Bundeswirtschaftsministeriums vom 18.12.2003, available at: http://www.fiw-
online.de/archiv/D/7.GWB-Novelle-Referentenentwurf.pdf. See also AfP 'Pressefusionsrecht wird
liberalisiert', 1/2004,46.
779 See for instance Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 'Clement erleichtert Pressefusionen' (2003-12-19) 12.
Even the Scientific Council of the Ministry for Economic Affairs and Employment described the proposed
amendment as an 'error' ('Irrweg'), see Gutachten des Wissenschaftlichen Beirats beim Bundesministerium
fOr Wirtschaft und Arbeit (Dokumentation Nr. 535) - 'Keine Aufweichung der Pressefusionskontrolle' (August
2004), available at: http://www.bmwa.bund.de/Redaktion/lnhalte/Pdf/doku-nr-535-keine-aufweichung-
wessefusionskontrolle, property=pdf .pdf.
80 BT-Drs. 15/3640 v. 12.8.2004.
781 Printed in BR-Drs. 210/05 v. 08.04.2005.
782 See epd medien 'Neuregelungen der Pressefusionskontrolle verabschiedet', Nr. 20 (2005-03-16) 14.
783 See BR-Drs. 210/05 and Press Release of the Bundesrat (Federal Upper House of Parliament), Nr.
69/2005 of 29.04.2005, 'Bundesrat schickt "Pressefusionsgesetz" in den Vermittlungsausschuss', available
at: http://www3.bundesrat.de/Site/lnhalt/DE/1 20Aktuelles/1.2 20Presse/1.2.1 20Pressemitteilungen/
1.2.1.5 20Pressemitteilungen 202005/HI/69.templateld=renderUnterseiteKomplett.html. Cf also epd me-
dien, Nr. 33/2005.
784 Cf Art. 77 II GG. The Bundesrat initiated this procedure, see BR-Drs. 210/05 (Beschluss) v. 29.04.2005.
785 BT-Drs. 15/5735 v. 15.06.2005.
786 See DIE WELT 'Die Regein fOr Pressefusionen bleiben unverándert' (2005-06-18), available at:
http://www.welt.de/data/2005/06/18/733391.html. The draft, on which was agreed in the
Vermittlungsausschuss, first passed the Bundestag (see Deutscher Bundestag, PIPr. 15/181 v.
16.06.2005,1709) and the next day the Bundesrat (see Deutscher Bundesrat, PIPr. 812 V. 17.06.2005, 239).
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The proposed amendment encompassed several provisions, which restrain the control of
mergers between enterprises. There were three aspects of particular relevance to publish-
ers:
• The new § 31 GWB enabled co-operations between publishers in the advertisement field
• § 35 GWB in its new proposed version made the 'de-minimis clause,787applicable to
mergers between publishers, albeit with a figure of € 2 million, instead of the € 10 million
limit that applies to other transactions
• The new § 38 III GWB diminished the scope of application of the GWB,788by raising the
thresholds applying in accordance with that provision from € 25 million/€ 1,25 million to
€ 50 million/€ 2,5 million
The possibility of cooperation in the advertisement field in § 31 GWB, which was con-
structed as an exemption from the cartel agreement prohibition in § 1 GWB, was modelled
on the suggestion of the Federal Association of German Newspaper Publishers (Bundes-
verband Deutscher Zeitungsverleger (BDZV)).789 It was very broad in earlier drafts, but
more restricted in the final draft. Publishers were only allowed to create co-operations to
'rationalize economic processes' in the field of advertisement, printing and distribution, if
such agreements helped to enhance the competitiveness of the involved companies and
the cooperation was 'necessary for the long-term protection of the economic basis and the
continuation of at least one of the participating newspapers'. Furthermore, no more than
five newspapers could participate in such agreements. In addition, such co-operations had
to be notified to the competition authorities prior to their implementation. The proposed §
31 III GWB clarified that such agreements were excluded from prohibition in terms of § 36
GWB with regard to the markets that would be directly affected by the cooperation.
The diminution of the scope of application of the GWB in § 38 III GWB was to be achieved
by halving the press-specific multiplication factor."? For the calculation of the combined
annual turnover of merging newspaper companies, the actual turnover was to be multiplied
only by 10. Hence, the control of newspaper mergers would only have been possible, if the
firms involved together had worldwide turnovers of over € 50 million (instead of € 25 mil-
787 See 2 3 4 1 1 and 2 3 5 1 supra.
788 See 2 3 5 1 supra.
789 Cf BDZV-Stellungnahme zur geplanten Anderung der Pressefusionskontrolle (05.02.2004), published in
e£d medien, Nr. 12/13 (2004-02-21) 30.
7 See 2 3 5 1 supra.
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lion) during the last business year preceding the merger and, additionally, the domestic
turnover of at least one of the participating undertakings would have had to be more than €
2,5 million (instead of € 1,25 million), so that the transaction was within the scope of appli-
cation of the GWB.
This amendment would have only applied to publishers, the turnovers of companies in the
broadcasting sector was still to be multiplied by 20.
According to the first draft, a merger between enterprises would have been approvable
even if it led to a 'market-dominant position' or strengthened it, if the maintenance of 'inde-
pendent editorial units' (selbsUindige publizistische EinheiQ were guaranteed (so-called
'old publisher clause' ('Altverlegerklausef)).791 According to § 36 la GWB792 in that version,
the maintenance of such independent editorial units was presumed under three conditions.
The seller (old owner) of the newspaper or a third party had to keep shares and voting
rights of the newspaper company of more than 25%. According to the draft, the purchaser
was not allowed to have 'competitive substantial influence' on this 'third party'. Secondly,
the old owner or the independent third party had to keep the right of the newspaper title.
Finally, the vendor or the third party had to have a veto-right or a right of codetermination
with regard to decisions that are substantial for the maintenance of the newspaper as in-
dependent editorial unit. According to the draft, such a decision for instance would have
been the dismissal or recruitment of the chief editor. Competition authorities would have
been entitled to enforce this by imposing conditions and monitoring the content of the
newspaper, to discern whether the content had been changed. § 36 Ib GWB of that draft
set out that the exception of § 36 la GWB only applied to mergers that were 'necessary' for
the long-term protection of the economic basis of one of the participating newspaper com-
panies as independent editorial units.793 This 'necessity' was presumed, if one of the
newspapers had declining advertisement revenues in the last three business years prior to
the notification of the merger or if the revenues were at least substantially below average
of comparable newspapers. After severe criticism, the government suggested an addi-
tional condition to prevent a big publisher from acquiring small newspapers. § 36 la was
791 Cf also Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 'Clement erleichtert Pressefusionen' (2003-12-19) 12.
792 See old draft (BT -Drs, 15/3640 v. 12.8.2004) par 21.
793 The memorandum of the German government (RegierungsbegrOndung zum Gesetzentwurf), BR-Drs.
441/04 v. 28.05.2004, par 4.h)cc) asserted that this would be only the case, if the existence of the acquired
newspaper as independent editorial unit would be 'with high probability without the merger seriously endan-
gered'.
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not to be applicable, if the continued application of this section was to lead to a market-
dominant position or the strengthening thereof on geographic neighbouring markets.
In the end, however, the German government decided not to implement the highly contro-
versial § 36 la and Ib GWB,794a clause that differed remarkably from broad principles un-
derlying the GWB. It would have established an extraordinary exception for newspaper
mergers.
The criticism of the planned new provisions for mergers between newspaper enterprises
may be explained by its context. The publishing group Holtzbrinck tried to acquire the Ber-
liner Verlag KG, a publisher (belonging to Gruner + Jahr) which was active on the news-
paper market in the city of Berlin with the newspapers Berliner Zeitung (a daily newspaper
on subscription), Berliner Kurier (a daily street-traded newspaper) and the 'city magazine'
Tip. The Bundeskartellamt prohibited the acquisition in 2002,795 stating that the merger
would lead to a market-dominant position for Holtzbrinck on the reader markets for 're-
gional daily-distributed newspapers on subscription' and 'city magazines' in Berlin, be-
cause pre-merger Holtzbrinck, inter alia, already owned the daily-distributed newspaper
Tagesspiegel and the city magazine Zitty. Both were published in the Berlin market. More-
over, the Bundeskartellamt was not convinced by Holtzbrinck's argumentation, which was
to the effect that the Tagesspiegel could not survive as editorially independent newspaper,
if the merger with the Berliner Verlag was to be prohibited. Holtzbrinck argued that the
Tagesspiegel would run at a deficit and that it would be impossible to sell it.796Moreover,
Holtzbrinck suggested to maintain the editorial independence of the Berliner Zeitung and
only to merge on a distribution and advertisement level.797
As a consequence of the prohibition, the parties to the merger applied for the Minister's
permission798 to continue with the merger in January 2003. The Monopolkommission sug-
794 Cf epd medien 'Koalition einigt sich auf neue Pressefusionskontrolle', Nr. 12 (2005-02-16) 13.
795 BKartA, decision of 10.12.2002, B 6 - 22121 - U - 98/02 - Holtzbrinck/Berliner Verlag/G+J I. See also epd
medien, Nr. 98/2002.
796 CfBKartA, decision of 10.12.2002, B 6 - 22121 - U - 98/02 - HoltzbrinckIBerliner Verlag/G+J I at V.1.3.
797 Holtzbrinck's plan consisted of founding an independent company, which would guarantee editorial inde-
~endence (so-called 'foundation model' (Stiftungsmode/~).
98 See 2 3 4 3 supra.
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gested that the Minister should not grant such permisston.Ï'" After a hearing, the Minister
for Economic Affairs and Employment urged Holtzbrinck to try to sell the Tagesspiegel. He
was not convinced that it was impossible to sell the newspaper."? Accordingly, Holtzbrinck
invited tenders, to which the Heinrich Bauer Verlag replied, offering to buy the Tages-
spiegel for € 20 million. In a second special report (Sondergutachten) the Monopolkom-
mission still recommended that a Ministererlaubnis not be granted.801 The parties, how-
ever, finally revoked their request at the end of September 2003. The next month, the
merger was notified for the second time, but with a different content. Holtzbrinck an-
nounced the sale of the Tagesspiegel to the former Holtzbrinck-manager Pierre Gerekens,
to dispel the competition concerns of the Bundeskartellamt.802 Notwithstanding this con-
cession,803 the Bundeskartellamt prohibited the merger again in February 2004,804assert-
ing that the Tagesspiegel would still have to be attributed to Holtzbrinck in terms of § 37 I
Nr. 3, S 2 GWB.805 In fact, Holtzbrinck had a call option, which granted the company the
right to re-buy 75% of the newspaper after the anticipated amendment of the GWB. More-
over, the price was significantly lower than the price offered by the Bauer Verlag, which
pointed towards a tactical acquisition.806 Holtzbrinck contested the decision of the
Bundeskartellamt,807 but without success.P"
799 See Zusammenschlussvorhaben der Georg von Holtzbrinck GmbH & Co. KG mit der Berliner Verlag
GmbH & Co. KG - 36. Erga.nzendes Sondergutachten der Monopolkommission (April 2003) par 161,
available at: http://www.monopolkommission.de/sg 36/text s36.pdf. Cf also the analysis of Sacker 'Der Fall
''Tagesspiegel/Berliner Zeitung" - A Never Ending Story' (2003), BB 2003,2245-2250.
BOO See epd medien 'Bauer Verlag hat Kaufangebot tur ''Tagesspiegel'' abgegeben', Nr. 47 (2003-06-16) 10.
BOl Zusammenschlussvorhaben der Georg von Holtzbrinck GmbH & Co. KG mit der Berliner Verlag GmbH &
Co. KG - 38. Erqanzendes Sondergutachten der Monopolkommission (August 2003) par 93, available at:
http://www.monopolkommission.de/sg 38/text s38.pdf.
B02 See epd medien "Tagesspiegel' wird von Holtzbrinck-Manager ubernornrnen', Nr. 77/78 (2003-10-01) 15-
16.
B03 The sale of the Tagesspiegel itself did not raise competition concerns and was approved by the
Bundeskartellamt, see BKartA, decision of 07.11.2003, B 6 - 121/03 - Holtzbrinck/Gerckens.
B04 BKartA, decision of 02.02.2004, B 6 - 22121 - U - 120/03 - HoltzbrinckIBeriiner Verlag/G+J II.
BOS Cffootnote 585 of this thesis supra.
B06 See also Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 'Kartellamt widersetzt sich weiter der Obernahme der Berliner
Zeitung' (2003-12-20) 13.
B07 See epd medien 'Holtzbrinck legt Beschwerde gegen Kartellentscheidung ein', Nr. 9 (2004-02-07) 13.
BOB See decision of the OlG Dusseldorf, Az.: IV Kart 7/04. Cf Kurp 'Holtzbrinck scheitert mit Kartell-
Beschwerde - Obernahme der Berliner Zeitung bleibt auch nach OlG-Beschluss verboten' (2004-10-27),
available at: http://www.medienmaerkte.de/artikel/print/032909tagesspiegel.html.
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Against this background, the proposed amendment seemed to be designed only for allow-
ing the planned acquisition of the Berliner Verlag by the Holtzbrinck group and was hence
described as 'lex Holtzbrinck'P'"
2 3 6 2 Discussion
The new provisions, even in the latest version, are highly controversial and criticism has
often been simply sarcaste."? On the one hand, critics demanded the strict maintenance
of the old provisions concerning the control of mergers between newspaper enterprises.811
The president of the Bundeskartellamt, Bëqe, in particular, criticised the government's
plans to amend the control of mergers between publishers and pleaded for the mainte-
nance of the status quO.812 On the other hand, the big publishing houses welcomed the
relaxation of the merger control provlslons.ê" They called for an even more drastic change
of the provisions. For instance, the Federal Association of German Newspaper Publishers
(Bundesverband Deutscher Zeitungsverleger (BDZV)) demanded a raise in the thresholds
in the GWB from € 25 million to € 100 million and application of the de-minimis clause to
newspaper companies in the same way as it applies to other mergers.814
The proposed concept of allowing mergers between newspaper enterprises, even where
they lead to a dominant-market position, just as long as editorial independence is guaran-
teed, was particularly contentious.F" The idea of maintaining a plurality of independent
809 See for instance Bremer & Martini 'Kartellrechtsreform und Sicherung der Pressevielfalt - Ware eine "Lex
Holtzbrlnck« im Rahmen der 7. GWB-Novelle verfassungsgemaB?' (2003), ZUM 2003, 942-959; Weberling
'Novellierung der Pressefusionskontrolle: Auslaufmodell Pressevielfalt? Zur geplanten Lockerung des
Pressekartellrechts' (2004), promedia, Nr. 7/04, 23.
810 The chairman of the German journalists' association (Deutschen Journalisten-Verbandes (DJV)) Michael
Konken for instance described the draft as 'Christmas present for the big publishers', quoted from: journalist
'Pressefusionskontrolle - Den GroBen TOr und Tor geaffnet' (2/2004) 17.
811 See for instance Gutachten des Wissenschaftlichen Beirats beim Bundesministerium fOr Wirtschaft und
Arbeit (Dokumentation Nr. 535) - 'Keine Aufweichung der Pressefusionskontrolle' (August 2004) par 34,
available at: http://www.bmwa.bund.de/Redaktion/lnhalte/Pdf/doku-nr-535-keine-aufweichung-
~ressefusions kontrolle .property=pdf. pdf.
2 Speech held at the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Berlin (28 January 2004); Bëqe 'Reform der
Pressefusionskontrolle: Forderungen, Vcrschlëqe, Konsequenzen' (2004), MMR 4/2004, 227-231. See also
eRd medien 'Kartellamt lehnt Novelle der Pressefusionskontrolle ab', Nr. 7 (2004-01-31) 12.
83 See for instance epd medien 'Hombach begrOBt Gesetzentwurf zur Pressefusionskontrolle', Nr. 49 (2004-
06-26) 16.
814 This should even exclude the application of § 38 III GWB (press-specific calculation) on this clause, see
BDZV-Stellungnahme zur geplanten Anderung der Pressefusionskontrolle (05.02.2004), published in epd
medien, Nr. 12/13 (2004-02-21) 31. See also Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 'Clement erleichtert
Pressefusionen' (2003-12-19) 12.
815 See for instance Schauerte 'Die Axt im Blátterwald' Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (2004-02-17) 12.
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editorial units as such is honourable, but the mechanism for achieving it in the proposed
draft by the government was an error. As will be shown, a conditional approval combined
with constant monitoring of the press content is not possible, for both constitutional and
competition reasons. The concept of approving such mergers in the knowledge of the
creation or strengthening of market dominance cannot be justified by the idea of press plu-
rality. Moreover, in practice, such a control would not have functioned and the implementa-
tion of this concept would have been fatal to press plurality. Fortunately, the government
decided against implementing it.
Nevertheless, the draft in its latest version remains controverstal.?" It is particularly con-
tentious, whether the proposed amendment would be constitutional or at variance with the
Grundrechte, in the German 'Bill of Rights'. This will be analysed later on.
2 3 6 2 1Need for amendment
It can nevertheless be asked whether it is actually necessary to amend those sections of
the GWB, which are concerned with the control of newspaper enterprises. The implemen-
tation of the provisions concerning the control of newspaper enterprises is not legally pre-
scribed by European legislation. The German government was aware of this.817
In the memorandum of the first draft818 it was explained, that the situation for newspaper
enterprises was 'economically difficult' at the time. There was a constant downward trend
in the advertising revenues of newspapers in the preceding decade. It was argued not only
to be a result of the general economic situation, but also of 'fundamental structural
changes, especially on the newspaper markets.' Big newspaper and magazine companies
agreed with the draft, arguing that there would be less revenues (because of the decline in
sales of newspapers and advertisements) and therefore an economic need to expand
more easily.
816 See epd medien 'Unterschiedliches Echo auf neue Pressefusionskontrolle', Nr. 13 (2005-02-19) 14. The
DJV was content with the draft.
817 See memorandum of the German government (RegierungsbegrOndung zum Gesetzentwurf), BR-Drs.
441/04 v. 28.05.2004, par A.2.
818 Published in epd medien 'Neue Regelungen zur Pressefusionskontrolle', Nr. 9 (2004-02-07) 29-32.
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Interestingly though, the big newspaper and magazine companies in Germany, do not
seem to struggle economically at all, but rather have the financial resources to invest
abroad. Economic activity beyond the German borders is actually a feature of all big Ger-
man publishers. G+J actually publishes 85 titles abroad and only 40 in Germany.819 The
same applies to Springer (30 titles in Germany / 120 titles abroad), Bauer (35/90) and
Burda (80/159).820The Westdeutsche Allgemeine leitung group (WAl) for instance keeps
on spending a high amount of their earned profits to expand in other European countries.
The WAl for example acquired interests in a multitude of (especially Eastern-)European
newspapers and magazines. The group holds 100% of the shares in at least eight news-
paper enterprises in Hungary and Bulgaria as well as 20 other involvements in Bulgaria,
Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Austria, Rumania, the Republic of Serbia and Hungary.
As far as magazines are concerned, the investments of the WAl are even greater, having
shares in 56 magazines in Bulgaria, Croatia, Austria, the Republic of Serbia and Hun-
gary.821Moreover, AS and big magazine publishers like Burda, Bauer and G+J similarly
are expanding their businesses, especially on the Russian and Polish markets.822 Fur-
thermore, AS recently announced interest in the ProSiebenSat.1 Media AG, a broadcast-
ing group, which runs the two big German broadcasting channels ProSieben and Sat.1.823
Nevertheless, it cannot be denied, that the economic crisis of the last years has also af-
fected the media industry. There has been an enormous decrease in advertising revenues.
In 2004, the amount of money, enterprises were willing to spend on advertising for in-
stance in magazines, was € 400 million less than it was five years ago.824Hence, there
has been a remarkable decline in the newspapers and magazine publishers revenues.825
Moreover, employees of media enterprises had to be dismissed.826 The decrease in the
819 G+J even makes 62% of all his turnovers abroad, see Schulz 'Der Moskau-Peking-Express' DER
SPIEGEL Nr. 18 (2005-05-02) 181.
820 See Schulz 'Der Moskau-Peking-Express' DER SPIEGEL Nr. 18 (2005-05-02) 181.
821 Alone for one of the last deals, the purchase of shares of the newspaper 'Romania Libera' in Romania,
the WAZ spent approximately € 3 million. The WAZ concern is said to participate in 158 titles in the Balkan
region, cf Hanfeld 'Eine beispielhafte l.ësunq - Wie die WAZ und ihr Gegenspieler Bacanu sich Ober die
'Romania Liberia' geeinigt haben' Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (2004-12-23) 40 with all figures in detail.
822 CfSchulz 'Der Moskau-Peking-Express' DER SPIEGEL Nr. 18 (2005-05-02) 181.
823 The group also owns the (mainly movie) channel Kabel 1, the news channel N24 and the entertain-
menVinteractive game show channel Neun Live, see Hamann 'AuBer Kontrolle' DIE ZEIT Nr. 17 (2005-04-
21), available at: http://www.zeit.de/2005/17/springer-psm.
824 Schulz 'Der Moskau-Peking-Express' DER SPIEGEL Nr. 18 (2005-05-02) 180.
825 See Publishing Market Watch, Final Report, par 13 Annex 2 (European Commission 2005, available at:
http://www.publishing-watch.org/documents/PMW-o-20050127%20%20Final%20report.pdf).
826 The BAW Institute for Economic Research of the university of Bremen (Institut fOr Wirtschaftsforschung,
see http://www.baw.uni-bremen.de) established for the end of 2003 a decline in employment between 2,67
and 4,27 percent in the 'media cities' Berlin, Hamburg, Munich and Cologne.
134
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Chapter 2 - European and German Competition Law
print media industry seems to be a global trend,827which might also be a result of the
growing importance of electronic media,828even though the Internet cannot be regarded
as a substitute for the 'classic' media.829Nevertheless, like other industrial sectors, media
companies have to look for novel strategies to increase their profits. Last year, a number
of enterprises began to sell successfully newspapers in tabloid830 torrnat.f" Other ideas to
use the advantages of the newspaper as distribution medium are experimented with these
days in different countries.832 Moreover, the economic crisis seems to be over. According
to newly released figures, German media companies have increased their income from
advertisement in 2004 by 5,8% to a total of € 18,2 billion.833The number of advertisement
pages in newspapers increased in January and February 2005 by 7,6% compared to
2004.834Especially daily-distributed newspapers could increase their income by 10,7%.835
Problems in the publishing industry exist, but the legislature should not react with an
amendment of the competition law, to address a temporary crisis. The asserted 'structural
crisis' of the newspaper industry can only be observed on the advertisement market. Thus,
there is certainly an argument to be made that co-operations between publishers in the
827 Since 1998 in North America, 7000 printers have gone out of business and 110.000 people in the industry
have lost their jobs, see Marsland 'Does print stand a chance in a wired world?' (2005-01-25), available at:
http://www.biz-community.com/Article/196/109/5576.html.
828 Especially losses for recruitment advertisement could be a result of job sites on the Internet, although it is
not clearly proved.
829 It rather seems that the Internet is used for advertisement complementarily, see promedia, 'Es geht stetig
bergauf, allerdings eher im Schneckentempo' - Interview mit Volker Nickel (Sprecher des Zentralverbandes
der Deutschen Werbewirtschaft), (Nr. 7/04) 41.
830 As the Tribunal defines these newspapers in Johnnie Publishing Ltd / New Africa Publications (CT
36/LM/Apr04) par 17: 'A "tabloid newspaper" is defined as a newspaper whose content is populist in style
and contains very little informative news. A tabloid has pages half the size of the average paper, character-
ised by bold headlines and large photographs.'
831 The Axel Springer AG and the Verlagsgruppe Georg von Holtzbrinck have started to distribute such
small-sized newspapers to a low price of 20 to 50 cent, see e-fellows.net newsletter of 23 March 2005
1http://www.e-fellows.net).
32 In the Netherlands, for instance, the magazine Libelle organises events for its readers in addition to its
'core business,' a practice also used by the German Bi/d. In Italy, on the other hand, magazines sell their
own manufactured but limited and good value products for a short period. Finally, the German Financial
Times established a newsletter for Blackberry, Smartphone and PDA, see also interview with Annet Aris,
professor for media strategy at the INSEAD in Paris, in e-fellows.net newsletter of 23 March 2005
(http://www.e-fellows.net). In South Africa, the latest idea to build reader circulation was to cooperate with
broadcasting programmes. Afrikaans daily Beeld and sister papers Die Burger and Volksblad invested in
product placement on M-Net's popular Egoli soap opera. Readers and viewers alike were encouraged to
participate in a daily interactive competition, see bizcommunity newsletter of 23 March 2005
1http://www.bizcommunity.com/Article.aspx?C-90&1=196&ai=6117).
33 Hamburger Abendblatt 'Mehr Werbung in den Medien' (2005-01-15/16) 24 (referring to data of Nielsen
Media Research).
834 Suggestions of the Economic Committee of the Federal Upper House of Parliament (Wirtschaftsaus-
schuss des Bundesrates) for the seventh amendment of the GWB, BR-Drs. 210/1/05 v. 18.04.2005 par 6.
835 Hamburger Abendblatt 'Mehr Werbung in den Medien' (2005-01-15/16) 24.
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advertisement field should be facilitated. Hence, the decision of the government to allow
co-operations in § 31 GWB seems to be reasonable. This section would have been justifi-
able. All other proposed amendments of press provisions - especially the lowering of
thresholds and the section that would lead to the condonation of mergers, even if they are
likely to lead to market dominance -lack this justification.
An evaluation of the rules regarding media regulation in other countries also militates
against changing the law. According to a study undertaken on behalf of the Ministry for
Economic Affairs and Technology (now Ministry for Economic Affairs and Employment),836
German newspaper enterprises already have a relatively large 'scope of action' to expand
their business externally. Mergers are only limited by the above-described lower thresh-
olds, but they are assessed on pure competition aspects. There are no limits relating to the
circulation of the newspaper and no special provisions for regional markets, such as provi-
sions, which demand a certain degree of plurality. Moreover, only rudimentary cross-
ownership rules exist.837
2 3 622 Impact on competition
If the proposed draft had been implemented, detrimental effects for the competitive situa-
tion in press markets would have been likely. The new provisions would have had detri-
mental consequences for concentration levels. Here, the situation rather demands stricter
provisions to maintain a certain level of diversity. It is highly likely, that the proposed provi-
sions would have reinforced the existing concentration in newspaper and magazine mar-
kets, enabling big publishers to swallow small- and medium-sized enterprises.838 The
number of 'control-free' transaction would have increased significantly, if the thresholds in
§ 38 III GWB were set to a higher level. Additionally, the bagatelle market clause839would
have been extended in its application, which is also linked to the press-specific calculation
636 Vergleich der kartellrechtlichen Regelungen und ihrer Rechtsanwendung fUr Fusionen und Kooperationen
im Bereich Presse und PressegroBhandel in Europa und den USA - Forschungsauftrag Nr. 49/01 des
Bundesministeriums fOr Wirtschaft und Technologie (Knoche & Zerdick, 07.08.2002) p. 186, available at:
http://www2.kommwiss.fu-berlin.de/%7Ekommoek/wwwNeranstaItungen/WS2003 2004/Konzentration/
Pressekonzentration und Regulierung.zip.
837 See 4 2 3 infra for cross-ownership provisions in Germany.
636 Even the memorandum of the German government (RegierungsbegrOndung zum Gesetzentwurf), BR-
Drs. 441/04 v. 28.05.2004, par 4.h)bb) admits that due to the new thresholds in § 38 III GWB around 50 pub-
lishers additionally could merge and as a result of the introduction of the de-minimis clause, it would be pos-
sible to acquire 30 publishing houses without control; same criticism: Roper 'Rotationen' (2003), journalist
11/2003, 15.
639 See 2 3 4 1 1 and 2 3 5 1 supra.
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in § 38 III GWB. This would have increased the ability to merge without supervision in the
markets for newspapers on subscription. These newspapers are often sold on small re-
gional and local markets. Moreover, the application of the de-minimis clause"? to mergers
between newspaper companies, also would have most likely led to several acquisitions,
without any supervision by competition authorines.P" Big publishers like the Axel Springer
AG have already announced, that they intend to establish 'regional newspaper-chains' by
buying small competttors.P" The situation on local newspaper markets is already alarming.
A diverse coverage of local issues often does not exist. The German trade union for the
employees in the service industry, ver.di, announced that in more than half of all towns in
Germany only one local newspaper exists (so-called 'single paper districts,).843 In the
western part of Germany there is only one or no independent regional daily newspaper on
subscription in more than 50% of all districts. In 1997, in the eastern part of Germany,
even 85% of the press was owned by ten big West-German publlshers.P" The abolish-
ment of the de-minimis clause would enable big publishers to acquire local newspapers,
which normally have small turnovers, without the control of competition authorities. Against
this background, such 'enlargement of the press companies' scope of actions,845has to be
obviated.
Moreover, there is another, press-specific argument that militates against the facilitation of
mergers between newspaper enterprises. It has been shown that levels of concentration
are already high in newspaper markets. As was argued earlier, the ease of market entry is
a crucial aspect in merger analysis,846 especially when concentration levels are significant.
That is not specific to the media, but barriers to entry are very high in press markets. The
establishment of an editorial office, equipped with highly-educated editorial staff, journalis-
840 See 2 3 4 1 1 and 2 3 5 1 supra.
841 Also the Economic Committee of the Federal Upper House of Parliament suggested not to make the de-
minimis clause applicable to newspaper mergers, see Suggestions of the Economic Committee of the Fed-
eral Upper House of Parliament (Wirtschaftsausschuss des Bundesrates) for the seventh amendment of the
GWB, BR-Drs. 210/1 lOS v. 18.04.2005 par 10.
842 See Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (2004-02-27).
843 Cftaz (2003-12-22), available at: http://www.taz.de/pt/2003/12/22/a0064.nf/textdruck. See also Daten zur
Pressefusionskontrolle (DJV), available at: www.djv.de/downloads/Daten.pdf.
844 See Weberling 'Novellierung der Pressefusionskontrolle: Auslaufmodell Pressevielfalt? Zur geplanten
Lockerung des Pressekartellrechts' (2004), promedia, Nr. 7/04, 24.
845 Memorandum of the first draft to amend the GWB, published in epd medien 'Neue Regelungen zur
Pressefusionskontrolle', Nr. 9 (2004-02-07) 32.
846 See 2 3 5 3 supra and the 'Entry Analysis' in the 1992 United States Department of Justice and Federal
Trade Commission Horizontal Merger Guidelines [with April 8, 1997, Revisions to section 4 on efficiencies]
Section 3.0, available at: http://www.ftc.gov/bc/docs/horizmer.htm.
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tic information networks, production and distribution costs, advertisement for the readers'
awareness of the new press product, just to name some aspects, are significant barriers,
especially when the new entrant has to face major players, which have abundant re-
sources to keep prices on the lowest level. Moreover, an eminent share of a newspaper
company's revenue comes from the advertisement business. In Germany, two thirds of all
revenues used to be generated by selling advertising space. Since 2001, it is still 57,5%
on average.847 Local advertisers usually have to contract with the strongest newspaper in
a market. That leads to a tendency to advertise only in this 'first-brand' newspaper.P" The
consequence is that only a small part of the advertising budget remains for all other news-
papers in this market. That, in turn, does not only facilitate acquisition of competitors, but
also impedes new firms from entering the market. A newspaper can only be successful if it
attracts a critical mass of readers, because the amount of readers (circulation) is the most
important factor for the advertising industry ('close reciprocal relation' between reader and
advertisement market).849 Therefore, newspapers have to offer an attractive journalistic
content from the very beginning, which demands high expenses, even if low revenues
must be expected in the beginning, especially for regional and local papers. Hence, start-
ups in this sector are highly risky and in the case of failure, all expenses are practically
lost, which usually scares off investors.
In addition, barriers to entry arise from another characteristic of press products, which can
truly be regarded as 'unique.'85o Newspapers differ from other products in the special rela-
tion that exists between the reader as consumer and the newspaper, which can be de-
scribed as the 'reader-paper-bond' (Leser-Blatt-Bindung).851 Notably in the case of re-
gional newspapers on subscription, such a bond between the reader and 'his' newspaper
can be observed. Newspapers transmit opinions, with which the reader wants to identify. It
is an important motivation for the readers to buy the press product, if their own opinions
and problems are addressed therein and if the paper accommodates their needs for infor-
647 Gutachten des Wissenschaftlichen Beirats beim Bundesministerium fur Wirtschaft und Arbeit
(Dokumentation Nr. 535) - 'Keine Aufweichung der Pressefusionskontrolle' (August 2004) par 5, available at:
http://www.bmwa.bund.de/Redaktion/lnhalte/Pdf/doku-nr-535-keine-aufweichung-pressefusionskontrolle.
~operty=pdf.pdf.
8 In German Media Science so-called' Erstzeitung'.
649 See 2 3 5 3 supra.
850 Baker Human Liberty and Freedom of Speech (1989) 228.
851 See for instance BKartA, decision of 02.02.2004, B 6 - 22121 - U - 120103 - Holtzbrinck/Berliner Ver-
lag/G+J /I at V.1.2.3.2.
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mation and entertainment. Hence, there is often special customer loyalty852to the special
'newspaper brand'. Thus, it is also highly likely that the prices of newspapers are relatively
inelastic for consumers as once they have found their preferred newspaper they will be
reluctant to change merely because of a small but significant price increase. There have
been only a few new successful entrants into newspaper markets in the last decades.853
Five new newspapers were established between 1999 and 2001, but none could per-
sist.854
Hence, there is certainly an argument to be made, that it is more difficult for new entrants
to achieve a stable market position and to create such a 'reader-paper-bond' by drawing
readers from other papers. Especially where the market is characterised by such entry-
barriers, the law has to prevent 'artificial' barriers to new entries caused by concentration,
so that the self-correcting forces of the marketplace can impede the attainment and main-
tenance of monopolies in press markets.
2 3 6 2 3 Constitutional aspects
German Media Law - and especially the Law of the Press - is strongly influenced by con-
stitutional jurisprudence. The German Constitution (Grundgesetz)855 sets out in Article 5 I 2
GG (Article 5 section 1 sentence 2) as briefly as the South African Constitution that the
freedom of the press is guaranteed. Nevertheless, the German Federal Constitutional
Court (Bundesverfassungsgerich~ has interpreted and developed the principle of press
freedom in a number of cases.
852 Cf Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of
concentrations between undertakings, OJEU C 31/5 of 05.02.2004 par 71 (c), also available at:
http://europa.eu.intleur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2004/c 031 Ic 03120040205en00050018.pdf.
853 For example the newspapers taz, Financial Times Deutschland and a couple of local newspapers.
854 See Gutachten des Wissenschaftlichen Beirats beim Bundesministerium fOr Wirtschaft und Arbeit
(Dokumentation Nr. 535) - 'Keine Autweichung der Pressefusionskontrolle' (August 2004) par 5, available at:
http://www.bmwa.bund.de/Redaktion/lnhalte/Pdf/doku-nr-535-keine-aufweichung-pressefusionskontrolle,
woperty=pdf. pdf.
5 Grundgesetz fOr die Bundesrepublik Deutschland enacted the 23 Mai 1949 - as amended by Art. 1 of the
Act of 26 July 2002 I 2863 (available at: http://bundesrecht.juris.de/bundesrechtlgg/index.html). The German
Constitution is often designated as 'Basic Law' (which is the translation word-for-word). However, this thesis
will use the proper designation 'Grundgesetz.
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The Bundesverfassungsgericht consistently underlines the importance of a free press for
the public discussion and the process of forming a 'public opinion' by providing information
on all aspects of life, and creating a political forum for the exchange of ideas. In contrast to
the South African approach, the freedom of the press is recognised to be a special funda-
mental right - and not just a part of freedom of expression856 - which is also regarded as an
essential element of democracy. 857
In the landmark judgment of 5 August 1966 (so-called Spiegel case),8S8the Federal Con-
stitutional Court stressed the necessity of a free press for a democratic society by outlining
its function as an intermediary between the government and the people.8s9 The Bundes-
verfassungsgericht found that a free press is a fundamental element of a liberal state, be-
cause of its essential role in both creating and transmitting public opinion. The Court pos-
tulated that the basic rights (Grundrechte), like freedom of speech, freedom of the press
and the right to human dignity are primarily 'defence rights' against governmental or ad-
ministrative conduct. Hence, the state may generally not interfere with these rights.86o
Moreover, the Court postulated that if one of these rights is fundamentally endangered, the
government has to enact provisions to protect it. Therefore, these rights do not only have a
'subjective-defensive' dimension but also an 'objective' one, although the scope of the di-
mensions differs depending on the right concerned.
856 See BVerfGE 10, 118 (121) - Berufsverbot.
857 See BVerfGE 7, 198 ff. - LOth; for details cfWendt in von Munch & Kunig (eds) Grundgesetz-Kommentar
Band 1, 5. Auf/age (2000) Art. 5.
858 BVerfGE 20, 162 - Spiegel. Cf also Wendt in von Munch & Kunig (eds) Grundgesetz-Kommentar Band 1,
5. Auf/age (2000) Art. 5 Rn. 35.
859 'Eine freie, nicht von der ëftentlichen Gewalt gelenkte, keiner Zensur unterworfene Presse ist ein
Wesenselement des freiheitlichen Staates; insbesondere ist eine freie, regelma.Big erscheinende politische
Presse tUr die moderne Demokratie unentbehrlich. Soli der Burger politische Entscheidungen treffen, muB er
umfassend informiert sein, aber auch die Meinungen kennen und gegeneinander abwáqen kennen, die an-
dere sich gebildet haben. Die Presse halt diese stándlqe Diskussion in Gang; sie beschafft die Informa-
tionen, nimmt selbst dazu Stellung und wirkt dam it als orientierende Kraft in der ëttentlichen Auseinander-
setzung. In ihr artikuliert sich die ëftentliche Meinung; die Argumente klaren sich in Rede und Gegenrede,
gewinnen deutliche Konturen und erleichtern so dem Burger Urteil und Entscheidung. In der reprásentativen
Demokratie steht die Presse zugleich als stándiqes Verbindungs- und Kontrollorgan zwischen dem Volk und
seinen gewahlten Vertretern in Parlament und Regierung. Sie faBt die in der Gesellschaft und ihren Gruppen
unauthërlich sich neu bildenden Meinungen und Forderungen kritisch zusammen, stellt sie zur Erërterunq
und tragt sie an die politisch handeinden Staatsorgane heran, die auf diese Weise ihre Entscheidungen auch
in Einzelfragen der Tagespolitik stándiq am MaBstab der im Volk tatsáchlich vertretenen Auffassungen
messen kennen.' (BVerfGE 20,162 (174 f.) - Spiege~.
860 BVerfGE 20, 162 (174) - Spiegel.
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Hence, according to constitutional jurisdiction, the freedom of the press has two constitu-
tional aspects. On the one hand, it guarantees a free press itself, thus a right to defend an
infringement of it by governmental or administrative conduct (protective claim by the press
against coercive action, so-called 'Abwehrrecht gegenOber dem Staaf). On the other
hand, the Court recognises a proper obligation on the state to create a legal framework to
guarantee the freedom of the press, especially by promulgating laws, which are apt to pre-
clude 'monopolies of opinlons.P" The Bundesverfassungsgericht pointed out in a later
case862 that the lawgiver is 'obliged in particular to face tendencies of concentration early
and as effectively as possible, particularly because it is difficult to change undesirable de-
vetopments.P" Hence, freedom of the press can only be guaranteed if there are a number
of independent press undertakings.
This doctrine of an 'objective-legal' dimension of a constitutional right was applied to other
rights as well. The Bundesverfassungsgericht recognised a strict governmental obligation
to provide protective provisions for the freedom of broadcasting, which is also guaranteed
in Article 5 I 2 GG.864 The Court emphasized the hypothetical risks to the society of abuse
of a potential monopolist. It argued, that the state must guard this freedom by providing a
legal framework, which ensures the independence of broadcasting companies from gov-
ernmental influence as far as the broadcasted content is concerned. This regulatory
framework has to ensure free access for potential broadcasting companies, due process in
frequency allocation and so forth. This explains the high level of regulation in German
broadcasting law. German broadcasting law provides a plethora of regulations and princi-
ples based upon the jurisdiction of the Bundesverfassungsgericht. Here, a difference with
861 'Der Funktion der freien Presse im demokratischen Staat entspricht ihre Rechtsstellung nach der
Verfassung. Das Grundgesetz gewahrleistet in Art. 5 die Pressefreiheit. Wird damit zunáchst - entsprechend
der systematischen Stellung der Bestimmung und ihrem traditionellen Verstandnis - ein subjektives Grun-
drecht fOr die im Pressewesen tatigen Personen und Unternehmen qewáhrt, das seinen Tráqern Freiheit
gegenOber staatlichem Zwang verbOrgt und ihnen in gewissen Zusarnrnenhánqen eine bevorzugte
Rechtsstellung sichert, so hat die Bestimmung zugleich auch eine objektiv-rechtliche Seite. Sie garantiert
das Institut "Freie Presse". Der Staat ist - unabhangig von subjektiven Berechtigungen Einzelner -
verpflichtet, in seiner Rechtsordnung Oberall,wo der Geltungsbereich einer Norm die Presse berOhrt,dem
Postulat ihrer Freiheit Rechnung zu tragen. Freie GrOndung von Presseorganen, freier Zugang zu den
Presseberufen, Auskunftspflichten der 6ftentlichen Beh6rden sind prinzipielle Foigerungen daraus; doch
lieBe sich etwa auch an eine Pflicht des Staates denken, Gefahren abzuwehren, die einem freien Pressewe-
sen aus der Bildung von Meinungsmonopolen erwachsen k6nnten' (BVerfGE 20, 162 (175 f.) - Spiege~.
862 BVerfGE 73,118 ft. - Niedersachsen.
863 'Insbesondere obliegt es ihm [dem Gesetzgeber), Tendenzen zur Konzentration rechtzeitig und so
wirksam wie m6glich entgegenzutreten, zumal Fehlentwicklungen gerade insoweit schwer rOckgangig zu
machen sind.' (p. 159 f.).
864 See for instance the so-called 'Third broadcasting case' of 1981 (BVerfGE 57, 295 ft. - FRAG).
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the law of the press can be observed. While broadcasting expressly needs a high degree
of regulation, the Federal Constitutional Court stated that commercial competition, unre-
stricted by the state, is generally sufficient to guarantee plurality in the press sector.?" The
state only has to provide a legal framework, in which competition can prevail.866
Hence, the government did not enact the same comprehensive rules for the press as for
broadcasting. The German Broadcasting Treaty (Rundfunkstaatsvertrag (RfStV)),867 for
instance, provides a special provision for the internal growth of broadcasters. According to
§ 26 RfStV, broadcasters may only have a certain share of television viewers. Even
though every broadcaster may own an unlimited amount of broadcasting channels, broad-
casting companies are not allowed to have 'prevailing power of opinions' (vorherrschende
Meinungsmach~. 868A special independent body, the Commission for the Assessment of
Concentration in the Media Sector (Kommission zur Ermittlung der Konzentration im Medi-
enbereich (KEK))869was established to ensure 'plurality of opinions' (Meinungsvielfa/~. A
complex calculation method"? is used to scrutinize which share of the audience is watch-
ing programmes of a particular broadcasting company. If the annual average equals or
exceeds 30%, it is presumed that 'prevailing power of opinions' exists.871A share of televi-
sion viewers of 25% can lead to such a presumption as well, especially if the broadcasting
company has a market-dominant position on a 'media-relevant related market' (medien-
relevanter verwandter Mar~.872 If a broadcaster reached 'prevailing power of opinions,' no
more licences will be granted for additional channels for the same broadcaster.F" More-
over, existing licences can be countermanded until there is no more 'prevailing power of
opinions,' if the broadcaster does not successfully reduce his shares or 'influence on opin-
865 BVerfGE 20, 162 (176) - Spiegel.
866 To the degree of regulation in the different media see also Hoffmann-Riem Kommunikationsfreiheiten -
Kommentierung zu Art. 5 Abs. 1 und 2 sowie Art. 8 GG (2002).
867 Rundfunkstaatsvertrag vorn 31. 8. 1991, zuletzt qeándert durch den Achten Hundfunkënderunqsstaats-
vertrag vom 8./15. Oktober 2004, available at: http://www.br-online.de/br-intern/organisation/pdf/rundfunk-
staatsve rtrag. pdf.
868 § 26 I RfStV.
869 See § 35 II Nr. 1 RfStV. The KEK consists of six experts in broadcasting and commercial law, cf § 35 III
RfStV, who are not bound by any instructions, § 35 VI RfStV.
870 Cf § 27 RfStV.
871 § 26 II 1 RfStV.
872 For details see § 26 II 2 RfStV. Broadcasters can 'lower' their shares by several ways, such as granting
broadcasting time to independent third parties, cf § 26 II 3 RfStV referring to § 25 IV and § 26 V RfStV.
873 § 26 III RfStV.
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ions' in other ways.874However, such provisions do not exist for publishing houses. Com-
petition law regulates only external growth via mergers.
In the Milnchner Anzeigenblatter case,875the Bundesverfassungsgericht declared the pro-
visions of the GWB concerning the control of mergers between newspaper enterprises to
be constitutional.
As explained above, the freedom of the press is specially protected under the German
Constitution. However, the freedom of the press is limited by other fundamental rights, or
rights protected by the Constltutlon.F" Article 5 II GG prescribes that the freedom of the
press and the freedom of expresslon"? are limited by general laws (allgemeine Ge-
setze),878 laws for the protection of minors and for the protection against defamation. A law
is 'general,' if it does not aim at the prohibition of a certain content of communication. In
several cases, the German Federal Constitutional Court drew the borders of the freedom
of the press according to other constitutional rights like the right of privacy, the public in-
terest in criminal prosecution and child protection.
In the Milnchner Anzeigenblatter case, the Court concluded that the newspaper merger
provisions are such general laws, because they serve primarily to fight economic domi-
nance and are not aiming at media content.879The Bundesverfassungsgericht pointed out,
that the rules bring 'specific adjustments to the special structures of the press markets' but
no special criteria for specific journalistic competition. Hence, the (only) reason for the
lowering of the thresholds of merger control with regard to press mergers is to effectively
stave off anti-competitive concentration and thus potential abuse of market dominance.88o
874 § 26 IV 3. These provisions, however, have not played a significant role so far. In 2002, the RTL Group
(owned by Bertelsmann) as the biggest broadcasting group had with all its stations a market share of 24,3%,
see Media Perspektiven Basisdaten 2002 - Marktanteile der Fernsehprogramme.
875 BVerfG, WuW/E VG 307 f. - MOnchner Anzeiqenblëtter.
876 So-called' Rechte mit Verfassungsrang'.
877 The provision equally applies to the freedom of broadcasting and the freedom to receive information.
878 Cf the limitation of the rights in the South African Bill of Rights by 'law of general application,' section
36(1) of the South African Constitution, see 1 74 supra.
879 BVerfG, WuW/E VG 307 - MOnchner Anzetaenbtëtter. See also BGH, WuW/E BGH 1685 -
Springer/Elbe-Wochenblatt, Schutz in Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrankungen und Europëiscnes
Kartel/recht Gemeinschaftskommentar (2001), § 36 Rn. 157.
880 Bosch in Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrankungen und Europaisches Kartel/recht
Gemeinschaftskommentar (2001), § 38 Rn. 15.
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Therefore, the German government was regarded as competent to enact specific press
merger provisionsP'"
However, the new proposed provisions in the first draft would have been a violation of the
Grundgesetz. Admittedly, the Bundesverfassungsgericht has consistently granted a certain
freedom to the legislature as regards lawmaking. For instance, the Court pointed out in the
MOnchner Anzeigenblatter case that it is up to the lawmaker to decide on the scope of the
press-specific turnover calculation clause and the multiplication factor.882
Nevertheless, the legislature may not enact unconstitutional provisions. The amendment of
the GWB in its proposed form would have led to a constant monitoring of the content of
press products. The German government is not competent to do so and would violate the
freedom of the press if it did.883 Constant monitoring is generally frowned upon in merger
considerations. As noted already, a conditional approval is never admissible in merger
considerations, if it aims at constant monitoring.884 The legal instrument of the imposition
of conditions in merger cases must structurally compensate the detrimental effects of a
merger on competition.88s It has even been maintained that the proposed monitoring would
have been a violation of the prohibition of censorship, as set out in Article 5 III of the Ger-
man Constltutlon.P"
Moreover, it is doubtful whether the German federal government is competent to enact
such provisions. The Grundgesetz differentiates quite complexly between the competence
of the federal government and the governments of the regions (Landet).887 Article 74 Nr.
16 GG empowers the federal government to enact laws for the prevention of the abuse of
economic dominance. This includes the elimination of economic dominance and sane-
881 BVerfG, WuW/E VG 307 - MOnchner Anzeigenblatter.
882 BVerfG, WuW/E VG 307 (308) - MOnchner Anzeigenblatter.
883 With the same criticism: Association of German Local Newspapers, see epd medien 'Verband der
Lokalzeitungen gegen Clements Fusionspláne', Nr. 9 (2004-02-07) 14; BDZV-Stellungnahme zur geplanten
Anderung der Pressefusionskontrolle (05.02.2004), published in epd medien, Nr. 12/13 (2004-02-21) 33.
884 See § 401112 GWB.
885 Cf Bosch in Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrankungen und Europëiscnes Kartel/recht
Gemeinschaftskommentar (2001), § 40 Rn. 21.
886 Cf Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 'Achtung Zensur' (2003-12-20) 13.
887 Cf chapter VII of the GG; also see Pieroth in Jarras & Pieroth Grundgesetz tur die Bundesrepublik
Deutschland, Kommentar (2004), Art. 70 Rn. 1.
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tions.s8s Nevertheless, there is no federal competence to maintain competition through the
regulation of media content. Thus, a pluralistic press market may not be enforced by laws,
which prescribe newspaper content. The federal government's competence embraces the
enactment of provisions ensuring competitiveness on the press sector, only if they do not
aim at press-specific goals.
Thus, in the MOnchner Anzeigenblatter case the Federal Constitutional Court pointed out
that the third amendment of the GWB was constitutional, because it aimed at the estab-
lishment of an effective control of mergers in the press sector, and not directly at journalis-
tic plurality in the press markets. Journalistic plurality is guaranteed only indirectly by guar-
anteeing a competitive market situation.
The proposed seventh amendment, on the contrary, contained provisions that were in-
tended to directly maintain press plurality. Hence, there is an argument to be made that
the federal government would not have been competent to enact the new supervision
measure.SS9
However, the amendment - even if revised - still touched a constitutionally 'sensitive'
nerve. The freedom of the press has to be borne in mind, when provisions are enacted,
which are highly likely to influence the press structure. The German Constitution obliges
the federal government to protect the freedom of the press, which, to a certain degree,
also includes plurality of press products. Nevertheless, the state is only competent to
guarantee an economic environment, which enables newspaper publishers to compete
with each other. Therefore, the government's scope of action is limited on both sides. First,
there is a proper obligation on the state to enact adequate competition-protecting laws in
the media sector, and, secondly, these laws may only protect competition and plurality of
press products indirectly. The latest version of the government's draft followed this ap-
888 Pieroth in Jarras & Pieroth Grundgesetz tar die Bundesrepub/ik Deutschland, Kommentar (2004), Art. 74
Rn.35.
889 Cf Stellungnahme zum Entwurf eines siebten Gesetzes zur Anderung des Gesetzes gegen
Wettbewerbsbeschrankungen (16 September 2004, Hans-Bredow-Institut fur Medienforschung, Schulz), 5;
Gutachten des Wissenschaftlichen Beirats beim Bundesministerium fur Wirtschaft und Arbeit
(Dokumentation Nr. 535) - 'Keine Aufweichung der Pressefusionskontrolle' (August 2004) par 33, available
at: http://www.bmwa.bund.de/Redaktion/lnhalte/Pdf/doku-nr-535-keine-aufweichung-pressefusionskontrolle.
property=pdf. pdf.
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proach, even though, from an economic and legal point of view, the amendment would
have been an error.
2 3 6 3 Conclusion
The proposed amendment in its first draft would not have been consistent with the German
Constitution. The revision of the amendment may have dispelled the most serious constitu-
tional concerns, but still could not be justified on economic and political grounds. The
amendment would not have enhanced competition in the newspaper markets, but it would
have most likely led to a higher level of concentration in such markets. Hence, detrimental
effects for the consumers (readers and advertisers) would have been the most likely out-
come. In the long term, the amendment would have endangered the plurality of newspaper
titles, independent editors and journalists and hence the transmission of a variety of opin-
ions via newspapers.
The weak economic situation cannot justify the approach of the German government. It
may be that newspaper enterprises - like companies in other industries - struggle with the
momentary recession, especially because of the decline in advertising revenues. It may
also be that new avenues for advertising such as the Internet have impacted negatively on
newspapers. Nevertheless, the amendment cannot be a solution for these economic and
structural woes of the print media. The reasons for the decline in profits of newspaper pub-
lishers are multiple.8g0
From a competition perspective, it would have been a reasonable approach to empower
competition authorities to scrutinize mergers and during this process to approve mergers,
if competitive circumstances demand it, rather than to withhold such mergers from any
control. The Bundeskartellamt approves a merger if it is necessary in order to rescue a
newspaper company, and hence to maintain plurality in press markets (Sanierungsfu-
sionen).8g1 Moreover, competition authorities already allow co-operation of publishers for
instance on the advertisement market. Such forms of collaboration are not necessarily an-
890 A decline in newspaper readers may also have socio-cultural reasons. See for instance promedia, 'Das
Internet bietet keinen Ersatz fur die ZeitungslektUre' - Interview mit Renate Kocher (Gescháttstuhrerin des
Instituts fUr Demoskopie in AlIensbach), (Nr. 7/04) 16.
891 See 2 3 5 3 supra.
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anti-competitive but may even be benign.892This is recognized also in other jurisdiction, for
instance in US antitrust law.893The US Congress has even passed a Newspaper Preser-
vation Act, restricting the application of antitrust provisions to arrangements between
newspapers to safeguard press plurality.894
The idea of the new § 31 GWB can be justified on economic grounds and has to be re-
garded as being within the constitutionally guaranteed 'scope of action,' which allows the
legislature to face structural problems of certain industrial sectors.P" Nevertheless, if an
amendment of the press-specific provisions comes onto the table in the future, the legisla-
ture has to set stricter limits for co-operations in the advertisement field. For instance only
arrangements, which are necessary to safeguard independent newspaper companies,
should be facilitated. Moreover, the suggested rules did not set out limits for the scope of
the co-operation.P" The Economic Committee of the Federal Upper House of Parliament
(Wirtschaftsausschuss des Bundesrates) suggested a limit of total turnovers of € 100 mil-
lion and € 50 million for each involved enterprise.897 This would seem to be a reasonable
constraint on such agreements. Furthermore, it is problematic that § 31 GWB only em-
892 See Sutherland Competition Law of South Africa (2004) 5-47 to 5-51 for the discussion of the positive and
anti-competitive effects of joint ventures.
893 See Antitrust Guidelines For Collaborations Among Competitors, issued by the Federal Trade Commis-
sion and the U.S. Department of Justice (April 2000) section 2.1, available at:
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/04/ftcdojguidelines.pdf: 'The Agencies recognize that consumers may benefit
from competitor collaborations in a variety of ways. For example, a competitor collaboration may enable par-
ticipants to offer goods or services that are cheaper, more valuable to consumers, or brought to market
faster than would be possible absent the collaboration. A collaboration may allow its participants to better
use existing assets, or may provide incentives for them to make output-enhancing investments that would
not occur absent the collaboration. The potential efficiencies from competitor collaborations may be achieved
through a variety of contractual arrangements including joint ventures, trade or professional associations,
licensing arrangements, or strategic alliances. Efficiency gains from competitor collaborations often stem
from combinations of different capabilities or resources. For example, one participant may have special
technical expertise that usefully complements another participant's manufacturing process, allowing the latter
participant to lower its production cost or improve the quality of its product. In other instances, a collaboration
may facilitate the attainment of scale or scope economies beyond the reach of any single participant. For
example, two firms may be able to combine their research or marketing activities to lower their cost of bring-
ing their products to market, or reduce the time needed to develop and begin commercial sales of new prod-
ucts. Consumers may benefit from these collaborations as the participants are able to lower prices, improve
:;tuality, or bring new products to market faster.'
8 4 See in detail 4 2 3 infra.
895 Also agreeing with this concept: Weberling 'Novellierung der Pressefusionskontrolle: Auslaufmodell
Pressevielfalt? Zur geplanten Lockerung des Pressekartellrechts' (2004), promedia, Nr. 7/04, 22.
896 The president of the Bundeskartellamt, Boge, criticised especially this point of the revised draft and held
that a 'price cartel in the advertisement business' would be exempted, quoted from: Frankfurter Allgemeine
Zeitung 'Kartellamtsprásldent kritisiert Clements Pressefuslonspláne' (2004-05-06) 1.
897 See Suggestions of the Economic Committee of the Federal Upper House of Parliament (Wirtschaftsaus-
schuss des Bundesrates) for the seventh amendment of the GWB, BR-Drs. 210/1/05 v. 18.04.2005 par 7.
147
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Chapter 2 - European and German Competition Law
braced newspapers and not magazines.898 Both press products are equally protected by
the Constitution. Therefore, no difference should be made between them. Magazines are
important for the creation of the public opinion, too, and the content of the press product
ought not to be used as the basis for differentiation. Hence, the Association of German
Magazine Publishers (Verband Deutscher Zeitschriftenverleger (VOZ)) criticised this sec-
tion for being unconstitutlonal.ê" Furthermore, it is not easy to specify a precise point of
delineation between newspapers and magazines.90o In addition, § 31 III GWB raised con-
cerns insofar as no legislative exceptions are made for co-operation in other industries.
This privilege for a specific industry would have been unique under German Competition
Law and cannot be justified. A provision, which facilitates newspaper mergers, even in the
advertisement field, should not be codified, especially where co-operations are already
possible. The section also embraces printing and distribution and would enhance concen-
tration on these markets.
Despite the high concentration levels in most of the press markets, the provisions concern-
ing the control of mergers have proved successful since their implementation in the 1970s.
Germany has a multitude of publishing houses and independent newspapers. The German
government should not endanger press pluralism by facilitating mergers in this field. It is
not the task of the lawmaker to react to the momentary problems of the publishing indus-
try. Nevertheless, the competition authorities should reconsider their practice, especially
the use of the problematically narrow market definitions. In particular, it has to be enquired
if it is still appropriate to consider advertisement markets in newspapers separately from
the market for electronically published advertisements on the Internet. Moreover, attention
should be paid to the strict conditions for 'safeguard-approvals'. 901
Even though the controversial new press-merger provisions have not been implemented, it
can be expected that the German government will continue to hold on to its proposed
amendment. Further discussion in this field will hopefully lead to a revised draft, which can
dispel the above-described concerns. The latest approach of the government, however, is
898 See also the criticism of the Economic Committee in: Suggestions of the Economic Committee of the
Federal Upper House of Parliament (Wirtschaftsausschuss des Bundesrates) for the seventh amendment of
the GWB, BR-Drs. 210/1/05 v. 18.04.2005 par 5-6.
899 See epd medien 'VDZ lehnt Neuregelungen der Pressefusionskontrolle ab', Nr. 20 (2005-03-16) 14.
900 See 2 3 5 2 supra.
901 See 2 3 5 3 supra.
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to be commended. In the final draft, the time of application for the new provisions, allowing
co-operations in the advertisement field, was limited to only five years. This was done to
provide for an opportunity to observe their effectiveness.902
902 See the proposed § 131 VII GWB. Cf also epd medien 'Neuregelungen der Pressefusionskontrolle
verabschiedet', Nr. 20 (2005-03-16) 14.
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Chapter 3
Comparison
The South African and German Competition Law differ in certain aspects, but fundamental
similarities can be noticed. First, this chapter will give a synopsis of the most important
aspects of both legal systems. Thereafter, certain selected aspects will be described in
detail.
3 1Synopsis
Graph 9: Synopsis
\. Aspect South 'African Competition Law
. ....German Competition Law
Purposes of Competition • Main economic purpose for mergers: • Main economic purpose for mergers:
Law Prevention of market power Prevention of market power
• Several purposes in the Competition • No expressed purposes in the GWB,
Act, including but main purpose is the prevention of
- Promotion of efficiency restraints of competition
- Consumer welfare
- Protection of SMEs
- Promotion of ownership of historically
disadvantaged persons
Competition authorities Powerful and independent bodies Powerful and independent bodies
Definition of mergers Broad definition (change of control) Broad definition (including minority
shareholding with competitively signifi-
cant influence)
Necessity of notification • Notification only compulsory for eer- • Notification only compulsory for eer-
tain transactions (depending on the tain transactions (depending on the
turnovers and assets of the parties to turnovers and assets of the parties to
the merger) the merger)
• Low thresholds • High thresholds
Definition of the relevant • Definition of the product and geo- • Definition of the product and geo-
market graphic market graphic market
• Test of functional interchangeability • Test of functional interchangeability
or substitutability of a product or ser- or substitutability of a product or ser-
vice from the consumer's point of view vice from the consumer's point of view
Newspaper markets Reader and advertisement markets Reader and advertisement markets
are recognised (also sub-markets) are recognised (also narrowly defined
sub-markets)
Merger prohibition crite- • A merger has to be prohibited, if the • A merger has to be prohibited, if it is
rion merger is likely to substantially prevent likely that the merger will lead to a
or lessen competition market-dominant position or will
• Several factors are taken into ac- strengthen it
count _(a non-exhaustive list of factors • Several factors are taken into ac-
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is codified) count (a non-exhaustive list of factors
is codified)
Exemptions Several exemptions: Several exemptions:
• Pro-competitive gains • Pro-competitive gains
• Public interest ground • Public interest ground
• 'Minister's permission'
Enforcement • Severe penalties • Severe penalties
• Wide powers of the Competition • Wide powers of the Bundeskar-
Commission (investigation rights, sei- tellamt (investigation rights, seizure,
zure, right to summon) right to summon)
Practice of merger con- General permissive tendency General permissive tendency
trol
Press mergers No specific provisions Specific .. (notably lower• provrsions
turnover thresholds), but consideration
according to the general rules
Right of third parties to • Trade unions and employees are • Application for interim relief only
take legal action against allowed to appeal the decisions of the admissible, if the third party's own
approved mergers Competition Tribunal to the Competi- rights are infringed903
tion Appeal Court, regardless if the • Appeal of third parties against
Tribunal approved, conditionally ap- merger approval only admitted, if the
proved or prohibited the merger third party is 'substantially affected by
• Competitors and consumers are not the decision' and took part of the pro-
allowed to appeal the decisions of the ceedings (but right of participation)
Tribunal, even if they participated in • Other legal actions are possible, if
the proceedings of the Tribunal the third party is adversely affected in
• Competition Commission is not al- its 'competitive interests'
lowed to appeal against decision
32 Similarities between South African and German Competition Law
The South African Competition Act and the German GWB are similarly structured, dealing
with prohibited practices and the control of mergers. In a nutshell, it can be stated that
South Africa and Germany follow the same approach to controlling mergers. Both nations
have codified a legal system of compulsory notification of transactions involving firms of a
certain size, in order to be able to consider the transactions' detrimental effects on compe-
tition before their implementation and thus in advance of structural changes of the market.
Both recognise the duty of notification for proposed mergers between parties who's turn-
overs are above certain thresholds, even though the German thresholds are very high
compared to the South African ones. In this context, it can be argued that both jurisdictions
seem to be determined to maintain wide access to the control of proposed transactions by
903 The right is now restricted due to the seventh amendment of the GWB.
151
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Chapter 3 - Comparison
broadly interpreting 'acquisition of control'. South African and German competition authori-
ties acknowledge that an internal change of control (as from joint to sole control) consti-
tutes a notifiable transaction. This is consistent with the practice in other jurisdictions, such
as Europe.904
Both jurisdictions follow the same approach to determine detrimental effects of mergers on
competition structures, aiming at the protection of competition, but not competitors. More-
over, competition authorities define the relevant product and geographic market in the
same way.
Furthermore, competition authorities are equally powerful and independent bodies,
equipped with legal powers to examine proposed transactions effectively. Especially as
regards the factors, which are assessed to determine potential anti-competitive conse-
quences of a transaction, German and South African Competition Law are remarkably
similar. Both competition laws empower the competition authorities to assess the merger's
effect on competition quite independently, allowing them to take into account a variety of
different criteria, which do not constitute a closed list.
Certain similarities can be explained by the influence of European law on both legal sys-
tems. For instance, the German definition of a merger in § 37 I Nr. 2 GWB ('acquisition of
control') was introduced in the GWB following Article 3 I lit. b) of the European merger
regulation. 90S Moreover, US antitrust law and doctrine has widely influenced European,
South African, and German legislation and jurisdiction. Nevertheless, in some ways both
South African and German law have departed from these systems in the same way. For
904 Cf ICI / Tioxide 1991 (4) CMLR 854 (Case No. IV/M/023). In this case the European Commission held
that a change from sole control to joint control amounted to a concentration, because '[d]ecisive influence
exercised §lngly is substantially different to the decisive influence exercised jointly, since the latter has to
take into account the potentially different interest of the other party or parties concerned' (par 2) and '[bly
changing the quality of decisive influence' exercised by one of the firms on the other, 'the transaction will
bring about a durable change of the structure of the concerned parties.' (par 4).
905 va 4064/89. See the memorandum of the German legislature to the sixth amendment of the GWB
(Reg.Begr. zur 6. GWB-Novelle FIW-Sonderheft, S.80). See also Schutz in Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbs-
beschrankungen und Europëisctïes Kartel/recht Gemeinschaftskommentar (2001), § 37 Rn. 24; for the influ-
ence of European jurisdiction on the interpretation of section 12 of the South African Competition Act see
Legh in Brassey et al Competition Law (2002) 240-241.
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instance, the express efficiency defence for the parties to a merger is codified in South
Africa and Germany but is absent from the US Clayton Act.906
A specialised authority exists under neither South African nor German Competition Law to
intervene in media mergers. Conversely, in the United Kingdom the Office of Communica-
tions (Ofcom)907was empowered to deal with media mergers. It has both investigative and
advisory duties in this regard. The UK Enterprise Act 2002908 requires Ofcom to investigate
specific matters of media public interest, arising from the merger of newspapers or broad-
cast media companies. Hence, a specialized body for media mergers was created recog-
nising the importance of media plurality, even though Ofcom has no statutory role unless
the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry issues an intervention notice on media
mergers. Such a notice must be issued on public interest grounds.909When the Secretary
of State issues the notice in relation to a media merger, Ofcom has a duty to advise the
Secretary of State on whether the merger is in the public interest. Ofcom assesses the
merger's effects on the public interest with reference to the considerations specified in the
intervention notice under the Enterprise Act's merger control regime.91oThe Secretary of
State will then decide whether to refer the merger to the Competition Commission.
As regards mergers involving newspapers, Ofcom applies the media mergers' public inter-
est test to proposed mergers and assesses the impact of these mergers on the media
market. In such cases, the public interest considerations, as defined by the Enterprise
Act,911are:
• the need for accurate presentation of news in newspapers
• the need for free expression of opinion in newspapers
• the need for, to the extent that is reasonable and practicable, a sufficient plurality of
views in newspapers in each market for newspapers in the UK or parts of the UK
906 Cf Trident Steel (Pty) Ltd Dorbyl Ltd (CT 89/LM/OctOO) par 70. On the US approach see also especially
~ar 52-67 with further references.
07 See www.ofcom.gov.uk.
908 As amended by the Communications Act 2003, available at:
http://www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts2002/20020040.htm.
909 Cf section 42(2) of the Enterprise Act. See also Ofcom guidance for the public interest test for media
mergers, p. 1, available at:
http://www.ofcom.org.uk/codes guidelines/broadcasting/media mergersl?a=87101.
910 See Part 3, Chapter 2 of the Enterprise Act.
911 S 58(2A)-(2B).
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It seems to be a sound approach to the problem of mergers between newspaper enter-
prises to take into account the specific role, which the media play in a democratic society.
In the case of newspaper mergers, Ofcom has a panel of experts in the newspaper indus-
try on which it draws to provide analysis and advice in each case.912 This ensures that de-
cisions are not made without the specific knowledge of this industrial sector. Ofcom may
also offer confidential, non-binding advice to the parties in advance of notification of a me-
dia merger.
3 3 Differences between South African and German Competition Law
As shown above, German competition authorities determine whether a merger is likely to
create or strengthen a 'market-dominant position' (MOP). In South Africa, the question is
whether a merger substantially prevents or lessens competition (SPLC). However, the dif-
ference between these tests appears to be textual rather than substantive. According to a
comparative research study, conducted by the Bundeskartellamt,913 no major differences
could be observed regarding the prohibition criteria codified in the legal systems of Ger-
many, the European Union, the United States of America, and Australia. All tests were
flexible enough to use economic criteria, such as market share data, market structure, bar-
riers to entry, countervailing power and so forth. The study concluded that the similarities
in both approaches would be the result of the identical major purpose: the prevention of
market power. Even though the South African test differs slightly from a 'substantial less-
ening of competition' test (SLC), as used in the United States, the textual nuance ('prevent
or lessen') is not significant.
As indicated above, the 'likeliness' of a transaction to substantially prevent or lessen com-
petition only implies that competition authorities are enjoined to make a predictive judge-
ment of the scrutinised transactlon.P" This can be found in the German approach of likeli-
ness of market domination. Certain differences, such as conditions set out for the failing
firm defence, are rather marginal.
912 See Dfcom guidance for the public interest test for media mergers, p. 2, available at:
http://www.ofcom.org.uk/codes guidelines/broadcasting/media mergersl?a=87101.
913 Bundeskartellamt 'Das Untersagungskriterium in der Fusionskontrolle - Marktbeherrschende Stellung
versus Substantial Lessening of Competition?' Arbeitspapier im Rahmen des Arbeitskreises Kartellrecht
~2001), available at: http://www.bundeskarteliamt.de/wDeutsch/download/pdf/AKK 01.pdf.
14 See 1 51 24 supra.
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The South African and German acts differ sharply when comes to their respective goals.
German Competition Law is aimed at promoting consumer interests through economic
efficiency. The South African Competition Act is stated to have several 'non-competition'
objectives. This can only be understood in historical context. As shown above, however,
the purposes and specific public interest grounds set out in the Competition Act have not
influenced the Competition Tribunal's decisions substantially so far.
Hence, South African and German Competition Law basically follow the same approach.
Competition authorities nowadays collaborate and benchmark in an attempt to meet inter-
national best-practice.
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Chapter 4
Discussion and Conclusion
4 1 Introduction
In the first chapter of this thesis it was shown that South Africa does not have specific pro-
visions in its Competition Act for the control of mergers between newspaper enterprises. In
this respect, the South African approach differs from the German one. Nevertheless, South
African media regulation is complex and well-developed. The regulation of the media will
be analysed in this chapter. The central question will be whether South Africa requires
media-specific and more specifically press-specific, competition law rules.
4 2 Does South Africa need a media-specific competition law?
To answer the question, if South Africa needs a media-specific competition law, the exist-
ing provisions, regulating the media in South Africa, have to be looked at first.
4 2 1 South African media regulation
South African media policy aims to achieve several goals. As regards broadcasting, there
is a plurality of objectives, to contribute to democracy, encourage ownership and control of
broadcasting services by people from historically disadvantaged communities and estab-
lish a strong and committed public broadcaster to service the needs of all South Afri-
cans.?" Finally, it is aimed at guaranteeing fair competition in this sector.
Several laws regulate the South African media sector to give this policy legal backbone.
Broadcasting is highly regimented. The Broadcasting Act916 and Independent Broadcasting
Authority (IBA) Act917 control frequency and licence allocation and supervision of broad-
casting content. The Independent Broadcasting Authority Act's purposes are set out in
section 2. It is, inter alia, intended to promote the provision of a diverse range of sound
television broadcasting services, on a national, regional and local level, and to ensure that
915 See South Africa Yearbook 2004/5,136.
916 Broadcasting Act 4 of 1999.
917 Independent Broadcasting Authority Act 153 of 1993 as amended by Broadcasting Amendment Act 64 of
2002, available at: Juta's Statutes (2003) II, 2-19.
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broadcasting services, viewed collectively provide for regular news and services. In May
2000, the ICASA Act918was proclaimed, paving the way for the merger of the South Afri-
can Telecommunications Regulatory Authority (SATRA) and the IBA919and the establish-
ment of the Independent Communications Authority of South Africa (ICASA),920 which is
responsible for the supervision of telecommunications and broadcasting. ICASA so far
granted a large number of licences for private radio stations.921
For the sake of political transparency, fairness, and equity in the media, the Independent
Media Commission was established by the Independent Media Commission Act in
1993.922According to section 3, the primary objectives of this Act are to ensure equitable
treatment of all political parties by broadcasting services and to ensure that State-financed
publications and State information services are not, directly or indirectly, used to advance
the interests of any political party, whether directly or indirectly, during the election period,
so as to promote and contribute towards the creation of a climate favourable to free politi-
cal participation and free and fair elections.
Moreover, there are limitation of foreign ownership in the media sector. Early in 2003, the
level of ownership of private radio and television stations for a foreigner was set at 20%,
though this level will be raised to increase investment.923 Furthermore, there has already
been a discussion about the enactment of cross-ownership regulations, such as a prohibi-
tion on control of a broadcasting station by a person who already controls a newspaper.924
918 Act 13 of 2000.
919 Cf http://www.info.gov.za/speeches/1999/9911091035a1002.htm. Both authorities merged on 1st July
2000.
920 S .ee www.lcasa.org.za.
921 In detail: South Africa Yearbook 2003/4, 144-145. ICASA, inter alia, is also responsible for monitoring the
activities of the broadcasting and telecommunications operators and for regulating the broadcasting and
telecommunications industry as a whole, see South Africa Yearbook 2004/5, 128; for the powers of ICASA
see also Competition Law and Policy in South Africa - OECD Global Forum on Competition Peer Review:
Paris, 11 February 2003, p. 35, available at: http://www.comptrib.co.za/Publications/South%20Africa%
20Peer%20Review.PDF. The powers of ICASA may raise the problem of concurrent jurisdiction, see Suther-
land Competition Law of South Africa (2004) 4-48. The Competition Commission, however, pleads for the
removal of concurrency in jurisdiction between the Competition Commission and ICASA on competition mat-
ters, see recently Submission of the Competition Commission and Competition Tribunal on the Convergence
Bill (B9-2005) for consideration by the Portfolio Committee on Communications (2005), available at:
http://www.compcom.co.za/policyresearch/Comments%200n%20the%20Convergence%20Bill%20April%202
005.doc.
922 Independent Media Commission Act 148 of 1993 as amended by Proclamation 54 of 1994, available at:
Juta's Statutes (2003) n, 2-12.
923 South Africa Yearbook 2003/4,143.
924 See Burns Communications Law (2001) 306-307 for details.
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Certain quotas for locally produced content on local radio and television are imposed.
These quotas have been raised recently for public and community radio stations to 40%,
while quotas for private and public commercial stations were raised to 25%. As far as tele-
vision is concerned, different quotas exist for public broadcasters (55%), commercial pri-
vate and public free-to-air stations (30%), and for pay stations (8%).925German broadcast-
ing law, in contrast to legislations in other European countries like France, does not set out
such quotas, even though it has been proposed recently that they be introduced to pro-
mote German and European content.926 South African broadcasting regulation seems to
be in many ways similar to the comparable German provisions. The law even provides
some restrictions, which do not exist under German broadcasting law.
4 2 2 The need for regulation
The extent to which competition law may be used to regulate markets is controversial. The
Chicago School scholars criticize an overly rigid regulation of markets, and argue that anti-
trust intervention is only necessary - and justified - to correct clear cases of market ineffi-
ciency.927Although the Chicago school has made some valuable contributions to antitrust
law, this 'almost religious belief in the self-correcting abilities of markets,928cannot be fol-
lowed through. In particular, it seems to be beyond doubt that South African competition
authorities cannot follow a pure Chicago School approach, because of section 2 of the
Competition Act.929The language used by the legislature in section 2 of the Act is pellucid.
Efficiency is merely one goal besides other more general ones, like social and economic
welfare.
925 Cf South Africa Yearbook 2003/4, 143-144.
926 However, such an approach would be highly problematic in terms of the German Constitution, because
the Bundesverlassungsgericht has consistently pointed out that the freedom of broadcasting notably consists
in the protection of the broadcasted content against governmental influence, cf BVerfGE 12, 205 ff. -
Deutschland-Fernsehen; BVerfGE 57,295 ff. - FRAG; BVerfGE 90,60 ff. - GebOhrenurteil.
927 See for instance Posner 'The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis' (1979) 127 UPALR 925-948. Chicago
scholars argue that competition policy should seek to maximize allocative efficiency - the state of affairs in
which consumer welfare is optimised occurring where price equals marginal costs in a market of perfect or
nearly perfect competition - without impairing productive efficiency - the ratio of a firm's output and input.
Bork The Antitrust Paradox - A Policy at War with Itself (1993) 91 states: 'The whole task of anti-trust can be
summed up as the effort to improve allocative efficiency without impairing productive efficiency so greatly as
to produce either no gain or a net loss in consumer welfare.'. See also Sutherland Competition Law of South
Africa (2004) 2-17 to 2-21.
928 Sutherland Competition Law of South Africa (2004) 2-18.
929 See 1 2 supra.
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The imposition of a system of official scrutiny and control over those mergers between en-
terprises, which are of significant size, is necessary and justified by the purpose for which
the legal framework was established. The objective to ensure that mergers, which are sub-
ject to this process, will not have adverse and unjustified effects by preventing or lessening
competition in the market or markets in which the merging enterprises operate, is crucial
for the market itself.930 The prevention of concentrated markets or even monopolies via
competition law is not intended as punishment.?" It simply prevents structural changes in
the market, which would be detrimental to competition. Internal growth via the successful
improvement of a competitor's performance is not restrained, if a market-dominant position
is not abused.932
The detrimental effects of uncontrolled market behaviour, especially the lack of control of
mergers, which would facilitate prohibited practices or even lead to monopolies, have al-
ready been indicated above.933 As far as the necessity of merger control is concerned, it
has to be agreed with Lewis, chairperson of the Competition Tribunal that:934
'Merger regulation is a key aspect of competition law - in fact by helping to main-
tain competitively structured markets merger regulation limits the necessity for
invasive intervention later on.'
US courts also emphasise the necessity of competition law as a regulator:935
'Antitrust laws in general, and the Sherman Act in particular, are the Magna Carta
of free enterprise. They are as important to the preservation of economic free-
dom and our free-enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to the protection of our
fundamental personal freedoms. And the freedom guaranteed each and every
930 Lewis puts it this way: 'The task of competition regulators is to ensure that the process of competition
does not destroy the very basis of its own existence.' (Lewis 'Competition Policy in South Africa - Where has
it come from and where is it going?' (2002), speech to Investment Analysts' Society of South Africa, 16th
May 2002, Johannesburg, available at:
http://www.comptrib.co.za/Publications/Speeches/IAS%20speech.htm).
931 As Areeda & Hovenkamp Antitrust Law 11/ Second Edition (2002) 24 point out for the expansion of firms
vis-a-vis their rivals: 'If there is a reason for dissolving a monopoly that has persistently kept a market to itself
by expansion of capacity, that reason is failure of the market to correct the situation, not the behavior of the
monopolist in expanding capacity to meet estimated demands. It is absurd to classify such behavior as
unlawfully "exclusionary".'
932 See for the exception under German broadcasting law 2 3 6 2 3 supra.
933 See 1 5 supra.
934 Lewis 'Competition Policy in South Africa - Where has it come from and where is it going?' (2002),
speech to Investment Analysts' Society of South Africa, 16th May 2002, Johannesburg, available at:
http://www.comptrib.co.za/Publications/Speeches/IAS%20speech.htm.
935 United States v Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 92 S.Ct. 1126, 1135.
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business, no matter how small, is the freedom to compete - to assert with vigor,
imagination, devotion, and ingenuity whatever economic muscle it can muster.
Implicit in such freedom is the notion that it cannot be foreclosed with respect to
one sector of the economy because certain private citizens or groups believe that
such foreclosure might promote greater competition in a more important sector of
the economy.P"
4 2 3 The need for regulation of the press
As stated above, independent newspapers play an essential role in democracies. News-
papers transmit political news and opinions. They allow citizens to be informed and to be
able to develop their own political opinions. It goes without saying that a properly function-
ing democracy requires an informed electorate.
There are many ways to ensure a flow of information. Print media is only one, alongside
others like broadcasting and the Internet. The Internet is a fast growing source of informa-
tion. More and more people have access to the Internet (4,6% of the South African popula-
tion in 2002).937 Most of the bigger newspaper companies in South Africa have websites
on the Internet. There are more than 600 online magazines (so-called 'netzines'), with at
least 16 of them specialising in daily news.938 Moreover, all other global online publications
are available in South Africa.
Hence, South Africa's media market is characterised by a large number of information
sources. Besides daily and weekly newspapers and magazines, there is a plurality of pub-
lic and private radio and television stations.939 Private television stations in particular have
become a counter in the broadcasting sector to public stations, even though they are still
rare in South Africa. Although M-Net exists since 1986, it is only a private subscription
936 Cf United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 371, 83 S.Ct. 1715, 1745, 10 L.Ed.2d 915
~1963).
37 South Africa Yearbook 2003/4, 157. According to the International Telecommunication Union, in 2003
even 6,82 percent of the population used Internet, see http://www.itu.int/ITU-
D/ict/statistics/at glance/lnternet03.pdf. In comparison, in Germany it is around 47% (with 34,4 million Inter-
net users in 2003, cf Media Perspektiven Basisdaten 2002 - Internetnutzer in Deutschland.
938 South Africa Yearbook 2004/5,143.
939 See for details Mersham in De Beer (ed) Mass Media Towards the Millenium - The South African Hand-
book of Mass Communication 2nd edition (1998) chapter 8.
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television service;"? the first private free-to-air station, e-tv, started broadcasting only in
1998.941Public broadcasting is subject to rules guaranteeing variety and neutrality, and the
maintenance and promotion of political news. New forms of information exchange are de-
veloping, especially on the Internet, such as blogs (web logging-online diaries) and vlogs
(video logs online).942
Nevertheless, newspapers play a special role due to the peculiarity of the written word.
Printed information will be, generally speaking, more 'reflective' and permanent than
broadcasted, or online-distributed, and hence 'non-persistent' news. Also from the recipi-
ent's point of view, newspapers differ from other media entities. Newspapers are in gen-
eral 'believed to be more intent on objective and relatively complete, even if opinionated,
journalistic coverage while broadcasters are thought to be more concerned with packaging
and 'selling' entertainment to the public.'943 In contrast to daily newspapers, the Internet is
often only used to find particular news.944Moreover, especially in rural areas, newspapers
are still the only source of information for many South Africans. Thus, the other media
cannot substitute a free press, even though they tend to play an increasingly important
role.
The question remains, if there is a specific need for regulating the press by competition
law. Private claims, particularly in the context of defamation cases, and self-regulation via
press associations can ensure a certain level of control of press contentr" In South Af-
rica, the office of the Independent Press Ombudsman was opened in 1997. Members of
the public who have complaints or concerns about reports in newspapers and magazines
can submit their grievances to the Ombudsman. Should they not be satisfied with the re-
sultant ruling, they can lodge an appeal with an independent appeal panel.?" Even though
such self-regulating mechanism should only be understood as an alternative to private civil
940 Also the satellite network DStv is run as pay TV.
941 CfSouth Africa Yearbook 2003/4,145-146.
942 Cf Marsland 'Newspapers' role in influencing opinion is dead' (2005-01-23), available at: http://www.biz-
community.com/ Article/196/109/5556.html.
943 Baker Human Liberty and Freedom of Speech (1989) 227.
944 See promedia, 'Das Internet bietet keinen Ersatz fUr die ZeitungslektUre' - Interview mit Renate Kocher
~GeSChaftsfUhrerin des Instituts fUr Demoskopie in Allensbach), (Nr. 7/04) 16.
45 Private claims can also assist in the enforcement of antitrust laws, as it is intended by the US Clayton Act,
cf Sutherland Competition Law of South Africa (2004) 2-14.
946 See Retief Media ethics - an introduction to responsible journalism (2002) chapter 13. Cf also Burns
Communications Law (2001) 302-305.
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claims and their effectiveness may be dubitable, it seems to be an enlightened approach.
Nevertheless, self-regulation may only be appropriate and sufficient as far as the content
of newspapers is concerned. The content of press products cannot be subject to the
State's control before publication. This would be unconstitutional censorshlp.?" Due to
their respective pasts, censorship is a sensitive issue in both South Africa and Ger-
many.?" To a certain extent the state must be able to examine publications for criminal
offences, but the free work of journalists must be guaranteed as well. Thus, under the
German Law there are several privileges for the press to ensure journalists' free and inde-
pendent work. For instance, § 186 of the German Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch (StGB))
outlaws untrue and contemptible allegations, if they are likely to be detrimental to someone
and the asserting person either knows that the allegation is not true, or he or she cannot
prove the truth of the statement. Nevertheless, according to § 193 StGB, a journalist may
not be punished for publishing an untrue statement (and neither is a civil claim possible), if
he or she respected the 'journalistic duties of care' ijoumshstiscne Sorgfaltspflichten), such
as research with due care.?" Moreover, a statement is deemed to be lawful at the time of
its publlcatlon."? Other privileges of journalists, such as the right to refuse to give evi-
dence or restriction on seizure of journalistic sources are codified as wel1.951
Admittedly, there has to be some belief in the self-regulating power of (press) markets.
Nevertheless, self-regulation cannot be a real alternative to the legal control of mergers or
prohibited practices by competition law. Only competition law can ensure that market
structures remain competitive and that there is a plurality of competing newspaper enter-
prises and therefore press products. Firms will not consider the interests of their competi-
tors, but, in contrast, try to maximise their own market share and market power, and with it
their profits. This is economically reasonable and surely not reprehensible, but proves the
947 For the South African concept of prior restraint of the freedom of expression see the case Government of
the Republic of South Africa v The Sunday Times Newspaper 1995 (2) BClR 182 (T).
948 See especially Art. 5 S. 3 GG (prohibition of censorship); for details thereon see Jarass in Jarass &
Pieroth Grundgesetz fOr die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Kommentar (2004), Art. 5 Rn. 63 f.
949 CfBGH, BGHZ 59,76; NJW 1997,1148 (1149).
950 CfBVerfGE 99,185 (198).
951 See for instance § 53 I Nr. 5 StPO and § 97 V StPO. The right to refuse to give evidence can be found in
every procedural code, as for civil, administrative, and social proceedings. Under South African law, in con-
trast, the protection of journalists' sources is not codified, but the courts have acknowledged a wide interpre-
tation of the 'just excuse' doctrine in the Criminal Procedure Act for journalists. Imprisonment for the refusal
or failure to provide information is due to the amendment of s 205 of this Act the exception rather than the
rule. See for details Burns Communications Law (2001) 292-298. Cf also De Waal et al The Bill of Rights
Handbook (2001) 313-314.
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need for regulation to ensure competition and therefore diversity, not least on the consum-
ers' behalf. Monopolies in press markets have to be prevented to guarantee diversity in
news and information952 and to protect a marketplace of ideas and - as the US Supreme
Court has stated - 'the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and an-
tagonistic sources.,953As shown earlier, in most press markets, barriers to entry are quite
high,954which calls for regulation to guarantee media diversity. In this context, it should be
mentioned that South Africa is promoting media diversity also in other ways. In 2002, the
Media Development and Diversity Agency (MDDA) was founded.955 Government, the me-
dia industry, and other donors jointly fund this independent and statutory body, and finance
projects to support community and small media.956
The specialties of press markets justify unique regulation. However, only the market itself
should guarantee a plurality of content. Neither under German, nor under South African
Constitutional Law, should the State interfere in press content prior to publication. The
awareness of both countries' histories should sensitise government to the dangers of in-
tervention in press content. A free press de facto neither existed under the Nazi regime nor
under the Apartheid qovernrnent.?" In South Africa, editorial independence was impossi-
ble, because newspapers were classified as either 'pro-government' or 'anti-
government,.958 The Afrikaans press was privileged and the government influenced press
content either directly or by indirect means, such as threats and inquiries. Especially the
establishment of a 'self-control system' made editors feel insecure about publishable con-
tent and therefore 'newspapers decided to play it safe and ignored news that would pro-
voke the ire of the government.,959 Only after the Information Scandal in the late 1970s,
which exposed the Department of Information's campaign to influence public opinion on a
952 Burns states: 'A diversity of news and information is generally not feasible in a monopolistic environment,
and the regulation of monopolies, cross-ownership and internal measures of control ensure the realisation of
the democratic ideal of the collective right to be informed.' (Burns Communications Law (2001) 56).
953 Associated Press v United States, 326 U.S. 1, 65 S.Ct. 1416 (1945) at 20.
954 See 2 3 6 2 2 supra.
955 See MDDA Act 2002 (Act 14 of 2002). See also www.mdda.org.za.
956 Recently, the MDDA for instance announced to offer bursaries to six print media projects to enable small
publishers to develop the management skills to assist them in becoming sustainable, see bizcommunity
newsletter of 07 March 2005 (http://www.bizcommunity.com/Article.aspx?c=15&1=196&ai=5971).
957 For South Africa see in detail The Role of Media Under Apartheid - African National Congress Submis-
sion to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (15 September 1997).
958 See Fourie (ed) Media Studies Volume 1: Institutions, Theories and Issues (2001) 43-44. Cf also for the
relation between the government and the media under Apartheid: Fourie 'Rethinking the role of the media in
South Africa' (2002), Communicaire 21 (1) - July 2002, 19-27.
959 Fourie (ed) Media Studies Volume 1: Institutions, Theories and Issues (2001) 44.
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global scale by, inter alia, establishing and purchasing newspapers did 'the Afrikaans
press [begin] to express misgivings about the government and apartheid with an increas-
ing frequency, producing cracks in the apartheid system that ultimately led to self-
destructlon.P" Notwithstanding this scandal, the South African government established
the New Media Council in 1983 which forced newspapers to join the Newspaper Press
Union.961 In the same year, strict limits on the compulsory registration of newspapere?"
were imposed.963 Furthermore, on 21 July 1985 the State of Emergency was declared by
the government, followed by the second State of Emergency on 12 June 1986.
'Special powers were granted to the ministers of law and order and home affairs
to close any newspaper they wished, either temporarily or permanently.'964
This State of Emergency was aimed to control information and ensure that only govern-
ment-friendly information reached the South African public. It was only lifted in 1990.
Against this historical background, both countries have a special obligation to protect the
press, also as a 'public watchdog' for governmental behaviour. During the last 60 years,
German legislation and jurisprudence have clearly pointed that out. Remarkable success
is also discernable in South Africa. The newspaper press is no longer subject to licensing
and governmental control965and the freedom of the press is constitutionally protected. Our
former regimes - as cruel and horrible as they were - give us a unique chance to promote
and maintain freedom of the press in the future. Democracy and the market itself will be
strong enough to guarantee diversity. Hence, only the reader's demand should bring out a
plurality of press products, which only can happen, if the legal framework allows a com-
petitive environment. Such a framework cannot be unconstitutional, if it aims at guarantee-
ing press plurality by restricting anti-competitive mergers and preventing the establishment
of 'monopolies of opinions,' and by outlawing practices that lead to foreclosure of new en-
trants.966
960 Fourie (ed) Media Studies Volume 1: Institutions, Theories and Issues (2001) 45.
961 See De Beer & Diederichs in De Beer (ed) Mass Media Towards the Millenium - The South African
Handbook of Mass Communication 2nd edition (1998) 108-109.
962 See Newspaper Imprint and Registration Act 63 of 1971.
963 See section 15 of the Internal Security Act 74 of 1982 and the Registration of Newspapers Amendment
Act 98 of 1982. Cf Burns Communications Law (2001) 56 and 299.
964 Fourie (ed) Media Studies Volume 1: Institutions, Theories and Issues (2001) 47.
965 See Burns Communications Law (2001) 59 and 298-301.
966 Also the Supreme Court of the United Stated asserted in Associated Press v United States, 326 U.S. 1,
65 S.Ct. 1416 (1945) at 20 that '[iJt would be strange indeed however if the grave concern for freedom of the
press which prompted adoption of the First Amendment should be read as a command that the government
was without power to protect that freedom. The First Amendment, far from providing an argument agains
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Moreover, regulation in this sector differs materially from other business sectors. In mar-
kets, which are privatised on the consumers' behalf, price-regulation can be an adequate
instrument to ensure a smooth transition from governmental (monopolistic) control to pri-
vate ownership as in the telecommunication soctor.?" or the energy market. Here, the
price968is of importance to the customers. In these sectors, a special regulatory authority
is sufficient to prevent abusive pricing of the quasi-monopolist and ensure the openness of
the market for new entrants.969
As shown, legal control to some extent is essential to guarantee media plurality.97o How-
ever, there are many ways, to maintain and guarantee competition in the press sector,
such as the enactment of specific turnover thresholds for publishing houses, as under
German law. Other approaches differing from both the German and South African system
also seem to be successful. For instance, the concept of a specialized authority, which
intervenes in cases of media mergers on public interest grounds, as it exists in the United
Kingdom in form of the Otcom."" will have to be taken into account as a possible option.
According to this approach control of the regulation exercised by the 'common' authorities,
like the Competition Commission or the Bundeskartellamt, rather than regulations itself
seems to be the best approach. Some mergers have to be prohibited from a purely eco-
nomic point of view, but public interest grounds demand a different decision exercised by
application of the Sherman Act, here provides powerful reasons to the contrary. That Amendment rests on
the assumption that the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources
is essential to the welfare of the public, that a free press is a condition of a free society. Surely a command
that the government itself shall not impede the free flow of ideas does not afford non-governmental combina-
tions a refuge if they impose restraints upon that constitutionally guaranteed freedom. Freedom to publish
means freedom for all and not for some. Freedom to publish is guarantted by the Constitution, but freedom
to combine to keep others from publishing is not. Freedom of the press from governmental interference un-
der the First Amendment does not sanction repression of that freedom by private interests.'
967 For the present South African efforts to liberate the telecommunication sector and end the monopoly of
Telkom, see Masango 'Deregulation won't do much for residential consumers' Business Report (2005-01-25)
2. See also South Africa Yearbook 2004/5,130-132.
968 The German Telecommunication Act (Telekommunikationsgesetz (TKG)), for instance, primarily intends
to guarantee the safeguarding of the consumers' interests by maintaining stable prices, but also the privacy
of transmitted content, a national wide functioning infrastructure, due frequency allocation to capable tele-
communication providers and so forth, see § 2 II TKG. Mathias Kuth, president of the German Regulation
Authority for Telecommunication and Postal Services (Regulierungsbehórde tur Telekommunikation und
Post (RegTP)), maintains that regulation can ensure low prices and quality of services at the same time, see
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 'Nur Monopolisten kannen Kosten an Kunden durchreichen' (2005-01-05) 13.
969 Under German law, the RegTP (now called Bundesnetzagentur tor ElektriziUit, Gas, Telekommunikation,
Post und Eisenbahnen) is even empowered to set (consumer end-)prices in certain cases.
970 See for instance the discussion about regulating media on a European level: Smith 'Rethinking European
Union competence in the field of media ownership: the internal market, fundamental rights and European
citizenship' (2004), 29 E.L.Rev. Oct, 652-672.
971 See 3 2 supra.
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an independent body. Again, governmental intervention for political reasons must be
avoided, and independence of such a body, preferably consisting of a panel of media ex-
perts, would have to be guaranteed.
Another approach is the regulation of the media industry as a whole. The enactment of
cross-ownership provision, as in the United Kingdom, is necessary for comprehensive pre-
vention of 'opinion monopolies'. In the UK, the Communications Act972provides in Sched-
ule 14 for special 'Media Ownership Rules'. According to section 1 of this schedule, any
person that runs a national newspaper, or national newspapers, which for the time being
together have a national market share of 20% or more, is not allowed to hold a national
broadcasting licence.973 Likewise, similar restrictions apply as far as regional broadcasting
licences are concerned, if the person runs a local newspaper with a local market share of
20% or more in the coverage area of the service, or if he or she runs local newspapers,
which for the time being together have a local market share of 20% or more in that cover-
age area. Moreover, according to section 2, proprietors of newspapers with a market share
of 20% or more may only restrictively participate in a body corporate, which is the holder of
a broadcasting licence. The same restrictions apply for the participation in newspapers for
broadcasting licence holders. A similar approach to local and national markets can be ob-
served in the United States, where cross-ownership rules prevent media enterprises from
buying a broadcasting company, if they already own a newspaper in the respective cover-
age area. Even though the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) suggested in
2003 that liberal rules be enacted,974 the US-government has not amended the existing
law yet.975Germany does not have such provisions on a national level.976This situation
makes it difficult to control acquisitions in the broadcasting sector by publishers. Competi-
tion authorities generally only examine the economic effects on each market separately, 977
972 UK Communications Act 2003, available at: http://www.legislation.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts2003/
20030021.htm.
973 'Licence to provide a Channel 3 service'.
974 Federal Communications Commission Media Ownership Policy Reexamination, available at:
http://www.fcc.gov/ownership/.
975 See also the criticism of Moore 'Double crossed: Why the newspaper/broadcast cross-ownership ban
remains necessary in the public interest' (2004), 88 Minn. L. Rev. 1697-1730.
976 Only on a regional level, the Lander enacted provisions to prevent big publishers from contolling broad-
casting stations. In Hamburg for instance, the regional Media Law ('Hamburgisches Mediengesetz
(HmbMedienG)' geandert durch das Gesetz zur Neuordnung des Hamburgischen Medienrechts v. 2 Juli
2003, HmbGVBI. Nr. 28, Seite 209) prescribes in § 19 II that only under certain conditions a broadcasting
licence may be granted to persons, who have a market-dominant position on the market for daily-distributed
newspapers in Hamburg.
977 The Bundeskartellamt even regards the advertisement markets in the newspaper and broadcasting sector
separately; for an exception concerning the assessment of cross-media effects see 2 3 6 2 3 supra.
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and cannot take into account that merging firms may gain eminent 'opinion power' in the
media sector. The discussion about the recently announced acquisition of the ProSieben-
Sat.1 Media AG by the Axel Springer AG illustrates this problern.?"
In the United States, the Newspaper Preservation Act (NPA)979was established to main-
tain press plurality. This law was enacted in an attempt to keep newspapers from failing,
especially if it would leave only one daily paper in a market and '[i]n the public interest of
maintaining a newspaper press editorially and reportorially independent and competitive in
all parts of the United States,.980The law creates a limited antitrust exemption, by allowing
the creation of Joint Operating Arrangements (JOA)981by newspapers after applying for it
with the Attorney General. The latter grants such exemption in situations where he or she
finds that 'not more than one of the newspaper publications involved in the arrangement is
a publication other than a failing newspaper, and that approval of such arrangement would
effectuate the policy and purpose of this chapter.'982 This antitrust exemption is limited in
many respects, though. Firstly, mergers between newspapers are expressly not embraced
by the Act.983Moreover, the Act provides for strict conditions. For instance, there has to be
a 'failing newspaper,' meaning that a newspaper publication is 'in probable danger of fi-
nancial failure'. 984
4 2 4 Conclusion
The different approaches in other countries show, that the regulation of the press, through
competition law, is mostly regarded as crucial, to the maintainance of press plurality. The
diversity of approaches and the discussion about the amendment of the GWB, however,
show that there are a variety of models for approaching this problem.
978 See already 2362 1 supra. Yet, 'cross-media-effects' should be part of press merger assessments.
979 Newspaper Preservation Act of 1970, Title 15, Chapter 43 of the U.S. Code, available at:
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/casecode/uscodes/15/chapters/43/sections/section 1801. htm I.
980 § 1801.
981 Such JOAs are defined by § 1802(2) as 'any contract, agreement, joint venture (whether or not incorpo-
rated), or other arrangement entered into by two or more newspaper owners for the publication of two or
more newspaper publications, pursuant to which joint or common production facilities are established or
operated and joint or unified action is taken or agreed to be taken with respect to anyone or more of the
following: printing; time, method, and field of publication; allocation of production facilities; distribution; adver-
tising solicitation; circulation solicitation; business department; establishment of advertising rates; establish-
ment of circulation rates and revenue distribution: Provided, That there is no merger, combination, or amal-
~amation of editorial or reportorial staffs, and that editorial policies be independently determined.'.
82 § 1803(b).
983 See § 1802(2) last sentence (footnote 981 of this thesis supra).
984 § 1802(5). For further references on the NPA see http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/links/exempt.cfm.
167
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Chapter 4 - Discussion and Conclusion
South African competition authorities primarily adjudicate upon mergers on competition
grounds. This approach is, generally speaking, commendable also for cases of mergers
between newspaper publishers. Nevertheless, the specialties of the case and the specific
role of the press in a democratic society should always be taken into account, particularly
in view of the lack of special provisions in the Competition Act guaranteeing press plurality.
The most recent case of the Competition Tribunal in the newspaper sector, the merger
between Johnnic Publishing and NAP,985nevertheless, raises serious concerns about the
absence of special provisions for the control of newspaper mergers. In this case, the Tri-
bunal considered under public interest issues, the concerns of the Freedom of Expression
Institute (FXI)986that the merger would result in a loss of one of the independent voices in
the print media. The Tribunal, however, was not willing to prohibit the merger simply to
ensure that the number of newspapers is not reduced. It stated that causality between the
transaction and the diminution of the 'plurality of voices' has to be shown.
From the Tribunal's point of view, the decision could not have been different. The Competi-
tion Act does not recognise press-specific criteria that have to be considered in determin-
ing the competitive effects of a media merger. In this respect, South African law does not
differ from other legal systems, such as Germany. For the most part, competition authori-
ties assess mergers between newspaper companies exactly like mergers in other indus-
trial sectors.
In South African Competition Law, unlike in Germany, there are also no special thresholds
for press companies. Indeed, s 13 of the South African Competition Act, at least, has the
advantage, of allowing the Commission the flexibility to assess small (newspaper) merg-
ers, even though they are a priori not notifiable. However, this section has not played an
important role in mergers between newspaper enterprises so far and it will cause uncer-
tainty for firms that are required to notify in terms of it.
Futhermore the Competition Act does not recognise a media-specific public interest excep-
tion. The authorities are not allowed to balance results purely based on competition
985 Johnnie Publishing Ltd / New Africa Publications (CT 36/LM/Apr04), see 1 5356 supra.
986 See http://www.fxi.org.za.
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against the need to maintain press plurality, as is the case in the United Kingdom. External
intervention on public interest grounds for the media sector is not provided for in the Com-
petition Act. 987
The public interest aspects under South African Competition Law in section 12A(3) are, as
shown above,988 aimed at different goals, and the competition authorities are reluctant to
alter a decision reached on competition grounds, with reference to the public interest.
There has been no case, in which competition authorities has prohibited a merger, which
was sound on competition issues, only on public interest grounds.989 In contrast, the Com-
petition Appeals Court implied in the Schumann Sasol/ Price's Daelite case,990that public
interest factors should not prevent a merger if there are no competition policy reasons to
do so. After rejecting the Tribunal's conclusions about competitive effects, the court found
it unnecessary to consider whether public interest factors were relevant. Against this back-
ground, it is unlikely that the competition authorities would prohibit a merger between two
newspaper companies only to maintain press plurality. The only public interest ground,
that would give the Tribunal the opportunity to 'create' a press-specific law by expansive
interpretation of the Act concerns the effect of the merger on 'a particular industrial sector
or region,'991 has not been called on so far, even though public interest considerations are
in general recognised as essential in the consideration of mergers.992
The conservatism of competition authorities is understandable to some extent, for the Act
sets high hurdles. Public interests have to 'outweigh' competition aspects. Hence it may be
necessary to consider the (controversial)993 idea of creating an independent authority that
987 See 1 5 1 2 6 supra.
988 See 1 5 1 2 6 supra.
989 The Tribunal recognises such possibility, though, see for instance recently Harmony Gold Mining Com-
~any Ltd / Gold Fields Ltd (CT 93/LM/NOV04) par 56. See also 1 5 1 26 supra.
90 Schumann Sasol (South Africa) (Pty) Ltd and Price's Daelite (Pty) Ltd (10/CAC/Aug01).
991 S 12A(3)(a).
992 According to Lewis it is 'wholly appropriate that they be incorporated into a merger evaluation' (Lewis
'Competition Policy in South Africa - Where has it come from and where is it going?' (2002), speech to In-
vestment Analysts' Society of South Africa, 16th May 2002, Johannesburg, available at:
http://www.comptrib.co.za/Publications/Speeches/IAS%20speech.htm).
993 Lewis, for instances, strongly opposes the idea of allowing a political authority like a Minister to veto on
public interest grounds the decision taken by a competition authority on competition grounds, stating that 'lilt
certainly invites massive lobbying.' (Lewis 'Competition Policy in South Africa - Where has it come from and
where is it going?' (2002), speech to Investment Analysts' Society of South Africa, 16th May 2002, Johan-
nesburg, available at: http://www.comptrib.co.za/Publications/Speeches/IAS%20speech.htm).
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will be able to intervene on public interest grounds in press mergers as the Tribunal is ob-
viously not willing to take a much needed pro-active stance.994
Moreover, the competition authorities assess only the specific impacts on competition of
every single merger on the single market(s) concerned. This is problematic, when it comes
to the highly concentrated structure of the South African press markets. In the case John-
nie Publishing / NAP, Johnnic's stake in its associated firm CPT, which publishes the
newspaper The Citizen, was not a substantial part of the competition authorities' merger
assessment. The Tribunal relied on the findings of the Commission, 'having found that
Johncom does not have a controlling stake in CTP.'995The Tribunal did not analyse this
involvement any further, even though it ought to have led to further scrutiny of concentra-
tion patterns in the market for nationally published daily-distributed newspapers.
In South Africa, the new Competition Act is still in an early stage of implementation. So far
competition authorities have not concerned themselves much with the specialities of media
mergers. Time will tell, whether an amendment of the Act is necessary to ensure special
consideration of such mergers. It will have to be discerned, whether special provisions for
media (and notably newspaper) mergers are necessary to maintain a degree of pluralism
in this sector. As the Competition Appeal Court996pointed out, 'the Act is [... ] a broad one,
designed to cater to the needs of all sectors of commerce, and not industry specific. It is a
springboard that could possibly give rise to future, more industry specific legislation.' Nev-
ertheless, either a special interpretation of the Act as far as media mergers are concerned
- or amendment of the Act will be necessary to cater for media mergers. Bearing in mind
the consequences for the young South African democracy, both legislature and competi-
tion authorities should be encouraged to take into account the necessity of the protection
of a free, but above all a competitive press.
994 See the very cautious approach in the decisions cited under 1 5 1 2 6 supra.
995 Johnnie Publishing Ltd / New Africa Publications (CT 36/LM/Apr04) par 10.
996 Association of Shipping Lines v The Competition Commission of South Africa (22/CAC/Sep02) par 17,
denying a special status of the maritime industry under the Act.
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63 Germany
BGH, BGHZ 59, 76 ft.
BGH, NJW 1997, 1148 f.
BGH, WuW/E BGH 879 ft. - Dispositionsrecht
BGH, WuW/E BGH 1445 ff. - Valium
BGH, WuW/E BGH 1501 ft. - Kfz-Kupplungen
BGH, WuW/E BGH 1655 ft. - Zementmahlanlage 1/
BGH, WuW/E BGH 1685 ft. - Springer/Elbe-Wochenblatt
BGH, WuW/E BGH 1854 ft. - Zeitungsmarkt Munchen
BGH, WuW/E BGH 1905 ft. - Munchner Anzeigenblatter
BGH, WuW/E BGH 2112 ft. - Gruner + Jahr/Zeit I
BGH, WuW/E BGH 2150 ft. - Edelstahlbestecke
BGH, WuW/E BGH 2425 ft. - Niederrheinische Anzeigenblatter
BGH, WuW/E BGH 2433 ft. - Gruner + Jahr/Zeit 1/
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BGH, WuW/E BGH 2443 ft. - SOdkurier/Singener Wochenblatt
BGH, WuW/E BGH 2731 ft. - Inlandstochter
BGH, WuW/E BGH 2783 ft. - Warenzeichenerwerb
BGH, WuW/E BGH 3026 ft. - Backofenmarkt
BGH, WuW/E DE-R 399 ft. - Verbundnetz
BGH, WuW/E DE-R 609 ft. - ASV/Sti/ke
BGH, WuW/E DE-R 613 ft. - Treuhanderwerb
BGH, WuW/E Verg 297 ft. - Tariftreueerklarung 1/
BKartA, decision of 12.04.2000, B 6 - 20/00 - SOdkurier/'akzent'
BKartA, decision of 22.08.2001, B 6 - 56/01 - SV-C/WEKA
BKartA, decision of 10.12.2002, B 6 - 22121 - U - 98/02 - Holtzbrinck/Berliner Verlag/G+J I
BKartA, decision of 07.11.2003, B 6 - 121/03 - Holtzbrinck/Gerckens
BKartA, decision of 02.02.2004, B 6 - 22121 - U - 120/03 - Holtzbrinck/Berliner Verlag/G+J 1/
BKartA, decision of 02.03.2004, B 10 - 102103
BKartA, decision of 02.04.2004, B 6 - 22122 - Fb - 81/03 - KG WochenkurierlWM/LR Medienverlag
BKartA, decision of 04.05.2004, B 3 - 2450 - Fa - 154/03 - Colgate-Palmolive Company/Gaba Hol-
dingAG
BKartA, decision of 02.08.2004, B 6 - 026/04 - Gruner + Jahr/RBA
BKartA, decision of 03.08.2004, B 6 - 045/04 - Gruner + Jahr/RBA
BKartA, decision of 01.03.2005, B 6 - 22122 - Fb - 103/04 - SoW Verlag
BKartA, WuW/E 1709 ft. - Bertelsmann/Deutscher Verkehrsverlag
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BKartA, WuW/E DE-V 1 ft. - ASV/Stilke
BKartA, WuW/E DE-V 100 ft. - Stellenmarkt fur Deutschland GmbH
BKartA, WuW/E DE-V 209 ft.
BMWi, WuW/E 177 ff. - IBH/Wibau
BMWi, WuW/E 191 ft. - Daimler/MBB
BVerfG, BVerfGE 7,198 ft. - Luth
BVerfG, BVerfGE 10, 118 ft. - Berufsverbot
BVerfG, BVerfGE 12, 205 ft. - Deutschland-Fernsehen
BVerfG, BVerfGE 20, 162 ft. - Spiegel
BVerfG, BVerfGE 57, 295 ff. - FRAG
BVerfG, BVerfGE 73, 118 ft. - Niedersachsen
BVerfG, BVerfGE 77, 346 ft. - Pressegrosso
BVerfG, BVerfGE 90,60 ff. - Geoimrenutteil
BVerfG, BVerfGE 99, 185 ft.
BVerfG, WuW/E VG 307 f. - Munchner Anzeigenblatter
KG, WuW/E DE-R 270 ft. - ASV/Stilke
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Article 81 EC
1. The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market: all agreements between under-
takings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices which may affect trade be-
tween Member States and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of
competition within the common market, and in particular those which:
(a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading conditions;
(b) limit or control production, markets, technical development, or investment;
(c) share markets or sources of supply;
(d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing them
at a competitive disadvantage;
(e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of supplementary obliga-
tions which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject
of such contracts.
2. Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this article shall be automatically void.
3. The provisions of paragraph 1 may, however, be declared inapplicable in the case of:
- any agreement or category of agreements between undertakings,
- any decision or category of decisions by associations of undertakings,
- any concerted practice or category of concerted practices,
which contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting technical or eco-
nomic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit, and which does not:
(a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not indispensable to the attainment of
these objectives;
(b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a substantial part of
the products in question.'
Article 82 EC
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the common market or in a substantial
part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market in so far as it may affect trade between
Member States. Such abuse may, in particular, consist in:
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading conditions;
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of consumers;
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing
them at a competitive disadvantage;
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of supplementary obli-
gations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the sub-
ject of such contracts.
Article 83
1. The appropriate regulations or directives to give effect to the principles set out in Articles 81 and 82 shall
be laid down by the Council, acting by a qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission and after
consulting the European Parliament.
2. The regulations or directives referred to in paragraph 1 shall be designed in particular:
(a) to ensure compliance with the prohibitions laid down in Article 81 (1) and in Article 82 by making pro-
vision for fines and periodic penalty payments;
(b) to lay down detailed rules for the application of Article 81 (3), taking into account the need to ensure
effective supervision on the one hand, and to simplify administration to the greatest possible extent
on the other;
(c) to define, if need be, in the various branches of the economy, the scope of the provisions of Articles
81 and 82;
(d) to define the respective functions of the Commission and of the Court of Justice in applying the provi-
sions laid down in this paragraph;
(e) to determine the relationship between national laws and the provisions contained in this section or
adopted pursuant to this article.
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Erster Teil Wettbewerbsbeschrankungen
Erster Abschnitt Kartellvereinbarungen, KartelibeschlOsse und abgestimmtes Verhalten
§ 1 Kartellverbot
Vereinbarungen zwischen miteinander im Wettbewerb stehenden Unternehmen, BeschlGsse von
Unternehmensvereinigungen und aufeinander abgestimmte Verhaltensweisen, die eine Verhinderung,
Einschránkunq oder Vertálschunq des Wettbewerbs bezwecken oder bewirken, sind verboten.
§7 Sonstige Kartelle
(1) Vereinbarungen und BeschlGsse, die unter angemessener Beteiligung der Verbraucher an dem
entstehenden Gewinn zu einer Verbesserung der Entwicklung, Erzeugung, Verteilung, Beschaffung,
RGcknahme oder Entsorgung von Waren oder Dienstleistungen beitragen, kormen vom Verbot des § 1
freigestellt werden, wenn die Verbesserung von den beteiligten Unternehmen auf andere Weise nicht
erreicht werden kann, in einem angemessenen Verhaltnis zu der damit verbundenen
Wettbewerbsbeschrankung steht und die Wettbewerbsbeschrankung nicht zur Entstehung oder Verstarkung
einer marktbeherrschenden Stellung fOhrt.
(2) Vereinbarungen und BeschlGsse, die eine Rationalisierung wirtschaftlicher Vorqanqe durch
Spezialisierung oder auf andere Weise, den gemeinsamen Einkauf von Waren oder die gemeinsame
Beschaffung gewerblicher Leistungen oder die einheitliche Anwendung von Konditionen zum Gegenstand
haben, kormen nur nach § 2 Abs. 2 und den §§ 3 bis 5 vom Verbot des § 1 freigestellt werden.
§ 8 Ministererlaubnis
(1) Liegen die Voraussetzungen der §§ 2 bis 7 nicht vor, so kann der Bundesminister fur Wirtschaft und
Arbeit Vereinbarungen und BeschlGsse vom Verbot des § 1 freistellen, wenn ausnahmsweise die
Beschránkunq des Wettbewerbs aus Gberwiegenden GrOnden der Gesamtwirtschaft und des Gemeinwohls
notwendig ist.
(2) Besteht eine unmittelbare Gefahr fur den Bestand des Gberwiegenden Teils der Unternehmen eines
Wirtschaftszweiges, so ist die Freistellung nur zulássiq, wenn andere gesetzliche oder wirtschaftspolitische
MaBnahmen nicht oder nicht rechtzeitig getroffen werden kennen und die Beschránkunq des Wettbewerbs
geeignet ist, die Gefahr abzuwenden. Die Freistellung ist nur in besonders schwerwiegenden Einzelfallen
zulásslq.
§ 9 Anmeldung von Kartellen, Widerspruchsverfahren
(1) Vereinbarungen und BeschlGsse der in den §§ 2 bis 4 Abs. 1 bezeichneten Art sowie ihre Ánderungen
und Erganzungen bedGrfen zur Freistellung vom Verbot des § 1 der Anmeldung bei der Kartellbehërde. In
den Fallen des § 2 Abs. 1 ist der Anmeldung die Stellungnahme eines Rationalisierungsverbandes, in den
Fallen des § 2 Abs. 2 die der betroffenen Lieferanten und Abnehmer beizufGgen. Rationalisierungsverbande
im Sinne des Gesetzes sind Verbande, zu deren satzungsmaBigen Aufgaben es gehort, Normungsund
Typungsvorhaben durchzufOhren oder zu prGfen und dabei die Lieferanten und Abnehmer, die durch die
Vorhaben betroffen werden, in angemessener Weise zu beteiligen.
(2) Bei der Anmeldung sind anzugeben:
1. Firma oder sonstige Bezeichnung und Ort der Niederlassung oder Sitz der beteiligten Unternehmen;
2. Rechtsform und Anschrift des KartelIs;
3. Name und Anschrift der Person, die zur Vertretung bestellt (§ 13) oder sonstig bevollmáchtlqt ist, bei
juristischen Personen die gesetzliche Vertretung des KartelIs.
In der Anmeldung durten keine unrichtigen oder unvollstandigen Angaben gemacht oder benutzt werden, um
fur den Anmeldenden oder einen anderen eine Freistellung zu erschleichen oder die KartelibehOrde zu
veraniassen, in den Fallen der §§ 2 bis 4 Abs. 1 nicht zu widersprechen.
(3) Vereinbarungen und BeschlGsse der in den §§ 2 bis 4 Abs. 1 bezeichneten Art sind vom Verbot des § 1
freigestellt und werden wirksam, wenn die Kartellbehërde innerhalb einer Frist von drei Monaten seit
Eingang der Anmeldung nicht widerspricht. Die Kartellbehërde hat zu widersprechen, wenn die in den §§ 2
bis 4 Abs. 1 bezeichneten Voraussetzungen oder die nach Absatz 1 Satz 2 erforderlichen Stellungnahmen
nicht vorliegen. Die anmeldenden Unternehmen haben nachzuweisen, daB die in den §§ 2 bis 4 Abs. 1
bezeichneten Voraussetzungen und die nach Absatz 1 Satz 2 erforderlichen Stellungnahmen vorliegen.
Werden Ánderungen oder Erganzungen einer Vereinbarung oder eines Beschlusses der in den §§ 2 bis 4
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Abs. 1 bezeichneten Art angemeldet, durch die der Kreis der beteiligten Unternehmen nicht verandert und
die Vereinbarung oder der BeschluB nicht auf andere Waren oder Leistungen erstreckt wird, betragt die in
Satz 1 genannte Frist einen Monat.
(4) Vereinbarungen und BeschlOsse der in § 4 Abs. 2 bezeichneten Art sind von den beteiligten
Unternehmen bei der Kartellbeh6rde gemaB Satz 2 unverzOglich anzumelden. Die Anmeldung ist nur
wirksam, wenn die Satzung oder der Gesellschaftsvertrag beigefOgt ist, die Angaben nach Absatz 2 Nr. 1
und 2 enthalten sind und wenn die Anmeldung Ober den betroffenen Wirtschaftszweig, vorgesehene
institutionelle AusschOsse sowie die gegenwartigen Verrechnungs- und Auêenurnsátze der beteiligten
Unternehmen AufschluB gibt. Alle zwei Jahre seit Anmeldung sind der Kartellbeh6rde von den beteiligten
Unternehmen Ánderungen der in Satz 2 bezeichneten Angaben, der Satzung oder des
Gesellschaftsvertrages sowie des Kreises der beteiligten Unternehmen anzuzeigen.
(5) Die Beendigung oder Aufhebung der in den §§ 2 bis 4 genannten Vereinbarungen und BeschlOsse ist der
Kartellbeh6rde mitzuteilen.
§ 10 Freistellungsantrag, Erteilung der Freistellung
(1) Vereinbarungen und BeschlOsse der in den §§ 5 bis 8 bezeichneten Art k6nnen auf Antrag durch
VerfOgung der Kartellbeh6rde vom Verbot des § 1 freigestellt werden. Sie werden mit Bestandskraft der
VerfOgung wirksam. In den Fallen des § 8 ist dem Antrag eine Stellungnahme der betroffenen inlándischen
Erzeuger und Abnehmer beizufOgen, es sei denn, eine solche ist nicht zu erlangen.
(2) Sind die Voraussetzungen fOr eine Freistellung nach den §§ 5 bis 8 nicht erfOllt, lehnt die Kartellbeh6rde
den in Absatz 1 genannten Antrag durch VerfOgung ab.
(3) FOrAntraqe nach Absatz 1 Satz 1 gilt § 9 Abs. 2 und 5 entsprechend.
(4) Die Freistellung nach den §§ 5 bis 8 ist zu befristen. Die Frist soli in der Regel fOnf Jahre nicht
Oberschreiten. Die Freistellung kann mit Bedingungen und Auflagen verbunden werden.
(5) Die Freistellung kann auf Antrag verlangert werden, wenn die Voraussetzungen der §§ 5 bis 8 weiterhin
erfOlit sind. Die Verlánqerunq wird nur tur diejenigen beteiligten Unternehmen erteilt, die sich damit der
Kartellbeh6rde gegenOber schriftlich einverstanden erklárt haben; die Erklárunq muB von den einzelnen
Unternehmen selbst und kann erst drei Monate vor Ablauf der Freistellung abgegeben werden. Absatz 2 gilt
entsprechend.
Zweiter Abschnitt Vertikalvereinbarungen
§ 14 Verbot von Vereinbarungen Ober Preisgestaltung oder Geschiiftsbedingungen
Vereinbarungen zwischen Unternehmen Ober Waren oder gewerbliche Leistungen, die sich auf Markte
innerhalb des Geltungsbereichs dieses Gesetzes beziehen, sind verboten, soweit sie einen Beteiligten in der
Freiheit der Gestaltung von Preisen oder Geschaftsbedingungen bei solchen Vereinbarungen beschránken,
die er mit Dritten Ober die gelieferten Waren, Ober andere Waren oder Ober gewerbliche Leistungen schlieBt.
§ 15 Preisbindung bei Zeitungen und Zeitschriften
(1) § 14 gilt nicht, soweit ein Unternehmen, das Zeitungen oder Zeitschriften herstellt, die Abnehmer dieser
Erzeugnisse rechtlich oder wirtschaftlich bindet, bei der WeiterverauBerung bestimmte Preise zu vereinbaren
oder ihren Abnehmern die gleiche Bindung bis zur WeiterverauBerung an den letzten Verbraucher
aufzuerlegen. Zu Zeitungen und Zeitschriften záhlen auch Produkte, die Zeitungen oder Zeitschriften
reproduzieren oder substituieren und bei WOrdigung der Gesarntumstánde als Oberwiegend verlagstypisch
anzusehen sind, sowie kombinierte Produkte, bei denen eine Zeitung oder Zeitschrift im Vordergrund steht.
(2) Vereinbarungen der in Absatz 1 bezeichneten Art sind, soweit sie Preise und Preisbestandteile betreffen,
schriftlich abzufassen. Es genOgt, wenn die Beteiligten Urkunden unterzeichnen, die auf eine Preisliste oder
auf Preismitteilungen Bezug nehmen. § 126 Abs. 2 des BOrgerlichen Gesetzbuchs findet keine Anwendung.
(3) Das Bundeskartellamt kann von Amts wegen oder auf Antrag eines gebundenen Abnehmers die
Preisbindung fOr unwirksam erkláren und die Anwendung einer neuen, gleichartigen Preisbindung verbieten,
wenn 1. die Preisbindung miBbrauchlich gehandhabt wird oder 2. die Preisbindung oder ihre Verbindung mit
anderen Wettbewerbsbeschrankungen geeignet ist, die gebundenen Waren zu verteuern oder ein Sinken
ihrer Preise zu verhindern oder ihre Erzeugung oder ihren Absatz zu beschránken,
§ 16 MiBbrauchsaufsicht Ober AusschlieBlichkeitsbindungen
Die Kartellbeh6rde kann Vereinbarungen zwischen Unternehmen Ober Waren oder gewerbliche Leistungen
fur unwirksam erkláren und die Anwendung neuer, gleichartiger Bindungen verbieten, soweit sie einen
Beteiligten
1. in der Freiheit der Verwendung der gelieferten Waren, anderer Waren oder gewerblicher Leistungen
beschranken oder
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2. darin beschránken, andere Waren oder gewerbliche Leistungen von Dritten zu beziehen oder an
Dritte abzugeben, oder
3. darin beschránken, die gelieferten Waren an Dritte abzugeben, oder
4. verpflichten, Waren oder gewerbliche Leistungen abzunehmen, die weder sachlich noch
handelsOblich dazuqehëren,
und soweit durch das AusmaB solcher Beschrankungen der Wettbewerb auf dem Markt fOr diese oder
andere Waren oder gewerbliche Leistungen wesentlich beeintráchtlqt wird.
Dritter Abschnitt Marktbeherrschung, wettbewerbsbeschrankendes Verhalten
§ 19 MiBbrauch einer marktbeherrschenden Stellung
(1) Die miBbrauchliche Ausnutzung einer marktbeherrschenden Stellung durch ein oder mehrere
Unternehmen ist verboten.
(2) Ein Unternehmen ist marktbeherrschend, soweit es als Anbieter oder Nachfrager einer bestimmten Art
von Waren oder gewerblichen Leistungen
1. ohne Wettbewerber ist oder keinem wesentlichen Wettbewerb ausgesetzt ist oder
2. eine im Verhaltnis zu seinen Wettbewerbern Oberragende Marktstellung hat; hierbei sind
insbesondere sein Marktanteil, seine Finanzkraft, sein Zugang zu den Beschaffungs- oder
Absatzrnárkten, Verflechtungen mit anderen Unternehmen, rechtliche oder tatsëchliche Schranken
fOr den Marktzutritt anderer Unternehmen, der tatsachllche oder potentielle Wettbewerb durch
innerhalb oder auBerhalb des Geltungsbereichs dieses Gesetzes ansássiqe Unternehmen, die
Fahiqkeit, sein Angebot oder seine Nachfrage auf andere Waren oder gewerbliche Leistungen
umzustellen, sowie die Moglichkeit der Marktgegenseite, auf andere Unternehmen auszuweichen,
zu berOcksichtigen.
Zwei oder mehr Unternehmen sind marktbeherrschend, soweit zwischen ihnen tur eine bestimmte Art von
Waren oder gewerblichen Leistungen ein wesentlicher Wettbewerb nicht besteht und soweit sie in ihrer
Gesamtheit die Voraussetzungen des Satzes 1 erfOlien.
(3) Es wird vermutet, daB ein Unternehmen marktbeherrschend ist, wenn es einen Marktanteil von
mindestens einem Drittel hat. Eine Gesamtheit von Unternehmen gilt als marktbeherrschend, wenn sie
1. aus drei oder weniger Unternehmen besteht, die zusammen einen Marktanteil von 50 vom Hundert
erreichen, oder
2. aus fOnf oder weniger Unternehmen besteht, die zusammen einen Marktanteil von zwei Dritteln
erreichen,
es sei denn, die Unternehmen weisen nach, daB die Wettbewerbsbedingungen zwischen ihnen wesentlichen
Wettbewerb erwarten lassen oder die Gesamtheit der Unternehmen im Verhaltnis zu den Obrigen
Wettbewerbern keine Oberragende Marktstellung hat.
(4) Ein MiBbrauch liegt insbesondere vor, wenn ein marktbeherrschendes Unternehmen als Anbieter oder
Nachfrager einer bestimmten Art von Waren oder gewerblichen Leistungen
1. die Wettbewerbsmoglichkeiten anderer Unternehmen in einer fur den Wettbewerb auf dem Markt
erheblichen Weise ohne sachlich gerechtfertigten Grund beeintrachtigt;
2. Entgeite oder sonstige Gescháttsbedlnqunqen fordert, die von denjenigen abweichen, die sich bei
wirksamem Wettbewerb mit hoher Wahrscheinlichkeit ergeben wOrden; hierbei sind insbesondere
die Verhaltensweisen von Unternehmen auf vergleichbaren Markten mit wirksamem Wettbewerb zu
berOcksichtigen;
3. ungOnstigere Entgeite oder sonstige Gescháttsbedinqunqen fordert, als sie das marktbeherrschende
Unternehmen selbst auf vergleichbaren Markten von gleichartigen Abnehmern fordert, es sei denn,
daB der Unterschied sachlich gerechtfertigt ist;
4. sich weigert, einem anderen Unternehmen gegen angemessenes Entgeit Zugang zu den eigenen
Netzen oder anderen Infrastruktureinrichtungen zu gewahren, wenn es dem anderen Unternehmen
aus rechtlichen oder tatsáchfichen GrOnden ohne die Mitbenutzung nicht mëqlich ist, auf dem vor-
oder nachgelagerten Markt als Wettbewerber des marktbeherrschenden Unternehmens tatig zu
werden; dies gilt nicht, wenn das marktbeherrschende Unternehmen nachweist, daB die
Mitbenutzung aus betriebsbedingten oder sonstigen GrOnden nicht rnëqlich oder nicht zumutbar ist.
Siebenter Abschnitt ZusammenschluBkontrolle
§ 35 Geltungsbereich der ZusammenschluBkontrolle
(1) Die Vorschriften Ober die ZusammenschluBkontrolle finden Anwendung, wenn im letzten Gescháftsjahr
vor dem ZusammenschluB
1. die beteiligten Unternehmen insgesamt weltweit Urnsatzerlëse von mehr als 500 Millionen Euro und
2. mindestens ein beteiligtes Unternehmen im Inland Umsatzerlëse von mehr als 25 Millionen Euro
erzielt haben.
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(2) Absatz 1 gilt nicht,
1. soweit sich ein Unternehmen, das nicht im Sinne des § 36 Abs. 2 abhangig ist und im letzten
Gescháttsjahr weltweit Urnsatzerlëse von weniger als zehn Millionen Euro erzielt hat, mit einem
anderen Unternehmen zusammenschlieBt oder
2. soweit ein Markt betroffen ist, auf dem seit mindestens fOnf Jahren Waren oder gewerbliche
Leistungen angeboten werden und auf dem im letzten Kalenderjahr weniger als 15 Millionen Euro
umgesetzt wurden.
Soweit durch den ZusammenschluB der Wettbewerb beim Verlag, bei der Herstellung oder beim Vertrieb
von Zeitungen oder Zeitschriften oder deren Bestandteilen beschránkt wird, gilt nur Satz 1 Nr. 2.
(3) Die Vorschriften dieses Gesetzes finden keine Anwendung, soweit die Kommission der Europálschen
Gemeinschaften nach der Verordnung (EWG) Nr. 4064/89 des Rates vom 21. Dezember 1989 uber die
Kontrolle von Unternehmenszusammenschlussen in ihrer jeweils geitenden Fassung ausschlieBlich
zustándiq ist.
§ 36 Grundsatze fUr die Beurteilung von Zusammenschlussen
(1) Ein ZusammenschluB, von dem zu erwarten ist, daB er eine marktbeherrschende Stellung beqrundet
oder verstarkt, ist vom Bundeskartellamt zu untersagen, es sei denn, die beteiligten Unternehmen weisen
nach, daB durch den ZusammenschluB auch Verbesserungen der Wettbewerbsbedingungen eintreten und
daB diese Verbesserungen die Nachteile der Marktbeherrschung Oberwieqen.
(2) Ist ein beteiligtes Unternehmen ein abhánqiqes oder herrschendes Unternehmen im Sinne des § 17 des
Aktiengesetzes oder ein Konzernunternehmen im Sinne des § 18 des Aktiengesetzes, sind die so
verbundenen Unternehmen als einheitliches Unternehmen anzusehen. Wirken mehrere Unternehmen derart
zusammen, daB sie gemeinsam einen beherrschenden EinfluB auf ein anderes Unternehmen ausuben
kënnen, gilt jedes von ihnen als herrschendes.
(3) Steht einer Person oder Personenvereinigung, die nicht Unternehmen ist, die Mehrheitsbeteiligung an
einem Unternehmen zu, gilt sie als Unternehmen.
§ 37 ZusammenschluB
(1) Ein ZusammenschluB liegt in folgenden Fallen vor:
1. Erwerb des Vermogens eines anderen Unternehmens ganz oder zu einem wesentlichen Teil;
2. Erwerb der unmittelbaren oder mittelbaren Kontrolle durch ein oder mehrere Unternehmen uber die
Gesamtheit oder Teile eines oder mehrerer anderer Unternehmen. Die KontrolIe wird durch Rechte,
Vertrage oder andere Mittel beqrundet, die einzeln oder zusammen unter Berucksichtigung aller
tatsëchlichen und rechtlichen Urnstánde die Moglichkeit gewahren, einen bestimmenden EinfluB auf
die Tátiqkeit eines Unternehmens auszuëben, insbesondere durch
a) Eigentums- oder Nutzungsrechte an einer Gesamtheit oder an Teilen des Vermogens des
Unternehmens,
b) Rechte oder Vertráqe, die einen bestimmenden EinfluB auf die Zusammensetzung, die
Beratungen oder Beschlusse der Organe des Unternehmens qewáhren:
3. Erwerb von Anteilen an einem anderen Unternehmen, wenn die Anteile allein oder zusammen mit
sonstigen, dem Unternehmen bereits gehOrenden Anteilen
a) 50 vom Hundert oder
b) 25 vom Hundert
des Kapitals oder der Stimmrechte des anderen Unternehmens erreichen. Zu den Anteilen, die
dem Unternehmen gehoren, rechnen auch die Anteile, die einem anderen fOr Rechnung dieses
Unternehmens gehOren und, wenn der Inhaber des Unternehmens ein Einzelkaufmann ist, auch
die Anteile, die sonstiges Vermogen des Inhabers sind. Erwerben mehrere Unternehmen
gleichzeitig oder nacheinander Anteile im vorbezeichneten Umfang an einem anderen
Unternehmen, gilt dies hinsichtlich der Markte, auf denen das andere Unternehmen tátiq ist,
auch als ZusammenschluB der sich beteiligenden Unternehmen untereinander;
4. jede sonstige Verbindung von Unternehmen, auf Grund deren ein oder mehrere Unternehmen
unmittelbar oder mittelbar einen wettbewerblich erheblichen EinfluB auf ein anderes Unternehmen
auseben kënnen,
(2) Ein ZusammenschluB liegt auch dann vor, wenn die beteiligten Unternehmen bereits vorher
zusammengeschlossen waren, es sei denn, der ZusammenschluB fUhrt nicht zu einer wesentlichen
Verstarkung der bestehenden Unternehmensverbindung.
(3) Erwerben Kreditinstitute, Finanzinstitute oder Versicherungsunternehmen Anteile an einem anderen
Unternehmen zum Zwecke der VerauBerung, gilt dies nicht als ZusammenschluB, solange sie das
Stimmrecht aus den Anteilen nicht auseben und sofern die VerauBerung innerhalb eines Jahres erfolgt.
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Diese Frist kann vom Bundeskartellamt auf Antrag verlangert werden, wenn glaubhaft gemacht wird, daB die
VerauBerung innerhalb der Frist unzumutbar war.
§ 38 Berechnung der Umsatzerlose und der Marktanteile
(1) FOr die Ermittlung der Urnsatzenëse gilt § 277 Abs. 1 des Handelsgesetzbuchs. Urnsatzerlëse aus
Lieferungen und Leistungen zwischen verbundenen Unternehmen (lnnenurnsatzerlëse) sowie
Verbrauchsteuern bleiben auBer Betracht.
(2) FOr den Handel mit Waren sind nur drei Viertel der Umsatzerlëse in Ansatz zu bringen.
(3) FOr den Verlag, die Herstellung und den Vertrieb von Zeitungen, Zeitschriften und deren Bestandteilen,
die Herstellung, den Vertrieb und die Veranstaltung von Rundfunkprogrammen und den Absatz von
Rundfunkwerbezeiten ist das Zwanzigfache der Urnsatzerlëse in Ansatz zu bringen.
(4) An die Stelle der Umsatzerlëse tritt bei Kreditinstituten, Finanzinstituten und Bausparkassen der
Gesamtbetrag der in § 34 Abs. 2 Satz 1 Nr. 1 Buchstabe a bis eder Verordnung i.iber die Rechnungslegung
der Kreditinstitute vom 10. Februar 1992 (BGBI. I S. 203) genannten Ertrage abzi.iglich der Umsatzsteuer
und sonstiger direkt auf diese Ertrage erhobener Steuern. Bei Versicherungsunternehmen sind die
Pramieneinnahmen des letzten abgeschlossenen Geschaftsjahres maBgebend. Pramieneinnahmen sind die
Einnahmen aus dem Erst- und Ruckversicherunqsqescháft einschlieBlich der in Ri.ickdeckung gegebenen
Anteile.
(5) Beim Erwerb des Vermogens eines anderen Unternehmens ist fi.ir die Berechnung der Marktanteile und
der Urnsatzerlëse des Verauêerers nur auf den veráuêerten Vermogensteil abzustellen.
§ 39 Anmelde- und Anzeigepflicht
(1) Zusammenschli.isse sind vor dem Vollzug beim Bundeskartellamt gemaB den Absátzen 2 und 3
anzumelden.
(2) Zur Anmeldung sind verpflichtet:
1. die am ZusammenschluB beteiligten Unternehmen,
2. in den Fallen des § 37 Abs. 1 Nr. 1 und 3 auch der VerauBerer.
(3) In der Anmeldung ist die Form des Zusammenschlusses anzugeben. Die Anmeldung muB ferner Ober
jedes beteiligte Unternehmen folgende Angaben enthalten:
1. die Firma oder sonstige Bezeichnung und den Ort der Niederlassung oder den Sitz;
2. die Art des Gescháttsbetriebes:
3. die Urnsatzerlëse im Inland, in der Europáischen Union und weltweit; anstelle der Umsatzerlëse sind
bei Kreditinstituten, Finanzinstituten und Bausparkassen der Gesamtbetrag der Ertrage gemaB § 38
Abs. 4, bei Versicherungsunternehmen die Pramieneinnahmen anzugeben;
4. die Marktanteile einschlieBlich der Grundlagen fi.ir ihre Berechnung oder Schátzunq, wenn diese im
Geltungsbereich dieses Gesetzes oder in einem wesentlichen Teil desselben fOr die beteiligten
Unternehmen zusammen mindestens 20 vom Hundert erreichen;
5. beim Erwerb von Anteilen an einem anderen Unternehmen die Hëhe der erworbenen und der
insgesamt gehaltenen Beteiligung;
6. eine zustellungsbevollmachtigte Person im Inland, sofern sich der Sitz des Unternehmens nicht im
Geltungsbereich dieses Gesetzes befindet.
Ist ein beteiligtes Unternehmen ein verbundenes Unternehmen, sind die Angaben nach Satz 2 Nr. 1 und 2
auch Ober die verbundenen Unternehmen und die Angaben nach Satz 2 Nr. 3 und Nr. 4 i.iber jedes am
ZusammenschluB beteiligte Unternehmen und die mit ihm verbundenen Unternehmen insgesamt zu machen
sowie die Konzernbeziehungen, Abhangigkeits- und Beteillqunqsverháltnisse zwischen den verbundenen
Unternehmen mitzuteilen. In der Anmeldung di.irfen keine unrichtigen oder unvollstándiqen Angaben
gemacht oder benutzt werden, um die Kartellbehërde zu veraniassen, eine Untersagung nach § 36 Abs. 1
oder eine Mitteilung nach § 40 Abs. 1 zu unterlassen.
(4) Eine Anmeldung ist nicht erforderlich, wenn die Kommission der Europálschen Gemeinschaften einen
ZusammenschluB an das Bundeskartellamt verwiesen hat und dem Bundeskartellamt die nach Absatz 3
erforderlichen Angaben in deutscher Sprache vorliegen. Das Bundeskartellamt teilt den beteiligten
Unternehmen unverzi.iglich den Zeitpunkt des Eingangs der Verweisungsentscheidung mit.
(5) Das Bundeskartellamt kann von jedem beteiligten Unternehmen Auskunft i.iber Marktanteile
einschlieBlich der Grundlagen fOr die Berechnung oder Scnátzunq sowie Ober den Umsatzerlës bei einer
bestimmten Art von Waren oder gewerblichen Leistungen verlangen, den das Unternehmen im letzten
Geschaftsjahr vor dem ZusammenschluB erzielt hat.
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(6) Die beteiligten Unternehmen haben dem Bundeskartellamt den Vollzug des Zusammenschlusses
unverzOglich anzuzeigen.
§ 40 Verfahren der ZusammenschluBkontrolle
(1) Das Bundeskartellamt darf einen ZusammenschluB, der ihm angemeldet worden ist, nur untersagen,
wenn es den anmeldenden Unternehmen innerhalb einer Frist von einem Monat seit Eingang der
vollstandigen Anmeldung mitteilt, daB es in die PrOfung des Zusammenschlusses (HauptprOfverfahren)
eingetreten ist. Das HauptprOfverfahren soli eingeleitet werden, wenn eine weitere PrOfung des
Zusammenschlusses erforderlich ist.
(2) 1m HauptprOfverfahren entscheidet das Bundeskartellamt durch VerfOgung, ob der ZusammenschluB
untersagt oder freigegeben wird. Ergeht die VerfOgung nicht innerhalb einer Frist von vier Monaten seit
Eingang der vollstandigen Anmeldung, gilt der ZusammenschluB als freigegeben. Dies gilt nicht, wenn
1. die anmeldenden Unternehmen einer Ftistverlánqerunq zugestimmt haben,
2. das Bundeskartellamt wegen unrichtiger Angaben oder wegen einer nicht rechtzeitig erteilten
Auskunft nach § 39 Abs. 5 oder § 50 die Mitteilung nach Absatz 1 oder die Untersagung des
Zusammenschlusses unterlassen hat,
3. eine zustellungsbevollmachtigte Person im Inland entgegen § 39 Abs. 3 Satz 2 Nr. 6 nicht mehr
benannt ist.
(3) Die Freigabe kann mit Bedingungen und Auflagen verbunden werden. Diese durten sich nicht darauf
richten, die beteiligten Unternehmen einer laufenden Verhaltenskontrolle zu unterstellen. § 12 Abs. 2 Satz 1
Nr. 2 und 3 gilt entsprechend.
(4) Vor einer Untersagung ist den obersten Landesbehërden, in deren Gebiet die beteiligten Unternehmen
ihren Sitz haben, Gelegenheit zur Stellungnahme zu geben.
(5) Die Fristen nach den Absatzen 1 und 2 Satz 2 beginnen in den Fallen des § 39 Abs. 4 Satz 1 mit dem
Eingang der Verweisungsentscheidung beim Bundeskartellamt.
(6) Wird eine Freigabe des Bundeskartellamts durch gerichtlichen BeschluB rechtskraftig ganz oder teilweise
aufgehoben, beginnt die Frist nach Absatz 2 Satz 2 mit Eintritt der Rechtskraft von neuem.
§ 41 Vollzugsverbot, Entflechtung
(1) Die Unternehmen durten einen ZusammenschluB, der vom Bundeskartellamt nicht freigegeben ist, nicht
vor Ablauf der Fristen nach § 40 Abs. 1 Satz 1 und Abs. 2 Satz 2 vollziehen oder am Vollzug dieses
Zusammenschlusses mitwirken. Rechtsgeschafte, die gegen dieses Verbot verstoBen, sind unwirksam. Dies
gilt nicht tur Vertrage Ober die Umwandlung, Eingliederung oder GrOndung eines Unternehmens und fOr
Unternehmensvertrage im Sinne der §§ 291 und 292 des Aktiengesetzes, sobald sie durch Eintragung in
das zustándiqe Register rechtswirksam geworden sind.
(2) Das Bundeskartellamt kann auf Antrag Befreiungen vom Vollzugsverbot erteilen, wenn die beteiligten
Unternehmen hierfOr wichtige GrOnde geitend machen, insbesondere um schweren Schaden von einem
beteiligten Unternehmen oder von Dritten abzuwenden. Die Befreiung kann jederzeit, auch vor der
Anmeldung, erteilt und mit Bedingungen und Auflagen verbunden werden. § 12 Abs. 2 Satz 1 Nr. 2 und 3 gilt
entsprechend.
(3) Ein vollzogener ZusammenschluB, den das Bundeskartellamt untersagt oder dessen Freigabe es
widerrufen hat, ist autzutësen, wenn nicht der Bundesminister tur Wirtschaft und Arbeit nach § 42 die
Erlaubnis zu dem ZusammenschluB erteilt. Das Bundeskartellamt ordnet die zur Auflësunq des
Zusammenschlusses erforderlichen MaBnahmen an. Die Wettbewerbsbeschrankung kann auch auf andere
Weise als durch Wiederherstellung des truheren Zustands beseitigt werden.
(4) Zur Durchsetzung seiner Anordnung kann das Bundeskartellamt insbesondere
1. einmalig oder mehrfach ein Zwangsgeld von fOnftausend bis fOnfhunderttausend Euro festsetzen,
2. die AusObung des Stimmrechts aus Anteilen an einem beteiligten Unternehmen, die einem anderen
beteiligten Unternehmen gehoren oder ihm zuzurechnen sind, untersagen oder einschránken,
3. einen Treuhánder bestellen, der die Autlësunq des Zusammenschlusses herbeifOhrt.
§ 42 Ministererlaubnis
(1) Der Bundesminister fUr Wirtschaft und Arbeit erteilt auf Antrag die Erlaubnis zu einem vom
Bundeskartellamt untersagten ZusammenschluB, wenn im Einzelfall die Wettbewerbsbeschrankung von
gesamtwirtschaftlichen Vorteilen des Zusammenschlusses aufgewogen wird oder der ZusammenschluB
durch ein Oberragendes Interesse der Aligemeinheit gerechtfertigt ist. Hierbei ist auch die
Wettbewerbsfahigkeit der beteiligten Unternehmen auf Markten auBerhalb des Geltungsbereichs dieses
Gesetzes zu berOcksichtigen. Die Erlaubnis darf nur erteilt werden, wenn durch das AusmaB der
Wettbewerbsbeschrankung die marktwirtschaftliche Ordnung nicht gefahrdet wird.
(2) Die Erlaubnis kann mit Bedingungen und Auflagen verbunden werden. § 40 Abs. 3 gilt entsprechend.
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(3) Der Antrag ist innerhalb einer Frist von einem Monat seit Zustellung der Untersagung beim
Bundesministerium fOr Wirtschaft und Arbeit schriftlich zu stellen. Wird die Untersagung angefochten,
beginnt die Frist in dem Zeitpunkt, in dem die Untersagung unanfechtbar wird.
(4) Der Bundesminister fOr Wirtschaft und Arbeit soli Ober den Antrag innerhalb von vier Monaten
entscheiden. Vor der Entscheidung ist eine Stellungnahme der Monopolkommission einzuholen und den
obersten l.andesbehërden, in deren Gebiet die beteiligten Unternehmen ihren Sitz haben, Gelegenheit zur
Stellungnahme zu geben.
Achter Abschnitt Monopolkommission
§ 44 Aufgaben
(1) Die Monopolkommission erstellt alle zwei Jahre ein Gutachten, in dem sie den Stand und die absehbare
Entwicklung der Unternehmenskonzentration in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland beurteilt, die Anwendung
der Vorschriften Ober die ZusammenschluBkontrolle wOrdigt sowie zu sonstigen aktuellen
wettbewerbspolitischen Fragen Stellung nimmt. Das Gutachten soli die Verhaltnisse in den letzten beiden
abgeschlossenen Kalenderjahren einbeziehen und bis zum 30. Juni des darauffolgenden Jahres
abgeschlossen sein. Die Bundesregierung kann die Monopolkommission mit der Erstattung zusátzlicher
Gutachten beauftragen. DarOber hinaus kann die Monopolkommission nach ihrem Ermessen Gutachten
erstellen.
(2) Die Monopolkommission ist nur an den durch dieses Gesetz begrOndeten Auftrag gebunden und in ihrer
Tátiqkeit unabhánqiq. Vertritt eine Minderheit bei der Abfassung der Gutachten eine abweichende
Auffassung, so kann sie diese in dem Gutachten zum Ausdruck bringen.
(3) Die Monopolkommission leitet ihre Gutachten der Bundesregierung zu. Die Bundesregierung legt
Gutachten nach Absatz 1 Satz 1 den gesetzgebenden Korperschaften unverzOglich vor und nimmt zu ihnen
in angemessener Frist Stellung. Die Gutachten werden von der Monopolkommission verëttentlicht, Bei
Gutachten nach Absatz 1 Satz 1 erlolgt dies zu dem Zeitpunkt, zu dem sie von der Bundesregierung der
gesetzgebenden Korperschaft vorgelegt werden.
§ 45 Mitglieder
(1) Die Monopolkommission besteht aus fOnf Mitgliedern, die Ober besondere volkswirtschaftliche,
betriebswirtschaftliche, sozialpolitische, technologische oder wirtschaftsrechtliche Kenntnisse und
Erlahrungen verlOgen mussen, Die Monopolkommission wáhlt aus ihrer Mitte einen Vorsitzenden.
(2) Die Mitglieder der Monopolkommission werden auf Vorschlag der Bundesregierung ourch den
Bundesprasidenten fOr die Dauer von vier Jahren berufen. Wiederberufungen sind zulássiq. Die
Bundesregierung hërt die Mitglieder der Kommission an, bevor sie neue Mitglieder vorschláqt. Die Mitglieder
sind berechtigt, ihr Amt durch Erklárunq gegenOber dem Bundesprasidenten niederzulegen. Scheidet ein
Mitglied vorzeitig aus, so wird ein neues Mitglied fOr die Dauer der Amtszeit des ausgeschiedenen Mitglieds
berufen.
(3) Die Mitglieder der Monopolkommission durten weder der Regierung oder einer gesetzgebenden
Korperschaft des Bundes oder eines Landes noch dem ëftentllchen Dienst des Bundes, eines Landes oder
einer sonstigen juristischen Person des óftentllchen Rechts, es sei denn als Hochschullehrer oder als
Mitarbeiter eines wissenschaftlichen Instituts, angehOren. Ferner durten sie weder einen Wirtschaftsverband
noch eine
Arbeitgeber- oder Arbeitnehmerorganisation reprasentieren oder zu diesen in einem stándiqen Dienst- oder
Gescháttsbesorqunqsverháltnis stehen. Sie durten auch nicht wah rend des letzten Jahres vor der Berufung
zum Mitglied der Monopolkommission eine derartige Stellung innegehabt haben.
Zweiter Teil Kartellbeh6rden
Erster Abschnitt Allgemeine Vorschriften
§ 48 Zustandigkeit
(1) Kartellbehërden sind das Bundeskartellamt, das Bundesministerium fOr Wirtschaft und Arbeit und die
nach Landesrecht zustandigen obersten t.andesbehërden.
(2) Weist eine Vorschrift dieses Gesetzes eine Zustëndlqkelt nicht einer bestimmten Kartellbehërde zu, so
nimmt das Bundeskartellamt die in diesem Gesetz der Kartellbehërde Obertragenen Aufgaben und
Befugnisse wahr, wenn die Wirkung der Marktbeeinflussung oder des wettbewerbsbeschrankenden oder
diskriminierenden Verhaltens oder einer Wettbewerbsregel Ober das Gebiet eines Landes hinausreicht. In
206
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
8 Appendix II - Relevant Provisions of the GWB
allen Obrigen Fallen nimmt diese Aufgaben und Befugnisse die nach Landesrecht zustándiqe oberste
Landesbehërde wahr.
Zweiter Abschnitt Bundeskartellamt
§ 51 Sitz, Organisation
(1) Das Bundeskartellamt ist eine selbstandlqe Bundesoberbehërde mit dem Sitz in Bonn. Es gehort zum
Gescháftsbereich des Bundesministeriums fOrWirtschaft und Arbeit.
(2) Die Entscheidungen des Bundeskartellamts werden von den Beschlussabteilungen getroffen, die nach
Bestimmung des Bundesministeriums fOr Wirtschaft und Arbeit gebildet werden. 1m Obrigen regelt der
Prësident die Verteilung und den Gang der Geschafte des Bundeskartellamts durch eine Gescháftsordnunq:
sie bedarf der Bestatigung durch das Bundesministerium tur Wirtschaft und Arbeit.
(3) Die BeschluBabteilungen entscheiden in der Besetzung mit einem oder einer Vorsitzenden und zwei
Beisitzenden.
(4) Vorsitzende und Beisitzende der BeschluBabteilungen mussen Beamte auf Lebenszeit sein und die
Befahigung zum Richteramt oder zum hëheren Verwaltungsdienst haben.
(5) Die Mitglieder des Bundeskartellamts dOrfen weder ein Unternehmen innehaben oder leiten noch dOrfen
sie Mitglied des Vorstandes oder des Aufsichtsrates eines Unternehmens, eines KartelIs oder einer
Wirtschafts- oder Berufsvereinigung sein.
§ 53 Tatigkeitsbericht
(1) Das Bundeskartellamt verëttentlicht alle zwei Jahre einen Bericht Ober seine Tátiqkeit sowie Ober die
Lage und Entwicklung auf seinem Aufgabengebiet. In den Bericht sind die allgemeinen Weisungen des
Bundesministeriums fOr Wirtschaft und Arbeit nach § 52 aufzunehmen. Es verëftentlicht ferner fortiaufend
seine
Verwaltungsgrundsatze.
(2) Die Bundesregierung leitet den Bericht des Bundeskartellamts dem Bundestag unverzOglich mit ihrer
Stellungnahme zu.
Dritter Teil Verfahren
Erster Abschnitt Verwaltungssachen
I. Verfahren vor den Kartellbehorden
§ 54 Einleitung des Verfahrens, Beteiligte
(1) Die Kartelïbehërde leitet ein Verfahren von Amts wegen oder auf Antrag ein. Die Kartellbehërde kann auf
entsprechendes Ersuchen zum Schutz eines BeschwerdefOhrers ein Verfahren von Amts wegen einleiten.
(2) An dem Verfahren vor der Kartellbehërde sind beteiligt,
1. wer die Einleitung eines Verfahrens beantragt hat;
2. Kartelle, Unternehmen, Wirtschafts- oder Berufsvereinigungen, gegen die sich das Verfahren richtet;
3. Personen und Personenvereinigungen, deren Interessen durch die Entscheidung erheblich berOhrt
werden und die die KartelibehOrde auf ihren Antrag zu dem Verfahren beigeladen hat;
4. in den Fallen des § 37 Abs. 1 Nr. 1 oder 3 auch der VerauBerer.
(3) An Verfahren vor obersten t.andesbehërden ist auch das Bundeskartellamt beteiligt.
§ 56 Anhorung, mundllche Verhandlung
(1) Die Kartellbehërde hat den Beteiligten Gelegenheit zur Stellungnahme zu geben und sie auf Antrag eines
Beteiligten zu einer mOndlichen Verhandlung zu laden.
(2) Vertretern der von dem Verfahren berOhrten Wirtschaftskreise kann die Kartellbehërde in geeigneten
Fallen Gelegenheit zur Stellungnahme geben.
(3) In den Fallen des § 19 entscheidet die Kartellbehërde auf Grund ëttentlicher mOndlicher Verhandlung; mit
Einverstandnis der Beteiligten kann ohne mOndliche Verhandlung entschieden werden. Auf Antrag eines
Beteiligten oder von Amts wegen ist fOr die Verhandlung oder fOr einen Teil davon die Offentlichkeit
auszuschlieBen, wenn sie eine Getáhrdunq der óttentlichen Ordnung, insbesondere der Staatssicherheit,
oder die Getáhrdunq eines wichtigen Gescháfts- oder Betriebsgeheimnisses besorgen laBt. In den Fallen
des § 42 sind im Verfahren vor dem Bundesministerium fOr Wirtschaft und Arbeit die Sátze 1 und 2
entsprechend anzuwenden.
§ 57 Ermittlungen, Beweiserhebung
(1) Die Karteubehërde kann alle Ermittlungen fOhren und alle Beweise erheben, die erforderlich sind.
207
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
8 Appendix II - Relevant Provisions of the GWB
(2) FOr den Beweis durch Augenschein, Zeugen und Sachverstandige sind § 372 Abs. 1, §§ 376, 377, 378,
380 bis 387, 390, 395 bis 397, 398 Abs. 1, §§ 401, 402, 404, 404a, 406 bis 409, 411 bis 414 der
ZivilprozeBordnung sinnqernáê anzuwenden; Haft darf nicht verhangt werden. FOr die Entscheidung Ober die
Beschwerde ist das Oberlandesgericht zustëndiq,
(3) Ober die Zeugenaussage soli eine Niederschrift aufgenommen werden, die von dem ermittelnden
Mitglied der Kartellbehërde und, wenn ein Urkundsbeamter zugezogen ist, auch von diesem zu
unterschreiben ist. Die Niederschrift soli Ort und Tag der Verhandlung sowie die Namen der Mitwirkenden
und Beteiligten ersehen lassen.
(4) Die Niederschrift ist dem Zeugen zur Genehmigung vorzulesen oder zur eigenen Durchsicht vorzulegen.
Die erteilte Genehmigung ist zu vermerken und von dem Zeugen zu unterschreiben. Unterbleibt die
Unterschrift, so ist der Grund hierfOr anzugeben.
(5) Bei der Vernehmung von Sachverstandigen sind die Bestimmungen der Absátze 3 und 4 entsprechend
anzuwenden.
(6) Die Kartellbehërde kann das Amtsgericht um die Beeidigung von Zeugen ersuchen, wenn sie die
Beeidigung zur HerbeifUhrung einer wahrheitsgemaBen Aussage fUr notwendig erachtet. Ober die
Beeidigung entscheidet das Gericht.
§ 58 Beschlagnahme
(1) Die Kartellbehërde kann Gegenstande, die als Beweismittel fUr die Ermittlung von Bedeutung sein
kannen, beschlagnahmen. Die Beschlagnahme ist dem davon Betroffenen unverzOglich bekanntzumachen.
(2) Die Kartellbehërde hat binnen drei Tagen die richterliche Bestatigung des Amtsgerichts, in dessen Bezirk
die Beschlagnahme vorgenommen ist, nachzusuchen, wenn bei der Beschlagnahme weder der davon
Betroffene noch ein erwachsener Angehariger anwesend war oder wenn der Betroffene und im Faile seiner
Abwesenheit ein erwachsener Anqehëriqer des Betroffenen gegen die Beschlagnahme ausdrOcklich
Widerspruch erhoben hat.
(3) Der Betroffene kann gegen die Beschlagnahme jederzeit die richterliche Entscheidung nachsuchen.
HierOber ist er zu belehren. Ober den Antrag entscheidet das nach Absatz 2 zustándlqe Gericht.
(4) Gegen die richterliche Entscheidung ist die Beschwerde zulásslq. Die §§ 306 bis 310 und 311 a der
StrafprozeBordnung geiten entsprechend.
§ 59 Auskunftsverlangen
(1) Soweit es zur ErfOliung der in diesem Gesetz der Kartellbehërde Obertragenen Aufgaben erforderlich ist,
kann die Kartellbeh6rde
1. von Unternehmen und Vereinigungen von Unternehmen Auskunft Ober ihre wirtschaftlichen
Verhaltnisse sowie die Herausgabe von Unterlagen verlangen;
2. bei Unternehmen und Vereinigungen von Unternehmen innerhalb der Oblichen Gescháttszelten die
geschaftlichen Unterlagen einsehen und prOfen;
3. von Wirtschafts- und Berufsvereinigungen Auskunft Ober die Satzung, Ober die BeschlOsse sowie
Ober Anzahl und Namen der Mitglieder verlangen, fOr die die BeschlOsse bestimmt sind.
(2) Die Inhaber der Unternehmen und ihre Vertretung, bei juristischen Personen, Gesellschaften und nicht
rechtstáhlqen Vereinen die nach Gesetz oder Satzung zur Vertretung berufenen Personen sowie die gemaB
§ 13 Abs. 2 Satz 1 zur Vertretung bestellten Personen sind verpflichtet, die verlangten Unterlagen
herauszugeben, die verlangten AuskOnfte zu erteilen, die geschaftlichen Unterlagen zur Einsichtnahme und
PrOfung vorzulegen und die PrOfung dieser geschaftlichen Unterlagen sowie das Betreten von
Gescháttsráurnen und -grundstOcken zu dulden.
(3) Personen, die von der Kartellbehërde mit der Vornahme von PrOfungen beauftragt werden, dOrfen die
Háurne der Unternehmen und Vereinigungen von Unternehmen betreten. Das Grundrecht des Artikels 13
des Grundgesetzes wird insoweit einqeschránkt.
(4) Durchsuchungen kannen nur auf Anordnung des Amtsrichters, in dessen Bezirk die Durchsuchung
erfolgen soli, vorgenommen werden. Auf die Anfechtung dieser Anordnung finden die §§ 306 bis 310 und
311 a der StrafprozeBordnung entsprechende Anwendung. Bei Gefahr im Verzuge kannen die in Absatz 3
bezeichneten Personen wanrend der Gescháttszelt die erforderlichen Durchsuchungen ohne richterliche
Anordnung vornehmen. An Ort und Stelle ist eine Niederschrift Ober die Durchsuchung und ihr wesentliches
Ergebnis aufzunehmen, aus der sich, falls keine richterliche Anordnung ergangen ist, auch die Tatsachen
ergeben, die zur Annahme einer Gefahr im Verzuge gefUhrt haben.
(5) Zur Auskunft Verpflichtete kannen die Auskunft auf solche Fragen verweigern, deren Beantwortung sie
selbst oder Angeh6rige, die in § 383 Abs. 1 Nr. 1 bis 3 der ZivilprozeBordnung bezeichnet sind, der Gefahr
strafgerichtlicher Verfolgung oder eines Verfahrens nach dem Gesetz Ober Ordnungswidrigkeiten aussetzen
wOrde.
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(6) Das Bundesministerium fur Wirtschaft und Arbeit oder die oberste Landesbehërde fordern die Auskunft
durch schriftliche Einzalverfuqunq, das Bundeskartellamt fordert sie durch BeschluB an. Darin sind die
Rechtsgrundlage, der Gegenstand und der Zweck des Auskunftsverlangens anzugeben und eine
angemessene Frist zur Erteilung der Auskunft zu bestimmen.
(7) Das Bundesministerium fUr Wirtschaft und Arbeit oder die oberste LandesbehOrde ordnen die Prutunq
durch schriftliche Einzelverfuqunq, das Bundeskartellamt ordnet sie durch BeschluB mit Zustimmung des
Prasidenten an. In der Anordnung sind Zeitpunkt, Rechtsgrundlage, Gegenstand und Zweck der PrOfung
anzugeben.
II. Beschwerde
§ 63 Zulassigkeit, Zustandigkeit
(1) Gegen Vertuqunqen der Kartellbehërde ist die Beschwerde zulássiq. Sie kann auch auf neue Tatsachen
und Beweismittel gestUtzt werden.
(2) Die Beschwerde steht den am Verfahren vor der Kartellbehërde Beteiligten (§ 54 Abs. 2 und 3) zu.
(3) Die Beschwerde ist auch gegen die Unterlassung einer beantragten Verfugung der Kartellbehërde
zulássiq, auf deren Vornahme der Antragsteller ein Recht zu haben behauptet. Als Unterlassung gilt es
auch, wenn die Kartellbehërde den Antrag auf Vornahme der Verfugung ohne zureichenden Grund in
angemessener Frist nicht beschieden hat. Die Unterlassung ist dann einer Ablehnung gleichzuachten.
(4) Ober die Beschwerde entscheidet ausschlieBlich das fUr den Sitz der Kartellbehërde zustándlqe
Oberlandesgericht, in den Fallen der §§ 35 bis 42 ausschlieBlich das fUr den Sitz des Bundeskartellamts
zustanolqe Oberlandesgericht, und zwar auch dann, wenn sich die Beschwerde gegen eine Verfugung des
Bundesministeriums fUr Wirtschaft und Arbeit richtet. § 36 der Zivilprozessordnung gilt entsprechend.
IV. Gemeinsame Bestimmungen
§ 80 GebOhrenpflichtige Handlungen
(1) 1m Verfahren vor der Kartellbehërde werden Kosten (Gebuhren und Auslagen) zur Deckung des
Verwaltungsaufwandes erhoben. Gebuhrenptlichtiq sind (gebuhrenpflichtige Handlungen)
1. Anmeldungen nach § 9 Abs. 1, § 22 Abs. 4, § 28 Abs. 1 Satz 2, § 29 Abs. 3 oder 4, § 30 Abs. 1 Satz
2 in Verbindung mit Satz 1, § 39 Abs. 1 sowie nach § 8 Abs. 3 Satz 5 bis 7 des
Personenbeforderungsgesetzes und § 12 Abs. 7 des Aligemeinen Eisenbahngesetzes;
2. Amtshandlungen auf Grund der §§ 10, 12, 15 bis 18, 22 Abs. 6, § 23 Abs. 3, §§ 24, 26, 29, 32, 36,
40,41,42 und 60;
3. Erteilung von Abschriften aus den Akten der Kartellbehërde,
Daneben werden als Auslagen die Kosten der ëttentlichen Bekanntmachungen und die in entsprechender
Anwendung des Gesetzes uber die Entschadigung von Zeugen und Sachverstandigen zu zahlenden
Betrage erhoben. Auf die Gebuhr fUr die Untersagung eines Zusammenschlusses nach § 36 Abs. 1 sind die
Gebuhren fur die Anmeldung eines Zusammenschlusses nach § 39 Abs. 1 anzurechnen.
(2) Die Hëhe der Gebuhren bestimmt sich nach dem person ellen und sachlichen Aufwand der
Kartellbehërde unter Berucksichtigung der wirtschaftlichen Bedeutung, die der Gegenstand der
gebuhrenpflichtigen Handlung hat. Die Gebuhrensátze durfen jedoch nicht uberstelqen
1. 50.000 Euro in den Fallen der §§ 36,39,40,41 und 42;
2. 25.000 Euro in den Fallen der §§ 10, 29 Abs. 1 - auch in Verbindung mit Abs. 3 - und des § 32;
3. 7.500 Euro in den Fallen der §§ 9 und 29 Abs. 4;
4. 5.000 Euro in den Fallen des § 15 Abs. 3, der §§ 16, 17 Abs. 3, §§ 18, 22 Abs. 6, des § 23 Abs. 3, §
26 Abs. 1 und § 29 Abs. 2 - auch in Verbindung mit Abs. 3 -;
5. 2.500 Euro in den Fallen des § 28 Abs. 1 Satz 2 und § 30 Abs. 1 Satz 2;
6. 1.250 Euro in den Fallen des § 22 Abs. 4;
7. 250 Euro in den Fallen des § 8 Abs. 3 Satz 5 bis 7 des Personenbeforderungsgesetzes und § 12
Abs. 7 des Aligemeinen Eisenbahngesetzes;
8. 17,50 Euro fUr die Erteilung beglaubigter Abschriften (Absatz 1 Nr. 3);
9. a) in den Fallen des § 12 Abs. 2 den Betrag fur die Freistellung,
b) in den Fallen des § 12 Abs. 1 und § 29 Abs. 3 und 4 den Betrag fur die Anmeldung (Nr. 2 bis 5),
7.500 Euro fUr Vertuqunqen in bezug auf Vereinbarungen oder Beschtusse der in § 4 Abs. 2
bezeichneten Art und 250 Euro fUr Vertuqunqen in bezug auf Vereinbarungen oder Beschlusse der
in § 28 Abs. 1 bezeichneten Art,
c) im Faile des § 26 Abs. 4 den Betrag fur die Entscheidung nach § 26 Abs. 1 (Nr. 4),
d) in den Fallen des § 60 ein Funftel der Gebuhr in der Hauptsache.
Ist der personelle oder sachliche Aufwand der Kartellbehërde unter Berucksichtigung des wirtschaftlichen
Werts der gebuhrenpflichtigen Handlung im Einzelfall auBergewohnlich hoch, kann die Gebuhr bis auf das
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Doppelte erhëht werden. Aus Grunden der Billigkeit kann die unter Berucksichtigung der Sátze 1 bis 3
ermittelte Gebuhr bis auf ein Zehntel ermaBigt werden.
(3) Zur Abgeltung mehrfacher gleichartiger Amtshandlungen oder gleichartiger Anmeldungen desselben
Gebuhrenschuldners kennen Pauschqebuhrensátze, die den geringen Umfang des Verwaltungsaufwandes
berucksichtigen, vorgesehen werden.
(4) Gebuhren durfen nicht erhoben werden
1. fur rnundliche und schriftliche Auskuntte und Anregungen;
2. wenn sie bei richtiger Behandlung der Sache nicht entstanden wáren;
3. in den Fallen des § 42, wenn die vorangegangene Verfugung des Bundeskartellamts nach § 36 Abs.
1 aufgehoben worden ist.
(5) Wird ein Antrag zuruckgenommen, bevor daruber entschieden ist, so ist die Halfte der Gebuhr zu
entrichten. Das gleiche gilt, wenn eine Anmeldung innerhalb von drei Monaten nach Eingang bel der
Kartellbehërde zuruckgenommen wird.
(6) Kostenschuldner ist
1. in den Fallen des Absatzes 1 Satz 2 Nr. 1, wer eine Anmeldung eingereicht hat;
2. in den Fallen des Absatzes 1 Satz 2 Nr. 2, wer durch einen Antrag die Tátiqkeit der Kartellbehërde
veraniaBt hat, oder derjenige, gegen den eine Verfugung der Kartellbehërde ergangen ist;
3. in den Fallen des Absatzes 1 Satz 2 Nr. 3, wer die Herstellung der Abschriften veraniaBt hat.
Kostenschuldner ist auch, wer die Zahlung der Kosten durch eine vor der KartelibehOrde abgegebene oder
ihr mitgeteilte Erklárunq ubernornmsn hat oder wer tur die Kostenschuld eines anderen kraft Gesetzes
haftet. Mehrere Kostenschuldner haften als Gesamtschuldner.
(7) Der Anspruch auf Zahlung der Gebuhren verjáhrt in vier Jahren nach der Gebuhrentestsetzunq. Der
Anspruch auf Erstattung der Auslagen verjáhrt in vier Jahren nach ihrer Entstehung.
(8) Die Bundesregierung wird errnáchtiqt, durch Rechtsverordnung, die der Zustimmung des Bundesrates
bedarf, die Gebuhrensátze und die Erhebung der Gebuhren vom Kostenschuldner in Durchtuhrunq der
Vorschriften der Absátze 1 bis 6 sowie die Erstattung von Auslagen nach Absatz 1 Satz 3 zu regein. Sie
kann dabei auch Vorschriften uber die Kostenbefreiung von juristischen Personen des ëttentlichen Rechts,
uber die Verjáhrunq sowie uber die Kostenerhebung treffen.
(9) Durch Rechtsverordnung der Bundesregierung, die der Zustimmung des Bundesrates bedarf, wird das
Náhere uber die Erstattung der durch das Verfahren vor der Kartellbehërde entstehenden Kosten nach den
Grundsátzen des § 78 bestimmt.
Zweiter Abschnitt BuBgeldverfahren
§ 81 BuBgeldvorschriften
(1) Ordnungswidrig handelt, wer vorsátzlich oder tahrlassiq
1. einer Vorschrift der §§ 1, 14, 17 Abs. 1 Satz 1, auch in Verbindung mit §§ 18, 19 Abs. 1, § 20 Abs. 1,
auch in Verbindung mit Absatz 2 Satz 1, § 20 Abs. 3 Satz 1, auch in Verbindung mit Satz 2, § 20
Abs. 4 Satz 1 oder Abs. 6, §§ 21,22 Abs. 1 oder § 41 Abs. 1 Satz 1 uber die Verbote dort genannter
Vereinbarungen oder Vertrëqe. der miBbrauchlichen Ausnutzung einer marktbeherrschenden
Stellung, der Behinderung oder unterschiedlichen Behandlung von Unternehmen oder sonstigen
wettbewerbsbeschrankenden Verhaltens oder uber Empfehlungs- oder Vollzugsverbote
zuwiderhandelt,
2. entgegen § 9 Abs. 2 Satz 2, auch in Verbindung mit § 29 Abs. 3 Satz 1 oder Abs. 4, § 24 Abs. 4 Satz
3 oder § 39 Abs. 3 Satz 4 eine Angabe macht oder benutzt,
3. entgegen § 9 Abs. 4 Satz 1 oder § 28 Abs. 1 Satz 2 Vereinbarungen und Beschlïïsse nicht, nicht
richtig, nicht vollstándiq oder nicht rechtzeitig anmeldet,
4. entgegen § 9 Abs. 4 Satz 3 oder § 39 Abs. 6 eine Anzeige nicht, nicht richtig, nicht vollstándiq oder
nicht rechtzeitig erstattet,
5. einer vollziehbaren Auflage nach § 10 Abs. 4 Satz 3, § 12 Abs. 2 Satz 1, jeweils auch in Verbindung
mit § 17 Abs. 3 Satz 3, § 40 Abs. 3 Satz 1 oder § 42 Abs. 2 Satz 1 zuwiderhandelt,
6. einer vollziehbaren Anordnung nach
a) § 12 Abs. 1 Nr. 1, auch in Verbindung mit § 29 Abs. 4, § 15 Abs. 3, §§ 16, 22 Abs. 6, § 23
Abs. 3 Satz 1, §§ 32, 41 Abs. 4 Nr. 2 oder § 50 Abs. 2 Satz 2 oder
b) § 39 Abs. 5
zuwiderhandelt,
7. entgegen § 39 Abs. 1 Zusamrnenschlusse nicht, nicht richtig, nicht vollstándiq oder nicht rechtzeitig
anmeldet,
8. entgegen § 59 Abs. 2 eine Auskunft nicht, nicht richtig, nicht vollstándiq oder nicht rechtzeitig erteilt,
Unterlagen nicht, nicht vollstandlq oder nicht rechtzeitig herausgibt, geschaftliche Unterlagen nicht,
nicht vollstándiq oder nicht rechtzeitig zur Einsichtnahme und Prutunq vorlegt oder die Prufung
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dieser geschaftlichen Unterlagen sowie das Betreten von Geschëftsráumen und -grundsHicken nicht
duldet oder
9. einer einstweiligen Anordnuhg nach den §§ 60 oder 64 Abs. 3 oder einer Anordnung nach § 65
zuwiderhandelt.
(2) Die Ordnungswidrigkeit kann in den Fallen des Absatzes 1 Nr. 1, 2, 5, 6 Buchstabe a und Nr. 9 mit einer
GeldbuBe bis zu fOnfhundertlausend Euro, Ober diesen Betrag hinaus bis zur dreifachen H6he des durch die
Zuwiderhandlung erlangten Mehrerl6ses, in den Obrigen Fallen mit einer GeldbuBe bis zu
fOnfundzwanzigtausend Euro geahndet werden. Die H6he des Mehrerl6ses kann geschatzt werden.
(3) Die Veriëhrunq der Verfolgung von Ordnungswidrigkeiten nach Absatz 1 richtet sich nach den
Vorschriften des Gesetzes Ober Ordnungswidrigkeiten auch dann, wenn die Tat durch Verbreiten von
Druckschriften begangen wird. Die Verfolgung der Ordnungswidrigkeiten nach Absatz 1 Nr. 1 verjahrt in fOnf
Jahren.
(4) Verwaltungsbeh6rde im Sinne des § 36 Abs. 1 Nr. 1 des Gesetzes Ober Ordnungswidrigkeiten ist
1. die nach § 48 zustándiqe Beh6rde, soweit es sich um Ordnungswidrigkeiten nach Absatz 1 handelt,
2. das Bundeskartellamt, soweit es sich dabei um Verfahren nach § 50 handelt.
(5) Vereinbarungen und BeschlOsse der in § 1 bezeichneten Art, die nach § 9 angemeldet worden sind,
werden nicht als Ordnungswidrigkeit verfolgt, solange die Kartellbeh6rde nicht gemaB § 9 Abs. 3
widersprochen hat. Gleiches gilt fOr Vereinbarungen und BeschlOsse, fOr die ein Antrag nach § 10 gestellt
worden ist, solange die Kartellbeh6rde den Antrag nicht nach § 10 Abs. 2 abgelehnt hat.
Vierter Teil Vergabe ottentlicner Auftrage
FOnfter Teil Anwendungsbereich des Gesetzes
§ 130 Unternehmen der offentlichen Hand, Geltungsbereich
(1) Dieses Gesetz findet auch Anwendung auf Unternehmen, die ganz oder teilweise im Eigentum der
6ffentlichen Hand stehen oder die von ihr verwaltet oder betrieben werden. Die Vorschriften des Ersten bis
Dritten Teils dieses Gesetzes finden keine Anwendung auf die Deutsche Bundesbank und die Kreditanstalt
fOrWiederaufbau.
(2) Dieses Gesetz findet Anwendung auf alle Wettbewerbsbeschrankungen, die sich im Geltungsbereich
dieses Gesetzes auswirken, auch wenn sie auBerhalb des Geltungsbereichs dieses Gesetzes veraniaBt
werden.
(3) Die Vorschriften des Energiewirtschaftsgesetzes stehen der Anwendung der §§ 19 und 20 nicht
entgegen.
Sechster Teil Ubergangs- und Schlussbestimmungen
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